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In this dissertation, I argue that drone warfare suggests a style of violence that always-already 
transcends the vulnerabilities of the citizen-soldier, burdening the relationship of citizen soldiering to 
sacrificial cults and idioms. As an archetype of citizenship, the citizen-soldier normalizes a belief that 
soldiers’ actions in wartime reflect the highest echelon of sacrifice. I claim that military sacrifice 
ought to be imagined as a political, paradoxical effect of the contradictions inherent to the neoliberal 
restructuring of capitalism’s link to war. I advance a political-sociological approach to sacrifice by 
which to analyze the changing meaning of the status of the citizen-soldier archetype.  
 
Managing the paradox of sacrifice is a priority for Western liberal governments, who, being casualty-
averse, aim to reconcile sovereign and biopolitical modes of power by subjecting sacrifice to 
governing logic. Here, I reveal the paradoxical effects of a liberal state that is both casualty averse, 
and engaged in prolonged high technology warfare. The paradox is about how to maintain the 
ideological, sociopolitical, and militarized conditions to simultaneously demand and deny sacrifice 
through a complex circumnavigation of bodily politics. I argue that sacrifice is disrupted along three 
interrelated themes, which all hinge on the sovereign and symbolic power associated with the 
archetype of the citizen-soldier: publicity, surplus, and embodiment.  
 
Pivoting on these themes, drone violence gains credibility through a dialectic of visibility (the 
battlefield) and invisibility (the violence) by rendering that which was previously unseen, visible. 
However, the sociopolitical landscape in which drone warfare operates, and gains credibility, is 
dependent upon the invisibilization of interrelated processes—the politics of emotional trauma, the 
scene of sacred violence, and the identification of the witness. I conclude that the end of conscription, 
coupled with neoliberal flexible citizenship, has troubled the content of military sacrifice and its 
ability to act as a check on violence. Rather than liberal democracy’s promise of a decline in 
violence, drone warfare contributes to the expansion of more, increasingly invisible, and therefore 
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"In the right of sovereignty, death was the moment of the most obvious and most spectacular manifestation of the 
absolute power of the sovereign; death now becomes, in contrast, the moment when the individual escapes all 
power, falls back on himself and retreats, so to speak, into his own privacy. Power no longer recognizes death. 
Power literally ignores death" (Foucault, 2003:248).  
 
"Every act of identifying an enemy is fraught with risk, for if the populace fails to see that person or group 
as the enemy, it will see only murder, not sacrifice" (Kahn, 2011:156). 
 
 
Chapter One: The Rise of the Drone 
 
American Air Power Today 
On January 29th, 2017, just five days after newly elect U.S. President Donald Trump 
took office, a Special Forces raid on a village in rural Yemen, which had been approved over 
dinner with Trump’s inner circle, went terribly wrong. The covert counterterrorism operation had 
the purported goal of acquiring intelligence. This in and of itself is a curious statement 
considering that villagers described sheer chaos, reporting that people were attempting to flee the 
gun battle before helicopters opened fire and “shot at everything,” including homes and those 
fleeing (Al Sane & Shabibi, 2017). Having initially been conceived of—but, notably, ultimately 
not approved—under the Obama administration, the raid came on the heels of weeks of intense 
surveillance, rehearsals in nearby Djibouti by Navy SEALS, and the agreement that such a 
mission would have to be precise and well-practiced due to the makeup of the targeted Yemeni 
neighborhood. The neighbourhood was a heavily guarded one, made up of both civilian houses 
as well as militant bases. Lacking sufficient intelligence, ground support, and adequate backup 
preparations, interview data with unnamed military officials (what the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism calls “unprecedented briefings against its own administration”) reveals that the 
trouble started when their cover was blown.  
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Data gathered by New York Times and Reuters reporters suggests that the operation was 
off to a poor start when one of their aircraft carriers crash-landed, injuring three members of the 
troops. Further, “One thing after another went wrong from the start of the mission...the Special 
Forces were confronted by heavily-fortified positions, including landmines, and faced heavy 
gunfire from buildings all around during the fifty-minute firefight” (Ackerman, Burke & 
MacAskill, 2017). An eleven-year old, who was awoken by the commotion and went outside to 
investigate, was the first to be killed. 
Despite the killing of twenty-five civilians, including a three-month old baby who was 
asleep in her crib (totaling nine children under the age of thirteen), as well as the death of Navy 
SEAL Chief Petty Officer William “Ryan” Owens, and the destruction of a $70 million aircraft, 
Trump’s press secretary Sean Spicer called it a “successful operation by all standards.” Spicer 
claimed further, in a notably inelegant statement, that it “achieved the purpose it was going to get 
- save the loss of life that we suffered and the injuries that occurred. The goal of the raid was 
intelligence-gathering, and that’s what we received, and that’s what we got” (as cited in Al Sane 
& Shabibi, 2017). Apparently, what tipped the Yemeni villagers off was the presence of drones. 
Although a common feature of daily life—the sound of drones buzzing became a recognizable 
one—on that evening the drones were flying lower than usual. Indeed, “though U.S. boots have 
been on the ground in Yemen on and off since 2002, drones and manned jets lead the hunt for 
AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula]. More than 182 strikes have left 815 people dead, 
including 134 civilians” (Al Sane & Shabibi. 2017).  
Drones are symptomatic of a reconfiguration of the liberal way of war, shoring up what 
Talal Asad (2007) calls the contradictions at the heart of the liberal West’s culture of war, 
namely that states need to legitimize organized violence against a collective enemy (including 
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civilians) while also espousing the humanitarian desire to save human lives (p. 16). Drone 
warfare, therefore, which is composed of algorithmic calculations together with a model of 
robotized fighting, produces new meanings for concepts such as state and nationhood, sovereign 
power, and the place of ethics in global politics, while re-entrenching a bio-politics of who ought 
to live and who must die.  
Yemen is merely one example of a nation that has become the target of an expanding 
U.S.-led drone program. The first strike there was devastating: “Commanders thought they were 
targeting al Qaeda but instead hit a tribe with cluster munitions, killing 55 people. Twenty-one 
were children—10 of them under five. Twelve were women, five of them pregnant” (Purkiss & 
Serle, 2017). According to human rights organization Reprieve, in Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan, drones have executed, without trial, some 4,700 people (“America’s 
deadly drones programme,” n.d.). There were more strikes in Obama’s first year as President 
than there were in the entirety of President Bush’s time in office—a total of 563 strikes, largely 
by drones, were carried out during Obama’s two terms, as compared to a total of 57 strikes under 
Bush (Purkiss & Serle, 2017). This trend is reflective of what can now be described as the 
“Obama administration’s way of war” as a response to the Global War on Terror. Therein is a 
marked shift from costly ground wars to one focused on generating greater distance between the 
subject and object of violence, primarily through forms of manned and unmanned air power. 
Consider Afghanistan, where air attacks dramatically increased while Obama withdrew most 
troops at the end of 2014 (Bureau of Investigative Journalism). However, it should be noted that 
withdrawing U.S. troops does not imply the removal of all U.S. forces, i.e., private military 
personnel, and other advisors, who, although not wearing the markers of U.S. citizen-soldiers, 
nevertheless remain and operate on behalf of American interests. The key point here is that the 
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removal of certain bodies from a conflict zone does not correlate with a decline in militarized 
violence.  
A cursory glance at international politics shows that unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), colloquially termed “drones,” constitute a prolific presence 
globally. UAS are a pillar of the U.S.’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and 
their centrality is only increasing. By 2022, the global drone sector is expected to reach a market 
value of U.S. $82 billion (Medina, 2014) despite no consensus on how to govern the expansion 
of the industry and curtail the innumerable legal, moral, and political problems associated with 
the military applications of drones. The synchronistic efforts of the U.S. government, the 
Pentagon, arms manufacturers, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and private military/security 
corporations (PMCs)1 to develop and promote drones suggests a future of state violence that is 
always-already transcending the physical and socioeconomic vulnerabilities of the citizen-soldier 
(Baggiarini, 2015).  
In the asymmetrical yet perpetual Global War on Terror, whose architects are also 
explicitly casualty-averse (Mandel, 2004; Shimko, 2010), the privatization of militaries has 
served as a necessary but insufficient strategy in the quest for clean and bloodless war. UAS and 
related means of combat-unmanning extend that ongoing quest, delivering, according to their 
proponents, enhanced battlefield capabilities, greater situational awareness, greater ownership of 
                                                        
1 Private contractors are key partners in the CIA’s counterterrorism and drone assassination programs. The company 
formerly known as Blackwater is active in the assembly and loading of Hellfire missiles onto Predator aircraft, work 
formerly done by CIA personnel. Benjamin (2013, pp. 63-64) quotes war correspondent Jeremy Scahill, claiming, 
“it is Blackwater that runs the program for both the CIA and JSOC because contractors are not [overseen by 
Congress] so they just don’t care. If there’s one person they’re going after and there’s thirty-four people in the 
building, thirty-five people are going to die. That’s the mentality.” 
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data, surer dominance of the field, and, perhaps most importantly, more certain means of 
casualty-avoidance.   
Indeed, the globalization of drones reveals their proliferation in both political debates and 
public consciousness, but the gaze has now turned inward, toward the domestic sphere. The New 
York Police Department (NYPD) has reported that the number-one terror threat is drones armed 
with explosives, while the U.K.-based Remote Control Project similarly warns that drones can 
easily be equipped with bombs, and that the technology of remote control warfare will be 
impossible to control. Indeed, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) uses drones for 
surveillance and have weaponized them to engage a rapidly accelerating campaign of armed 
drone strikes in northern Iraq. In our post-9/11 world, states are not only strategizing about how 
best to apply military drones overseas, but also now must contend with how to defend against 
them “at home” and mitigate the dangerous effects of their expanded use worldwide. In the 
continuing maintenance of the good political life, drones are now integral to the question of the 
role and meaning of mortal violence, which is embedded in the concept of liberty, and lies at the 
core of the liberal doctrine (Asad, 2007, p. 59).2  
Returning now to the recent botched counterterrorism raid in Yemen. There is one part of 
the story yet to be told, which is of critical importance to this dissertation—that of the sole 
casualty on the U.S. side—the death of Navy SEAL William “Ryan” Owens. Consider some of 
the statements made by U.S. officials about his death following the raid. Donald Trump’s Press 
                                                        
2 Still, it is important not to fetishize or exaggerate the place of drone technology. The reality, at least for now, is 
that military operations will likely rely upon what is called, in military-speak, “manned-unmanned teaming” (MUM-
T), which combines the strength of each platform (manned and unmanned) to successfully complete a mission. “The 
teaming theory allows the man-in-the-loop to cover additional ground, complete additional actions, and 
communicate information and actions across the space quickly and efficiently. By adding the eyes and ears of UAS 
to their battlefield picture, pilots can grow the reach of their situational awareness and improve safety” (Iriarte, 
2016). A drone is thus thought to be just one tool at the war-fighter’s disposal, not a solution in and of itself. 
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Secretary and Communications Director, Sean Spicer, said the raid was “absolutely a success, 
and I think anyone who would suggest it’s not a success does disservice to the life of Chief 
[Petty Officer] Ryan Owens,” while a White House spokesperson, Michael Short, said of Ryan 
Owens that he was “an American hero who made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of his 
country.” An additional spokesperson, deputy press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders, said, “as 
a parent, I can’t imagine the loss that [Ryan's father- Bill Owens] has suffered. I think every 
American owes his son a great deal of gratitude. We are forever in his son’s debt. I know that he 
paid the ultimate sacrifice when he went on that mission” (Pengelly, 2017).  
However, not everyone shared in this positive reconstruction of events. Bill Owens 
refused to meet with the President upon the return of Ryan’s body to U.S. soil, claiming, “Trump 
should not hide behind my son’s death to prevent an investigation.” President Trump himself, in 
his first address to Congress on February 28, 2017, said of Ryan’s legacy that it would be 
“etched into eternity” (Davis, Sheer, and Baker, 2017). Still, Bill Owens dug in his heels and 
refused. In calling it a “stupid mission” he remarked, “For two years prior, there were no boots 
on the ground in Yemen—everything was missiles and drones—because there was not a target 
worth one American life. Now, all of a sudden we had to make this grand display” (Pengelly, 
2017). 
“A grand display”—the presence of U.S. troops as fleshy and vulnerable beings on the 
ground, as opposed to bodies made invisible, protected, and stationed in faraway trailers, as part 
of ostensibly “smart” missions that ought to preserve American life at all costs. Although “every 
war requires the making of human killing machines” (Asad, 2009, p. 27) the pervasiveness of 
casualty-aversion suggests that soldiers need not go to war expecting to die, but only to kill 
(Asad, 2009, p. 35). A grand display amounts to what in previous conflict zones would have 
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been considered normal: embodied, violent (albeit unplanned and/or undesired) encounters. Yet 
for Spicer and the other White House spokespeople, this loss of life paradoxically effects a 
normalization of the lethal violence, and enables the silencing of any criticism. By invoking the 
transcendental theme of sacrifice as that natural and glorified act which binds the nation-state to 
its citizen-soldiers (who bear its legitimate claim to violence) U.S. officials effectively 
depoliticized the violent event, rendering the death of Ryan—that which “we are all forever 
indebted to”—both acceptable and justified, and thereby rendering the raid, and the death of the 
combatants and the Yemeni civilians, also acceptable and justified.  
The myth of sacrifice was utilized in this (all too familiar) case to, as Bill Owens so 
acutely observed, “hide” the material, antagonistic politics of war’s oftentimes senseless, brutal, 
and unjustified violence. Sacrifice, then, offers a narrativized glue by which order can be applied 
in moments of violent disorder. In these narrativized disagreements, Ryan Owens emerges as a 
symbol in how nation-states paradoxically manage the meaning of life and death: 
[T]he indeterminate status of the recently dead is a source of great anxiety because death 
threatens the identity of the living to whom the deceased was bound. Proper words and 
gestures—even angry ones—are a means of responding appropriately to this threat. They 
serve—in the funerary rites and later—to incorporate death into the predictable continuity 
of a form of life and thereby to suppress the thought that it is life that is contingent. Thus, 
it is not the occurrence of death as such in which horror resides but the manner in which 
it occurs and how the dead body is dealt with by the living (Asad, 2007, p. 78). 
So, while to politically interrogate Ryan’s death by refusing the dominant political narrative, 
would be, according to the statements made by the White House representatives, to belittle the 
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life lost, to accept the death in silence would be to become complicit in what Achillé Mbembé 
calls “necropolitics”: the biopolitical ordering of life and death.   
As I will argue in this dissertation, the archetype of the citizen-soldier, that which 
emerged within the tradition of democratic republicanism, is integral to the politics and 
narrativization of sacrifice. For sacrifice to be cognitively and emotionally legible today in the 
context of (increasingly unjustifiable) war making, it must not only convey “proper words and 
gestures” such that the living might make peace with the death in question, but it must also hinge 
on the deployment of a robust conception, normalization, and acceptance of the archetype of the 
citizen-soldier. Yet this archetype has a historical component, which renders its status in society 
fraught and, like other fetishized subject positions, unstable and potentially untenable. Below, I 
outline how republicans and liberals have theorized the meaning of the citizen-soldier. To this 
end, I will argue later in this chapter that both “flexible citizenship” and the citizen-soldier’s 
juxtaposition with the image and actions of the martyr, together offer mechanisms by which to 
destabilize both republican and liberal theorizing on the meaning of the citizen-soldier. I then use 
flexible citizenship and the notion of the martyr to illustrate the decay of the citizen-soldier’s link 
to sacrificial cults. Following that, I provide a brief rationale for why “sacrifice” is compelling 
today, along with an introductory definitional schematic of two key terms in this dissertation: 
sovereign and biopolitical power. I then summarize the arguments and conclusions to be made in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
The Soldier-Citizen: A Lasting Archetype? 
The schematic of militarized suffering and loss upheld by sacrificial cults is tied to the 
nationalized, biopoliticized disciplining of citizen soldiering. As Foucault states, war in the mid-
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twentieth century is not necessarily or primarily aimed at expanding a state’s territorial reach, 
i.e., securing territory, but instead is enacted with the view of populations in mind. War is no 
longer for the benefit of a few powerful monarchs, but it is for everyone, in the name of life 
necessity. The citizen-soldier is therefore not simply the embodiment of a nation state’s capacity 
for violence, which demands the ultimate sacrifice of its citizens during war, but of everyone’s 
capacity for violence in the service of the nation. Modern iterations of citizenship, which hinge 
on the concept of every-one, and the importance of sacrifice, is informed by the continuing 
legacy of the French Revolution and its radical subversion and therefore displacement of 
sovereign power from the body of the monarch to the People.  
These critical events characteristic of the French Revolution (democratization) disrupted 
and reconfigured the relationship between the sovereign and citizens. The People, as a political 
collective, a historically distinct and perpetually antagonistic entity, was born. Since the French 
Revolution, citizenship has been profoundly marked by a formal and institutionalized willingness 
to die for the nation, which willingness spring from a sense of sovereignty now invested in the 
individual, and, therefore, a notion of individual sacrifice as necessary for the defense of the 
collective whole, or nation. War medals (sometimes awarded posthumously), for example, honor 
soldiers according to the personal injuries they suffered, the duration of their service, and/or what 
kinds of risks they took on the battlefield, because these sacrifices, according to this notion, were 
made in order for “civilization” (the People) to flourish. Dying for one’s patria is a notion that 
only emerges with the civic republican tradition and its democratic culmination in the mass draft 
of the French Revolution.   
However, as the research of this dissertation attests, there is nothing permanent about this 
social arrangement between the citizen-soldier and the state -- although it has come to be widely 
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accepted along the political spectrum as an assumed given. Military sacrifice, which supersedes 
politics, is an assumed feature of nation-state violence. Yet just as the heroic soldier figure’s 
relation to national citizenship is contingent on social and historical forces that explicitly link the 
figure to sacrificial cults, the figure of the soldier-citizen can also be undone and reconfigured 
anew. For example, the individualized sense of responsibility, and likewise, the potential to enact 
legitimate violence as a soldier, in the past understood as both a burden and an opportunity to 
embody one’s patriotism and citizenship (a historically specific politics of being within a nation) 
was once more evenly shared amongst people, whereas the all-volunteer armies of today offer 
opportunities to break and/or resist this (albeit tenuously) established link between violence and 
community.  
Yet scripting a nation into being requires more than just standing armies and the 
deployment of symbolic capital around the figure of the soldier: it requires deliberate effort and 
in turn (at times) unconscious consent to violence. As Antonio Gramsci (1950/1971) argues, the 
state has a profound role in the regulation of society, the production of culture and ideas, and the 
construction of citizenship. For example, Gramsci’s concept of the ethical state reflects how the 
state “educates” consent on behalf of the masses through coercive and disciplinary forces in 
addition to hegemonic processes. Gramsci states, “Every state is ethical in as much as one of its 
most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and 
moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces of 
development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes” (1950/1971, p. 258). Indeed, “there 
is no polity without a homeland and no homeland without a founding narrative. This space is 
sanctified by the appearance of the sacred, which is preserved in memory by the national 
narrative” (Kahn, 2011, p. 154). National and foundational narratives, which, following Gramsci, 
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contain some trace of coercion, join the People and the state in instituting a regime of rights, 
based on erecting borders around inclusion and exclusion, or citizenship.   
Furthermore, citizenship rights have a territorial quality. According to Ulrich Beck, “the 
national state is a territorial state: that is, its power is grounded upon attachment to a particular 
place upon control over membership, current legislation, border defense, and so on” (Beck, 2000, 
p. 4). State policies like citizenship and border security not only secure the nation state from 
outside interference, but they also solidify an ideological allegiance or loyalty to the state as seen 
in supposedly patriotic acts such as dying or killing for one’s homeland. In other words, states’ 
expression of sovereignty, and therefore the expression of sovereign power, has historically 
entailed some application of territorialisation. Yet the ascendance of the neoliberal state has 
witnessed trends toward denationalization, and thus the enemy is no longer a single country 
and/or those populations within. In this respect, the “national” is thought to be intimately bound 
up in both the “local” and the “global” (Sassen, 2006), which troubles the integrity of the nation 
state generally, and its relation to identifying the enemy generally and war-making specifically.  
The territorial quality of nation states and populations therein, which fixes identity to 
territory, means that the concept of the nation runs the risk of idealizing itself as an ethnically 
pure entity. But this falsehood of, first, ethnic purity, and second, spatial constraint, is revealed 
by the highly mobile and diverse categories of the “stranger,” “outsider,” or the more 
modernized categories of the “immigrant” or “refugee,” which together reveal the politicization 
(and violence) involved in symbolically or materially turning, through inclusive and exclusive 
forms of racism, a racially heterogeneous nation into a homogenous one in the eyes of its 
beholders. Nationalist imagery reinforces a false nexus between territory and identity, thus 
people marked as “populations” are in turn marked with ethnicity as a brute social fact, reflecting 
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a crude essentialism and primitive rigidity which views ethnicity as an antagonizing, mutually 
exclusive, and inherently conflicting, yet still dominant, trait that ought to be controlled. 
Consider this in relation to the Bosnian War: the idea that national community requires a nexus 
of demarcated territory and fixed identity was insufficient as a response to the War, but critically, 
this thinking was nevertheless necessary for the War. Here, and elsewhere, nationalism, and 
nationalist imagery, entailed a violent and contradictory relationship with the other. 
For the nation to acquire a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence it depended in part 
on the application of an emerging administrative and technocratic rationality onto questions of 
populations (an emerging site of social and political inquiry) and their security, and also on state 
narratives of violence and sacrifice, which created the citizen-soldier and codified the 
archetype’s significance through interrelated sociopolitical and economic imperatives. The 
interrelated processes of biopolitics, nationalization, territorialisation and colonization, which 
developed notions of healthy populations vis-à-vis a delimitation of the (racialized) other were 
bound up with the perceived role and virtues of the citizen-soldier. Preparation for war became 
anything but rare or exceptional but instead rational, consciously routinized, political 
phenomenon. Indeed, soldiers, both as individuals but also as an imagined category of socially 
constructed persons, have become primary targets of disciplinary power under the guise of a 
bourgeoning military apparatus. Citizen-soldiers’ roles are chiefly defined in relation to the stuff 
of the body: the spilling of blood, origin stories, primordial ties and fraternity, physical and 
emotional suffering, debt owed by and to the state on behalf of the poor and labouring classes, 
conscription and allegiance to the flag, collective memorializing, and the potential for death –  
the ultimate giving of the self through the destruction of the body for the productive purposes of 
the nation and its collective security.  
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In the modern period, permanent armies became an integral feature of a state’s defense 
planning and thus a part of a wider rational, bureaucratic, and centralizing undertaking, in a 
context of widespread capitalist development. While states began to take on some of the qualities 
of “nation-states” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, their territorial and sovereign power 
did not become fully expressed until the eighteenth century when their military function 
expanded (Mann, 1996). At the same time, nations became imagined in terms of sacred idioms, 
and the will to “collective sacrifice” was (albeit at times coercively) established (Balakrishnan, 
1996). These developments worked to produce a seemingly fixed and normative relationship 
between the soldier and the state understood as a form of exchange marked by notions of mutual 
responsibility, often referred to as a social contract: the citizen-soldier sacrificed his individual 
self through military service and, potentially permanently, through injury or death, so that a 
notion of the public good might flourish, alongside other historically specific and wide-ranging 
ideals. In exchange, the state would provide the institutional services to care for the soldier and 
(his) dependents in the aftermath of the soldier’s service to the state: his legacy might be 
memorialized, reifying soldiers’ privileged acts of sacrifice.3  
                                                        
3 A historical time-line of sorts is warranted. Veteran’s benefits take two forms: commemoration (consider federally 
owned dedicated cemetery plots, annual days of remembrance, and war medals as examples) and social services, 
each invoking a rich history far too complex for our purposes here. According to the VA document History in Brief, 
“from the beginning” the English colonies in North America provided pensions to disabled veterans. However, in 
the U.S., benefits for social services gradually moved away from individual state- and community-oriented care.   
centralized care under a national framework, as technology enabled new forms of injury and of brutality, and the 
numbers of veterans escalated. Culminating in the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, the G.I. Bill, (described 
as one of the most influential pieces of legislation in the U.S.), was widespread in that it 1) had to account for the 
significant increase in veteran population, and 2) established medical centers (although it was WWI- the first 
mechanized war- that saw the greatest influx of hospitals), made low-interest mortgages available, provided 
unemployment insurance, and offered stipends for college tuition. Benefits therefore emerged in tandem with the 
deadliness of contemporary warfare. “Taken together, these well-known facts hint at something unique about the 
violence intrinsic to modern liberty. This has to do partly with advanced technologies for death dealing. The fact that 
modern warfare has given birth to numerous inventions is well known. These include improved techniques for 
destruction, of course, but also for the restoration of human life. Important developments in surgery, psychiatry, and 
psychology, as well as in nursing and hospital administration, are famously connected with the demands and 
consequence of modern war” (Asad, 2007, p. 60). It seems possible to invert this relation and question how the 




As Rachel Woodward (2008, p. 378) explains in her analysis of British narratives of 
military sacrifice, state-military discourses around the meaning of the figure of the soldier, and 
the meaning of the participation of that soldier in military activities, are adamant and persuasive 
that military participation constitutes national service. The idea of individual military sacrifice 
for shared national benefit is quite fundamental to this representation of the meaning of war and 
militarized violence. Given this dominant idea, state violence without the visible institutional 
presence of a public mass military contributes to what I will ultimately argue is the erosion of the 
link between soldier-citizenship and sacrifice.  
Still, in the context of a developing inter-state system and in the aftermath of the Treaty 
of Westphalia, North American and European states worked to develop a robust military and 
administrative apparatus to territorialize sovereignty and preserve their spatial expressions of 
power (Cowen & Gilbert, 2008). The economic and ideological prerequisites of a standing army 
and a mass draft allowed Western states to continue to centralize their mechanisms of control so 
that they could properly implement and execute a system of national governance. Key here is 
how the state could mobilize citizenship as an aspect of nationalism so that it could install 
effective technologies of government (Isin & Turner, 2002, p. 6). As a “dynamic concept that 
prioritizes process and emergence in the constitution of both lasting and fleeting political forms” 
(Cowen & Glibert, 2008, p. 10) citizenship is bound up with the state’s ongoing claim to 
authority.   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
increasing “safety” of war for those on “our side” (through enhanced technology and the ideology of casualty 
aversion) might then too result in the rolling back of veterans’ benefits.  
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The blending of citizenship and nationality, as explained by Isin and Turner,4 marked a 
turning point in the citizen-soldier’s subjective orientation toward the state in that one could 
ostensibly articulate and express a newfound national-collective consciousness—by a subjective 
transformation of the self towards humanist enlightenment principles, alongside a nationalized 
identity which constructed “imagined communities” amongst formerly disconnected people 
through acts of military sacrifice. While again this consciousness can be traced back to the 
French Revolution, the social contract that was produced because of the crystallization and 
institutionalization of sacrifice had its heyday in the post-World War II era, exemplified by the 
G.I. Bill. This bill, which authorized the building of hospitals, low-interest mortgage rates, and 
tuition stipends, marked the beginning of a period of thriving welfare state policies aimed at 
soldiers and their dependents, which thrust forward the idea of the social contract, a relationship 
based on mutual reciprocity between the state and citizens, consolidating it within public 
imagination.   
I argue that this social contract, as a transcendental ideal, which takes sacrifice for as an 
assumed given, tends to ease the central disputes between liberal and republican views of 
citizenship. Liberal citizenship, for example, involves the idea that private property is the 
quintessential condition for the realization and protection of individual freedom (Schuck, 2002, 
p. 133). The citizen, from the liberal viewpoint, is primarily a private individual. Often noted for 
its use of possessive and methodological individualism, liberalism advocates for a subject 
position that is defined by a political ideal that seeks to maximize individual liberty and 
                                                        
4 Isin and Turner argue that nationality is the primary axis by which people are classified and thus also how 
citizenship rights can be defined, allocated and comprehended overall. As such, national trajectories and practices 
constitute important issues in citizenship studies. The notion of national citizenship, however, has become 
increasingly problematic since globalization has produced so-called flexible and non-national forms of citizenship 
and transnational capital flows and supranational organizations have challenged the power of nation-states to 
effectively govern its citizenry.  
   16 
 
 
minimize if not limit altogether any kind of state attempt at curtailing those liberties.5 Liberalism 
promotes a deeply-ingrained, possibly irreconcilable opposition between individual freedom and 
the state: the state must always be kept in check because it is viewed as a set of practices within a 
given bureaucratic apparatus that is always-already keen on undermining the rights, freedom and 
liberties of individuals. Simultaneously the state relies on the coercive-ideological and practical 
incorporation of the figure of the night watchman, allowing it access to legitimate violence, from 
surveillance technology to outright military force, to preserve this protection myth.   
Liberal constitutionalism, supported by notions of individual responsibility and the 
institutionalization of the rule of law, attempts to curb the dangerous power of both private 
groups and state bureaucrats so that they may not infringe on so-called public values and public 
institutions that underwrite the ideals of individual liberty. Following Schuck’s (2002) invocation 
of Locke, we know that liberalism’s ideal subject, as a person with reason, can depart the state of 
nature, obtaining freedom through the use and application of said reason. A notable critique of 
liberalism, then, is that the figure of the reasonable subject reflects a liberal and republican 
tradition of citizenship that associates the citizen with abstracted notions of reason and 
rationality—indicative of masculine citizenship (Lister, 2003). While liberal citizenship’s 
incorporation of reason required that subjects fit the conditions of being white, male, and 
propertied, it did so inconsistently, under a nascent legal conception of equality and rights.  
Liberal citizenship, then, considers private property to be the quintessential condition for 
the realization and protection of individual freedom (Schuck, 2002, p. 133). Classical theory, in 
its crudest articulation, presupposes that the liberal citizen is compelled to avoid total retreat into 
                                                        
5According to Schuck (2002, p. 132) the meaning and application of liberty varies according to a vast liberal 
spectrum of ideals. At one extreme, "negative liberty" would advocate the right to total privacy of the individual, 
whereas “positive liberty” might require the state to actively affirm and create the conditions to secure social 
entitlements.   
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the private sphere by his desire to enhance the conditions of his individual freedoms through 
institutions that protect his private property. Therefore, liberal citizens, it can be argued, relate to 
each other as, more than anything else, embodiments of private property: Citizens freely enter 
into the public sphere to cultivate economic contracts with one another mediated by uninhibited 
and open markets. Although highly abstract and rudimentary, this notion of an individual 
consumed by his need for privacy and economic betterment has prevailed in dominant liberal 
thinking and institutions. That said, these public contracts conceived amongst private (men) 
occur to foster a regime that champions the acquisition and protection of private property, that 
which is thought to be the legal-institutional, symbolic, and material pre-conditions of liberal 
freedom. 
Civic republicans, in contrast, claim that liberalism’s privileging of private interests, 
materialism, and normative neutrality reflects its failure to garner a necessary ethical, active 
orientation to politics that will ultimately sustain the republic and the common good (Schuck, 
2002). In their view, liberalism presents an impoverished version of citizenship. Both the 
dominance of liberal thinking and its production of ambivalent citizens are revealed by a recent 
poll, conducted by Harvard’s Institute of Politics. The survey concluded that most U.S. 
millennial-aged people polled (60 percent) supported a ground invasion to combat the Islamic 
State, but that same majority (62 percent) would decline to enlist in the military, even if the U.S. 
needed additional troops (Della Volpe, 2015). We can take from this that these respondents 
know instinctively that disembodied warfare in the form of remotely controlled air strikes alone 
are not sufficient to combat the threat of the Islamic State, but that they do not wish to suffer the 
risk of death or injury to sustain the greater good—potential peace of the collective, national 
   18 
 
 
body. These poll results seem to confirm the republican sentiment that liberalism promotes and 
sustains a dangerous form of hyper-privatized individualism.  
Republicans also tend to argue that politics must be conducted and struggled over in a 
visible public sphere to stave off the state’s supposed inherent tendencies toward corruption. This 
tradition differs from the liberal approach because it emphasizes that individuals should submit 
to the moral, material, and symbolic demands of the imagined public sphere. The making of the 
“good” citizen is accomplished through habitual practices at the micro level of existence, and 
reaffirmed and legitimized in collective moments and expressions of national consciousness. A 
public-spiritedness therefore constitutes a republican’s orientation to politics, but this spirit is 
only born, à la Tocqueville, out of habitual practice, which Dagger (2002) defines as 
characteristic of the integrative and educative aspects of republican citizenship, which folds the 
individual citizen’s actions into a common expression of the good, and thus re-inscribes these 
sociopolitical values and ideals onto citizens and potential citizens alike.  
Nevertheless, the tension between liberal and republican philosophy, highlighted by the 
above discussion, is still inadequate for our purposes, since it does not capture the nuance of 
power when applied to the politics that result from the erosion of the link between citizen-
soldiering and the sacrificial cults integral to the credibility of the nation-state’s claim to 
legitimate violence. Instead, following Aihwa Ong, I understand liberalism not as “a political 
philosophy but an art of government...not something that can be reduced to a perfect realization 
of a doctrine called liberalism; rather, it includes an array of rationalities whereby a liberal 
government attempts to resolve problems of how to govern society as a whole” (Ong, 1999, p. 
195). As I will claim in the following section, if sacrifice is to be understood as a problem of 
liberal government, as a site where, utilizing Ong’s language, sacrifice emerges as part of a 
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rationality of governing, then both liberal and republican traditions fail us in so far as they cannot 
account for the problematic of citizen-soldering and sacrifice as a product of neoliberal govern-
mentality’s reliance upon flexible citizenship. I will explore this more in the following section. 
For now, it can be said that, in shoring up the power of war and security discourses, states use 
violence to justify their authority. War and security, which today I argue are processes that are 
increasingly fragmented, individualized, and privatized, are thus enabled by neoliberal 
citizenship regimes that support these notions of privatization where individuals relate to one 
another as embodiments of private property for the purposes of more efficient governing.  
Preceding the neoliberal period, the welfare-state-inspired social contract indicated a 
spatial order that was considered national and thus it engaged social relations within the 
boundaries of the state. For more illustration, let us take an additional historical step back to say 
that the nation-state system was born in tandem with the citizen-soldier archetype and its 
associated expressions of symbolic nationalized performance, which hinged on a complex 
imaginary of sacrificial discourse. In this vein, McClintock (1993) argues that nationalism is 
transmitted primarily through fetishistic spectacle: nationalism’s translation takes place because 
of the ceaseless circulation of fetish objects such as: “flags, uniforms, airplane logos, maps, 
anthems, national flowers, national cuisines and architectures, as well as through the 
organization of collective fetish spectacle- in team sports, military displays, mass rallies, [and] 
the myriad forms of popular culture” (1993, p. 71). The military and its citizen-soldiers are 
actively involved in McClintock’s discussion of the reification of fetish objects. Likewise, the 
citizen-soldier as a model is deeply rooted in a political imaginary that renders nation-states as 
discrete, territorially contained entities opposed to other discrete states. National armies 
facilitated the symbolic and material development of the nation-state and were indeed a product 
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of a newfound securitized technocratic reason. This rationality required that citizen-soldiers 
underwent systematic physical and moral disciplining so that, ideally, their own vitality would 
solidify the overall strength of the military and the population.  
These multiple ideological imperatives (recall Gramsci) were used to mobilize 
hegemonic narratives of soldiering and warfare, the moral and disciplinary project of making 
“good” citizens. While it would be bold to suggest they originated in military organizations, 
these imperatives were notably also extended beyond the military to schools and factories as per 
the expansion and diffusion of capitalist ideals and spaces of production. For example, military 
work was central in shaping the principles of Taylorism that revolutionized industrial production, 
workplace organization, and worker discipline (Cowen, 2008) thus suggesting that military logic 
has fluid boundaries, producing similar rationales and techniques of power characterized in 
different yet not unrelated social, political, and economic domains.  
In the post-WWII period, citizenship discourse thrust out into the public domain in North 
America (Brodie, 2008). Within this discourse, the link between citizenship and soldiering was 
tightly woven together. The public called on the state to provide public education, an 
unprecedented social intervention justified by the idea of children as a pool of future citizens 
who would contribute to democracy and nation-building, and who were thus targets of moral 
regulation appropriate to potential future soldiers and wives of soldiers (Brodie, 2008). The 
diverse social movements of the 1960s in North America and Western Europe witnessed the 
demilitarization of these benefits, and as such they were extended to increasingly more civilians. 
In 1966, social citizenship in Canada, for example, was reflected in a threefold policy approach: 
the Medicare Act, the Canada Pension Plan, and the Canada Assistance Plan (Brodie, 2008). Yet 
the concept of national duty always hovered over the discourse on social rights. A rights based 
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discourse6 framed the parameters of the social contract as an exchange between state and 
citizen—a reciprocal give-and-take: national duty in exchange for social entitlements (Cowen, 
2008). In other words, the state has special claims on its citizens (claims to loyalty and 
potentially to military service) while the citizenry has special claims on the state (rights of entry 
and residence, rights to political participation, social, economic, or cultural rights, or claims to 
diplomatic protection abroad) (Brubaker, 1998, p. 63). This exchange of claims also 
institutionalized and normalized the male-breadwinner family model through the notion of a 
family wage, thus constructing the “real” citizen as an autonomous masculine subject.  
Indeed, an analysis of the citizen-soldier as a working and laboring body, a body that 
required care and maintenance, was made possible in this context, and as such the citizen-soldier 
was the first body to receive these benefits. The citizen-soldier embodied the highest expression 
of sacrifice, and thus citizenship, and so served to signify proper conduct for civilians (Burchell, 
2002).  Military sacrifice, as it unfolded within the parameters of a (relatively) strong welfare 
state, therefore included an idea of mutual reciprocity. Much of this was the result of feminist 
praxis that unfolded with both the introduction into the military of servicewomen and also the 
theoretical critique of the universal/particular dichotomy that had marginalized women and 
naturalized their subordination in the public and private sphere. And so, through its hailing of 
citizens within a rubric of the gendered expectations of citizenship (Lister, 2002), underpinned 
by an unevenly administered logic of sacrifice, the state could negotiate the unstable relationship 
between the universal need for bodies, and the particularities of those (gendered) bodies through 
a simultaneous, contradictory incorporation of feminist ideology and the negation of women.    
                                                        
6 Isin and Turner (2002), drawing on T.H. Marshall, note, “Modern citizenship rights which draw from the nation-
state typically include civil (free speech and movement, the rule of law) political (voting, seeking electoral office) 
and social (welfare, unemployment insurance and health care) rights” (p. 3). 
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The citizen-soldier, however, comes to represent a challenge to the idea of democracy when 
viewed alongside the welfare-breadwinner citizen in the post-war period. As Cowen (2008) 
explains, the citizen-soldier provides a peculiar challenge to the concept of democracy, 
specifically because an explicit denial of democracy marks the citizen-soldier’s sacrifice: 
soldiers, by their reliance on a deeply ingrained military hierarchy, and thus their integral denial 
of individual rights, are socially constructed in the absence of democracy. And ironically, while 
the absence of democracy marks solider-citizens, they are also folded into national narratives 
about the unquestionable desire of democracy- which further lends to the legitimation and 
support of foreign wars abroad.  
The tracing of these historical and political processes facilitates a critical analysis of 
power relations in the current neoliberal era, which, as I will argue in Chapter Four, witnessed 
the decline of the welfare state model. Tracing the qualities of neoliberal political economy, and 
its impact on the applicability of the citizen soldier’s ties to sacrifice, also entails a critical gaze, 
harnessed to “de-naturalize these concepts and ask what is a nation and how is it made, but also, 
what is a people and how is it made” (Negri & Hardt, 2000, p. 102)? Indeed, “the modern 
conception of the people is in fact a product of the nation-state, and survives only within its 
specific ideological context.” This suggests that just as the category of ‘the people’ were created, 
they too can be destroyed or at least eroded, in a similar sweep of the brush.  
Accordingly, nation-states developed with an interest (although not in a universal sense) 
precisely in securing territory, acquiring resources to secure war-making technologies, regulating 
populations and categorizing individuals based on ethnic markers and nationhood—sacrificial 
idioms, as tied to the archetype of the soldier-citizen, were critical to implementation and 
justification of these processes. As I will argue in this dissertation, both military/security 
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privatization and drone warfare are symptomatic of the weakening link between citizen-
soldiering and sacrifice, thus revealing the decay of this often taken-for-granted figure in 
nationalist imagery. Below, I outline two challenges to the figure of the soldier-citizen, which 
show the dangers in presuming the historical permanence of the citizen-soldier, and questions 
what might be at stake in its decline. 
 
Challenges to Soldier-Citizenship: Flexibility and the Martyr  
Recall that, in the democratic republican tradition, sacrifice has a reasonably expected 
place in the highly-publicized imagining of social relations, and therefore informs how ‘good’ 
citizens ought to conceptualize and serve the nation. The will to sacrifice is to be expected as a 
chief quality of not just soldiers eschewing the danger of liberalism’s preference for privacy by 
acting on behalf of the public good, but also their families, and ordinary people, too. As 
previously stated, I suggest that both liberal and republican traditions ultimately fail to 
adequately conceptualize the problematic of soldier-citizenship and sacrifice in the global era, 
partly due to the following two related empirical phenomena: the globalization of citizenship 
(which is best understood via the socioeconomic concept of flexible citizenship) and the Global 
War on Terror (analyzed here through the soldier/martyr archetype). To examine these 
conditions, I will next turn to Ong’s landmark work on flexible citizenship, followed by Talal 
Asad’s research on suicide bombing, assessing the implications for thinking about the status of 
the soldier-citizenship model of warfare within each of these theoretical trajectories.  
My argument in this section is that both flexible citizenship and the soldier/martyr 
archetype provide direct challenges to the meaning and stability of the ‘good’ citizen-soldier as 
both an essential and/or undisputed figure in the national imagining of war, and also as a body 
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with (assumed) immanent ties to national duty, sovereign power, and sacrificial idioms and cults. 
While flexible citizenship undermines the public spiritedness championed by republican 
philosophy, an analysis of the liberal-state-at-war’s most prized possession, the citizen-soldier, 
alongside the construct of the martyr, as discussed by Asad, tests the ostensible ethical 
superiority- through its invocation of secular humanism- of liberal violence. Suicide bombing- 
“the martyr”- is a direct assault on the routinization of privacy and ordinariness of legally 
justified killing abroad as advocated by liberal constitutionalism, which ought not to ignore how, 
“Today, cruelty is an indispensable technique for maintaining a particular kind of international 
order in which the lives of some peoples are less valuable than the lives of others and therefore 
their deaths less disturbing” (2007, p. 94), and how war reveals the simultaneous idealism and 
apparent inhumanity of its character (Mbembé, 2003). Consider the “unbearable intimacy shared 
in their final moments by the suicide bomber and her or his victims. Suicide bombing is an act of 
passionate identification- you take the enemy with you in a deadly embrace” (Asad, 2007, p. 66). 
It is a form of disrupting the ordinariness by which human identity is anchored, and rejecting -- 
and embracing -- the notion of sovereign power that regards the prohibition of the material 
destruction of human bodies as its defining feature (Mbembé, 2003), and thereby produces a 
competition between and amongst sovereign selves. 
First, let us consider the meaning of flexible citizenship and how it serves as a challenge 
to the applicability of the archetype of the citizen-soldier given today’s expansive yet 
increasingly globalized, privatized, and techno-fetishistic disembodied practices of warfare. 
Popularized by Ong, the term “flexible citizenship” refers to the  
cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to 
respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions. These 
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logics and practices are produced within particular structures of meaning about family, 
gender, nationality, class mobility, and social power. (1999, p. 6)  
The internal logic of flexible citizenship, for our purposes, would show how the practices of 
nation states competing in a global economy would effectively result in the fracturing and 
separation of “citizen” from “soldier,” and would lead to a new regard for the labor of soldiers – 
which is, namely, violence -- as that which ought to be treated like any ordinary commodity 
circulating in the free market. That is, this labour becomes something which can be stripped from 
the body of the soldier-citizen, thereby doing away with, or perhaps simply curtailing, whatever 
“rights” that soldier might claim. The effects of flexible citizenship can also be seen from the 
bottom-up, particularly in how former military personnel take up jobs in the private sector, in 
countries other than their home countries, to gain more stable and lucrative employment (see 
Chapter Four).   
Ong further argues that capitalism compels people to regard themselves through identity 
categories. There emerges a tension between flexible citizenship (which requires elasticity) and 
identity (which tries to fix the self against different categories of being). Ong invokes the concept 
of “transnationality” to combat a tendency in social thought to define the “global” as political 
and economic and the “local” as cultural. The concept of transnationality allows Ong to capture 
the horizontal and relational qualities of embeddedness within socioeconomic and cultural 
processes (1999, p. 4). Flexible citizenship requires people to embrace a nomadic existence, and 
be willing to enter and exit labour markets on a whim, and to restructure their social and familial 
relationships so that they might maximize economic productivity within and beyond multiple 
national borders. Combining the insights of Marx and Foucault, Ong asserts that the art of 
government has been responsive to the challenges of transnationality, and thereby maintains the 
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nation state as a powerful force in the globalization of capitalism. Hence, Ong does not 
sympathize with a post-nationalist order. Accordingly, Ong asserts that Eastern states, for 
example, have contradicted the “hegemonic link between whiteness and global capitalism” (p. 
181) by adopting practices of “graduated sovereignty” and by making use of “differentiated 
zones of sovereignty” and “sovereignty free zones,” as exemplified by growth triangles in Asia. 
Subjects are thus unevenly included and excluded under different forms of sovereignty so that 
flexible production through regional reorganization of economic activities can occur. By 
breaking the dichotomy of “traditional” and “modern” economies, Ong successfully shows how 
Asian countries differently assimilate capitalism, therefore dispelling the popular scholarly 
notion of core, periphery, and semi-periphery nations. 
While her empirical interest is focused on Asian economies, her theoretical insight 
around the concept of flexibility is nevertheless applicable here. Using flexible citizenship as a 
challenge to the archetype of the citizen-soldier, particularly as it is conceptualized within the 
republican tradition, one main point can be asserted: The logic of neoliberal governing, 
specifically its use of flexible citizenship, has thoroughly penetrated and disrupted what 
republicans would regard as a sacred bond, that between the citizen and the state, a bond which 
is most acutely tested in the will to sacrifice as seen in the publicized theater of war.  
Although the violence of war continues- the seemingly unending Global War on Terror 
provides sufficient evidence of this- as I will show in future Chapters, the outsourced, 
disembodied, privatized and otherwise invisible qualities of this violence, as it is executed within 
the parameters of neoliberal governing, mean that the model of the citizen-soldier as theorized 
within the republican tradition now must endure an unbearable strain, as a result of the increasing 
distance that the authors of state violence attempt to put between the subjects and objects of 
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violence. “Flexibility” has pushed many of the qualities of military violence out of the private 
sphere, threatening the public quality of wartime’s will to sacrifice. Wars of the globalization era 
remind us that, in this age of global mobility  
military operations and the exercise of the right to kill are no longer the sole monopoly of 
states, and the ‘regular army’ is no longer the unique modality of carrying out these 
functions. The claim to ultimate or final authority in a particular political space is not 
easily made. Instead, a patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights to rule emerges, 
inextricably superimposed and tangled, in which different de facto juridical instances are 
geographically interwoven and plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties, and 
enclaves abound. (Mbembé, 2003, p. 31)    
Consider an example: namely, the private contracting of soldiery. Here, the relationship 
between citizenship and sacrifice has weakened considering the military’s use of flexible 
citizenship. This captures a shift relative to the sacrificial logic that is bound up with the 
archetype of the citizen-soldier, witnessed by the bureaucratization and incorporation of experts 
into the machinery of political government (Rose, 1999, p. 149). In securitizing the right to be 
free, private military corporations shore up expert knowledge. This expertise requires a 
subsequent shift toward flexible citizenship, which can complement and accommodate the terms 
of neoliberal governmentality. The neoliberal demand for both flexible citizenship and free-
market capitalism (synthesized in the act of privatization) has deeply pierced the military sphere, 
where private contractors resolve the problems of personnel shortages and deficiency in 
expertise. Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, they are not subject to the benefits 
normally afforded to military personnel as set out by the Department of Veteran's Affairs.  
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Military outsourcing reshapes the very need for sacrifice in a period marked by flexibility 
and de-nationalization: states can now surpass borders and harness the appropriate forms of 
technology to justifiably incorporate non-humans and non-citizens into the practice of warfare 
vis-à-vis the interrelated logic of free-market capitalism, the decline of the mass army model, and 
flexible citizenship, promoting various forms of governing at a distance. Rather than the 
democratic republican sentiment of a shared fate energized by the collective bloodshed of 
patriots in the name of the nation (a public spiritedness) we have instead to contend with the how 
flexible citizenship complements neoliberal governing to alter not just how the state perceives 
soldiers (as politically costly, inherently vulnerable, yet necessary, liabilities) and subsequently 
the careful articulation of violence that takes this into account. More, we contend with how 
soldiers, and ordinary citizens too, conceptualize the meaning of their potential for state violence, 
which was traditionally justified a priori by their very citizenship status. This is what is at stake 
in the decline of the citizen-soldier model of warfare. 
For Talal Asad, a similar line of questioning arises in his 2007 text On Suicide Bombing. 
Asad, writing against “liberal moralists,” motivates the reader to theorize how we might more 
thoroughly comprehend the project of the liberal West’s culture of war through the “civilized” 
citizen-soldier, in relation to the figure of the “uncivilized/barbaric” suicide bomber. Of the 
citizen-soldier, Asad writes: 
There is another, less dramatic aspect of modern state violence to which I want to draw 
attention and that informs liberal politics. The mobilization of individuals within and by 
the sovereign democratic state and the care devoted to its population have been at the 
heart of the liberal conception of the good life. And a guarantee of that life is the citizen-
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soldier who is prepared to kill and die for it, yet whose health, longevity, and general 
physical well-being are objects of the democratic state’s solicitude [emphasis added].7 (p. 
60)  
A contrast to the “less dramatic,” legitimate, and civilized citizen-soldier is the martyr, a 
figure who not only reveals, but profoundly agitates within secular humanism the tensions  
that hold modern subjectivity together: between individual self-assertion and collective 
obedience to the law, between reverence for human life and its legitimate destruction, 
between the promise of immortality through political community and the inexorability of 
decay and death in individual life. These tensions are necessary to the liberal democratic 
state, the sovereign representative of a social body, but they threaten to break down 
completely when a sudden suicide operation takes place publicly and when its politics is 
seen not to spell redemption but mutual disaster. (p. 91) 
What sets these two figures apart is their relation to sovereign power -- that “unique act 
of freedom” (p. 67). The citizen-soldier is, in Asad’s telling, the product of the nation-state’s 
love, and of the care and devotion that has historically marked how the nation-state has 
cultivated and mobilized him to protect the good life. To protect life, liberal politics, specifically 
secular humanism, is informed by the notion of redemption, which asserts that some humans 
must be treated violently so that humanity might be redeemed; “it is a part of the genealogy of 
                                                        
7 Here, it appears that Asad is taking the democratic state’s solicitude toward the citizen-soldier as a historical and, 
perhaps too, a future given. As I will attempt to argue throughout this dissertation, there are many examples of the 
U.S. state - most notably - retreating from this role as caretaker of the citizen-soldier, through individualizing the 
citizen-soldier’s trauma and emotional suffering and/or withdrawing material benefits, as well as outsourcing 
military labor to companies whose laborers have no claim to the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. 
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modern liberalism itself, in which violence and tenderness go together” (p. 88). In this construct, 
suicide is equated with sin. 
In the Abrahamic religions, suicide is intimately connected with sin because God denies 
the individual the right to terminate his own earthly identity. In the matter of his/her life, 
the individual creature has no sovereignty. Suicide is a sin because it is a unique act of 
freedom, a right that neither the religious authorities nor the nation state allows. Today, 
the law requires that a prisoner condemned to death be prevented from committing 
suicide to escape execution; it is not death but authorized death that is called for. So, too, 
all other convicts in prison, all soldiers in battle, and the terminally ill cannot kill 
themselves, however good they think their reasons for doing so may be. The power over 
life and death can be held legitimately only by the one God, creator and destroyer, and so 
by his earthly delegates. But although individuals have no rights to kill themselves, God 
(and the state) gives them the right to be punished and to atone. (p. 67) 
Suicide is an act equated with an expression of sovereign power, an aggressively 
controlled expression of freedom that in the citizen-soldier model of the politics of killing and 
dying, is ultimately reserved for the nation-state and its “earthly representatives.” This notion of 
how self-immolation is wrapped up in a politics of sovereignty comprehended through the logic 
of sacrifice. “One must urge the citizen-soldier to give up his life so that a particular way of life 
may be reproduced—a sacrifice” (p. 85). Citizen-soldiers on some level must agree to the 
possibility of death on the battlefield, but as an authorized potential-death (sacrifice), containing 
the signature of the sovereign.    
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However, in the suicidal, “illegal” actions of the martyr not only is this notion of the 
nation-state’s possession of sovereign power flagrantly contested in the act of self-immolation 
through surprise bombing, but the final act of the story as told by the Crucifixion8- that of 
redemption and subsequently humanity’s potential for moral improvement- is altogether 
circumvented, thereby denying the act of violence its sacrificial potential. In the disruption of the 
liberal narrative of wartime sacrifice, the martyr’s attempt to control the context and outcome of 
sovereign violence reveals how the figure of the citizen-soldier—that is, its very applicability in 
contemporary conflict zones—hinges on these paradoxes within the liberal West’s culture of 
war, specifically its telling of the relation between the nation-state, sovereign power, and citizens 
in the management of life and death. 
Asad wants to move away from “the mythology of suicide [which] encourages fantasies 
of accessibility” (2007, p. 41) thereby contradicting the most common explanations of suicide 
bombing: those which seek to uncover motivation, and/or frame suicide bombing as a religious 
sacrifice- for him, the martyr’s connection with sacrifice is contingent-  suicide bombing, for 
him, is not always-already an escape from political oppression, and/or an effect of a Freudian 
death wish. Mainstream interpretations, even those thought to be nuanced and scholarly, tend to 
problematically see suicide bombing as a violent expression of either a perverted, totalitarian 
Islam, or of a primordial (and therefore irrational) religious urge that secularism has overcome 
(p. 95). Key here is the final piece of the sentence -- the ostensibly secular, liberal West’s 
insistence on its “humane” (because codified in international law) means of killing as being not 
                                                        
8Asad writes, “God’s only begotten son gave his life willingly and deliberately in order to redeem mankind: the 
supreme sacrifice. Although he did not murder himself, he devised that he should be cruelly killed. The Crucifixion 
has long been a model in Christendom for legal punishment, so that a convicted victim’s suffering has been seen as 
the repayment by which social and metaphysical order can be restored, as a means of cultivating absent virtue, as an 
example to others of the death that is at once sin and the cleansing of sin” (p. 85). 
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only justified but superior to the violence expressed by the terrorist and terrorizing actions 
contained in suicide bombing.   
While Asad’s ultimate interest remains with religious vocabularies and religious 
subjectivities, his non-essentialist approach becomes particularly productive when he invokes 
Arendt, whose theoretical framework allows him to examine suicide bombing through the 
intersections between human finitude, violent death, and the re-establishment of political 
community. For Arendt (as discussed by Asad) the pursuit of immortality is inextricably linked 
to a profoundly this-worldly endeavor -- the founding or recreating of a just community on earth 
(Asad, 2007, p. 56), and as such, “political life is the space of an earthly permanence that can 
compensate for human mortality” (p. 58). But Asad’s inquiry is less concerned with moralistic 
narrativizations of suicide bombing than with how “violence is embedded in the very concept of 
liberty that lies at the heart of the liberal doctrine” (2007, p. 59). An analysis of the link between 
personal mortality and political action reveals how the citizen-soldier and martyr, rather than 
purely discrete and oppositional categories, in fact share in their various, tenuous interactions 
with iterations of sovereign power. To exercise sovereign power is to exercise control over 
mortality (Mbembé, 2003). 
Indeed, it is sovereignty’s link to sacrifice that unexpectedly connects each figure in the 
imagination and practice of re-founding collective violence. Typically understood as 
diametrically opposed in terms of what bodies are regarded as capable of wielding legitimate 
violence, Asad’s critical portrayal exposes the different understandings of sovereign and 
biopolitical power that become attached to violence qualified as either legitimate or terroristic. 
The suicide bomber, in eschewing the typical soldier’s uniform, and in displaying no weapon, 
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brings the destruction of violent death into the ordinary spaces of everyday life (Mbembé, 2003, 
p. 36). Alternatively, the citizen-soldier, whose cost of survival is calculated in terms of the 
capacity and readiness to kill someone else- to impose death on others while preserving one’s 
own life- reflects a logic of heroism as classically understood, namely, to execute others while 
holding on to one’s own death at a distance thus consolidating the moment of power and the 
moment of survival (Elias Canetti, cited in Mbembé, 2003, p. 37). The suicide bomber is 
therefore unheroic. Curiously, drone warfare has also been mocked for its heroic deficiencies,9 
which pivots on the question, “What intrinsic difference is there between killing with a missile 
helicopter or a tank [or a weaponized drone] and killing with one’s own body” (Mbembé, p. 36)? 
As this discussion reveals, sovereignty’s relation to sacrifice suggests the importance of 
denouncing the normative project of sovereign politics, wherein the “romance of 
sovereignty…rests on the belief that the subject is the true master and controlling author of his or 
her meaning” (p. 13), but which also locates and fixes legitimacy and worth within the 
boundaries of the nation state.  
Why Sacrifice? The Meaning of Sovereign and Biopolitical Power  
The assumed presence of sacrifice’s place in a nationalized imagining of the state’s 
monopoly of military violence is what makes it ripe for, and particularly suitable for, critical 
social inquiry; inquiry that renders the normal abnormal. Given that part of the state’s power is 
evidenced by its ability to monopolize the communicative potentiality of sacrifice and its logic 
                                                        
9 Drone operators have often been mocked by so-called “real pilots” for their labor, which allows them to inflict 
great violence while maintaining the comfort of ultimate safety and zero risk to their personhood. One interviewee 
commented, on the topic of heroism and drone warfare, “Drones might even take away the individual need for 
sacrifice, like the brave hero who rescues five guys while bullets are flying all around him. He can send in the robot 
next time! So even there we do not have sacrifice or heroism or something like that. So, we have totally unheroic 
warfare from the very top to the very bottom. That would be the essence of the wars we have at the moment and the 
wars we’re going to face in the future: totally unheroic warfare.”    
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(Taussig-Rubbo, 2009), sacrifice facilitates broader claims of legitimacy and authority, thereby 
allowing states to grasp the material and symbolic tools and techniques of violence that are 
pertinent to sustaining the ideals of the nation-state system. 
Sacrifice should, therefore, be a critical site or entry point into an inquiry about military 
violence today. Consider for example how politically inappropriate it would be to scoff at the 
notion of wearing a poppy on Remembrance Day (or to challenge the legitimacy of 
Remembrance Day in some formal capacity) even slightly. Military veterans, we have come to 
effortlessly accept, deserve our utmost display of respect always, but on these days of 
remembrance we make our built-in gratitude publicly known with a banal act of solidarity. Any 
resistance to this social norm ought to not be publicly expressed should the offender hope to not 
be ridiculed by the establishment -- what underpins this is the belief that soldiers embody the 
purest potential for sacrifice. To turn sacrifice on its head, to take it as a site of political struggle 
rather than devoid of politics, is to think critically about how liberal states rationalize killing 
today.   
Sacrifice- this ostensibly mundane and routine social fact- reveals how the citizen-soldier 
has come to represent the purest form of citizenship, having made the generic “ultimate 
sacrifice” as a model of citizenship to which all others ought to aspire. Research with a 
Foucauldian bent, such as this dissertation, however, is concerned with suspending normalcy to 
bring out the abnormal as a means to better understand some aspect of the social world. A study 
on sacrifice—one that does not take sacrifice for granted—brings the politics of nation-state 
violence, specifically that wrought in relation to the institution of the military, into sharp relief. If 
we as a “society” accept that the most valorized expression of sacrifice is contained within the 
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image of the soldier-citizen, we must account for the materiality of sacrifice and for how the 
outsourcing of war-making practices destabilizes and reconfigures this powerful discourse, 
through and beyond the concept of citizenship. Herein lies an evocative fabric for shaping the 
logic of contemporary biopolitical and sovereign violence.  
It is important to theorize sacrifice in relation to concepts of sovereign and biopolitical 
power. Although I discuss these concepts in greater detail throughout the dissertation, most 
notably in Chapter Four, a preliminary definition of each term as discussed by Foucault and 
those inspired by Foucault’s scholarship, and of how I propose they operate (however tenuously) 
together in the confines of the logic of wartime sacrifice, will be offered here. Briefly, sovereign 
power is a repressive, spectacular, and prohibitive form of power. Foucault claims that 
sovereignty was a central form of power prior to the modern era, is associated with the state, and 
is articulated in terms of law. Its preeminent form of expression is the execution of wrongdoers. 
Sovereignty is a main component of the liberal normative political project, which values 
autonomy and the achievement of agreement among a collectivity through communication and 
recognition. Thus, sovereignty here is primarily about self-institution and self-limitation wherein 
the subject is defined by the capacity for reason (Mbembé, 2003). Yet, the approach in this 
dissertation upholds a different definition of sovereignty. For our purposes, rather than reason, 
life and death- the material destruction of human bodies- are foundational to sovereignty. 
Moreover, the limit of sovereignty is to be seen in the power to kill or allow to live (Mbembé, 
2003). Sacrifice resides with sovereignty (although it survives in biopolitics) since its domain is 
centered upon killing and dying.  
I use biopower to refer to power concerning state intervention into the administration of 
human life. In contrast to sovereign power, biopolitical power is a productive power as far as it is 
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aimed at cultivating positive effects. It is a subtler, fragmented, and potentially invisible form of 
power that aims to enhance life by fixing on the management and administration of life via the 
health of the physical and political population. These two forms of power together illustrate the 
heart of the paradox of how liberal modernity regards the problem of life. Liberal government is 
concerned with how to satisfy the conditions for two competing types of power. The first being 
sovereign power: “to let die,” while the second is biopolitical power, which fosters life-
enhancing techniques and programs: to “make live.” The former sovereign right was to “take life 
or let live” (Foucault, 2003, p. 241). These two forms of power, furthermore, inform an 
additional contradiction at the heart of liberal modernity as far as how militarization is concerned 
and how it might be applied to manage the problem of life: how can a liberal society claim the 
belief that life ought to be protected, but have entire industries and political-economic policies 
devoted to killing? Indeed, this question haunts this dissertation. I attempt to seek not an answer, 
but rather a means of interrogating these contradictions through an analysis of war-making today. 
These are contradictions which unfold in the context of a European legal imaginary, which, 
through a model of colonial warfare, is not itself subject to legal and institutionalized rules 
(Mbembé, 2003).     
It ought to be clear by now that at the centre of the inquiry to follow is a concern with the 
relationship between two interrelated, and what I argue are mutually constitutive, sociological 
concepts: soldier-citizenship and sacrifice. As I have already attested, citizenship is a compelling 
site where relations of subordination and domination—albeit reflecting more complex material 
and symbolic webs of power that move beyond the purview of the dichotomous language just 
invoked—are worked through at micro and macro levels. This prepares the ground for a 
ceaseless looping effect between these interrelated nodal points of power. Citizenship is not 
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merely a status or an indicator of belonging to a body politic or the effect of power to determine 
the boundaries of membership, inclusion, and exclusion. It is also a precarious biopolitical 
process rife with uneven political struggle along interwoven lines of race, class, and gender, 
which work to constitute the citizen and the “other” simultaneously. These identity markers 
produce tension over the ostensible permanency and universality of historical gains that have 
been made in the name of citizenship. Attempting to negotiate this tension first requires a 
genealogical undoing or “stripping away” of citizenship, viewing it not as an a priori built-in 
quality of life, but as a tireless, ongoing product of mediation.  
Critical social theory shows how the modern individual citizen embodies a rich historical 
residue of this enduring political struggle. Subjectivisation has been marked by the memorialized 
stains of old disciplinary institutions which aggressively sought to control: to turn the feudal 
subject into a contractual citizen, an individual agent and member-of-nation who operates via a 
mandate of legal-juridical rights and thus takes on both real and imagined obligations to the 
nation-state. The citizen today, although marked by its assumed freedom of choice, is 
nevertheless always becoming, resisting, and responding to this historical residue of control. 
Citizenship, in both the ways it is embodied and articulated in policy, is always being worked 
through bodies and worked out in policy and national expressions of self-consciousness. Thus, as 
a practice, citizenship serves to construct and regulate internal and external territorial borders, to 
discipline and morally regulate bodies-in-motion and to reify the terms of global capitalism.  
Of importance is how citizenship can suggest particular truths about whose bodies are 
worthy of sacrifice, and what kinds of actions constitute sacrifice. This becomes especially 
pertinent in contemporary times of war, mourning, and loss, when the biopolitical ordering of 
life and death is reconfigured. Globalization has dissolved the consistency of the citizen thus 
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requiring new ways to determine and set the foundations of what makes a citizen. This 
dissertation, in part, maps how articulations of citizenship become discursively linked and 
unlinked to notions of sacrifice. The process of synthesizing citizenship with notions of sacrifice 
is evidenced in the West by periods of intense nation and state-building practices, such as during 
the post-WWII period.  
At the same time, I will show how the erosion of the seemingly fixed bond between 
citizen and nation-state has been reconfigured considering neoliberal and biopolitical modes of 
governing. As a reaction to how neoliberal states interact with global capital, postmodern power 
manages to reconfigure the concept of sacrifice as it pertains to citizenship, rendering the 
traditional image of the soldier-citizen less politically and culturally salient. I argue that 
neoliberal modes of governing have disrupted and complicated the ways in which citizens can 
become consciously willing to sacrifice for the nation-state because of the multiple and 
conflicting sites of nationalism, and of economic and political activity, to which “flexible” 
citizens are now beholden.  
Additionally, current distancing military technologies, including the outsourcing of war, 
suggest a rupture in the relationship between citizenship and sacrifice in that they redraw the 
conditions of sacrifice. My primary question is not are citizens willing/able to sacrifice for the 
nation, but how do military technologies and war-outsourcing newly shape those very 
possibilities and conditions of sacrifice in a period of neoliberal governmentality? Unlike the 
soldier-citizen, private contractors make up a class of people whose deaths may not be 
considered a sacrifice and whose actions exist outside the welfare-state inspired contract between 
the state and citizen. My overall aim is to show how discourses of sacrifice can serve as a portal 
into an examination of the domain of citizenship. By saturating the practices of citizenship with 
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an eye on the sign of sacrifice and all its political and cultural capital, we can begin to make 
more rigorous claims about how the mechanisms of power contained within citizenship work to 
facilitate and reinforce different conceptions of (de)-nationalized and military violence.  
The concept of sacrifice is critical, because discourses of sacrifice allow the nation to 
breathe life back into those who it claims perished on its behalf. Sacrifice is an important feature 
of politics, and thus neoliberal government is deeply concerned with establishing some sense of 
monopoly over its discursive trajectories. This monopoly is challenged by contemporary war 
technologies and practices which results in a contestation over the categorization and 
classification of sacrifice as it pertains to the lives and deaths of soldier-citizens and contractors 
alike, and thus affects the biopolitical ordering of the boundaries between citizenship (the right to 
claim a certain kind of life) and sacrifice (the right to claim a certain kind of death). 
 
Overview of Chapters  
Following this first chapter (Introduction) in Chapter Two I discuss my methods and 
methodology. In Chapter Three, I argue that the relation to military sacrifice ought to be 
imagined as a political, paradoxical effect of the contradictions inherent to the neoliberal 
restructuring of capitalism’s link to war. I supplement the theological/philosophical literature, 
which, as I claim, without appropriate amendments runs the risk of essentializing sacrifice. I 
argue for a critical political-sociological approach concerned with 1) the place and positioning of 
bodies in an increasingly disembodied architecture of global violence, 2) how sacrifice is 
mobilized or immobilized as it is invoked or silenced in political and militarized discourses, and 
3) the changing meaning of the status of the citizen-soldier archetype. Chapter Three thus takes 
up a comparative method to focus on how sacrifice is constructed in a distinctly militarized 
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imagining, and how it is subsequently represented as integral to the politics of the nation-state. It 
also examines how sacrifice becomes depoliticized, and under what conditions it includes or 
rejects issues of the body or technology. I argue that political discourse reveals the 
precariousness of the citizen-soldier’s relation to sacrifice, and that, because of this 
precariousness, the attempts to manage the contradictions of the neoliberal restructuring of 
capitalism’s link to war are brought into sharp relief. In Canada, the examples given point to how 
sacrifice is deployed in a celebratory manner, where identity becomes re-nationalized and re-
militarized, and how the democratic pulse of the sovereign nation is explicitly linked to the 
memory of honorable past sacrifices. In the U.S. case, sacrifice is deployed in a hesitant and 
cursory manner. It is un-problematically regarded as essential to victorious warfare, but 
nevertheless presented as ideally no longer required in the fantastical imagining of bloodless, 
downsized, and high technology war, where bodies are treated as fallible liabilities rather than 
necessary assets. In upholding a Foucauldian-inspired inquiry, and through a conscious rejection 
of theoretical closure, I claim that we are better positioned to investigate these contradictions as 
unfolding as a productive paradox. 
In Chapter Four, I claim that governing this paradox is a priority for Western liberal 
governments, who, being explicitly casualty-averse, aim to reconcile sovereign and biopolitical 
modes of power by subjecting sacrifice to governing. Here, Foucault’s language of “letting die” 
and “making live” captures how this paradox is governed in relation to multidirectional forms of 
violence, which intensified in tandem with global militarization following the end of the Cold 
War. Marked by the formal downsizing of militaries alongside the expansion of militarization, 
the question of how the U.S. ought to manage the geo and social politics of the paradox of 
military sacrifice, otherwise coded in terms of how to deploy bodies, citizens, or others in war, 
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reveals the contradictory effects of a liberal state that is both casualty averse and engaged in 
prolonged high technology warfare. The paradox, once again, is about how to maintain the 
ideological, sociopolitical, and militarized conditions to simultaneously demand—to call on 
citizens to sacrifice, and to likewise cultivate a brand of citizenship wherein those subjects 
answer the call and/or tacitly support creeping domestic and global surveillance and 
militarization—and deny sacrifice by circumnavigating bodily politics. The effects of the 
thinning of the archetype of the citizen-soldier, and what it has historically represented for the 
nation, are becoming abundantly clear, paving the way for a form of violence that benefits from 
postmodern capitalism’s reliance upon high technology’s fusion with the intensification of 
military and security privatization schemes. Finally, I claim that to better understand the 
applicability of sacrifice, we must position it within a historically defined concept of sovereignty. 
In highlighting some of the conceptual differences between pre-modern and democratic 
sovereignty I claim that sacrifice risks conceptual incoherence within the political landscape of 
the democratic sovereign. As a result, to gain credibility, sacrificial discourse must invoke 
aspects of pre-modern sovereignty to maintain the nation-state’s grip on legitimate violence.   
In Chapter Five, I argue that sacrifice has been displaced along three interrelated axes: 
publicity, surplus, and embodiment. While rhetoric links citizenship to sacrifice (Kahn, 2011, p. 
80) “for many today, the link of citizenship to identity and identity to sacrifice seems a 
memory—a remnant—of a less cosmopolitan, and more violent past” (Kahn, 2011, p. 99). 
Indeed, I gesture to the idea that political rhetoric upholds a relation between citizenship and 
sacrifice in the context of a rapidly changing style of violence where the intensification of social 
relations, which have been geared towards economic and social forms of privatization, is 
evident: Here, the speed at which violence is designed and applied is held back by the 
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ideological, citizenship-based commitments to the body of the citizen-soldier and, by extension, 
“the people.” Yet, recalling Foucault’s famous remark that “wars are waged on behalf of the 
existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter,” 
it appears that this imagining of war as an all-encompassing activity, or the idea of total war as 
was best reflected by WWII, is undermined by neo-liberal economic framings of war. Rather 
than war, in its traditional practice, we have targeted, fragmented, and isolated acts of violence 
where sovereign power is no longer maintained by or reflected in the body of the citizen-soldier. 
Considering this rejection of a national audience—the demobilization of (nationalized) 
populations—I argue that sacrifice is disrupted along three interrelated themes or axes, which all 
hinge on the sovereign and symbolic power associated with the archetype of the citizen-soldier: 
publicity/privatization, surplus/rejection of surplus, and embodiment/disembodiment.  
In Chapter Six, I draw on my interview data, participant observation, investigative 
reporting, drone advertising imagery, and secondary academic literature, to argue that body-less 
warfare transcends the socio-political and moral limits of bodies (which are always threatened by 
simply being) thereby eclipsing the injury of citizen-soldiers on “our” side. This problematically 
destabilizes traditional means of commemorating wartime suffering—and therefore dramatically 
limits how wartime state violence can be acknowledged or recognized in a distinctly sacrificial 
language. The aim of the chapter is to flesh out these disruptions with greater precision in the 
context of drone warfare, showing how the abandonment of the citizen-soldier model of warfare 
has further enabled this destabilization of sacrifice. If we accept that the most valorized 
expression of sacrifice is contained within the image of the citizen-soldier, we must account for 
how the combination of military privatization, outsourcing, and technologizing of war making, 
destabilizes and reconfigures this powerful process, amounting to a non-sacrificial style of 
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warfare. I ask, What work is the citizen-soldier no longer doing for the nation state? Drone 
violence gains credibility through a dialectic of visibility (the battlefield) and invisibility (the 
violence) and renders that which was previously unseen visible—casting excess light upon the 
battlefield to break up the fog of war, while it claims to save and protect those lives that matter 
most: American and allied soldiers. However, the political and social landscape in which drone 
warfare operates and gains credibility is dependent upon the invisibilization of interrelated 
processes: the politics of emotional trauma, the scene of sacred violence, and the identification of 
the witness.  
In Chapter Seven, I conclude that, in the imagining of the nation state, the citizen-soldier 
represents the supreme expression of sacrifice, and therefore citizenship, which other citizens are 
compelled to aspire to. The figure of the citizen-soldier, making up the first group of people to 
receive regular benefits, signified ideally proper conduct for all civilians (Burchell, 2002). 
However, the end of conscription, coupled with neoliberal flexible citizenship, troubled the 
content of military sacrifice and its ability to act as a check on violence. Rather than liberal 
democracy’s promise of a decline in violence (we have fewer casualties), however, drone 
warfare—as the technological expression of the sociopolitical philosophy of privatization—is 
contributing to the expansion of more, increasingly invisible, and therefore meaningless 
violence. Therefore, I propose that we consider the concept of “non-sacrificial war” to capture 
these trends in state violence, where privatization and drones work together to destabilize the 
archetype of the citizen-soldier. 
 
Summary 
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The citizen-soldier emerged as a critical ideological figure in the context of nation-state 
building following the birth of modern citizenship in North America and Western Europe. In this 
period, the model of citizen warfare was anchored in the territorialisation of sovereignty, which 
was bound up with the exteriorization and biopoliticization of war. The citizen-soldier, as 
someone whose sacrifice in war is thought to de facto constitute national service, served dynamic 
sociopolitical purposes for the nation. It did so in a period of state building when nationalism and 
citizenship were discursively woven together, through origin stories, racialized conceptions of 
otherness, and territoriality.  
As an archetype of citizenship, the citizen-soldier normalized a belief that soldiers’ 
actions in wartime reflected the highest echelon of sacrifice—a consensus that is widely shared 
today, although not without its challenges. As argued, both flexible citizenship (as evidenced by 
military privatization) and the archetype of the martyr (whose embodiment offers a direct 
critique of secular humanism and the liberal West’s culture of war) show how the global era of 
war places an unbearable burden on the liberal and democratic republican theories of 
sovereignty’s relationship to sacrifice. This dissertation will show how military/security 
privatization and drone warfare together reveal the loosening of the citizen-soldier's grip on 
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
Chapter Map  
This chapter is comprised of three sections. First, it begins with a description of how the 
dissertation is informed by a general set of intellectual commitments and motivations, which 
mostly coalesce around (but ought not be reduced to) Foucault, for his contribution of discourse 
analysis in critical security studies, and around his admirers, who take up his insights in their 
own work. Included here is a discussion of how I mobilize these Foucault-inspired traditions of 
discourse analysis and apply them in my investigation of narratives of militarized violence and 
official, politicized speeches. I also make some preliminary points in response to the 
contemporary moment and explain the history and context framing my research questions. Next, 
I discuss the interview process, data sources, and other methods. In this last section, I explain 
how I selected interview participants and excluded others, and I describe the nature, experience, 
and purpose of the interviews themselves. Finally, I point to what I imagine are the main 
contributions of this research.  
 
Methodological Approach and Methods 
My methodological approach, epistemological, and ontological impulses combine 
elements from (in no order) feminist geopolitics, critical security studies, and sociopolitical 
critical theory. Considering the research questions, 1) how do states and militaries respond to the 
contemporary problem of military sacrifice; 2) what notions of citizen-soldiering, and technology 
inform their responses, and 3) how do their responses impact understandings of the conduct of 
war and international politics, it ought not be surprising that my theoretical perspective is 
inherently interdisciplinary: “A political science topic from a political- sociological perspective” 
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is what I am now accustomed to saying when describing my somewhat unanticipated research 
framework to inquiring minds.  
After all, few sociologists are likely take up critical, geopolitical approaches to war. 
While warfare has traditionally been claimed as an area of study by political scientists, realists, 
neo-realists, and International Relations’ (IR) scholars, “war studies” has only recently, since 
approximately the 1980s, begun to shed its constraints --for example in its consideration of ways 
to conceptualize how “the social” is operationalized in the study of war’s violence. This move to 
include the category of the social in IR scholarship productively challenges the field’s tendency 
towards realism, neorealism, and their associated positivist methodologies, as well as its 
problematic, historical preoccupation with viewing key concepts such as sovereignty, the state,10 
violence, and war as inherently bounded, knowable, progressive, self-evident, and unit-based 
occurrences.  
Often termed the “post-modern”11 or “discursive” turn in IR, these critical interventions 
are characterized by Foucauldian impetus towards what he termed “archeological” and 
                                                        
10 I ascribe to Rygiel’s “ontology” of the state. Drawing on David Campbell, Rygiel argues that this view of the 
state argues that territorial borders do not exist in “some essentialist kind of way...they must be performed and are 
continually being reconfigured through governing practices” (2008, p. 230). Moreover, this approach argues that 
governing takes place outside of the state as evidenced by alliances and amalgamations of power amongst different 
non-state actors, private entities, individuals, etc. So, an analysis of the state must account for the ways in which the 
state participates in the downloading or outsourcing of its own power, as well as more “hard,” explicit forms of 
power such as immediate and direct acts of violence. 
11 Postmodern approaches to topics within international relations writ large build on the discursive turn in critical 
security studies. Emphasizing deconstructive methods, these approaches often apply Foucault’s concepts of power 
and governmentality—which describe control techniques and practices that are not reducible to state politics— to 
securitization (Edkins, Pin-Fat & Shapiro 2004; Dauphinée & Masters 2007).  Particularly, I draw inspiration from 
Foucault’s theoretical maneuver of ‘problematization,’ and his notion that “conditions of possibility,” make certain 
concepts, events, or processes, in this case, military sacrifice, knowable. In theorizing military sacrifice as a site of 
problematization, I claim that it is oftentimes deployed in discourse and in practice in vague and unelaborated-upon 
ways. Although Foucault himself would have likely resisted the classification of himself as a “discourse analyzer” 
the epistemological premise of discourse analysis nevertheless asserts that understanding how discourse, or “talk and 
text,” is dialectically constructed, maintained and perpetuated is essential for understanding power/knowledge 
dynamics across local nodes and global spaces.  
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“genealogical” methods as well as Derrida-inspired deconstructive methods (Mutlu and Salter, 
2013). Together, these methods constitute a general suspicion of modern metanarratives and a 
congruent trend toward ahistoricity, closure, and essentialism, as well as the belief that 
transcendental constructs such as reason and consciousness are historically and culturally 
contingent (Fournier, 2012). Briefly, the discursive approach in critical security studies theorizes 
that “language is political, social, and cultural: discourse analysis is the rigorous study of writing, 
speech, and other communicative events in order to understand these political, social, and 
cultural dynamics” (Mutlu & Salter, 2013, p. 113). The discursive turn is a general phrase to 
refer to the methodologically broad ways in which social meaning is derived from the interplay 
between various textual artefacts across time and space.    
For critical security studies’ topics and approaches, where genealogy, intertextuality, and 
speech acts make up the primary concepts, discourse analysis has as its object of study the 
sociopolitical world: continuity, change, and rupture are its strategies (Mutlu & Salter, 2013). 
Although both Foucault and Derrida variously resisted their association with the methods of 
discourse analysis and de-construction, their approaches nevertheless inspired the discursive turn 
in IR. I suggest that my political-sociological perspective offers a natural entry point into a 
research project that pivots on the discursive turn in IR, whose historical lineage, and 
contemporary impact, is made apparent throughout the dissertation.   
For example, official discourses of the “exceptional” War on Terror and those which 
might attribute their origin or inspiration to the War on Terror are regarded here as deeply 
connected to other more “routine” politicized speech acts which have war, sacrificial violence, 
memorialization, and militarization as their core elements. In this way, discourses are not 
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discretely bounded entities but must be contextualized, and inevitably theorized, in relationship 
to discourses past and present: “Discourse is not produced without context and cannot be 
understood without taking context into consideration…discourses are always connected to other 
discourses which are produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and 
subsequently” (Fairclough & Wodak, quoted in Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 4). Discourses 
ultimately reflect a historical and relational quality that permits the ascendance of some ideas 
over others according to a relation of knowledge and power-- a relation that the social 
construction of ideas cannot escape. Social structures not only determine discourse, they are also 
a product of discourse (Fairclough, 1989). In this way, the theme of “exceptionalism” contained 
within the discourse of the War on Terror, and the “routine” speech acts that appear more banal 
in the everyday, are co-constituting. 
My research shows how continuity, change, and rupture, much of which occurs on and 
through the (material and symbolic) body of the “citizen-soldier,” a primary puzzle piece of the 
research, is inexplicably tied to official discourses of the War on Terror. I examine these 
discourses for continuity with regards to sacrificial themes as a way to explain moments when 
sacrifice is absent or silenced. The dissertation begs the question: “What work is the citizen-
soldier and/or a militarized notion of sacrifice no longer doing here?” Likewise, in moments 
where sacrifice is thematically centralized, when it is celebrated, and emboldened, it signals, for 
this author, a critical entry point to analyze the effects of sacrifice as a trope- one that is an 
assumed given in the nation-state’s presentation of its war powers.    
Like many sociologists, my approach, in supplementing political science’s historical 
blind spots with questions of “the social” in militarized violence- “the social construction of 
security -” is inspired, in part, by C. W. Mill’s (1959) notion of the “sociological imagination.” 
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Mills claims that, “neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood 
without understanding both” (p. 3), that is, that particularized stories and larger processes 
intersect and in turn are shaped by one another. Following Mills, then, as an interdisciplinary 
researcher who views the individual and society as mutually co-constitutive, informs the way I 
theorize about the neoliberal way of war. In this way, the archetype, or subject-position, of the 
“citizen-soldier,” a centerpiece of this dissertation, cannot be separated out from the broader 
questions of how citizen-soldiers are entangled with dynamic neoliberal citizenship regimes, and 
how those regimes further engage in and enable globalization, technologization, economic 
privatization, and sacrificial politics in the maintenance and production of military violence. So, 
taking advantage of my home discipline’s ability to capture the intersections between micro and 
macro powers, this dissertation attempts to show how these two dimensions unfold in the politics 
of sacrifice. In this way, I advance Taussig-Rubbo’s (2009) claim that sacrifice concerns how 
violence becomes contained within a “schematic of significance and insignificance.” 
Indeed, it is a key argument of this dissertation that the solidification of the relation 
between citizenship, soldiering, and sacrifice has historically been marked by the framework of 
“significance and insignificance.” As an archetype, the citizen-soldier reflected a turning point in 
the legitimacy of nation-state violence, yet, I will argue, that archetype is increasingly troubled. 
The complex reasons for this rupture will be explored in subsequent chapters. Of importance 
here for historicizing the citizen-soldier’s link to sacrificial cults and putting into context our 
contemporary moment are the critical turning points of WWI and WWII (total war), and 
likewise, the political and ideological effects of the intersections between morality, technology, 
and militarization after the key historical/political events of the Vietnam War and the first Gulf 
War in 1991.  
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WWI reflected “the combination of modern nationalism, industrialism and technological 
limitations…whose defining characteristic was mass” (Shimko, 2010, p.10). The inaccuracy of 
the newly acquired firepower of WWI was eventually resolved during the nuclear revolution of 
WWII, which revealed the “speed with which total annihilation [could be] carried out, and the 
ability to do so without first achieving success on the battlefield” (Lieber, 2005, p. 126). From 
machine guns to air assaults and bombing, WWII altered how technology would be 
conceptualized within the spatial logic of the battlefield. Accordingly, American war-making in 
WWII and into the Cold War period was defined by a military doctrine of annihilation along 
with a resource-based approach to warfare, as evidenced by the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam 
(Adamsky, 2010, p. 79). While over nineteen million people died in combat during WWII, the 
deaths of American and Canadian soldiers were regarded as honourable, and for a just cause, and 
therefore are remembered as noble sacrifices (Singer, 2010). These were called “total wars” (so-
called “wars of necessity”), which facilitated citizen-soldier deaths as legitimate. Sacrificial 
politics were, and continue to be, effortlessly consolidated in the nation’s imagination of itself 
during this time. In contrast, limited wars, such as humanitarian wars, (so-called “wars of 
choice”) turn casualties (and therefore the problem of how to incorporate sacrifice in a schematic 
of significance and insignificance), into a serious political problem (Mandel, 2004).  
With respect to the significance and insignificance of certain modalities of sacrifice and 
suffering,12 Jennifer Hyndman’s (2008) theory of feminist geopolitics further inspires this 
                                                        
12 As Hyndman (2008) shows, a privileging of American life over politically marginalized “others” results in a 
racialized hierarchy of suffering, whereby some lives are worth mourning and others are not (Butler, 2006). “Dead 
US soldiers, for instance, get counted. They tell a story about which bodies count as politically qualified life” 
(Masters 2007, p. 47). Notably, the deaths of private contractors are not “counted.” The following chapters will 
attempt to show how PMCs’ conceptions of sacrifice, and the general resistance to it, might complement or 
contradict state-generated discourses of sacrifice. The dissertation illuminates how the naming of sacrifice is always 
contested in relation to regimes of citizenship, of who is excluded and who is included as embodiments of the 
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dissertation’s interdisciplinary impulse. Hyndman’s approach  recasts war away from the 
disembodied space of neo-realist geopolitics towards understanding war in material terms; that 
is, Hyndman makes clear, war is about live human subjects. Hyndman also crucially argues that 
war has productive qualities, that is, war gives content and meaning to the nation-state and 
provides grounds for a certain mode of governing and related kinds of actions. In this way, war is 
productive as far as it re-constitutes the archetype of the citizen-soldier while at the same time 
calling on ordinary citizens to identify as militarized subjects within and through nationalized 
discourses of history and sacrifice. Historically, this has occurred in relation to nation-building 
projects by rendering foreign outsiders and racialized people as “dangerous” and external to the 
nation. War’s violence (both material and discursive violence) provides a site where narratives of 
nationalized and collective memory are produced, which in turn legitimizes national borders. In 
the aftermath of security violations, which today are often coded in the media as terrorist acts, 
borders are often represented as threatened. Thus, a chief security concern emerges: to authorize 
the protection of the nation against these perceived threats. But this security concern, particularly 
after September 11th, 2001, is not just defensive or reactive—it also actively legitimizes pre-
emptive military interventions, often for so-called humanitarian purposes, and intensifies the 
policing and surveillance of (often racialized) bodies domestically. Therefore, war, and its 
related security discourses, is a positive good13 as far as it, in the inclusion and exclusion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
sovereign right to apply lethal violence. Given that globalized regimes of citizenship have been restructured towards 
flexible modes of belonging (Ong, 1999), citizenship is a relevant portal through which to theorize how citizen-
soldiers ascribe to and resist the rhetoric of sacrifice. Hence, the dissertation reveals a genealogical thread concerned 
with tracing the trajectories of soldiering as it pertains to citizenship.  
13 Positive forms of power imply that biopolitics is often expressed in terms of bettering (protecting) human lives. 
However, the same argument used to ensure the well-being of society can also be used to justify mass killings in the 
name of protecting society (Hunt & Rygiel, 2006).  
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people, and in claiming killing and dying are the grounds of sovereign politics, re-authorizes 
state violence.14     
For Hyndman, research into the qualities of war’s violence is about putting together the 
quiet, even silenced, narratives of violence and loss that do the work of taking apart dominant 
geopolitical scripts of “us” versus “them.” The deconstruction of such binary scripts is vital, and 
feminist geopolitics aims to recover stories and voices (p. 197). In this vein, in Chapter One I 
argued that in connecting the figures of the citizen-soldier and the martyr we might be better 
equipped to see these two embodiments of sovereign struggle as complementary and co-
constitutive pieces in a globalized tapestry of “terroristic” and “terrorizing” violence, that is, in 
contrast to oppositional figureheads of so-called “civilized” and “uncivilized” communities.   
But in this dissertation, not all voices, not all stories shared with me via the interview 
process, belong to groups that need to be “recovered” in the way that Hyndman is suggesting. 
These voices are not of marginalized people in disenfranchised communities, having been 
unjustly silenced or ignored by the mainstream elements of society. Indeed, many (but not all) of 
                                                        
14 Consider as a counter-example how American Motown artist Edwin Starr's popular anti-war anthem “War,” 
describes war in purely negative terms. War is destructive (“It ain’t nothin’ but a heartbreak”), it induces death 
(“War, it’s got one friend, that's the undertaker,”) and it is deeply gendered: women sacrifice their sons who are in 
turn sacrificed through death or injury (“War means tears to thousands of mothers eyes when their sons go off to 
fight and lose their lives.”) War is negative. According to the lyrics, war is negative not only morally and ethically 
but also in how it destroys communities and their inhabitants, who are often innocent civilians and therefore non-
participants in war, along with infrastructure and resources. This was particularly apt in the Vietnam War, when 
carpet-bombing was often indiscriminately applied and lacked the (arguable) precision that is typically ascribed to 
today’s high-tech weapons systems. As one interviewee asked me, illustrating this point: “Do you remember during 
the Vietnam War, we had carpet-bombing? We just bombed a certain village, let’s say a quarter of mile, we thought 
the whole country was the enemy. That is just not possible for US forces today” (S.G.). War leaves soldiers on all 
sides dead, injured, and sometimes psychologically traumatized. Entire nations are deemed enemy territory. War, 
according to the powerful lyrics of “War,” offers no concrete solutions for the complex, myriad causes of 
contemporary globalized wars. Here, war is good for absolutely nothing; my dissertation instead is attuned to not 
only the material destruction wrought by war but its productive quality as well. 
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my interviews, as will be discussed further later, might be characterized as privileged, well-
spoken, educated, and successful voices, experts in manned/unmanned aviation, drone research, 
and/or the lobbying industry. As such, most were in fact quite comfortable sharing their expert 
knowledge and insight, particularly to the uninitiated. These are the discourses of security 
professionals, an emergent cadre of experts on the issue of drones, of interest here primarily 
because of how they participate in the production of what the Copenhagen School calls 
“securitizing speech acts.”15 In these speech acts of security and defense professionals, I found 
an elaborate use of distanced and sanitized abstraction and euphemism, which I suggest serves in 
the stabilization of their subject position as agents, experts, actors, and users of drone 
technology, rather than as passive victims of it. Consider the phrases “clean bombs” and 
“surgically clean strikes,” which Carol Cohn found circulated frequently amongst nuclear 
defense professionals in her study of their discourses in the late 1980s. Such phrasing 
demonstrates “an astounding chasm between image and reality that characterizes technostrategic 
language” (Cohn, 1987, p. 692) reminding us that the linguistic and discursive deployment of 
“clean bombs” and “surgically clean strikes” has a historical lineage that predates our 
contemporary technological moment of drone warfare.   
                                                        
15 That security ought to be understood as a “speech act” located within political argument and discursive 
legitimation, is a core claim of securitization theory (Williams, 2003). Here, security is treated not as an objective 
condition, but as the outcome of a specific social process: the social construction of security issues (who or what is 
being secured, and from what) is analyzed by examining the “securitizing speech acts” through which threats 
become represented and recognized. Issues become “securitized,” treated as security issues, through these speech 
acts, which do not simply describe an existing situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully 
representing it as such (p. 513). In this way, securitization must be understood as both an existing reality and a 
continual possibility (p. 522). For Williams, securitization theory bears close resemblance to a neorealist, 
“Schmittian,” understanding of political order, since the specificity of security as a particular kind of speech act has 
its roots in an understanding of the politics of enmity, decision, and emergency. That aside, for a speech act to be 
socially effective in the act of securitization, it must cast the issue as one of existential threat, which calls for 
extraordinary measures.     
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In contrast to the euphemistic and sanitized abstraction characteristic of the security and 
defense security experts, I also interviewed people who could be characterized as having a more 
“counter-culture” mindset. This group of interviewees portrayed their stories pertaining to war’s 
violence and the specific issue of drone warfare as fraught with the intimacy (rather than 
distance) of experience, with trauma, with emotional difficulty, and, often, as politically 
sensitive, and therefore, always-already critical. Many of these interview subjects told me that 
they had encountered poverty and/or poor job prospects prior to their enrollment in the military, 
and many have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain 
injuries (TBI), and other mental health disorders following their service in the military.  
Still, regardless of who the speaking subject is, whether characterized as a “recovered,” 
“privileged,” or “counter-cultural” voice, my methodological framework obligates me to 
remember that all knowledge claims can only be partial, that is, they are historically, socially, 
and politically contingent artefacts of an elusive truth, which I view as fleeting, contested, and 
unfixed.  
In this way, this dissertation is deeply indebted to both Foucault’s conceptualization of 
truth, not as immaculate sociological research (because even the most adherent disciples of 
Foucault recognize how flawed and unfinished much of his work is) but for his cultivation of a 
certain sensibility—a method for looking at the social world that rejects theoretical closure and 
does not foreground origins or causes as explanatory devices.  This mode of thinking embraces 
a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating, 
and specifying ‘real causes,’ concerning itself instead with considering the manifest 
political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another. (Campbell, 
quoted in Milliken, 1999, p. 225) 
   55 
 
 
Indeed, this approach argues that, in the politics of representation, it would be undesirable if not 
impossible to trace a cause/origin while upholding historical complexity over a reductionist 
simplicity. The approach draws on a deconstructive tradition: speaking, and writing tentatively of 
correlation, congruent effects, and relationality.  
As such, in my analysis of interview and textual data, namely official government 
speeches, I follow Carol Cohn’s approach to studying the language of political elites, and 
defense professionals and/or intellectuals. She writes, “The temptation is to draw some 
conclusions about the defense intellectuals themselves- about what they are really thinking 
about, or their motivations; but the temptation is worth resisting” (Cohn, 1987, p. 693). Further, 
“individual motivations cannot necessarily be read directly from imagery; the imagery itself does 
not originate in these particular individuals but in the broader cultural context” (Cohn, 1987, p. 
693). In my case, I too seek to avoid this temptation in the analysis of my data, and I avoid 
reducing complex sociopolitical phenomenon -- sacrificial politics, and disembodied, privatized 
forms of violence and warfare -- to a single individual, to a single presidential administration, or 
to a single political moment.   
On the subject of cause and effect, it is worth here pausing to preface some of the 
methodological/epistemological difficulties in the dissertation to foreshadow some of the 
discussions to come. In the dissertation, I present several processes that I argue have come to 
bear on the decline of sacrifice relative to the citizen-soldier: “globalization,” “techno-fetishism,” 
“neoliberalism,” “post-modernism,” the “Vietnam syndrome,” and the character of “non-state 
terrorism.” These processes tend to hover over, or circulate around, two specific processes that I 
most thoroughly want to trace: 1) the fate of the problematic of sacrifice that underwrites the 
citizen-soldier, and 2) corresponding shifts in military practice, as evidenced by both 
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military/security privatization, and drones. Since this is a Chapter on methodology, it is worth 
clarifying the respective weight given to these macro processes to qualify their relation without 
reducing the discussion to one of historical linearity, or cause and effect, which I believe is a 
fruitless endeavor as evidenced by the framework provided by both Campbell, and Cohn, and 
others, as discussed above.  
Despite Foucault’s limited engagement with war and security, he is nonetheless an 
important thinker within critical security studies due partly to his development of a genealogical 
historical method (Salter, 2013). In contrast to dominant historical accounts, genealogy does not 
search for “authorized, originary moments of a particular set of practices or politics; rather there 
is a focus on the breaks, silences, and disruptions in a discourse, institutions, and practices” 
(Vucetic, quoted in Salter, 2013, p. 5). Put differently, it is in the paradoxes, ambiguities, and 
moments of contradiction and incompletion that the Foucauldian scholar will find inspiration, 
rather than in seeking theoretical closure..  
And so, it is Foucauldian insight I apply when I attend to what I will call “the paradox of 
sacrifice.” Although it is the subject of the next chapter, I will define and justify the phrase 
briefly here, in order to show how Foucauldian genealogical methods, as well as discourse 
theory, become central to the methodology of this dissertation.   
The “paradox” of sacrifice is found in the sociopolitical tension between demanding and 
disavowing sacrifice, that is, the interplay between the sovereign power to kill or let die and the 
power, most trenchant in our current biopolitical moment, wherein life is to be protected at all 
costs.  
This has become especially strained since 9/11 and the subsequent launch of the Global 
War on Terror. Why? On the one hand, The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
   57 
 
 
(and its continued re-authorization), originally signed into law by President George W. Bush on 
September 18th, 2001, means that any entity thought to be associated with al Qaeda (“associated 
forces”) and/or perceived past or future violence toward the U.S. is subject to American military 
power. This, as far as it is an invitation for endless war, dramatically widens the temporal and 
spatial scope of militarization, and the neoliberal economics that underpin it, as well as the 
potential broadening of a sacrificial impetus.  
On the other hand, the ideology of casualty-aversion, which came about as an effect of 
the Vietnam syndrome, provides the second explanation for the straining of the sacrificial 
paradox—since it means that the U.S. cannot readily implement sacrifice. Biopolitics here acts as 
a sort of “check” on sovereign power. Military sacrifice is, quite simply, about sovereign 
power’s role in orchestrating and justifying control over both international and domestic acts of 
killing and dying, including risk, death, and injury to American troops. Even the perceived risk 
to troops is regarded as a politically costly endeavor, one that both the American public and 
Congress adamantly avoid. Herein is where the trouble lies: both military and security 
privatization, coupled with the high-technology of drones, work in the service of easing this 
tension, and ultimately easing the paradox of sacrificial violence. 
Let us briefly depart from the War on Terror to contextualize and trace the history of this 
casualty-aversion. We may look to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as integral to its 
design and implementation. Central to the RMA is “net-centric warfare,” the aim of which is to 
link up a smaller number of highly trained human warriors with small, fast, agile weapons 
systems and mechanized support linked via GPS and satellite communications into an intricate, 
interconnected system in which the behaviour of components would be mutually enhanced by 
constant exchange of real-time battlefield information (Eco quoted in Lucas, 2010, p. 290). 
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Unmanned systems, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are, as “the most important 
contemporary development in conventional military armaments” (Sauer & Schornig, 2012, p. 
363) essential to the operation of net-centric warfare. Net-centric warfare produces and sustains 
the technological conditions necessary to achieve bodyless warfare through drones and robotics 
more generally, as machines can operate in hazardous environments, do not need extensive 
education and training, require no minimum hygienic standards, do not tire, and are perfect in 
suppressing the enemy since soldiers do not even have to be exposed to an enemy in the first 
place (Sauer & Schornig, 2012, p. 363-4).16 The RMA thus facilitates the desire for full-spectrum 
dominance: including surveillance and dominance of land, air, and sea, the militarization of 
space, information warfare, and control over communication networks. This also entails the 
expansion of military bases globally, yet, instead of “boots on the ground,” military operations 
are now often conducted by technicians who sit in air-conditioned tents, away from any sign of 
the battlefield (Parenti, 2007).  
Indeed, significant force reduction is required to finance the technology necessary for the 
RMA (Moskos, Williams & Segal 2000, p. 5). The military was not exempt from broader 
institutional transformations in industrial societies: it too shifted from a labour to capital-
intensive organization (Manigart, 2006). The decline of the mass army model went together with 
restructuring towards professionalization. Managers and technicians increasingly conducted war, 
as opposed to combat leaders (Moskos, 2000, p. 15). The professionalization of the military was 
                                                        
16 In response to this, there has been an “ethical turn” in debates on the incorporation of drones and robotics in war 
(Singer 2009). Ronald Arkin (2010) argues that robots can perform more ethically on the battlefield as compared to 
soldiers, and thus provides a case for “autonomous” unmanned systems. In response, scholars like Patrick Lin (2010, 
p. 315) claim that these technologies will have self-defeating, unintended effects. New military technologies can 
spill over into the civilian realm creating a feedback loop between military and society. For example, the use of 
drones for domestic purposes such as policing might violate privacy and civil liberties. Moreover, Noel Sharkey 
(2010) posits that while there is an insatiable military demand for UAVs (troops do not like to move without them) 
the automation of killing could potentially breach international humanitarian law (pp. 369-370).    
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essential for the realization of the goals of the RMA: “a policy agenda emphasizing the 
exploitation of technological advances to preserve and even improve the United States’ long-
term strategic position” (Shimko, 2010, p. 2). Without professionalization, the ideals of the 
RMA, particularly the incorporation of precision-guided weapons to give qualitative advantage 
to the U.S. over the quantitative advantage of the Soviet forces, would have remained abstract 
(Adamsky, 2010, pp. 59-61).  Hence the emergence of war strategies concerned with the 
importance of efficiency linked with the concern to reduce casualties. Currently, “many 
onlookers appear to utilize casualty minimization as their yardstick for success” (Mandel, 2004, 
p. 1). Indeed, following WWII, and throughout the Cold War, U.S. casualty aversion became 
full-fledged. However, one can also note that casualty aversion escalates in moments when the 
public questions the legitimacy of wars (Shimko, 2010) and also seems to reflect historical 
qualities of American political culture: specifically, the value of the individual over the state, and 
a historically deep-seated suspicion of government (Mandel, 2004).  
Circling back now to the War on Terror. In the post-9/11 era, threats are now 
conceptualized, or “securitized,” to use the language of the Copenhagen School, not in the 
framework of war between states, but as having transnational origins and effects. “There has 
been a fundamental shift in the emphasis of armed forces from the defense of the homeland to 
multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian missions” (Moskos 2000, p. 17). Once the Cold 
War conflict between East and West had officially dissolved, new threats, enemies, and 
transnational security issues were identified, such as the drug trade, environmental degradation, 
and uncontrolled immigration (Moskos, 2000) such that defense from invasion was no longer the 
primary concern of states.  
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The War on Terror, which launches from this new idea of threat and insecurity, becomes 
the primary entry point into my topic because I am claiming that the paradox of sacrifice, as 
understood in the U.S. context where the U.S. is both the primary author and the principle 
pursuer of the War on Terror, has endured tremendous pressure. Although I write of macro 
historical processes, such as globalization, neoliberalism, and post-modernism, it is not with the 
intention to claim that these processes have directly caused shifts in the U.S. military (such shifts 
as privatization and drones) and that this in turn has directly caused the slippage between the 
citizen-soldier and sacrificial idioms. Instead, what I want to claim is that this tension, or 
paradox, of sacrifice has been there all along, that it is integral to the very enactment of sacrifice, 
and that the War on Terror and its associated effects (including greater outsourcing and use of 
technology to avoid casualties and make war more efficient, in line with neoliberal economic 
logic) has made that paradox increasingly unbearable. To speak of congruent effects and 
correlation is more productive than speaking of causes and origins and can establish a greater, 
more complex, and nuanced, treatment of the sociological phenomenon this dissertation 
investigates.  
As should now be clear from the above, Foucault’s conceptual and methodological tools, 
including discourse analysis and the genealogical method, can be valuably applied to analysis of 
war, security, and sacrifice in our contemporary neoliberal moment. Therefore, genealogy, 
intertextuality, and speech acts make up the primary materials of this study. Discourse analysis 
has as its object of study the sociopolitical world: attention to continuity, change, and rupture is 
its strategy (Mutlu & Salter, 2013). which is defined by an increasing proliferation and 
marketization of security concerns. As far as the neoliberal discourse regards it, insecurity is the 
problem and more security is the solution. But, if we accept that security is an abstract rather 
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than objective concept, can a notion of a collective “we” ever be secure, and even still, who or 
what is the subject to be securitized? How are we to measure and quantify security?  
Paradoxically, North American audiences are encouraged to accept heightened 
surveillance techniques and increased powers of spy agencies to effectively implement 
counterterrorism measures. Yet there is no evidence of increased safety wrought by the 
application of these measures. Consequently, civil liberties groups criticize anti-terror legislation 
both in Canada and the U.S. (the Patriot Act in the U.S., and Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2015) for infringing on privacy rights and for allowing domestic spy agencies unprecedented, 
ostensibly unending, and unhindered spying capacity, thereby circumventing the American 
Constitution and Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Indeed, in our post-9/11 era, security 
is championed primarily. We see evidence of this in the increasing reliance upon the notion of 
risk, in the expanding global presence of private military and security companies, and in the 
neoliberal economic logic of “cost-benefit” analysis that is so often applied to analyzing conflict 
zones and preparing military solutions to counter perceived threats.  Unless the researcher is in a 
privileged institutional position, perhaps with a top security clearance, any research problematic 
concerned with security is going to encounter blocks to relevant data, but Foucault’s (anti) 
method frees us from these constraints, as far as what is left unsaid unseen is just as important as 
what is said or revealed. 
Finally, considering the specific focus on sovereign power it is curious that Foucault (and 
Foucault scholars more generally) does not explicitly engage the topic of sacrifice, since, as I 
will argue, sacrifice and sovereign power are deeply interconnected. However, Singer and Weir 
(2006) caution Foucauldian scholars of the danger in, as Foucault does, treating sovereignty as a 
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contrast concept in relation to discipline and governance, rather than as analytically distinct and 
useful in and of itself. They argue that historians of the present insufficiently theorize 
sovereignty (on the issues of historical specificity, the false equations of sovereign power and 
law, sovereign power and the state, and sovereign power and a delimited territory). This dearth 
of conceptual rigor, seen as well in the disregard for how the symbolic regime shifted to 
accommodate governance, also informs governmentality theorizing, whereby governance is 
often conflated with politics and thus problematically ends up acting as an umbrella term for all 
forms of power. If, as the authors argue, Foucault treats sovereignty as a straw man, then it 
would make sense that Foucault would resist exploring sacrifice as the link between sacrifice and 
sovereignty would not be sufficiently grasped using Foucault’s tools alone. Even so, this chapter 
attempts to design not a universal theory, but more of an approach to military sacrifice and the 
citizen-soldier with distinctly Foucauldian sensibilities to explore, later in the dissertation, the 
abandonment of the citizen-soldier model of warfare, the unambiguous turn toward 
military/security privatization, and the proliferation of drones. 
In summary, discourse analysis provides a sense of methodological freedom that proves 
necessary for a research program that has at its core a sensitive subject matter. This 
methodological freedom encourages the researcher to be curious about what is spoken, but also 
what remains unsaid, including seemingly banal utterances and occurrences. For example, the 
abstractness of sacrifice, coupled with its ostensible ordinariness, is here in this research 
conceptualized as a productive paradox, far from a theoretical dead-end. Like the concept of 
“war,” it is instead regarded as productive because of how it enables active governing of the self 
and others. By examining what is said and unsaid about sacrifice, its deployment in a “schematic 
of significance and insignificance,” the space is opened for an analysis of how it is discursively 
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harnessed to perpetuate a narrative about nation state power, national (non)-belonging, and the 
role of global military violence and its relation to citizenship (and therefore exclusion) within 
national communities.  
As I will argue in upcoming chapters, military sacrifice has been progressively hollowed 
out as a state demand and state practice. This is because, through the congruent practices of 
privatization and drone warfare, states can opt to avoid what I describe as “the scene of 
sacrifice,” unraveling the sacrificial politics that have historically informed war making and the 
role of the citizen-soldier therein in the nation-state’s imaginary of itself. Still, despite this 
avoidance, sacrifice has its symbolic power periodically activated to communicate mythic 
qualities of the state, namely, the legitimization of the sovereign state’s monopoly of violence 
(through its link to the sacred), which gains momentum through the construction, activation, and 
remembrance, of the citizen-soldier.  
The Foucauldian tradition of discourse analysis, combined with the teachings of the 
discursive turn in IR, mean that I read and interpret textual data in upcoming chapters through a 
lens that prioritizes the notion of security as perpetual and emergent, rather than fixed and 
objective, the notion of truth as elusive and fleeting, rather than stable and identifiable, and the 
problematic of the citizen-soldier’s ties to sacrificial cults as an effect of, rather than an inherent 
feature of, the changing meaning and status of sovereign politics as theorized alongside nation-
state power. My research design, specifically its use of discourse analysis as described in this 
chapter, complements the oftentimes unlikely bedfellows, the interdisciplinary theoretical and 
intellectual underpinnings of the dissertation.     
 
Interview Process 
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This dissertation research was conducted using a multi-pronged research strategy that 
relied upon several data sources. The most significant and thought-provoking data emerged from 
the twenty semi-structured interviews that I conducted. Beyond the interviews, which I will 
discuss below, data included secondary academic literature and other textual sources such as 
government speeches and reports, non-governmental reports, and popular media sources that 
often feature critical accounts of drone warfare, such as investigative news articles located in the 
U.K.’s Guardian, The New York Times, and The LA Times. Conducting sensitive research on 
ongoing technological development pertaining to weapons systems has its challenges.  
Being on the “outside” of the security and defense community and industry, combined 
with only having access to documents that are de-classified and available to the public, meant 
that, from the beginning, there would be strict limits to what kind of data I would be able to use. 
This meant that the “problem” of deciding which texts to study, one that many researchers 
genuinely face, was not entirely applicable to me, particularly with respect to government 
statements or documents pertaining to drones. Any such available treasures surely caught my 
attention, as they were very rare during the research process. Although undoubtedly there are a 
multitude of textual sources with information pertaining to a state or military’s “official” position 
on the use or applicability of drones in conflict zones (and of course I could never claim to have 
encountered them all) my research design, areas of research, and research questions, made me 
always-already intellectually open to most applicable textual sources. Indeed, investigative 
journalism, defense and security industry magazines, publications with a focus on unmanned 
technology, press releases from the lobbyist organization, the Association for Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles International (AUVSI), advertising or promotional materials, information found on 
websites of independent research facilities (i.e., DARPA), and information found on military 
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websites (i.e., the American Air Force) all made up applicable data sources for the research, so 
long as their information was credible and their insight was broadly respected, and therefore 
could be presumed accurate.     
Interviews were conducted slowly, over a long period of time: between late 2013 and 
early 2017. This stretch of time was not planned, but instead reflects a lull in productivity- a 
period of one-year, where the author took maternity leave. Due to the varied geographical 
locations of interview subjects (the U.S., Canada, and Europe) all interviews were conducted 
over the phone, typically via Skype. All interviews were recorded. Some interviews were 
transcribed in full, while others were only partially transcribed, depending on the relevancy and 
applicability of the resulting interview data. (Of course, not all interviews were equally 
“productive” in this regard). All interviewees provided written consent to participate in the 
interview. Many of the interviews were acquired through simple email introductions and 
requests; while many that followed those came about because of a snowball sampling technique. 
This method was quite successful. In some cases, one person would reach out to several people 
on my behalf, resulting in two or three additional interviews.   
The dissertation interviews were not aimed at one group. As such the goal was not to 
capture a single viewpoint of one organization, but a variety of voices and perspectives. 
However, even still, the multiplicity of voices was not meant to set parameters around, and/or to 
simplistically capture and define “the debate” around drones, i.e., in the framework of “defense 
practitioners” versus “critics,” but to reveal how personal experiences, professional/economic 
interests, and occupations differentially inform how interviewees regard and speak about the 
topics at hand. In this vein, there were of course competing narratives and contested versions of 
events. 
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As suggested above, my interviews fell broadly into two camps of people. The first camp 
that I interviewed I would call “practitioners,” i.e., security and defense experts and 
professionals. Sometimes they were from an academic or scholarly background, while in other 
cases they identified as drone lobbyists (typically members of the Association for Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles International or AUSVI) and/or former members of the U.S. military who now 
find themselves working in the private sector in drone consulting, research and development 
fields. In some instances, I approached these people for interviews following a talk they gave at a 
professional, industry conference. In other cases, I introduced myself and requested an interview 
through e-mail, after having vetted their expertise, experience, and credibility through an 
exhaustive web search.    
Interviews with drone or security insiders/practitioners were especially difficult to obtain. 
In rare cases people were immediately open; but that was the minority experience. I might 
speculate that the trouble in acquiring participants was because the immediate benefit for them 
was not clear—their effort and time was completely voluntary, and their contributions were for a 
research project with a decidedly critical bent, one that their views might not be entirely in line 
with (it is likely the viewpoints, on the surface, were directly opposed). Therefore, it is possible 
to speculate that most would think there would be no immediate gains to be had from such an 
exchange, and as such, I received many ignored and/or rejection-themed emails.  
That said, although they were the most difficult to establish, I was most transformed by 
these interviews, as well as by my (albeit brief) time as a participant-observer at academic and 
professional/industry conferences with an expressed military/defense and/or security theme. In a 
way my experience was reminiscent of Carol Cohn’s self-reflexive thoughts contained in her 
(1987) revolutionary essay “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” In 
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this piece, Cohn confesses her amazement at how, over spending some time as a participant 
observer as a “feminist spy in the house of death,” within the nuclear strategic analysis 
community, where men “calmly and matter-of-factly discuss nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, 
and nuclear war,” she ultimately began to like the men, and this was the source of an internal 
struggle around how to reconcile her liking of them with her disliking of their politics. I, too, was 
surprised to find that 
what is striking about the men themselves is not, as the content of their conversations 
might suggest, their cold-bloodedness. Rather, it is that they are a group of men unusually 
endowed with charm, humor, intelligence, concern, and decency. Reader, I liked them. At 
least, I liked many of them. The attempt to understand how such men could contribute to 
an endeavor that I see as so fundamentally destructive became a continuing obsession for 
me, a lens through which I came to examine all of my experiences in their world.” (p. 
690) 
In contrast to the hard-to-access security and drone insiders, a second set of interviewees 
were much more amenable to being interviewed for this research, since many of them saw 
obvious benefits in the timely politicization of topic(s) near and dear to them. This second camp 
of interviewees might be termed “critics.” This camp includes military veterans (many of whom 
I located and contacted through the organization, Iraq Veterans Against the War in Iraq); 
activists opposed to drone warfare (people active in protests, organizing and/or resistance 
movements) and two former soldiers, now identified in the media as “whistleblowers,” who were 
featured in an independent film about their experiences working directly with drone technology 
when they were deployed in Iraq and/or Afghanistan.  
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Regardless of where on the political spectrum each participant fell, and/or their specific 
life and professional experiences, I was surprised at how moved and inspired I was by each 
conversation. I also at first expected interviews to, in a sense, to simply “confirm” what I already 
anticipated to be true, general facts, theories, and figures, for example. Instead, what I found over 
time was that interviewees at times not only confirmed and/or triangulated the data, but were 
quite instrumental in shaping the direction, and goals, of the research; wielding an influence with 
respect to the control over and direction of the research parameters that I did not anticipate.  
Despite difficulties at times in acquiring participants, the selection criteria remained 
strict. I only interviewed people who have or have had a direct line into the application, 
conceptualization and/or practices associated with military drones and globalized violence. I 
primarily interviewed veterans who had seen combat, or at a minimum were deployed overseas, 
such that they could reasonably speak to the issues of how technology informed the application 
of violence abroad; the experts I interviewed work directly in unmanned technology; the security 
practitioners/lobbyists were typically in the drone research and development sector, or in 
consulting, and/or were directly involved with rolling out unmanned technology overseas.   
The interviews were semi-structured.  As time went on in the interview process, I began 
to refine my approach. I was, near the end of the process, not primarily interested in using 
interviews for “information” in the typical sense. In other words, I did not ask participants to 
recount events in a linear fashion, or to simply confirm widely available facts about drones or 
relevant events. In this vein, it was not so critical what informants said, but rather how they said 
it. For example, I took notice of what metaphors, discourses, and theoretical assumptions they 
cited in their representation of an answer to a question. My approach to the interview strategies, 
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as a novice interviewer, was refined over the entire process; as was my ability to effectively code 
and consolidate, synthesize, and integrate, what I transcribed.  
For illustration, those who might be classified as “drone advocates” discussed drones 
using a language of economic efficiency and clean, humanitarian types of warfare -- language 
choices that were often deeply intertwined with, indeed saturated in, sleek-sounding acronyms, 
and the euphemisms of neoliberal free-market capitalism. They discussed the violence of drones 
with a certain marked moral and emotional distance, drawing out a rhetoric of historical 
determinism flanked by rational objectivity. Meanwhile, those who might be deemed “drone 
critics” drew explicitly on an empathetic framing via their experiences of trauma and suffering 
(usually regarding the historical particularities of their time in the military.)  As Cohn described, 
I “liked” my interviewees. Asserting and maintaining my critical voice, learning how or when to 
subtly challenge their viewpoints, and when to remain silent, were all significant elements in the 
interview learning process.   
  
Research Contributions  
The apparent triumph of speed over geopolitics in military strategy obfuscates the 
sociopolitical, legal and moral hazards of drone warfare. I hypothesize that, when combined, 
military privatization and drone warfare remedies Foucault’s tension between biopower— “make 
live”— and sovereign power— “let die.” In assessing the diagnostic potential of sacrifice for 
theorizing political violence (Schott, 2010) I claim that bodies still matter (Butler, 2004) despite 
attempts to depoliticize the embodied aspects of violence through techno-fetishist smokescreens. 
Critical scholarship so far has mapped the morality of distanced combat (Coeckelbergh, 2013; 
Shaw, 2014) positing drones as an effect of high-technology capitalism (Der Derian, 2001; 
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Whitehead & Finnström, 2013). However, this research attempts to fill a gap as far as scholars 
having not yet addressed 1) how drones reconfigure sacrificial violence, and 2) how drones 
mystify agency as far as who can bear legitimate violence. As the first study to include the voices 
of both drone advocates and critics, I believe this research makes an original contribution to 
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Chapter Three: Politicizing Sacrifice 
 
A Political-Sociological Approach to Sacrifice 
Sacrifice is a hotly contested and enduring theme within the social sciences writ large. A 
deeply compelling theoretical concept, it spans an interdisciplinary spectrum. The topic of 
sacrifice has long warranted inquiry from a variety of theoretical gazes: anthropologists and 
sociologists, philosophers and theologians, legal scholars, and feminists. Indeed, the notion of 
the sacred has generated tremendous interest. Legal scholar Paul Kahn (2008) for example states, 
albeit with some likely criticism from social contract theorists, that the original political moment 
is not a contractual one, but in fact is a sacrificial one.17 The persuasiveness of sacrificial theory 
has further provoked an analogous interdisciplinary conversation on the sub-topics of ethics, 
psychology, and religion, between (in a non-exhaustive list): Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Blanchot, 
Bataille, Derrida, Nancy, Nietzsche, Girard, Levinas, Kristeva, Hubert & Mauss, Irigaray, and 
Žižek. To various degrees they also simultaneously develop their theories of sacrifice through an 
engagement with Lacanian and/or Freudian psychoanalysis, Hegelian dialectics, the history of 
Christianity, and/or the Bible's teachings.  
 
The Question of Sacrifice (Keenan 2005, p. 14) is an example of a remarkable text that 
captures and further extends this interdisciplinary conversation. Keenan methodically 
investigates a rich genealogy of the theories of sacrifice. This genealogy, he argues, invokes, and 
indeed requires, a parallel investigation into the “history of economics, sexism, and Christo-
                                                        
17 “Politics begins not in the social contract but in the pledge that expresses a willingness to sacrifice the self for the 
particular community” (Khan, 2008, p. 111). Khan goes on to describe this pledge as a “performative utterance” that 
shows the self-evident truth that is the transcendent value realized in the coming into being of the sovereign 
community (p. 111). 
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centric evolutionism.” I pause at this text, embracing, and indeed applauding the worthwhile 
genealogical methodological inclination, but ultimately, I depart from Keenan’s approach, 
because as a non-historian, my interest in sacrifice will not engage a purely historical angle. As a 
non-theologian, and non-philosopher, I will also not contribute to these metaphysical, 
psychoanalytic, or religious conversations on sacrifice, which I claim tend to be wrapped up in, 
and therefore overly preoccupied with, a search for generality, origins, and likewise, theoretical 
closure. While these approaches are undoubtedly important, my arguments will likely have no 
immediate contributions to these areas of inquiry.  
I want to suggest that these theoretical frameworks (to be discussed later) lack the 
required tools to explore sacrifice in its particularities within the specific empirical context to 
which this dissertation is situated in—the post-9/11 era of the War on Terror—and thus they are 
not fully equipped to capture the nuances within the globalized militaristic application of 
violence, of which the War on Terror has contributed. Nor can they fully account for the 
sociopolitical and economic conditions that fix meaning to who is thought to be able to order a 
sacrifice, who can sacrifice, and who must be sacrificed. Instead of inquiring, for example, about 
the unstable role of citizen-soldier archetype in relation to ‘public’ and ‘private’ modes of 
violence, or the intersections of racial, gendered, national, and class dynamics that constitute 
contemporary, global practices of violence, such specificities are omitted in the project of 
constructing abstract universal theories of sacrifice, thereby obfuscating sacrifice’s materiality- 
the lived politics of sacrifice.  
 
Part of the problem with the dominant literature on sacrifice is that it is difficult to 
imagine a straightforward way (assuming that this is even desirable) to import the deeply 
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religious, meta-historical, philosophical, and psychoanalytically motivated contributions to the 
concept of sacrifice into a distinctly political-sociological and critical security studies-minded 
framing of globalized militarized sacrificial violence, where biopower (to “make live;” 
concerning state intervention in the administration of human life) is taken seriously as an element 
of sacrifice alongside sovereign power (to “let die;” the right to take life). As I will further 
elaborate upon, these previously cited accounts ought to be supplemented to more adequately 
explain the applicability of sacrifice in the reconfiguration of capitalism’s link to war (discussed 
here as the “neoliberal restructuring of capitalism,” particularly revealed in relation to 
military/security privatization) and what I will eventually claim is its technological extension: the 
proliferation of unmanned technological systems such as weaponized and/or surveillance drones. 
It is commonplace to find an attempt to fix meaning to sacrifice in the makings of a general 
theory, rather than view sacrifice as a dynamic, political concept. To view sacrifice with 
skepticism, as that which ought to be rendered in ambivalent rather than certain vocabularies, is 
to destabilize it. In this act of destabilization, the space is created for a distinctly political-
sociological critique of sacrifice to emerge.   
As indicated by the title of this section, I take a political-sociological approach to 
militarized sacrifice, which is concerned with 1) the place and positioning of bodies in an 
increasingly disembodied architecture of global violence, 2) how sacrifice is mobilized or 
immobilized as it is invoked or silenced in political and militarized discourses, and 3) the 
changing meaning of the status of the citizen-soldier archetype. This approach views sacrifice, 
especially the taken-for-granted moments when it is both implicitly and explicitly invoked 
politically, as a gateway into the practices and processes of power integral to disembodied 
techno-fetishistic war, and the various expressions of privatization and flexible citizenship that 
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enable it. In this chapter, I lay the groundwork to eventually argue that sovereign and biopolitical 
forms of violence should be analyzed in tandem with the theorization of sacrifice, alongside 
moments when sacrifice appears to be a target of governmentality; silenced, rejected or 
otherwise circumvented, to understand how the incorporation or rejection of sacrifice serves to 
re-authorize a politics of legitimate violence.  
Theorizing politics as a site of (sometimes violent) confrontation integral to the 
production of meaning as pertains to ongoing contentious, exclusionary, and antagonistic social 
relations, my approach to sacrifice is characterized by this broader inquiry into how it, as a 
fundamentally embodied phenomenon, is constructed and represented in the making up of 
increasingly disembodied and depoliticized geographies of violent social relations. A political-
sociological approach, in my view, further explores sacrifice in terms of its discursive qualities; 
how it fails or succeeds as political, rhetorical device within given militarized, specialist, and/or 
institutionalized speech acts. This aspect focuses on how political elites and ordinary citizens 
alike can harness or reject the symbolic capital of sacrifice (an effect of power/knowledge 
relations) as a means to more efficiently govern or resist these contentious, exclusionary, and 
antagonistic relations that constitute the politics of the social and unequal power relations 
therein. 
Finally, a political-sociology of sacrifice mobilizes sacrifice as a means to contribute to 
discussions on the unstable meaning of the violence associated with archetype of the citizen-
soldier. It reveals how military sacrifice is always-already tied to the image of the citizen-soldier, 
a contested and itself unstable, albeit historically universally valued archetype, which is further 
tied to the dominant traditions of democratic republicanism. Herein I argue that the link between 
citizen soldiering and sacrifice is not a predetermined social given, but instead invokes a socially 
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constructed relationship, one that often consolidates retroactively in correspondence to 
historicized and nationalized affective frameworks as a means to reify or destabilize the citizen-
soldier as embodying sovereign will as the executor of legitimate violence.  
It should now be clear that, in this chapter, the crafting of a concrete theory of sacrifice is 
not the ultimate objective, but instead I use sacrifice as a portal into this larger problematic of the 
politics of how the Canadian and the American states differentially construct, mobilize, or reject 
sacrificial themes and discourse, to then authorize, make credible, and justify distinctive styles of 
military violence. Thus, this chapter contains a comparative element,18 but the comparison is 
only invoked somewhat briefly—in the spirit of a full-fledged comparison—as means to reveal 
the malleability and incongruity between sacrifice and the citizen-soldier archetype as it unfolds 
in relation to notions of history, the sovereign nation, and war. However, it is worth noting that 
the idea of a just war (the paradigm being World War II, which witnessed a clearly identifiable 
enemy and determinable spatial and temporal limits) is integral to the imagining and practice of 
sacrifice. The drive to sacrifice, in the form of an individual action of self-sacrifice, such as 
signing up for the military, or as a top-down, nationalized political-economic policy, such as in 
implementing a mass draft and therefore cultivating a nationalized ethos of widespread sacrifice, 
is especially apparent when wars are widely regarded as just. Given the ambiguity of the War on 
Terror’s enemy, and the related erosion of temporal and spatial boundaries of today’s counter-
terror wars, sacrifice, in both its micro and macro imaginings and practices, appears hollowed 
                                                        
18 My goal in this regard is not to develop a systematic comparison of Canada and the U.S. in a straightforward 
way; rather it is to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Therefore, I borrow this approach from historical 
sociologist Philip McMichael (1990). He utilizes comparison in a way in that it concerns the substance of the inquiry 
rather than the framework. The “whole” that McMichael speaks of emerges via comparative analysis of parts as 
moments in a self-forming whole. Incorporated comparison allows for the idea that totality is a conceptual 
procedure, rather than an empirical or conceptual premise. Accordingly, the whole is discovered through an analysis 
of the mutually conditioning parts. This is beneficial to my research because it allows for an analysis of both the 
material and discursive power dynamics in a way that reveals how the state-system is a fluid product of historical 
processes, which are intimately tied to, and shaped by, social relations. 
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out. To be sure, should a properly moral and just war present itself again,19 sacrifice would be 
primed to shed this ambivalence, likely re-emerging as a credible and powerful principle.  
I conclude this chapter by suggesting that sacrifice is best understood not a priori but as 
an unstable paradox. How might we understand military sacrifice as a paradox? Consider that in 
this contemporary era of humanitarian wars (characterized by peace-driven violence that is 
implemented to improve, empower, and ultimately enhance life) how citizen-soldier bodies are 
folded into, deployed, and/or excluded in this ostensible “humane” casualty-averse architecture 
of lethal violence (“the materiality of sacrifice”) constitutes the grounds of the sacrificial 
paradox. The paradox of sacrifice unfolds within the deeply complicated problem of how states 
govern the tension between biopolitics—making live, and sovereignty—letting die. These are 
two distinct directions of power (discussed more in Chapter Four) that are indeed dissimilar, as 
far as their aims, targets, and trajectories are concerned, yet are still tenuously reconcilable, and, 
as I will argue, military/security privatization together with drones present a precariously 
rectified vision of sovereign and biopolitical power, at a minimum where sacrifice is concerned.  
Sacrifice is an embodied, violent, albeit oftentimes ambiguous force with multidirectional 
and globalized iterations existing between citizens, states, and others. Sacrifice must take; it must 
consume something, such as bodies and/or limbs, as to then prove, and validate its existence in 
the public domain through representation, and recognition of the sovereign’s presence. This 
recognition then re-confirms the existence of the author of violence. As well, sacrificial violence 
brings into being, through inclusionary/exclusionary practices, those who receive the benefit of 
                                                        
19 Although there was a moment when the 2003 Iraq war appeared to be just, it was quickly denounced as unjust 
when it was confirmed that then President Bush’s claims about Iraq harboring weapons of mass destruction was 
falsified. The continued maintenance of an “enemy” is also critical to making war efforts appear just. As Khan 
(2011:156) writes, “even if the ends at stake are just, the absence of an enemy means that there is no legitimate 
claim on Americans to sacrifice their lives. Nor is there ground for Americans to be killing Iraqis.”  
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the sacrifice such as citizens, and the nation state. Military sacrifice historically produced a 
surplus that would be productively harnessed by the nation state for utilizing war as a site of 
collective identity. Sacrifice is paradoxical because its deployment is contingent upon the politics 
of, and configurations of, violence to which it is embedded in. However, as will become clear 
further on in the dissertation, the dominance of humanitarian-inspired and so-called bloodless 
wars, the latter which were especially made credible in the post-9/11 period exemplified by the 
ideologies of high-technology and casualty aversion, means that sacrifice is being slowly 
stripped from the body of the citizen-soldier, edged out beyond the terrain of the social, paving 
the way for forms of non-sacrificial war.  
The political-sociological approach advocated here then views sacrifice as an embodied, 
surplus-producing, and publicity-driven practice. I suggest that sacrifice ought to be 
problematized and treated with skeptical curiosity rather than blind romantic affirmation. 
Sacrifice performs as a portal into the political, and when configured intellectually as a paradox, 
reveals a style of violence that must negotiate its terms via the political quality of life (Agamben, 
1998). We encounter today a style of violence that, as it becomes dislodged from the archetype 
of the citizen-soldier, risks being made increasingly meaningless.   
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, sacrifice is taken up in diverse literatures, but its 
deployment as a category of analysis often circumvents the particularities of the politics that 
enables it by problematically perpetuating sacrifice as an eternally cryptic, if not entirely 
mystical concept, rendering its particularities at worst impenetrable, and at best plain 
uninteresting to the non-philosopher-scholar. For example, Kahn (2011) argues that when a 
liberal state is at war, it will deny claims to justice, equality, and due process, but it must still 
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uphold a commitment to both law and sovereignty.20 “It can abandon neither the language of law 
nor the rhetoric of sacrifice. It keeps each in place by deploying the categories of citizen and 
enemy, of interior and border, of policing and war” (p. 157). He further argues that liberal states, 
particularly the U.S. after 9/11, are committed to a style of sacrificial violence, expressed by 
terror and torture, which only political theology, not law, can explain. Khan claims that “[l]aw 
and sovereignty are bound to each other, but they cannot appear simultaneously” (p. 168). Yet 
Kahn's commitment to a theological perspective, coupled with the assertion that law and 
sovereignty (where sovereignty is made synonymous with sacrifice) are entirely distinct, further 
mystifies rather than clarifies the link between sovereignty and the law.  
Consider Kahn’s claim that the sacred is “self-evident because there is no test of its truth 
apart from the character of the experience itself” and that sacrifice “never makes sense within the 
terms of our ordinary lives- that is the whole point” (Kahn 2008, p. 117). Moreover, Kahn 
claims, “the act of sacrifice can refer to the self or an other. Sacrifice is both transitive and 
intransitive. Whom do we sacrifice for the state: citizen or enemy” (2011, p. 94)? These 
assertions rightly point to the difficulty—it is worth pausing here to emphasize the degree of 
methodological difficulty—in precisely capturing the objective, empirically identifiable, and 
                                                        
20 For Khan, the liberal state at war contains an internal contradiction in that its legal order rests on notions of 
equality, right to life, due process, etc. but when at war the liberal state denies these claims. Khan’s analysis upholds 
a distinction between sovereignty and law, one that ought to be problematized in the context of privatized, drone 
warfare. As distinct “social imaginaries” he nonetheless argues there is “regular, rhythmic movement” (p. 123) 
between the two domains (he cites the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution as sites where this interplay 
occurs). Law is characterized by the expression of reason, whereas sovereignty is expressed by sacrificial politics, 
that which exists in the space of exception (notably Khan does not invoke the “state of exception” phrasing, or 
literature), and “always goes beyond the regulatory order of law,” (p. 110) and “is never the conclusion of a rational 
argument;” “where violent sacrifice is the measure of meaning” (p. 129). For Khan, “sacrifice is always the 
foundation; dying always has existential priority over killing” (p. 138). There are two obvious problems: first, drone 
warfare reveals how killing is now the existential priority over dying. Second, as Chapter Six will show, there is 
quite a bit of law, of legal meanings, justifications, discourses, and ideas, informing how killing takes shape, how it 
might be authorized, in the context of drone bombings. Therefore, it appears that, for our empirical interests in this 
dissertation, the politics of sacrifice (killing and dying) do not escape the grip of law but have descended into it, 
rather deliberately, suggesting the possibility that these two realms are not as distinct as Khan would argue. 
   79 
 
 
agreed upon space, and the exact content of the micro experiential quality of sacrifice. Sacrifice 
appears to be somehow everywhere and nowhere21 yet, “the sovereign dies when citizens are no 
longer willing to take up its presence in their own bodies” (p. 176) and “a state that no longer 
thinks of itself as capable of demanding a life has passed out of the political ethos of modernity. 
The narrative of such a state can no longer invoke the myth of sacrifice or the experience of 
revelation” (pp. 122-123). Khan is correct to caution about the qualities of a state that cannot 
include citizens in a national politics of sacrifice. But this shift does not indicate the decline of 
the state (the “death of the sovereign,” as he puts it) but rather its reconfiguration. We ought to 
account for how this reconfiguration is possible, and what is owed to it. This remains 
unanswered in Khan’s analysis. As will become clear in later chapters, Khan’s analysis risks a 
deterministic view of sacrificial politics, since is based on a problematic, perhaps overstated or 
over exaggerated, distinction between law and sovereignty and the place of theology and the 
significance of religious imagery and meaning therein.    
In a similar mystifying and/or essentializing vein, Girard (1979) argues that sacrifice 
creates the necessary conditions for the socially acceptable use of violence. Girard claims that all 
violence emerges because of “mimesis” or mimetic desire. Desire is a byproduct of imitation; it 
is inherently mimetic. Man does not actually know what he wants until he sees that desire in an 
Other- and this produces rivalry and/or conflict. If two people desire the same object, for 
                                                        
21 According to Kahn, sacrifice is loaded with significance. In terms of how it defines the self- “the boundaries of 
the self only become clear through the imagining of sacrifice, for sacrifice circumscribes the limits of a world…the 
boundaries of sacrifice are those of love, which is always beyond measure” (p. 109) there is subsequently an implied 
relation to the other. In this way, sacrifice is also banal (because it is a feature of everyday life). Putting the specifics 
of this debate aside, Kahn here still does not bring us closer to an understanding of the embodied, uneven, material, 
relational, and macro-political components of sacrifice that pertain to contemporary war making practices. Khan is 
right to point out that states use sacrifice to establish its own borders (“where the state can demand sacrifice is 
exactly the point at which is establishes its borders”) yet Khan’s analysis does not easily lend itself to the changing 
nature of today’s battlefield, the role of technology and privatization; in other words, the differentiated meaning of 
bodies in warfare today. 
   80 
 
 
example, they will eventually lose sight of the object and focus their hostilities on each other in 
the form of violent competition. Continuing in Girard’s narrative, eventually everyone becomes a 
model/rival of the other, increasing mimetic desire and conflict, resulting in a snowballing of 
violent contagion; the intensification of mimetic violence (now when the division is most 
intense) is when violence becomes targeted toward a surrogate victim- the scapegoat. For him, 
sacrifice allows for the circulatory movement or displacement of vengeance onto a scapegoat. 
Unchecked violence is only tamed through sacrifice or through the implementation of a judicial 
system. Sacrifice is an act of violence without the risk of vengeance. Girard argues that there is a 
clear identifiable essence that links and homogenizes all sacrifices (granting it a meta-historical 
character)22 as far as they all relate back to this mimetic theory of violence, such that “all 
prohibitions and rituals can be related to mimetic violence” (Brighi & Cerella, 2015, p. 12). 
Furthermore, “where critical theory employs the method of relentless critique and deconstruction 
to navigate the complexity [of] the late modern condition, mimetic theory becomes decidedly 
metaphysic and eschatological when it invokes the possibility of grace and redemption via the 
path of imitatio Christi. The narrative that Girard weaves through history is clearly incompatible 
with the incredulity toward foundations professed by theorists of a critical bent” (Brighi & 
Cerella, p. 17) and as such appears “too totalizing and mechanical. It is not sufficiently 
responsive to the meanings realized in and through the violence itself” (Khan, 2011, p. 120). 
Thus, while Girard’s approach is credited with bringing the centrality of violence to bear on 
politics, it is ultimately too formulaic.   
                                                        
22 According to Brighi and Cerella (2015, p.12) Girard’s hypothesis, of “the origin of culture, and on the relation 
between violence and religion, is somewhat controversial because of its meta-historical character. The founding 
murder is in fact an episode (or series of incidents or crises) that happened in illo tempore, and cannot be empirically 
analyzed. Yet, according to Girard, there would be traces, and significant evidence of this historical moment” (the 
founding murder).   
   81 
 
 
Girard’s portrayal of violence therefore contains an ahistorical or deterministic quality 
and thus, in line with the critical approach offered here, it is problematic, although others have 
identified some analytic potential and conceptual alignment between mimetic theory and 
international studies, worth citing here.23 However, ultimately, I argue that all identifications of 
truth entail a politics of interpretation. Girard’s arguments about how violence unfolds preclude 
and overlook the possibility of that very struggle over interpretation. For Girard, sacrifice is the 
site whereby violence can be enacted in a healthy way and is thus externalized and purged from 
the community thereby protecting the community from its own capacity to commit violence 
against itself. The purpose of sacrifice is that it serves as a mechanism by which to restore and 
repair social harmony within the community through a disavowal of outsiders, via the 
externalization of violence through the scapegoating mechanism as seen in the identification of a 
surrogate victim.  
Yet, in the context of state-soldiers, their sacrifices do not produce exclusionary practices 
by a community (especially currently, when in the U.S. the bar for physical, intellectual, and 
mental standards for the military have been significantly lowered, everyone who meets basic 
eligibility may join the American military) rather, their sacrifices are positively and lovingly 
celebrated. The deaths of citizen-soldiers are consecrated within the boundaries of the nation and 
memorialized in a way that allows for both the production of shared collective memory as well 
                                                        
23 Brighi and Cerella claim that there are noteworthy points of contact between mimetic theory and international 
studies, offering, in their words, analytic potential. First, there is Girard’s point against liberal theory about the 
centrality (rather than externality) of violence: “liberalism fails to acknowledge the permanently violent, necessarily 
sacrificial of the political order” (p. 15). Second, writing against traditional International Relations theory, violence, 
and war, in Girard, are regarded as inherently relational rather than unit-based occurrences (p. 16). Third, in 
attempting to supplement IR’s historical inability to explain the social, the authors claim that Girard offers a notion 
of violence that is profoundly social. Finally, Girard’s conceptualization of the sacred abolishes the dichotomy 
between “secularism” and “anti-secularism,” or “secular” and “post-secular:” “Girard cuts through this ambiguity 
and debunks the false dichotomy between “religious” and the “secular” by offering an account of human history 
where sacred violence and political, “secular” order are intimately linked rather than dichotomous” (p. 18). 
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as a projected future-oriented discourse of unification, empowered through shared national 
destiny. Indeed, the citizen-soldier was never a scapegoat. Traditionally, his death did not 
remove him from the community, but instead solidified his place within it.  
Girard, whose theorization cannot account for the intersections between biopower and 
sovereign power, or the biopolitical or life enhancing qualities of sacrifice cited above, is rightly 
critiqued for his Hobbesian essentialization of male violence, the denial of possible cooperation 
and therefore avoidance of violence amongst people, making the analytic point of departure and 
point of arrival foreordained (Taussig-Rubbo, 2011, p. 141). Furthermore, for a political 
sociology of sacrifice, a straightforward application of Girard’s analysis risks romanticizing the 
extent to which global wars are necessarily contingent on a violent schema of sacrifice, thereby 
de-historicizing the role that gendered and racialized bodies play in the meaning of the sacrificial 
violence. If, as Girard remarks, “sacrifice deals with humankind” (Girard and Gregory, 1979, p. 
90) then we must, to make these theories more applicable for our purposes herein, ask how the 
symbiotic relationship between military/security privatization and the proliferation of drones 
reshapes the imagining and applicability of sacrificial violence considering the changing notions 
of what it means to be human-in-war. While inspiring the question, Girard’s analytical tools 
alone do not aid in the investigation. Moreover, from Khan and Girard’s above claims we cannot 
glean how sacrifice, as an effect of contentious (but not predetermined) social relations, produces 
an increasingly uneven application and experience of military sacrifice.  
 
Military sacrifice implies an inherently unequal relation between the state and soldiers, 
and soldiers and civilians: benefits for some, and disadvantages for others. Still, much of the 
dominant literature on sacrifice does not on the surface extend to the political context of war or 
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militarization, but instead limits its focus to ancient rituals, anthropological and/or religious 
aspects of sacrifice. Originally, sacrifice is theorized in the anthropological literature as primarily 
a religious act which mediates the domains of the immanent and the transcendent. It is conceived 
of as an act that allowed a sacrificial victim to bring someone in closer proximity to God(s) since 
man and god are not in direct contact, hence how the fusion of the sacred and the profane, which 
come together in the various elements of the sacrifice, are completed in the victim (Hubert and 
Mauss 1964, pp. 11-32). Hubert and Mauss further argue that “sacrifice is a religious act which, 
through the consecration of a victim, modifies the condition of a moral person who accomplishes 
it or that of certain objects with which he is concerned” (p. 13). We might productively translate 
this point into the terms of the citizen-soldier, whose death renders sacred not just his/her 
sacrifice, but the nation and its cause. Hubert and Mauss show how sacrifice is not simply tied to 
the logic of social exchange with the gods, but acts as a means of consecrating.  
However, globalization, coupled with postmodern forms of political-economic power, 
has dissolved, and re-inscribed the content of citizens and others, obfuscating the categories and 
subjectivities “victim” and “scapegoat,” rendering consecration contentious. As I will argue in 
Chapters Five and Six, drone warfare avoids and conceals, rather than exposes and reveals, the 
characteristic elements of sovereign power’s place in sacrificial violence. Nevertheless, despite 
complications, we might agree with Girard and others that sacrifice creates the grounds for the 
transmission of a transcendental truth. It is profoundly communicative as far as it is meant to 
engage, and bring into being for the receivers of sacrifice, the gift of knowledge that only a 
higher power can provide—to allow the sacred and the profane realms, normally separate, a 
chance to come into contact. Given that sacrifice is partly about the power to communicate, 
name, and legitimize certain deaths as having public significance, to recognize certain deaths as 
   84 
 
 
loss, and others as forgettable, the current trend toward the privatization of warfare and 
incorporation of private contractors into a denationalized mode of warfare lends itself to 
theorizing how this contestation over the domain of sacrifice is particularly relevant today.  
I will argue that the incorporation of private military contractors allows the state to free 
itself from the accountability and responsibility typically associated with twentieth century 
warfare. Henceforth governments can potentially wipe their hands clean, so to speak, of any hint 
of burden. That potential burden (or the government’s end of the social contract) is thrown to the 
wind of the market thus becoming a problem and a solution to be remedied by the market. Alas, 
this is the cornerstone of privatization, but it also suggests trends toward the desacralisation of 
citizenship. To say “no” to sacrifice through privatization schemes, to bracket and deny it its 
communicative powers, is to create distance between the ordinary citizen and the state’s violence 
it supposedly applies on its behalf. Drones are the technological expression of this sociopolitical 
distancing and likewise the muzzling of sacrifice’s communicative powers. 
Privatization is an effect of the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism whereby state and 
non-state actors alike have an expressed biopolitical investment in the socially constructed, 
evolving terrains of life and death. The biopolitical problem of liberal government is reflected by 
the state’s commitment to life as being also directly related to its control (or anxiety over its lack 
thereof) over the communicative potentiality of death. (Suicide is thus of particular importance 
since it operates as a direct challenge to the state’s ability to control the terms and rhetorical 
after-effects of who can die).24 Part of the state’s strategy of managing these rhetorical after-
effects and thus the potential for certain deaths to be contested as sacrifices retrospectively is the 
                                                        
24 As Feldman (1991) has shown, the deaths of hunger-striking members of the IRA were instances of suicides that 
were construed as sacrificial (see Tausig-Rubbo, 2009, p. 111) in that they were able to claim sovereignty through 
the "destruction of a surplus" (p. 118).    
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move to privatize sacrifice, (Taussig-Rubo, 2009, p. 86) moving its effects into the domain of the 
home or private family, thereby neutralizing them by placing sacrifice within a gendered 
framework outside the public gaze (Taussig-Rubo, 2009).  
Jay (1992) argues that rituals of sacrifice are used to maintain patriarchal relations and 
reconcile the problem of having been born of woman. In foundational narratives, women are 
constructed as the symbolic, cultural, and biological reproducers of the nation. Women occupy 
the home front as the Good Mother or Beautiful Soul, while “the male heterosexual human or 
citizen is firmly located in the public sphere, dis-associated from the female private sphere, or 
the realm of necessity of the body” (Lister 2002, p. 194). Women’s sacrifice is defined 
relationally or by lack. Her body is in and of itself insufficient, so sacrifice is experienced 
through men, embodying “men’s honor [and] their accomplishments, and are the repository of all 
that should be protected and conserved” (Pin Fat and Stern, 2005).  
Sacrificial rituals unite community members by disavowing outsiders. Indeed, the 
opposition between the sacred and the profane is key to sacrificial rituals: it is often women’s 
and feminized bodies that represent the impure. Naturalizing men’s transcendence over the 
constraints of womanhood, particularly in reproduction, sacrifice is the site in which men’s 
historical need to establish and maintain the integrity of kinship relations is contingent on 
controlling childbearing women. Jay argues that sacrifice is performative because it causes what 
it signifies (Jay, 1992, p. 37). For Jay, sacrifice gives continuity to the social world; worlds 
which are often characterized by male domination or explicit misogyny, which is why theories of 
sacrifice tend to resemble the traditions they claim to illuminate (p. 128) and as such while they 
tend to universalize sacrifice these theories also fold into them a universalistic account of gender 
and patriarchy.  
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In her focus on the gendered, embodied, and performative dimensions of sacrifice, Jay 
moves us closer to a political-sociological approach to sacrifice. Extending this critical, feminist 
impulse, Schott (2010) argues that sacrifice (in her case, she examines narratives of sexual 
violence as pertains to sacrifice) reveals the potential of violence that is imminent in society. She 
claims that sacrifice can be used as a diagnostic tool to ascertain how violence informs the 
political. I agree with Schott when she claims that there is no universal theory of sacrifice worth 
pursuing that would also satisfy the sociological need for an emphasis on the importance of 
particularity. 
Still, scholars disagree about whether we can or should attempt to know the internal logic 
of sacrifice truly and objectively. Perhaps some of these aforementioned tensions within the 
literature on sacrifice have to do with the inability to translate what is lost in the theorizing when 
sovereignty is historicized—put differently—what is gained when sovereignty is de-historicized. 
What I claim is a mystification and depoliticization of sacrifice on the part of the theories might 
be resolved with a more nuanced treatment of our contemporary historical moment, considering 
the specificities enabled by a political-sociological approach.   
The aim of this chapter is to supplement these theories in order to demystify sacrifice, 
first, by not entirely departing from but instead momentarily bracketing the theological and 
philosophical arguments, and second by troubling sacrifice through asking (not for the first time, 
to be sure) a series of rather rudimentary questions: How is sacrifice politicized, problematized, 
and deployed, and what are the effects? What kind of “work” is sacrifice doing in the imagining 
of sovereign violence in the context of biopolitical governmentality?  This desire for 
simplification should not imply a stripping of the complexity of sacrifice’s rich conceptual 
lineage, but instead reflects an attempt to write about sacrifice from a sociopolitical position—
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within a specific historical period, that of democratic sovereignty—and to construct a distinctly 
critical sociology of sacrifice, which ought to be concerned with how sacrificial bodies are 
included or excluded in acts of military violence. Thus, the research is occupied to some extent 
with issues of visibility and justice, to bring sacrifice’s materiality to bear on the broader 
empirical topic at hand: privatized drone wars. I aim to trace how discourses of sacrificial 
violence are constructed so that subjects (citizens and others) may be more efficiently governed, 
giving content to the re-entrenchment of national identity's link to militarization. 
Next, I explore recent examples of the deployment of sacrifice in political discourse, 
namely official state speeches, and defense strategy documents, which differentially invoke 
critical themes of technology, history, embodiment, and national identity in Canada and the U.S. 
While the primary focus of this research is the U.S., the comparison with Canada is productive 
insofar as it shows the stark contrast between how the two governments conceptualize the 
relationship between war, technology, and the body, both historically and for the purposes of 
future combat operations. I argue that, by politicizing sacrifice, there emerges an analytically 
productive paradox of sacrifice, as far as the specific qualities of sacrifice are revealed in relation 
to how governments either include or exclude bodies in acts of military violence. In Chapter 
Four I then link that discussion of paradox to the governing of sovereign and biopolitical 
violence, wherein I primarily extend, modify, and amalgamate Agamben and Foucault’s 
theoretical framework, and model of power, to conceptualize and advance the primary argument 
of Chapter Five: that sacrificial violence is a practice characterized by themes of 1) publicity, 2) 
surplus, and 3) embodiment. It is through these same lines of inquiry, understood here too as 
‘sites,’ that privatized drone warfare ruptures sacrifice by destabilizing the internal coherence of 
the scene of sacrifice by concealing the sovereign presence. This undermines the applicability 
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and cogency of sacrifice as far as it facilitates non-sacrificial war through disembodiment, the 
rejection of surplus, and privatization. To more thoroughly understand the applicability of 
sovereign power’s entitlement to the means (symbolic and material) of military sacrifice (killing 
and being killed) I claim it should be situated in a discussion on the contradictory although not 
irreconcilable incorporation of biopolitical power (living and making live) into a casualty-averse, 
liberal-democratic architecture of violence.  
Building on this productive tension between sovereign and biopolitical modes of 
violence, and in contrast to views of violence that see it as exceptional or external to society, I 
conclude in Chapter Six that the argument for military sacrifice struggles to remain convincing, 
even though its iterations continue to circulate in political discourse as a way to legitimize a 
distinctly anachronistic notion of sovereign power’s tie to military violence. The organizational 
and ideological restructuring of American-led militarized violence suggests a desire on the part 
of business elites and military planners to transition to a form of bodyless and bloodless (on 
“our” side) style of violence, rendering sacrifice (which requires bloodshed) increasingly fraught. 
Since it is invested in, and therefore requires bodies, military sacrifice today appears 
indefensible. As such, in Chapters Five and Six I show, in part, how militarized acts of violence 
appear to be increasingly devoid of a practice of meaning-making that historically has utilized 
war’s link to the nation-state, and the citizen-soldier therein, as a site of that cultivation of that 
very meaning. 
Mobilizing Sacrifice  
In the twentieth century, the archetype of the citizen-soldier emerged conterminously 
with liberal politics- liberal citizenship, economics, and democracy. For example, military work 
was central in shaping the principles of Taylorism that revolutionized industrial production, 
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workplace organization, and worker discipline (Cowen 2008). Catherine Lutz (2002, p. 727) 
argues that the period of twentieth century industrial warfare not only required the raising of 
mass armies, but it also centered on manufacturing labour and thus incorporated workers to 
produce relatively simple guns, tanks, ships, and eventually airplanes.  
In the imagining of the nation state, the citizen-soldier represents the supreme expression 
of sacrifice, and therefore citizenship, which other citizens ought to aspire to. The figure of the 
citizen-soldier signifies proper conduct for civilians, as people who are seen as sacrificing for a 
particular body or association are regarded as “true” citizens (Burchell, 2002). As Frank Pearce 
(2010) argues, in line with a previous discussion, sacrifice draws the sacred (the realm of God) 
and the profane (the realm of humans) into direct contact. Typically, these sacred and profane 
realms are mutually exclusive but through sacrificial actions, men alter their societal position, 
either through transcendence, exchange, or communication with deities. There are social or 
spiritual benefits associated with sacrifice. Sacrifice allows nation-states to organize collective 
violence by using the symbolic excess that resides within sacrifice to assert its authority.  
For example, when sacrifice is invoked alongside citizenship, belonging, and wartime 
remembering, it provides the grounds to effectively recast nationalism in violent terms. There are 
notable intersections between citizenship (the right to claim a certain kind of life) and sacrifice 
(the right to claim a certain kind of death). Citizenship includes the practice of claiming rights to 
something: the right to life, the right to a better life, the right to enhance one’s life and future 
potential. As such it contains an impetus toward biopolitics because of its concern with the 
empowerment and enhancement of life. While it is understood that the distribution of and access 
to these rights is uneven, citizenship’s effects are widely regarded as positive, while discourses 
of sacrifice might invoke negative images of suffering, loss, and death. Although sacrifice can 
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have positive, altruistic connotations (i.e. the “willing giving of the self”) this research is 
concerned with the discursive interplay between both negative and positive connotations. The 
interplay (and indeed management of) between citizenship’s promise of a better life and 
sacrifice’s call to potentially obliterate life provides the fruit of this chapter. Below, I draw on 
examples from political speeches that pivot on this interplay between citizenship, nationhood, 
and sacrifice.  
As a political phenomenon, sacrifice has re-emerged in political discourse with an 
expression of renewed gravitas attached to it, having been deployed by Canadian and American 
state officials in recent speeches to commemorate wars and/or justify novel ways of applying 
military force. Consider the Canadian examples below, which includes three excerpts from three 
separate speeches. First, on January 13, 2014, the Honourable Shelly Glover, then Minister of 
Canadian Heritage and Official Languages, in a speech directed at veterans and their families, 
said:  
I look at all of you, and I think not only of your sacrifice, but the sacrifices of those in my 
family and many of your families...we wouldn’t be the country we are today were it not 
for their sacrifices and your sacrifices...the commemorations will recall the sacrifices of 
those who took part in the two World Wars [allowing] Canadians to better know and 
appreciate their history.  
 
The Minister here is drawing a direct link between sacrifice and the integrity of the nation 
(“we wouldn't be the country we are today”). This begs the question: what kind of country is 
that? It appears the listener/reader intuitively knows what kind of country Canada is. We might 
assert descriptors like “reasonable,” “tolerant,” “honorable,” and “peaceful” for deliberation on 
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this question. That aside, the Minister is suggesting that sacrifice is partly mystical yet has a 
ripple effect (whose cause/origin is not clear) as sacrifice applies not only to the actions of 
veterans, but also to the actions of their families. Second, and perhaps most critically, through 
sacrifice, and its implied but unelaborated upon transcendental quality, “we” Canadians come to 
know national identity through these sacrifices. Sacrifice is represented here not just an 
incidental aspect of a certain shared history (the history of the Great Wars) but it is much more: 
It is a gateway into a pure and uncontested historical knowledge of the Canadian Self. 
Second, at the same event, Minister of Veteran's Affairs Julian Fantino commented, “two 
generations of Canadians made incredible sacrifices so that we might live in peace and freedom. 
It is our profound duty to commemorate and honour those who served at home and abroad and 
made our country the free, democratic country that it is today.” Like Minister Glover’s 
comments, Minister Fantino implies that sacrifice has an immediate bearing on our shared sense 
of the political. Specifically, the form of democracy that is familiar to Canadians’ understanding 
of their nationhood is portrayed as the direct result of these wartime sacrifices, eclipsing other 
notable, although less spectacular examples of social and political struggle, which may have also 
contributed to the development of democracy.  
In other words, liberal democratic nations have a built-in right to call on citizens to 
sacrifice—and, to ensure the democratic health and survival of the nation they are obliged to 
answer the call. There is no acknowledgment of possible coercion, deceit, or bad blood 
underpinning this relationship. Peace, freedom, and liberalism, simplistically portrayed as 
desirable, unproblematic, and interchangeable philosophies, were born from the wartime 
sacrifices of two generations of Canadians. It is “our profound duty” to not simply superficially 
respect these sacrifices, but in fact honour, and most importantly accept their sacrifices into the 
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fabric of national identity. As Canadians, to call into question, criticize, or even refuse these 
sacrifices would be profoundly un-Canadian, and in fact quarrelsome, the political equivalent, 
for example, of explicitly refusing to don a poppy on Remembrance Day.        
Finally, then Prime Minister Stephen Harper, at an event honoring the 100th anniversary 
of the start of the First World War remarked,  
The mud, the blood, and the sacrifices that marked those years left more than a third of 
these Canadians dead or wounded. Forgive me if I do not dwell on these numbers, the 
bitter harvesting of suffering and death. We have had a hundred years to contemplate this 
war. Much has been written on the subject. And yet, what it means to have lived in muck 
and disease, to fight through mud deep enough to drown a man, to lose thousands of lives 
in a single day to gain what could be measured in yards...it’s also difficult to measure 
sacrifice. 
 
The proximity of the words “mud,” “blood,” and “sacrifice” in the opening sentence is 
striking. Wartime sacrifice necessitates death, injury, and bloodshed, as such it requires earthly, 
territorial bodies living in “muck and disease” trained in battle and exposed to the unforgiving 
and cruel brutality of nature (“mud deep enough to drown a man.”) But, the precise numbers, the 
specifics in political terms of the bodies do not matter in this construction (“forgive me if I do 
not dwell on these numbers”) because, we are to imagine, their suffering and loss is almost too 
overwhelming to submit to such crude quantification, especially when considering the gains 
made, which could only “be measured in yards.” Were these spectacular acts of sacrifice—
which, Prime Minister Harper is simultaneously politicizing and depoliticizing, and, as a 
reminder, according to Harper himself, cannot be truly known or measured, (in line with Kahn’s 
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similar notion that sacrifice cannot be known beyond its experience)- worth the yards gained? 
We are not presented with an explicit answer, but the expectation, especially in light of Minister 
Fantino’s aforementioned remarks about the duty to accept these wartime sacrifices as noble and 
just, would be an affirmative response. Sacrifice here is painted as banal, because it affected so 
many people and families during the Great Wars, but it is also characterized by its deeply felt yet 
intangible and unknowable impact on society. Despite having had “one hundred years to 
contemplate this war” wherein “much has been written on the subject” sacrifice escapes us; we 
still are nowhere closer to understanding or truly knowing sacrifice, although all Canadians, 
Harper suggests, much in line with Kahn’s (2011) analysis, still feel the pervasively haunting yet 
unknowable presence of sacrifice.  
Taken together, these comments attest to how the discourse of sacrifice, as pertains to 
Canadian identity making, although imprecise and mystical, has been resuscitated to give 
militaristic truth, content, and meaning to the current political climate. This climate includes a 
parallel attempt to use the 100th anniversary of the Great War as a means to renationalize 
Canadian identity and rebrand it as a nation of warriors (discussed below). Sacrifice implies 
coercive and unequal relations of power, (it is now well known that people of colour and those 
living in poverty or with precarious citizenship/residency status are more likely to sign up for the 
military) yet there is no acknowledgment of this political reality in official speeches. Despite 
then Prime Minister Harper’s own admittance that the meaning of sacrifice is ultimately 
contested (it is “difficult to measure”) he still nevertheless invokes it in concrete terms; 
consciously drawing on the symbolic power of the image of sacrifice to make universal claims 
about the essential link between nationalism and militarization, as well as promote a distinct 
imagining of Canada’s historical legacy and Canadian identity as something inherently 
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vulnerable, that is being remade in relation to the historical unbearable weight of wartime 
sacrifices.  
When combined, these excerpts show how sacrifice is made up in a politicized discourse 
to inspire an affective economy, generating varied emotional responses to be sure, but patriotism 
is clearly a primary desired emotion, which allows elected and unelected state representatives the 
comfort from which to access the “hearts and minds” of Canadians. The effect is a subtle, 
disciplinary one: it grants the credibility and consent to govern and normalize its perceived 
monopoly of violence. We learn that liberal democracy is not only the ideal governing ideology, 
but it is also the product of many knowable/unknowable ultimate sacrifices. Liberal democracy is 
imagined here as fragile, and deserving of renewed protection through continued sacrifice.         
Further, sacrifice is invoked without regard for specificity or precision around its 
meaning or effects, and with seemingly no tangible consequences or challenges to this: to be 
brief, it is a term that is taken for granted. It is a seductive and all-encompassing word choice, 
matched by equally powerful and historically charged imagery, deployed to re-nationalize and 
re-militarize the nation state's power—to authorize the sovereign claim to violence and naturalize 
the uneven and contentious relationships between citizens, non-citizens, and the nation state in a 
globalized era. (Thus, I argue in Chapter Four that sacrifice ought to be analyzed alongside the 
changing notions of sovereign and bio power within globalized military economies to reveal 
what the deployment of bodies means for different forms of state power). Likewise, moments 
when sacrifice is alternatively denied, or outright avoided, suggests an opportunity to better 
understand how state power differentially re-authorizes “legitimate” military violence.  
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Although Canada currently has a newly elected liberal government, headed by Prime 
Minster Justin Trudeau,25 Stephen Harper’s conservative government (2006-2015) was long 
focused on mobilizing and manipulating the concept of sacrifice, and sacrificial rhetorical 
discourse, as a means to militarize Canadian identity and biopolitics prior to these 
aforementioned excerpts from political speeches. For example, Harper summoned the impact of 
soldiers’ sacrifice for bio-politics up in a 2006 address to the media. He explained how soldiering 
is the highest calling of citizenship ‘not because you are ready to die for your country [but] 
because you are ready to live [emphasis added] for your country” (Harper quoted in Cowen, 
2008, p. 205). This is reminiscent of when, some 150 years earlier in 1863, Lincoln remarked at 
Gettysburg that soldiers “[give] their lives so that the nation might live” (Lincoln quoted in 
Taussig-Rubo 2009, p. 88). Finally, in 2008, Stephen Harper’s “Sacrifice Medal” was introduced 
to recognize those killed or wounded in hostile action since 2001. The medal presumably marked 
the beginning of Canada’s explicit support of the Global War on Terror. 
The global War on Terror produces a series of political, technical, and social effects of 
control, regulation, and discipline, which are now well documented. Pre-eminent among these 
effects is the intensification of militarization in Western states. Militarization includes the 
“multidimensional and diverse set of social, cultural, economic and political processes and 
practices unified around an intention to gain both elite and popular acceptance for the use of 
military approaches to social problems and issues” (Rech et al., 2014, p. 2). Militarization draws 
on violent or techno-scientific mechanisms and ideas to manage a range of problems, from the 
ostensibly banal remembrance of life, to sophisticated and sweeping military invasions. 
                                                        
25 It remains to be seen how Harper's legacy will inform the current government, particularly on matters pertaining 
to defense. Canada's current defense minister, Harjit Sajjan, expects a review of the future of the Canadian Armed 
Forces, including procurement priorities expressly related to drones and unmanned technology, to be completed in 
2017.    
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Furthermore, militarization implies “the contradictory and tense social processes in which 
civil society organizes itself for the production of violence” (Lutz quoting Geyer, 2002, p. 723). 
Militarization is essentially contradictory because our current historical moment is characterized 
by, as Lutz suggests, the social organization required to produce wide-scale violence. Yet, 
society places tremendous importance on individual human life- (humanitarian wars, for 
example, are an effect of this rights-based desire to protect life). Following Lutz, militarization 
occurs at two levels: institutionally and discursively. First, institutions become refashioned to 
support military pursuits. Second, society’s values change in a way to legitimize the use of force 
(standing armies, possible increase in taxation) and military spending is deeply connected to 
development of knowledge in fields such as physics and psychology thereby redefining ideas 
about citizenship, sexuality, and masculinity- consider the phrase “war makes men.” 
Militarization is integral to Canadian identity despite the dominant understanding that 
Canada is a nation of peacekeepers rather than war makers. As Sandra Whitworth (2007, p. 90-
91) says of the traditional understanding of Canadian military might, “the Canadian soldier as 
peacekeeper is not a warrior but a protector. These are representations that fit very well with the 
more generalized notions of moral purity that pervade Canadian foreign policies toward 
developing countries.” However, the notion of the Canadian soldier, not as a peacekeeper, but as 
a heroic soldier-warrior, became more visible in popular culture during Harper’s reign. This was 
particularly noticeable after 2006, during the height of the violence for Canadian troops serving 
in Afghanistan (Richler, 2012). 
These attempts at militarizing Canadian identity and rebranding Canadian troops as 
warriors culminated in 2011 when the Harper government launched a campaign to honor the 
commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the War of 1812. Until 2015 the Canadian 
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government planned to “invest to increase Canadians’ awareness of this defining moment in our 
history” (“Harper Government Launches the Commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of the 
War of 1812,” 2011). According to the Government, the war of 1812 was key to ensuring our 
country’s existence and shaping our identities as Canadians today. As “a defining moment in our 
history,” the Campaign has a $28 million price tag for its events, ($6.5 on television commercials 
alone) which includes War of 1812 battle re-enactments, special exhibitions at the Canadian War 
museum, and collectible coins, among others community, political and business endeavors 
(Citation?). (For comparison’s sake, consider that Governor Cuomo of New York City vetoed a 
bill to establish a War of 1812 commission, although he did allocate a much more modest 
amount, $450,000, for commemorations). In the campaign’s advertising, the War of 1812 is 
described as an act of American aggression against Canada, even though Canada was not a 
country until decades after the War. Altogether, the War comprises a fiercely debated series of 
historical events, whose meaning with respect to the campaign has puzzled many people. Take a 
minute to read over the transcript from one commercial: “Two hundred years ago, the United 
States invaded our territory,” ‘a narrator says over dark images and ominous music.’ “But we 
defended our land, we stood side by side and won the fight for Canada.’” In the New York 
Times, Professor Andrew Cohen remarked, “the War of 1812 is part of our [American] history, 
and that's fine. It’s turned into a form of propaganda, and it seems to have married the 
government’s interest in the military, with its interest, some would say obsession, with the War 
of 1812. It’s clearly, to me, part of a campaign to politicize history” (Austen, 2012). In the same 
article, a less critical military historian, David J. Bercuson, is still nevertheless confused, saying, 
“I’m scratching my head for the last year and asking myself: Why is the government placing so 
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much emphasis on this war?” Even a battle re-enactment scene curator and administrator 
quipped, “It's kind of weird” (Austen, 2012).  
James Moore, then Canadian Minister of Heritage, claimed that the purpose of the 
campaign is to simply encourage Canadians to remember: “Canada was invaded, the invasion 
was repelled and we endured, but we endured in partnership with the United States. It's a very 
compelling story [emphasis added].” (Austen, 2012). Indeed, the links between the nation, 
citizenship and sacrifice is one that needs periodic ideological maintenance through storytelling 
and deliberate acts of remembrance. When combined, these examples reveal a resurgence of 
militarized language (curious for a nation that is universally regarded as a middle power at best). 
It also reveals the Harper government’s attempts to lay sacrificial groundwork through the re-
deployment of social memory, arguing for the recognition of the nation state’s fundamental right 
to demand sacrifice from its citizens.  
However, remembrance is a political, contested process. It must include, according to 
Jonathan Vance (1997, p. 3-4), who writes on the memorialization of the First World War, 
disparate yet complementary aspects of fabrication: a piecemeal combination of invention, 
truths, and half-truths. The result of this assemblage of details is the creation of social memory. 
Never entirely shared, social memory of war is the product of how “diverse media were used to 
convey the myth to those people who had not experienced the events themselves and to ensure 
that a certain version of the war became the intellectual property of all Canadians, not simply 
those who had lived through 1914-1918.” Thus, Vance argues that through nostalgia, or a 
tendency to look back on the past with a sense of yearning for better times, “the dominant or 
collective memory of a society is not always (perhaps, even, not often) based on historical fact, 
but on a set of assumptions of what the past was like” (p. 9) thus propelling Canadians to 
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remember the war “in terms that sometimes bore little resemblance to its actualities” (p. 4).26 
Memories of sacrifice, and the production of objective facts that inform and pollute these 
memories, coexist precariously. Both processes are vulnerable to misinformation, ongoing 
contestation, and therefore re-making.   
Before turning next to the American example, it is worth preliminarily noting that there 
are marked differences and departures in comparison to the Canadian example, particularly in 
regard to how the U.S. treats the issue of technology, namely its growing reliance on unmanned 
systems and combat unmanning, and therefore its related emphasis on leaner forces.27 While the 
Canadian examples emphasize the role of commemoration, regarding wartime sacrifices as sites 
of, and opportunities for, historical and national memory making, in addition to the significance 
                                                        
26 Consider the Vimy Ridge commemoration, celebrating the Canada’s role in this battle, which took place on April 
9, 1917. Canadians gathered in France to remember “the fateful battle” and “reflect on its enduring legacy.” 
According to Toronto’s newspaper, the Star, (April 9, 2017) “there was one key similarity between that Easter 
Monday on April 9, 1917, and the scene 100 years later: Canadians stood together, shoulder to shoulder, proudly 
and unabashedly as one people. According to Trudeau’s speech at the event, “these ordinary and extraordinary men 
of the British dominion fought for the first time as citizens of one and the same country. Francophones and 
anglophones. New Canadians. Indigenous peoples. Side by side, united, here in Vimy. The battle was described as a 
distinctly Canadian effort- “a true demonstration of all the best qualities that Canada represents: individual initiative; 
esprit de corps; gumption; enthusiasm.” At Ottawa’s Vimy ceremony, the Environment Minister said that the event 
marked “our coming of age as a country.” One woman remarked that more people of her generation need to 
remember the heroic sacrifices of those long gone. “The selflessness that they had, the respect they had for each 
other, and just all the turmoil and the sacrifice that they’ve done, everything they lost- it was all for this country that 
they never saw” (Thompson & Blanchfield. 2017). Indeed, these sentiments confirm Vance’s point about the 
synthesis of myth, fact, and fiction, in the making up of Canadian identity pertaining to war. Of course, many of 
these statements cannot be empirically tested as “true” but nevertheless the context in which they emerge naturalizes 
the statements as symbolic capital in the construction of Canada’s wartime past, and therefore future.    
27 It is worth citing here the general failure to create a way to honor drone pilots, which would then presumably 
open the space to in some way memorialize their actions. It is unclear whether Americans regard drone piloting as 
heroic or not. For example, consider former American Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s plan in 2013 to make drone 
pilots eligible for a distinguished warfare medal. As the first combat-related award to be created since the Bronze 
Star in 1944, it would have ranked higher than both the Bronze Star and Purple Heart, which are typically given to 
wounded troops. Unlike traditional combat medals, it would not require that the recipient engage in direct combat. 
Two months following Panetta's announcement, then- Secretary of State Chuck Hagel, himself a Vietnam veteran 
with two Purple Hearts, cancelled the medal and replaced it with a distinguishing device that would be affixed to 
already existing medals. We see here the deepening of a crisis: how to recognize and understand citizen-soldiering 
today; particularly given the problem postmodern violence has in reconciling the expanding forms of dis-embodied 
violence with liberal democracy's promise of peace.  
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of bodies in battle for interpreting and solidifying Canadian identity, the American examples 
show a clear desire to circumvent not only traditional means of sanctifying war (Congressional 
approval, and drawing in a national audience, as examples) but also the physical limitations of 
the body through expanding technological proficiency. Of course, these examples, and the 
subsequent analyses of them, should be understood in relation to the vast differences within 
Canadian and American historical context and practices around war-making: Canada at best 
serving as a supportive middle power, with a meager, if not purely symbolic military presence, is 
often regarded as composed of humanitarian peacekeepers rather than war fighters (despite the 
Harper government’s efforts at rebranding). The U.S., in contrast, being born out of revolution 
rather than loyalty, is universally regarded as the world’s unchallenged military superpower. As 
the single target of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it is actively if not unilaterally engaged in 
engineering a post-9/11 counter-terrorism roadmap as well as spearheading military and civilian 
solutions to post-9/11 counter-insurgencies, of which the chief characteristics are stark limits on 
the size and scope of troop movements.   
Consider the evidence (with an analytical discussion of sacrifice to follow): In 2012, the 
Department of Defense released the DSG (Defense Strategic Guidance) document, outlining its 
priorities for 21st century defense. Inside, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta describes an 
anticipated critical shift in defense policy in response to economic austerity and thus within 
American practices of war making more broadly. In the introductory paragraph of the Unmanned 
Systems Roadmap (2011-2036) the authors praise UAVs for their “persistence, versatility, and 
reduced risk to human life” before asserting that the Department of Defense (DoD) faces a fiscal 
environment in which acquisitions must be complementary to the DoD’s ‘Efficiencies Initiative,’ 
in other words, defense spending must “pursue investments and business practices that drive 
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down the life-cycle costs for unmanned systems. Affordability will be treated as a Key 
Performance Parameter (KPP), equal to, if not more important than, schedule and technical 
performance.” The document claims:   
This country is at a strategic turning point after a decade of war, and therefore, we are 
shaping a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, 
flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. It will have cutting edge capabilities, 
exploiting our technological, joint, and networked advantage. It will be led by the highest 
quality, battle-tested professionals. (p. 5) 
 
Furthermore, in the document we learn that, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to 
conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations” (p. 6) and as such, as the above quote states, 
the specialized labor contained in the Joint Force is thought to replace the mass quality of the 
traditional military structure, most importantly shedding the economic burden therein. Instead of 
citizen-soldiers, who some military experts caution are no longer sufficiently equipped to fight,28 
we are presented instead with the squeaky-clean image of “battle-tested professionals” signaling 
the downsizing, professionalization, and modernization of the military—the impact of which is 
discussed more thoroughly later in the dissertation.  
 
Critically, Panetta is not declaring that American forces will outright decline to engage in 
prolonged operations. What he is saying is that they will not be sized to engaged in prolonged 
operations. This points directly to the most profound quality of, albeit not explicitly stated, shift 
                                                        
28 A 2010 report by ‘Mission: Readiness,’ an organization of retired, senior military experts, warns that childhood 
and adult obesity might soon pose a threat to national security. It claims that 75 percent of young Americans are 
ineligible for military recruitment because of weight, criminal records, asthma, drug abuse, and educational 
inadequacies.   
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in policy: prolonged operations, to be sure are expected, as the Global War on Terror and its 
architects do not take kindly to spatial, national, temporal, or political boundaries. But, these 
missions will be conceptualized and orchestrated by combat managers invested in primarily 
efficient (low cost) business practices, and designed for special operations technicians, with 
fewer, less visible, troop movements. Elsewhere in the same document, as discussed by Ian Shaw 
(2013, p. 7) Panetta stated,  
As we reduce the overall defense budget, we will protect and in some cases increase our 
investments in special operations forces, new technologies like unmanned systems, space 
and in particular cyberspace capabilities and in the capacity to quickly mobilize.  
 
That a flexible, agile, and lean military unit, coupled with unmanned systems is a pillar of 
the future orientation towards counter insurgency and counter terrorism is unapologetically clear. 
Aside from the mildly ambiguous statement about the economic landscape informing the future 
of defense strategy, which for Panetta, necessitates a reduction in overall budget, yet also 
produces an increase in investment, the signaling of the deployment of fewer bodies overall, and 
an explicit desire to increase investment in technology but reduce investments in troops and their 
mobilization globally, is abundantly evident. The scope of American imperial power reveals that 
U.S. strategy mainly involves the “globalization of Anglo-American constitutional principles and 
neoliberal mechanisms of accumulation and economic discipline” (Gill, 2005, p. 24), in addition 
to their claim to have the power to “decree national and international rules, laws, and norms, 
whilst reserving ‘exceptional powers’ for themselves” (p. 24). The assumption, as Gill states, is 
that the U.S., from both moral and economic standpoints, has the right to act as a Global State.  
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This Global State mentality is manifested as “full spectrum dominance,” which is the 
surveillance and dominance of land, air, sea, and space, and serves as the counterpart to the Bush 
Administration’s concept of the new wars of the 21st Century. Full spectrum dominance entails 
the militarization of space, information warfare and control over communication nodes and 
networks. Paradoxically, North American audiences are encouraged to accept heightened 
surveillance techniques and increased powers of spy agencies to effectively implement 
counterterrorism measures. Yet there is no evidence of increased safety wrought by the 
application of these measures. Indeed, civil liberties groups have criticized anti-terror legislation 
both in Canada and the U.S. (the Patriot Act in the U.S., and Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2015) for infringing on privacy rights and for allowing domestic spy agencies unprecedented, 
ostensibly unending and unhindered spying capacity, thereby circumventing the American 
Constitution and Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
Nevertheless, U.S. imperialism is expressed by the expanding empire of military bases, 
uniformed military personnel and informants that have been dispersed globally with the aim of 
policing world order in favor of American economic and cultural interests. Put briefly, this 
dominance entails “all elements of national power: economic, diplomatic, financial, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and both overt and covert military operations” (p. 35). This totalizing 
perspective includes the need for not only sovereign power to override the existing rules of war, 
e.g. pre-emptive strikes against actual or potential enemies, but also policing what the Bush II 
Administration came to call “the arc of instability” (p. 35). Under this paradigm, military bases 
and surveillance technology will surely extend, but the origin of that power will be made opaque: 
discreetly dislocated, fragmented, and relocated.  
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This information presented thus far, which points to a reluctance to incorporate citizen-
soldiers into future missions, considered singularly in a vacuum is not particularly 
groundbreaking. Yet, contemplate it in relation to the introductory remarks of the very same 
document. President Obama writes, immediately in the opening line, “our nation is at a moment 
of transition. Thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, we have 
responsibly ended the war in Iraq.” That the President would so hastily invoke the theme of 
sacrifice, prior to his operatives detailing a plan, which explicitly advocates for fewer soldiers, 
combat unmanning, and therefore the disavowal or circumvention of sacrifice, is not a 
coincidence, but a clever rhetorical move on the part of a sovereign authority who, it appears, 
wishes to simultaneously distance his war powers from citizen-soldiers, while consolidating the 
power of the Executive branch by reclaiming and indeed expanding his place as the rightful 
author of violence through the symbolic capital offered by the invocation of sacrificial language.  
Billing himself as an anti-war candidate, President Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2009. Yet, perhaps unexpectedly, he was a President at war in the two terms he served. 
According to Landler (2016) Obama tried to reconcile his anti-war position with the reality of 
governing by “approaching his wars in narrow terms, a chronic but manageable security 
challenge rather than as an all-consuming national campaign in the tradition of World War II, or 
to a lesser degree, Vietnam.” From this, it appears that, for Obama, the shift from war to security 
is a form of preventative ‘healthcare’ for a body politic, which is exposed to a dull and ongoing 
pain that cannot be resolved by drawing in a national population, but instead requires supra-
national, discreet, and singular attacks targeting the (oftentimes multiple) sources of national 
pain. The reluctance to draw in a national population is key. It suggests a breakdown in 
traditional means of waging war, but also the citizen-soldier’s role therein.   
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Returning to the document, I argue that, in recognizing these citizen-soldiers for their 
sacrifices, President Obama is, first, falsely equating the end of war to the officially declared 
withdraw of troops. Yet, at time of writing, there are approximately 10,000 U.S. troops 
remaining in Afghanistan, and 3,500 troops in Iraq (despite the official withdraw of troops in 
2011). Moreover, the number of private contractors working for the State Department grew 
eight-fold in 2015 (Weisgerber, 2016). What is Obama’s evidence that war has “responsibly 
ended?” Is it an official declaration, the complete removal of all U.S. troops (and U.S. 
contractors) or is it the complete cessation of violence in any given state? President Obama 
perhaps is aware of his audience here being primarily composed of military, defense, and 
technology industry stakeholders, and therefore does not feel it necessary to spend time 
unpacking or defending this claim. Regardless, it is also the case that traditional temporal 
categories- ‘before’ and ‘after,’ ‘begin,’ and ‘end’ are not even applicable in the global, 
permanent war against Terror. More critically, however, President Obama’s comments naturalize 
and normalize these sacrifices as expected and dutiful contributions of citizens, in line with his 
Canadian counterparts who assert the obligation of states to call on citizens to sacrifice and 
citizens to answer this call. But, unlike the Canadian officials, the more detailed defense strategy 
outlined further on in the document suggests, at a minimum, a deep hesitation if not outright 
discomfort with the role that citizen-soldier bodies (as sacrificing bodies) will play in future 
combat operations. 
 
Part of this discomfort can be explained, I argue, in part to the sacrificial politics of 
resistance that characterized the early moments of the 2003 Iraq invasion, and the failure on the 
part of the U.S. government to adequately theorize what its desire for bodyless war meant for its 
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ability to control the sacrificial message in light of growing anti-war resentment. Looking at 
sacrifice directly provides explanatory power here: The concept of sacrifice is analytically 
meaningful because in death, particularly the deaths of soldiers serving abroad, discourses of 
sacrifice allow the potential for the authors of sovereign violence, acting in tandem with the 
credibility of the nation state, to breathe life back into those who it claims perished on its behalf, 
reinforcing the biopolitical ordering of life and death by propping up narratives that underscore 
who is authorized to conduct the sacrifice and who must be sacrificed. But this is not a 
straightforward process. Take the example of Cindy Sheehan,29 a prominent antiwar activist and 
mother of fallen soldier, Casey. Sheehan acutely (and dangerously) pinpoints the political 
content of sacrifice when she, in speech at a peace rally in 2007, states, in a clear act of criticism 
and resistance to the state’s attempt to incorporate her son's death into a narrative of noble 
sacrifice for the nation: “my son was used as sacrificial cannon fodder by the military industrial 
complex and the Bush Crime family to line their pockets.” Sacrifice is a critical component of 
how people are governed in moments where war is being explained or justified, and thus 
neoliberal governments are deeply concerned with establishing some sense of monopoly over its 
discursive trajectories (Taussig-Rubbo, 2009) to control its meaning. This monopoly of sacrifice 
is challenged by Sheehan and others, combined with contemporary war technologies and 
practices, and as such reveals the mythical and increasingly weakened underpinnings of military 
sacrifice. This results in a contestation over the categorization and classification of sacrifice as it 
                                                        
29 Cindy Sheehan famously became a focal point on the subject of the sacrifice of Mothers’ of fallen soldiers. While 
speaking of her own sacrifice as a mother, as well as the sacrifice of her son, she critiqued then President Bush’s 
attempt to minimize her loss. She was able to “mobilize her private suffering in the public domain” (Taussig-Rubbo 
2009, p. 108) which served to destabilize and/or resist a hegemonic interpretation of the public and private spheres 
thereby unsettling the gendered expectations of citizenship, (Lister, 2002) namely that she would, as a mother, 
reserve her grief for the private sphere only and accept the fate of her son as somehow serving a greater, national 
good. Granted, Sheehan’s political grounding of her claim was warranted in that her son was a state-soldier and not 
a private contractor. Her claim gained further momentum in her assessment that her son’s sacrifice was unnecessary, 
and therefore not a legitimate sacrifice, and by virtue of that, meaningless. 
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pertains to the lives and deaths of citizen-soldiers, and military contractors alike, and as such 
affects the biopolitical intersection between the parameters of citizenship (the right to claim a 
certain kind of life) and self-sacrifice in war (the right to claim a certain kind of death). 
Much like how Prime Minister Trudeau’s government inherited aspects of Prime Minister 
Harper’s policies, it is worth noting too the context that the Obama administration inherited from 
the former Bush administration. The current U.S. government, of course, inherited, and indeed 
extends, aspects of President Bush’s national security strategy,30 namely its preoccupation with 
counterterrorism, defined as the “tactical appropriation of guerilla warfare under the doctrine of 
counterinsurgency developed during the Vietnam War” (Troyer, 2003, p. 262). In response to 
9/11, former President Bush was quick to claim that terrorists are heirs to “all murderous 
ideologies of the twentieth century. By sacrificing [presumably all forms of] human life to serve 
their radical visions, by abandoning every value but the will to power, they follow in the path of 
Fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism” (Bush, quoted in Troyer, 2003, p. 261). The image of 
sacrifice invoked here by Bush is used to insult; it is negative as far as self-immolation is 
regarded as cowardly and barbaric, in contrast to Obama’s use of sacrifice, which speaks out in a 
congratulatory manner. Bush is constructing sacrifice here as an anachronistic form of irrational 
pre-modern violence, as occurring outside the national, and therefore, legitimate sacrificial 
                                                        
30 Turning on these developments, and otherwise known as the Bush Doctrine, counterterrorism, as a national 
strategy, positions the Western state (noble and responsible) as a target of violence whose injury resonates at the site 
of sovereignty in the form of terrorism—illegitimate violence—rather than viewing itself as a practitioner or agent 
of violence. Its principles, as summarized by Bush himself in his book Decision Points include:  
“1, Make no distinction between terrorists and the nations that harbor them—and hold both to account.” 
“2. Take the fight to the enemy overseas before they can attack us again here at home.” 
“3. Confront threats before they fully materialize.” 
“4. Advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy's ideology of repression and fear.” 
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framework. According to him, it is baseless murder, not sacrifice, since its motivations are 
perceived to be ideological, carried out by illegitimate non-state actors.  
The implication of this rhetoric, as discussed by Frank Pearce (2010, p. 52), is a 
Manichean vision that produces the conditions for ‘othering’ but also implies that “God is not 
only on the side of the United States, but the devil is with its opponents.” Lon Troyer (2010) and 
Zuriek and Hindle (2004) similarly argue that a moral, ‘demonolgoical’ discourse of terrorism 
emerged after 9/11, alongside the consolidation of sovereign authority against the other branches 
of government. In this political environment, the emphasis on counterterrorism encouraged the 
troubling of the legal status of ‘unlawful’ versus ‘enemy combatants’ as well as the 
reconfiguration of military tribunals, the invitation of unilateralism, and the depoliticization and 
persecution of political opposition. It also produced a moral discourse, which viewed terrorists31 
are unhinged evildoers, thus rendering them rightful targets of sovereign violence.  
 
The Paradox of Sacrifice  
To compliment and elucidate this previous discussion, in Chapter Four I move to 
establish a theoretical framework, characterized by a discussion of sovereignty and biopolitical 
                                                        
31 A critical approach to counterterrorism claims that to invoke the word ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ marks the 
beginning of an attempt to draw boundaries around various styles and motivations for violence, as well as to provide 
ground to narrate as well as differentiate violence. The violence of the stateless “other” is considered to be 
insurgent/barbaric, versus the rationally motivated, sophistically and deliberately calculated, and morally centered 
violence of the state: the legitimate bearer of violence. Counterterrorism policy, which emerged during the Cold 
War, homogenizes terroristic violence and categorizes so-called terrorists as unified by a supposedly shared, 
fanatical hatred for the same things, namely ideals cherished by the U.S. and other liberal and/or Western political 
economies. It historically was just one prong of foreign policy, but now the entirety of military strategy is foreign 
policy, a conflation that functions to sharply differentiate U.S.-backed terror from the opposing practices it sees as 
both its justification and inspiration. As the role of the military changed from defense of the homeland to identifying 
domestic and international security threats and maintaining security both at home and abroad, armed forces in many 
places are expected to combat threats without enemies, thus broadening the roles of military personnel. Forces are 
now expected to engage non-traditional military threats: illegal immigration, terrorism, and cyberattack. 
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violence, by which to broaden, and anchor it. However, some summative points must be asserted 
first to carry forward into the remainder of the chapter. To consider sacrifice as a paradox, we 
must clarify the context in which this paradox emerges, namely within the crisis of postmodern 
warfare. Postmodern wars reveal a crisis as far as they increasingly rely on technology for full-
spectrum dominance, and yet the most powerful military technologies cannot be used (Gray 
2003, p. 215). Speed has replaced geopolitics as the basis of military coordination (Der Derian 
quoted in Hooper 2001, p. 111) extending (simulated) battlefields beyond national borders 
(Uesseler, 2008). This illuminates the amalgamation of public (state) and private (non-state) 
powers to realize the goals of liberal wars of choice—wars that are conceived of in humanitarian 
terms in terms of empowering life yet nevertheless enable and perpetuate material forms of 
violence. Through the above (albeit admittedly brief) comparison between Canada and American 
use of sacrifice in political discourse, different approaches to thinking about wartime sacrifice 
are apparent: one (Canada) is focused on presenting a singularly seductive memory of a 
celebrated past to conflate militarism and nationalism in the making up of an uncontested 
Canadian identity. The other discourse (that of the U.S.) is so preoccupied with enabling the war 
fighters’ ability to wage full-spectrum dominance through a business model of 'efficiency' and 
'ownership' of the future/potential realm, that it cannot carve out the time or space for the 
historical focus required by a slow-burning talk of body/memory politics. These differences in 
the representation of sacrifice, delineating a particularized scope and scale of sacrifice, can be 
made analytically useful only if analyzed not in isolation, but in tandem. These trajectories of 
sacrifice unfold as two sides of the same coin, producing an effective tension as far as how 
bodies might be differentially situated as agents of military violence, and how that violence is 
socially organized, either through a departure from the citizen-soldier model of warfare (as in the 
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U.S.) or through a symbolic celebratory reclaiming of the sacred grounds of violence (as in 
Canada). (While Obama did cite the importance of sacrifice in his introductory statements, recall 
that it was presented in the form of a cursory, passing remark: surely, sacrifice was something 
that happened in the past, but now that war is over, as shrinking defense budgets warrant, he does 
not imagine that similar embodied sacrificial actions will figure into the planning and operations 
of future combat missions). 
In this vein of organizing violence through the re-writing of founding moments of the 
nation, a clear effect is the reasserting of the importance of sacrifice for the nation, which is seen 
in official wartime speeches, commemorative campaigns, and various annual days of 
remembrance. The oft-repeated question on days of remembrance, “how will you remember?” 
has a productive purpose. In being asked, or rather compelled to re-remember certain historical 
wartime events, subjects are drawn into and reproduce their own narratives about the myths of 
national belonging and citizenship through interpolation, or hailing, to use philosopher Louis 
Althusser’s language. In the act of accepting these embodied sacrifices as just, subjects are 
reified as citizens while they are folded into a violent militarized identity. 
In contrast, the U.S. discourse reveals a desire for bodyless and bloodless war. 
Championed by the architects of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly Donald Rumsfeld, the 
RMA seeks to replace military labour- that is, soldiers, and of course the now politically 
problematic American casualties- with technology, capital, or “dead labour” (Parenti, 2007, p. 
88). This desire is a function of contemporary expectations held by dominant political and 
military planners that war can be a phenomenon that, when sufficiently commodified, 
technologized, and exposed to neoliberal market logic, and private sector accounting and 
management techniques, (Duffield, 2001, pp. 48-60) rendered efficient and “clean.” This 
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deliberate aesthetic construction of war as potentially sanitized not only contributes to the 
continued de-politicization of violence, but also, more critically, offers the potential to make 
modern, militarized sacrifice- what I argue is a politicized and nationalized relation between 
citizen and state characterized by the promise of mutual reciprocity- increasingly unevenly 
applied, recognized, and represented, in a climate of expanding privatization schemes; schemes 
which gain further credibility in relation to the commodification, corporatization, and techno-
fetishism of the social organization and application of violence. When war is ideally imagined as 
bodyless or bloodless, at a minimum on “our side,” the contradictory effect on sacrificial logic in 
postmodernity is clear, given that, as I have already gestured to, and will more thoroughly argue 
below, sacrifice is fundamentally characterized by its surplus-driven, publicizing, and embodied 
practices and tendencies.  
As Girard & Gregory (1979, p. 28) write, regarding blood spilt in conflict, “the only way 
to avoid contagion is to flee the scene of violence.” That people would actively avoid the 
contagion of the other by avoiding the stigma of bloodshed and death is further enabled and 
sustained through privatization and unmanned military technology, the logic extending one step 
further as soldiers do not even have to physically arrive onto the scene of violence, but can 
apply, view, and analyze the violence and wreckage in a risk-free setting, at a comfortable 
physical (and legal-political) distance. While not implying, because it is not within the scope of 
this project, that drone operators do not experience a gamut of conflicting emotions, such as 
shame, numbness, remorse, pride, or trauma, nevertheless, in the absolute prevention of 
contagion, there is no need to physically (or ethically) face the humanity of the other. The U.S.’s 
preference for technological solutions (although for the time being supplemented with human-
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centered solutions) has therefore shifted the terrain of sacrifice in that killing and being killed are 
no longer the legacy of the nation’s citizen-soldiers.  
As a collection of technological artefacts, strategic and tactical systems, and practices that 
supplement war fighters, the U.S. Department of Defense claims that ideally these systems will 
gain greater autonomy such that “the algorithms must act as a human brain does.” The DoD’s 
report, entitled, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038, claims that “research 
and development in automation are advancing from a state of automatic systems requiring 
human control toward a state of autonomous systems able to make decisions and react without 
human interaction” (p. 29). For now, however, the application of unmanned systems involves 
significant human interaction. Yet, the goals of net-centric warfare assume a gradual shift from 
humans “in the loop” to humans “on the loop,” because of how it regards bodies as obstacles 
(Masters, 2008). 
As a result, we are left with a paradox inherent to the current imagining of military 
sacrifice, expressed in the difficulty of how a government can position itself to simultaneously 
demand and disavow sacrifice: how to flip the coin and respond accordingly when it lands on 
either side. Turning on these political underpinnings of the demand and disavowal of sacrifice, 
this problematic also simultaneously teases out multiple tensions pertaining to fundamental 
political categories: citizens/others, national/post-national, local/global, peace/war, and 
public/private. For now, it can be said that militarized technological advancements, and the 
gradual supplementation of humans with technology such that humans ultimately sit further back 
“on the loop” rather than as fully integrated “in the loop,” would ostensibly allow for the 
potential of sacrifice, in its former nationalized and totalizing iteration, to be made entirely 
obsolete. The effect of this is profound: a sociopolitical shift in how violence is conceived and 
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projected in accordance with ideals of the nation, expressed by the slow ejection of sacrifice 
from its historical legacy in the archetype of the citizen-soldier. Flexible citizenship, the private 
contracting of soldiery, drone wars, and combat unmanning, together capture an unprecedented 
shift relative to the sacrificial logic that is bound up with how the nation imagines and harnesses 
the archetype of the citizen-soldier, in relation to the practices of war and state violence, but also 
in relation to ordinary, non-citizen-soldiers, as far as how they are perceived and treated by the 
state. 
Still, despite the disavowal of sacrifice, the other side of the sacrificial coin (the demand 
for sacrifice) remains theoretically and analytically useful in analyzing sacrifice in relation to a 
dialectical methodological approach. Sacrificial discourses, while perhaps appearing negated or 
sociologically irrelevant in comparison to previous political or historical moments, such as in the 
lead up to, during, and after total, mass, or ‘Great’ wars, are also curiously and inconsistently 
reasserted (as in the Canadian examples) despite what I argue is the untethering of sacrifice from 
within the parameters of citizen-soldiering. Sacrifice is indeed currently demanded and 
appropriated by state officials, but I argue that its invocation—making up the geo-political scene 
of sacrificial interpolation— is only effective when it draws on a notion of a historical past, and a 
specific narrative of sovereignty and sovereign authority therein, that is in fact incongruent with 
the actual practices and lived realities, and indeed the architecture of war today.  
In the avoidance of the violent scene of sacrifice through drone warfare, sacrifice itself 
then appears as a historical glitch, throwback, or an “animated anachronism.”32 Indeed, if the 
sacred is not “an idea but a presence” (Kahn, 2011, p. 147) then the appearance of the sacred—
which must emerge in tandem with some axis of sovereign power wherein embodied combatants 
                                                        
32 This phrasing is borrowed from Judith Butler (2004).  
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encounter one another on a battlefield—can be concealed or suffocated, just as it can be exposed 
and celebrated. Either way therein exists a symbolic and political struggle, aimed primarily at 
governing a key archetype, the body of the citizen-soldier, to make the sacred (in)-visible.  
 
Summary 
The paradox of military sacrifice is exemplified by the struggle to both demand and 
disavow sacrifice, to manage the contradictory (Mutimer, 2005) yet intersecting trajectories of 
both sovereign power (let die) and biopower (make live), and subsequently to contain the 
increasingly visible, often negative effects of this contradiction as far as sovereign nation-state 
power and global violence are concerned. Duffield (2005, p. 61) advances this paradox further 
with respect to the question of how best to manage this series of conflicting needs in the 
organization and application of state violence. That is, to first maintain sovereign power: the 
traditional ideological and political-military capacity to demand sacrifice—while, second, 
supporting agile weapons systems and promoting real-time responsiveness by offering flexible 
types of citizens, and therefore war fighters, indeed, producing and sustaining a bricolage of 
military masculinities (Gray 2003), in light of the asymmetrical demands of new wars—in other 
words, to be more efficient at killing while also protecting and saving (some) life through a 
disavowal of sacrifice. The simultaneous requiring and relinquishing of sacrifice does not in and 
of itself constitute a social conundrum per se, but rather thesis and antithesis, and thus the 
incorporation of both processes result in some semblance of synthesis. How this synthesis is 
governed, normalized, and resisted, given that states are by no means committed to a principle of 
non-contradiction (Kahn, 2011, p. 157) represents the crux of the investigation to follow. 
Historically, sacrifice justified and expanded violence but also operated as a check to limit it. As 
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explicit war is becoming progressively indefensible, its militarized violence, while increasing in 
scope and frequency, risks being rendered meaningless.  
Next, in Chapter Four, I offer a theoretical framework by which to analyze the governing 
of sacrifice within regimes of sovereign and biopolitical violence. Immediate tensions are 
produced because of how these dissimilar, multiple directions of power are applied to the topic 
of how to incorporate or reject bodies in contemporary war. This chapter advances my larger 
argument that militarized notions of sacrifice are becoming less applicable to postmodern 
framings of war, even while sacrifice still circulates in political discourse, and is nevertheless a 
target of governmentality. This becomes clearer in Chapter Five, where I draw on notions of 
embodiment, surplus, and publicity, to further make the case that military/security privatization 
and drone warfare together are symptomatic of the citizen-soldier’s loosening grip on sacrificial 
cults. In Chapters Five and Six I claim that drone warfare signifies profound tensions in 
conceptions of military sacrifice—revealing the trend towards non-sacrificial war: the geography 
of the battlefield redistributes the sacred based on a dialectic of visibility and invisibility, giving 
way to a style of violence that is differentially embodied and embodying, life enabling and 
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Chapter Four: Governing Sacrifice 
Governing Sacrifice  
The battlefield is strewn with the dis-emboweled and beheaded, with severed limbs and 
broken bodies. All have died a terrible death in a display of sovereign power. To view the 
battlefield is to witness the awesome power of the sovereign to occupy and destroy the 
finite body. It is to stand before the modern, democratic equivalent of the spectacle of the 
scaffold. Viewing the battlefield from a certain distance, it is not even clear who is the 
object of sacrifice: the enemy and the conscript suffer the same threat and burden of 
physical destruction for the sake of making present sovereign power. (Kahn, 2011, p. 43) 
 
Kahn’s seductively written yet ahistorical, and therefore conceptually incoherent 
imagining of sovereign power’s place in the battlefield offers mixed metaphors of sovereign 
violence. As his description slips between pre-modern and modern ideas of sovereign power, in 
the opening two sentences we are very much reminded of the tremendous and spectacularly 
crushing randomness of monarchical sovereign violence, while the third sentence explicitly and 
effortlessly cites the imagery characteristic of modern democratic sovereignty. It appears that 
from this historically incoherent description of the relation between sovereignty and sacrifice, 
one that is powerful yet still slightly awkward, we cannot give sacrifice the nuanced treatment 
required to export its theoretical value into our empirical context.    
In this vein, Khan problematically asserts a supposedly given or static quality of 
sovereign power. Its ostensible immediate publicity, as emerging in the violence that flows from 
one body to the next, the sovereign makes itself present in that it occupies these bodies through 
their conflicted association as both citizens (bound by duty) and individuals (bound by free will) 
   117 
 
 
making Himself visible as they fight to the death. In Kahn’s portrayal of sovereignty there is an 
implied invitation to view and experience (as a means to gain knowledge of) the public spectacle 
of violence.  
Khan’s narrative therefore has the effect of placing the body of the conscript and the 
body of the enemy in a shared space as relatively equal counterparts, as far as they are both 
equally and simultaneously exposed to, and compelled to embrace the destructive power of the 
sovereign in their consent to the violent encounter. His battlefield assumes the presence of 
bodies, from both sides. Sovereignty, his analysis suggests, is realized in these bodies’ embodied 
violence with each other, in their encounter of destruction and subsequent bloodshed. While 
Kahn is not explicitly discussing battlefields particular to expressions of sovereign and 
biopolitical power contained in drone warfare, it is nevertheless possible, and indeed productive, 
to export his description of the battlefield to supplement the question of sacrifice, sovereignty, 
and biopolitics.  
Yet, if we were to supplement Khan’s analysis by granting sovereignty its necessary 
historical parameters, different symbolic regimes and therefore different relations between 
knowledge, power, and law, would be revealed in the distinction between pre-modern and 
democratic sovereignty (Singer & Weir, 2006/2008). I will return to this discussion of the 
implications for sacrifice in the application of an ahistorical conception of sovereignty in the 
final section of this chapter. Therein, I will further elaborate upon Singer and Weir’s research on 
Foucault’s mistreatment of sovereignty to expand upon how sacrifice is deployed at the 
intersection between sovereign and biopolitical power. In the meantime, consider the above 
epigraph from Khan as an example of how sovereignty, and sovereign power, can be easily 
misused.    
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For now, the global military application of drones necessitates corresponding 
theorizations of sovereign power, biopolitical power, and sacrificial violence. These theoretical 
frameworks ought to accommodate contradictions and tensions, which can show the intersections 
between sovereign and biopower, the virtual and the material, and the political effects of seeing, 
visibility, invisibility, and witnessing, all of which are mediated by technology’s ability to 
simultaneously remove bodies from the battlefield and still extend the scope, depth, and range of 
an (imperfect but perfectible) human/imperial gaze. Building on the question, “What are the 
practices that make it possible to speak about a common object called security” (Salter, 2013, p. 
5) I inquire here about what conditions of possibility allow us to speak about a common object 
called sacrifice, albeit as a paradoxical relation, as an effect of sovereign and biopolitical 
violence, within the context of liberal, and neoliberal governmentality.33  
The map for this chapter is as follows: As I will argue in this section, both liberal and 
neoliberal forms of governing can be discussed as that which have the management of sacrifice 
as one of its targets of power, in relation to three of its defining qualities: market logic, expertise, 
and the cultivation of empowered subjectivities associated with enhanced freedom. In the 
following section, after establishing how sacrifice is indeed a target of governmentality, I claim 
that part of the governing of sacrifice requires the reconciliation of sovereign and biopolitical 
                                                        
33 As Stuart Hall (2011, p. 708) reminds us, neoliberal ideals come from the principles of ‘classic’ liberal economic 
and political theory: over the course of two centuries, “political ideas of ‘liberty’ became harnessed to economic 
ideas of the free market: one of liberalism’s fault-lines which re-emerges within neoliberalism” (p. 710). Therefore, 
there is tremendous overlap between so-called liberalism and neoliberalism, both in terms of theory as well as in 
how they manifest across time and space. Similarly, recall Ong’s definition of liberalism as not “a political 
philosophy but an art of government...not something that can be reduced to a perfect realization of a doctrine called 
liberalism; rather, it includes an array of rationalities whereby a liberal government attempts to resolve problems of 
how to govern society as a whole” (Ong, 1999, p. 195). On the subject of how sovereignty operates within each 
paradigm, consider that they both monumentalize sacrifice, although, within neoliberalism, sacrifice- killing and 
being killed- is becoming increasingly invisible and thus untethered from its historical emergence in the body of the 
citizen-soldier, thus the content of sacrifice risks seeming an “animated anachronism.”  
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power as they confront each other in contradictory ways in globalized acts of violence, where the 
tensions wrought by liberalism become amplified under the ideology and practices of 
neoliberalism. I discuss this in relation to the unfolding of neoliberal economic and political 
policy in the post-Cold War period. Next, I trace how this neoliberal restructuring of capitalism, 
which saw the increasing militarization of high technology and the expansion of military bases 
worldwide combined, with the downsizing of militaries globally, has enabled a new style of 
“postmodern violence.” This violence, pivoting on the “decline of the social” that informs the 
neoliberal restructuring of capitalism, is characterized by an ethos of privatization, technological 
fetishism, and the abandonment of the citizen-soldier model of warfare. My central argument is 
that the invisibility of drone warfare, supported by neoliberal privatization, flexible citizenship, 
and fragmentation of social relations therein, has altered the content of sacrifice such that those 
who authorize sacrifice, and what entity is to receive the benefits, are not immediately known. 
Finally, after tracing some of the dominant literature and themes regarding sovereignty, the 
chapter ends with a section on democratic sovereignty (where the main argument takes shape) to 
better understand how pre-modern and modern notions of sovereignty differentially inform 
sacrifice. The point in this section is not to uphold a false and neat distinction between pre-
modern (“religious”) and modern (“secular”) periods (I discuss this more later in the Chapter)34 
but instead to reveal how the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism, and the shifting notions of 
sovereign and biopolitical power therein, alter the content and meaning of sacrificial politics in 
global wars today.   
                                                        
34 Consider Robert N. Bellah’s landmark essay on “civil religion.” He writes that, despite official declarations of 
secularism, religious imagery, symbolism, and language still circulates in political speeches, particularly in moments 
of national crises such as in events leading up to war, or those that reflect on war. Sacrifice is an example of a theme 
that, although profoundly religious in its historical orientation, nevertheless finds a way to be palatable to, and 
indeed necessary for, both religious and non-religious people alike.  
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Returning now to the first section: the discussion on governmentality. The first defining 
feature of how governmentality operates today is its reliance upon market logic. This market 
logic facilitates the investment, research, and capital necessary to create technological 
advancements in weaponry that enable the vision of disembodied warfare (Graham, 2008) 
making the protection of (our) soldier’s lives the primary concern. Second, since governing 
includes “patience rather than wrath,” and the production of experts and expert knowledge to 
synthesize and implement the ideals of disembodied war, rational and deliberate calculation over 
life and death is valued over random, impulsive violence.  
The third point: governmentality contains a tension between security and freedom 
(Ciccarelli, 2008) in that, to be secure, freedom must be managed. The governing that results 
from this tension produces new socioeconomic and political conditions for getting beyond the 
contemporary challenges of military sacrifice. Since governing enables new subjectivities with 
positive associations, i.e. the self-sacrificing citizen, it does not attempt to control but instead 
recognizes the capacity for action—control being an effect. It allows the discourse of military 
sacrifice to carry positive associations with freedom, interpolating the subject to act as though 
free—the neoliberal, sacrificing citizen spends their hard-earned money at the shopping mall as 
per Bush's infamous post-9/11 recommendation, or signs up for the military, or sings their 
national anthem at a sporting event (which happens to feature military personnel) with renewed 
effort, all to disable and resist the terrorist's attempt to mitigate his/her own freedom—while in 
these actions the citizen is justifying military intervention—the spreading of freedom in places 
that are not officially Christian/liberal or Western and thus are decidedly un-free.  
Governmentality theorizing reveals how war is not purely destructive but also productive as far 
as it gives content and meaning to the nation-state while providing ground for a certain mode of 
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governing and thus related kinds of action. War is productive in that it re-constitutes and 
normalizes the archetype of the soldier-citizen, while calling on ordinary citizens to subscribe to 
militarization, to identify as militarized subjects within and through discourses of history and 
sacrifice. 
Liberal government, then, contains two considerable, paradoxical tensions. First, “to 
maintain its own legitimacy, the state had to fashion the economy, civil society and the family as 
autonomous and self-generating and, at the same time, continuously and selectively intervene in 
these spaces to ensure their 'freedom' to function properly” (Brodie, 2008, p. 29). Liberalism 
presupposes that citizens regard themselves as individual bearers of sovereign power. Yet they 
nonetheless exist within a model of institutional pluralism where the task of liberal government 
is to construct and enforce pluralism while also developing “reflexive strategies of intervention 
to sustain this model,” i.e., social governance (Brodie, 2008, p. 29). The paradox of democratic 
legitimacy (Benhabib, 2004) therefore implies that freedom itself is a target of governmental 
power: it must be managed. Democratic legitimacy expresses a tension between “universal 
human rights claims and particularistic cultural and national identities” (Benhabib, 2004, p. 44). 
Social governance through liberal government requires that one be willing to sacrifice one’s life 
to preserve individual security.  
However, globalization has witnessed and produced proliferating security threats. 
Marked by processes of deterritorialization and denationalization, globalization reconfigures the 
link between citizenship and sacrifice. The fixed relationship between soldier and a discrete 
national public, rooted in a particular citizenship regime, and a particular time-space relation, 
which situates the nation (Singer, 1996, p. 320) has been uprooted and replaced anew. My 
interpretation suggests that military sacrifice has historically required a public to validate it, to 
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identify it and name it as such. Denationalization renders the political struggle to categorize 
sacrifice tenuously contingent on non-national and supra-national mechanisms of power, namely 
political-economic forms of privatization that make this recognition of sacrifice increasingly 
problematic. These tensions in how sacrifice is managed are exposed by the principles of liberal 
governmentality. Below I explore Foucault’s treatment of governmentality to better comprehend 
the concept before moving to explore sovereign and biopolitical power within the post-Cold War 
era.    
For Foucault, the “art of government” emerged during the sixteenth century and consists 
of a twofold government of the self and government of souls/lives (herein is the whole 
problematic of pastoral doctrine); the government of children, government of the state by the 
prince: “how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people 
will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor” (p. 87). Governing 
entails a double movement of state centralization and the dispersion of religious dissidence and it 
is at the intersection of these processes where the problem of government is revealed. The art of 
government is defined in 16th century text in a manner differentiating it from a certain capacity 
of the prince. Here Foucault is critical of Machiavelli and wants to replace his philosophy: 
 
[T]he objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen and protect the 
principality but with this last understood to mean not the objective ensemble of its 
subjects and the territory, but rather the prince’s relation with what he owns, with the 
territory he has inherited or acquired, and with his subjects. (p. 90)   
 
The central point is that the prince is trying to keep his principality (the prince reflects 
externality and transcendence) and this is replaced with “the art of government.” 
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Drawing on La Mothe and Le Vayer, in an educational text, Foucault writes that the art of 
government consists of three types of governing: self-government (morality); governing a family 
(economy); and the science of ruling the state (politics). What matters according to Foucault is 
the essential continuity of one type with another. Since the doctrine of the Prince is constantly 
attempting to draw the line between the power of the prince and any other form of power, its task 
is to explain this essential discontinuity between them: by contrast, “in the art of government the 
task is to establish a continuity, in both an upwards and downwards direction” (p. 91). Upwards 
means the person who wishes to govern the state must learn to govern him self, while 
downwards means ensuring good government of the state, via the police, for example.   
The essential issue for the establishment for the art of government is the introduction of 
economy into political practice: “to govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set 
up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, 
and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as 
that of the head of the family over his household and his goods” (p. 92). In the sixteenth century, 
the economy signified a form of government while in the eighteenth century the economy 
became a level of reality and a field of intervention. 
The target of power in Machiavelli: territory and its inhabitants. “Machiavelli simply 
adapted to his particular aims a juridical principle which from the Middle Ages to the sixteenth 
century defined sovereignty in public law” (p. 93). 
[I]n this sense we can say that territory is the fundamental element both in Machiavellian 
principality and in juridical sovereignty as defined by the theoreticians and philosophers 
of right. Obviously enough, these territories can be fertile or not, the population dense or 
sparse, the inhabitants rich or poor, active or lazy, but all these elements are mere 
   124 
 
 
variable by comparison with territory itself, which is the very foundation of principality 
and sovereignty. On the contrary, in La Perriere’s text, you will notice that the definition 
of government in no way refers to territory (government is the distribution of things—so, 
Foucault says, government has a finality of its own which distinguishes it from 
sovereignty). One governs things. (p. 93) 
 
The art of government means “the question of landed property for the family, and the 
question of the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory for a prince, are only relatively 
secondary matters. What counts essentially is this complex of men and things; property and 
territory are merely one of its variables” (p. 94). “Within the perspective of government, law is 
not what is important: this is a frequent theme throughout the seventeenth century, and it is made 
explicit in the eighteenth-century texts...it is not through law that the aims of government are to 
be reached” (p. 96). The good governor does not have to have a sting (weapon of killing, a 
sword) he must have patience rather than wrath—the positive content, which forms the essence 
of the governor and replaces the negative force. Power is about wisdom and not knowledge of 
divine laws, of justice and equality, but rather, knowledge of things (p. 96). 
The raison d'état acted as an obstacle to the development of the art of government. Yet 
the art of government had to contend with demographic expansion, the novel abundance of 
money, and the expansion of agricultural production, all through the emergence of the problem 
of the population. Therefore, the population becomes irreducible to the dimension of the family, 
and the family now becomes considered as internal to the population as an instrument of 
government, rather than a model. “Population comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end 
of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of 
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government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the 
increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.” (p. 100). Further, 
In other words, the transition which takes place in the eighteenth century from an art of 
government to a political science, from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty 
to one ruled by techniques of government, turns on the theme of population and hence 
also on the birth of political economy. This is not to say that sovereignty ceases to play a 
role from the moment with the art of government begins to become a political science...as 
for discipline, this is not eliminated either...in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-
discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential 
mechanism the apparatuses of security. (pp. 101-102)  
Political economy is thus a central form of knowledge in governmentality. Governmentality, or 
control techniques and practices that are not reducible to state politics, does not indicate the loss 
of or departure from sovereignty.  
In reaction to challenges, which disrupt spatialization and communication that 
underpinned conventional notions of nation states their territoriality and governability, Nikolas 
Rose, in Powers of Freedom, utilizes Foucault’s notion of governmentality to show how certain 
positive understandings of freedom have become a pre-requisite for the governing of subjects. To 
govern is to recognize the capacity for action. Investigations of government focus on “the will to 
govern as it is enacted in a multitude of programs, strategies, tactics, devices, calculations, 
negotiations, intrigues, persuasions and seductions aimed at the conduct of the conduct of 
individuals, groups, populations- and indeed oneself” (Rose, 1999, p. 5). Further, he claims, “the 
insistence on the significance of the formation and transformation of truthful thought 
differentiates studies of government from most varieties of political sociology” (p. 8). For Rose, 
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a genealogy of freedom and the social would examine how relations between freedom and power 
are established. The point is not to be critical of freedom, or reveal it as a grand hoax, or to think 
of a more purely truthful freedom, but to ask how we have come to define and act towards 
ourselves in relation to a certain notion of freedom: “The government of freedom can first be 
analyzed in terms of the inventions of spaces and gazes, the birth of calculated projects, to use 
space to govern individuals at liberty” (p. 72). Modern individuals are not ‘free to choose’ but 
‘obliged to be free.’ (p. 87). To efficiently govern is to harness and mobilize those technologies 
that allow for it to be accomplished at a distance, such that any immediate hierarchy of power is 
eclipsed. 
If the world is now understood, as will be elaborated upon later in this chapter, as 
primarily a marketplace, where market logic, capital, and expert knowledge now dominate 
political, social, and cultural life, in a manner unprecedented in the history of capitalism, then 
war, security, and its discursive and material counterpart—sacrifice— are not exempt from the 
expanding logic of what we now call “neoliberal”35 capitalism, and neoliberal governing. In fact, 
war and security are coterminous practices that are explicitly harnessed by neoliberal ideology, 
for example, by reducing security to a commodity to bought and sold in the global marketplace.  
As I will argue in this chapter, sacrifice, in both discourse and practices, is deployed in 
society for the purposes of more efficient governing. It is a target of governing, as far as it aids in 
the rationalization of its own capacity for violence through a scientific knowledge underpinned 
                                                        
35 When speaking of liberalism and neoliberalism, one does not involve a complete rejection of the practices of the 
other. In fact, “neoliberalism…evolves. It borrows and approximates extensively from classical liberal ideas; but 
each is given a further ‘market’ inflexion and conceptual revamp…neoliberalism performs a massive work of trans-
coding while remaining in sight of the lexicon on which it draws” (Hall, 2011, p. 711). Following this passage from 
Stuart Hall, I use “neoliberalism” to refer to the globalized and marketized amplification of tensions contained in 
classical liberalism. The amplification of these tensions on a global scale are notably reflected in the economic crises 
characteristic of the post-Cold War period, where neoliberalism is primarily defined through a language of 
marketization while not forgetting the “lexicon on which it draws,” i.e., the spirit of classical liberalism and its 
emphasis on equality, dignity, and rights for all. 
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by a calculus of the meaning of life and death. Neoliberal governmentality is not just destructive, 
in terms of how it enables recessions, environmental degradation, and the horrors of war’s 
violence. It is also a productive force because it empowers subjectivities with positive 
associations, enabling the notion of the empowered-to-be-free subject.  
As said, neoliberal governmentality embraces and amplifies the contradiction between 
security and freedom (Ciccarelli, 2008) and makes subjection a condition of that freedom. The 
governing of sacrifice occurs at two levels, micro (subjectivity) and macro 
(nationally/institutionally). To be a subject willing to sacrifice the self and others for the 
preservation of freedom—characteristically democratic ideals—is to begin to ease the burden 
between security and freedom. In this reconciliation of power, we are made complicit in 
normalizing the neoliberal way of war. The demand for sacrifice on the part of the state’s 
military apparatus is where biopolitics (the administration of life) and the sovereign’s support for 
militarization (the socioeconomic and political planning for violence) correspond under the 
practices integral to neoliberal governing. Through the archetype of the honourable sacrificing 
subject, states more efficiently authorize legitimate violence abroad. Neoliberal governing 
reveals how war and security are productive in that they constitute new markets, and new ways 
of being made free while paradoxically being subjected to and subjectified by security.   
 
Sovereign and Biopolitical Power in the Post-Cold War Era 
The paradox of military sacrifice, a problem to be managed through the governing-at-a-
distance of self and others, reflects, and indeed hinges on, Foucault’s analysis of sovereign 
power (to let die) and biopolitical power (to make live) (Foucault, 2007) but requires 
supplementation and clarification particularly around the distinction between pre-modern and 
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democratic sovereignty. As previously discussed, the paradox of sacrifice is revealed at the 
intersection or confrontation of these two modes of power in contemporary political moments, 
namely globalized acts of violence, which attempt to resolve, or at least partially reconcile, the 
tensions between two aforementioned contradictory directions of power: the sovereign 
requirement of execution, bloodshed, and of destructive violence, and ultimately injury and 
death, and the biopolitical demand to protect and administer life in the domestic sphere through, 
for example, citizenship entitlements in the domestic sphere, and through humanitarian action 
and intervention abroad. 
The reconciliation between sovereign and bio-power reveals much about the expanding 
place of neoliberal privatization schemes and their expert forms of knowledge which flows 
inward through private corporations and outward into public entities, coupled with enhanced and 
continuously enhancing technology, to ease this contradictory burden as it unfolds in relation to 
liberal democratic forms of violence. Since the end of the Cold War, states have relied heavily 
upon technology, and related forms of outsourced institutional, technological, and securitized 
expertise to accomplish military and security goals (namely full-spectrum dominance) and yet in 
reality the most powerful military technologies cannot be used given the threat of mutually 
assured destruction (Gray, 2003, p. 215).  
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new economic reality, marked by uncertainty and 
economic insecurity owing to economic liberalization policies. These polices, adopted, and 
promoted by dominant states, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, which tied 
loans to a receiving government’s continued acceptance of them (note that they are ‘obliged to 
be free’). This resulted in a deepening divide between the global rich and poor; a “planet of 
slums” (Davis, 2006) combined with an epistemic crisis in the state-system and neoliberal 
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project (McMichael, 2009). The neoliberal restructuring of capitalism has a short yet aggressive 
history. Initially these ideas came to fruition via conservative coalitions in the United States and 
Britain in the 1980s. However, neoliberal reforms began earlier, in the 1970s. Following these 
reforms, private industries, such as the biometrics industry, benefited from several interrelated 
events, which coincided with significant reductions in social spending: The War on Drugs, 
welfare backlash and severe attack on welfare recipients, a shift within the prison system, 
increasingly privatized, from rehabilitation to punishment, and the enhanced surveillance and 
criminalization of poverty, racial minorities, and immigration (Magnet, 2013). Beyond North 
America, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the privatization of state-owned industries across 
Europe, and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank's endorsement and enforcement of 
these principles made privatization, and its harmful effects for ordinary people, appear inevitable 
(Avant, 2007:183).  
According to Rose, neoliberalism is not a simple return to nineteenth century laissez faire 
ideology. It was not a matter of “freeing an existing set of market relations from their social 
shackles, but of organizing all features of one’s national policy to enable a market to exist, and to 
provide what it needs to function” (1999, p.141); the enactment of techniques aimed at the 
responsibilization and entrepeneurialization of individuals, families, firms, and corporations. To 
govern better, one must govern less, ideally through the governing of the entrepreneurship of 
autonomous actors (p. 139). Thus, what emerged was the reconstitution of the relationship 
between the economy and the social: all aspects of social behaviour are now re-conceptualized 
along economic lines (p. 141) rendering the social and economic spheres antagonistic; 
fragmenting the social into a multitude of markets (ibid). Division between employment and 
unemployment is now blurred (whereas nineteenth century saw it to have clear divisions—moral, 
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spatial, and economic) perpetual insecurity is the norm for labour. The purpose of life itself is to 
become a ceaseless economic capitalization of the self (p. 161). Active citizenship is now not 
defined by military participation, or community service, for example, but by the extent to which 
one becomes an entrepreneur of him/herself (p. 161). 
In line with neoliberalism’s privileging of the unfettered market, security in this context 
is transformed from a public good into a commodity, packaged as a private service, delivered by 
private enterprise, and consumed by individuals as well as state and non-state actors (Avant, 
2005). This included the privatization of public services and the abolition of capital controls, 
representing the foundation of total capitalism, (Leys, 2008) the universal privileging of the 
standpoint of free-flowing transnational capital in the form of currencies or human labour (never 
fixed, often feminized, always flexible), the unquestionable belief in the superiority of the 
universally applicable and uninhibited market, often unburdened by historical contradictions, or 
the complexity and diversity of culture. The rise of transnational corporations shifted power 
away from (arguably) democratically elected governments into profit-driven, mobile regimes 
aimed at managing the world as a globally assimilated economic unit (Clarke, 1996).  
Economic liberalization favours the freeing of the market, market efficiency, hyper-
individualistic competitiveness, and freedom of choice (Brown, 1995). Brown (1995) claims that 
privatization, a chief technique of governing at a distance, “violates public space, depoliticizes 
socially constructed problems and injustices, exonerates public representatives from public 
responsibility, and undermines a notion of political life as concerned with the common and 
obligating us in common” (p. 123). It was at this historical moment, Brown (1995) argues, that 
the discourse of “getting government off our backs” was amplified, but simultaneously there was 
an expansion of and indeed aggressive consolidation of state power, as expressed by the state’s 
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participation in deregulation, privatization and contracting out its chief activities, identified as 
characteristically postmodern techniques of power (p. 18). Postmodern capitalism is therefore 
“monopolized without being concentrated or centered: it is tentacular, roving, and penetrating, 
paradoxically advanced by diffusing and decentralizing itself” (32). Private means of governing 
redraw the parameters between the public and the private spheres (Hibou, 2004) as far as the 
national era produced a relationship between the state and citizens within national boundaries, 
whereas the neoliberal era provides a significant challenge to the notion of the state as a 
seemingly fixed container. Yet, the public-private divide ought to be understood, not as an 
objective fact, but as a “signifying tool” used to make truth claims and is thus better analyzed as 
a “complexity of shadows” (Memmi, 2002) rather than as normative entities. There is no pure 
public sphere, just as there is no pure public one; it is the naming of certain actions as public that 
attributes tremendous political power to that action. Conversely, naming an act or thing private 
depoliticizes it, and makes it invisible. Privatization recasts the spatial and political dimensions 
of the public and private spheres, finding approval in the prevailing neoliberal discourse. 
Privatization, it should come as no surprise, makes increasing use of private, non-state means of 
governing, and alters not only the forms of economic regulation but also the practice of 
securitization.  
Consider the biometrics industry as an example that pivots on issues of both security and 
privatization. Since 9/11, the biometrics industry became extremely profitable when proliferating 
concerns with security offered new markets for expansion. As a result, biometrics has emerged 
as an integral feature of how both Canada and the U.S. imagine security. In When Biometrics 
Fail: Gender, Race and the Technology of Identity, Shoshanna Amielle Magnet demonstrates 
how biometric technology, through its reliance on predetermined categories of race, gender, 
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class, sexuality, and ability, reinscribes relations of power and domination. Biometrics works by 
attempting to fix subjects to static identity categories (this is especially pertinent given Magnet’s 
main premise that human bodies are not biometrifiable), which turns on the central paradox of 
the neoliberal governing of security in an era of economic privatization: surveillance transforms 
citizens into masses yet also hyper individualizes people, thereby dissolving distinctions. Further, 
following Mariana Valverde, as discussed by Zureik and Hindle (2004:115) security, like 
democracy, and justice, is an abstract concept—an ideal or social construct rather than an 
empirical fact or object. However, biometrics only succeeds on the basis that security is treated 
as an objective fact. Security is an ideal “in the name of which a vast number of procedures, 
gadgets, social relations, and political institutions are designed and deployed.” Privatization is 
one mechanism in which we are relegated to governance through security (Zureik & Hindle, 
2004, p. 115). 
Nevertheless, following widespread neoliberal reforms in 1970s, the biometric industry 
benefited from several events: the privatization of social services and significant reductions in 
social spending, the War on Drugs, welfare backlash, a shift within prisons from rehabilitation to 
punishment, and the increased surveillance and criminalization of poverty and immigration 
(Magnet, 2013). In this context, Magnet addresses citizenship at the Canada-U.S. border by 
examining how biometrics serves to make the boundaries of the nation visible by identifying 
travelers and assessing them according to a criterion of risk. The process of making the Canada-
U.S. border visible depends upon practices of inscription and interpretation that are assumed to 
be self-evident and yet remain complex and ambiguous. To manage risk, biometric technology 
visualizes the border not at an individual point of entry but as something that multiplies itself 
outward. This allows biometrics to permeate all aspects of mobility: before, during, and beyond a 
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traveler’s interception at the border, thereby efficiently separating ostensibly high-risk travelers 
(predominately racialized people of colour and low-income people) from low-risk travelers 
(predominately identified as ethnically white Euro-American business elites).  
Biometrics is imagined as bringing visibility to a mostly invisible border, to render it 
concrete and transparent. In an era of multiplying security threats, irrespective of whether the 
threats are “legitimate” or not, the biometric industry claims to be able to provide a set of neutral, 
technically objective, and reliable technologies to combat security threats (Baggiarini, 2013) 
promoting new forms of economic and political regulation. Advocates of neoliberal rationality as 
applied to matters of security posit that goods and services (including security itself) are best if 
sold and purchased by free and rational consumer-citizens within the uninhibited market. 
However, neoliberalism falsely imagines the market to be disembedded from society, despite the 
reality that the market has never been, and can never be, fully disembedded from society. The 
idea of a fully autonomous, self-regulating market is merely a product of political imagination: a 
utopian project based on the idea of fictitious commodities (Polanyi, 2001). This is especially 
relevant given the state’s direct and penetrating role in the management of fictitious 
commodities, such as land (Block, 2001). Governing thusly occurs outside of the state as 
evidenced by alliances and amalgamations of power amongst different non-state actors, their 
distinct knowledge, private entities, and individuals, so an analysis of the state must account for 
how the state participates in offloading its power to various non-state organizations, such as the 
United Nations, for example. 
As Sandra Whitworth writes, the post-cold war period was dominated by the realism of 
John Mearsheimer. The “United Nations [are to] establish peacekeeping missions and maintain 
international peace and security. They also establish ‘order,’ ‘normalcy,’ ‘democracy,’ and 
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‘economic restructuring’ as the goals of those missions” and “identify who is to be saved and 
who is to be left to die” (p. 33). The identification of 'conflict-prone/third world countries’ is 
indicative of a colonial era notion that advanced European states have a moral obligation to 
civilize others and that pacification is wrought through economic liberalization. So, “once 
illiberalism has been established as the problem, however, a series of responses to ‘conflict-
prone third world countries’' presented themselves, regardless of whether those responses were 
embraced or resisted by local peoples, and regardless of whether they made sense within 
particular local contexts” (p. 43). 
In the post-Cold War period, technological expertise, speed, and the hyper-reality of so-
called bloodless war together illuminate the amalgamation of public and private powers to 
realize the goals of liberal wars of choice; wars that are conceived of in humanitarian terms—
through a framing of protection—yet are nonetheless grounded in, and perpetuate, structural and 
material violence against people who are rendered politically, ideologically, and economically 
marginalized within the global economy. Bloodless wars are never bloodless, or without 
suffering and loss. But the changing meaning that is ascribed to this bloodshed, suffering and 
loss (historically for the nation state) gestures to an unstable, politicized economy of sacrificial 
ideation generated by competing forces, including the military, private military forces, lobbyists, 
governments, and citizens. In the post-Cold War commitment to continuous technological 
advancements (to nurture the possibility of bloodless wars) the specificities of the violence 
therein— captured by America’s drone program—is revealed: violence, in its sheer 
fragmentation across public and private entities, and in its targeted, calculated applications, takes 
cover in hidden and discrete places, no longer seeking or even requiring recognition from a 
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national audience. As will be argued later, rather than ownership, or taking pleasure in public 
demonstrations of violence, violence denies itself even in the moment of its enactment. 
 
The Violence of Postmodern War 
The violence of postmodern war then is characterized by this post-Cold War tension 
between the increasing militarization of high technology, marked by the analogous expansion of 
military bases and technological grip worldwide, and the simultaneous downsizing of militaries 
globally. This facilitates a gap, as far as the technological side is constructed as apolitical 
(research and development monies and scientific expertise, alongside University labs to test 
equipment is all that is required) whereas the human element, or specifically what bodies and in 
what context (what is the exact nature of the mission, and the theater) they will be deploying the 
technology remains deeply political. Negotiating this problem, I argue, is indicative of the 
paradox of sacrifice, how best to govern it, and as well be explained later, gestures to the 
conditions that have displaced it. 
Returning to the particular question of violence in this postmodern landscape, and Kahn’s 
aforementioned description of a bloody battlefield characterizing it as a contained, identifiable, 
singular site of sovereign violence—the “democratic equivalent of the spectacle of the scaffold” 
is complicated in the context of drone strikes, where the nature of sacrifice (or mere murder) is in 
fact, contrary to his point, not quite clear, given that the conscript (assuming this term is even 
accurate/applicable) and the enemy (who is also not appropriately understood given, as will be 
explored later in the dissertation, that any “military-aged male” qualifies as an enemy) are not 
even required to encounter one another. The drone’s battlefield, its targets, and its victims, do not 
reflect a single, static space of noble exchange, engagement, and embodied violence, as Kahn’s 
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vision of the battlefield describes, but a morally deficient globalized site of absolute 
victimization in the purest sense of the term. Herein lies a fundamental reconfiguration of nation-
state violence, which shores up capitalism’s changing relation to war. 
Whitehead and Finnström (2013, pp. 1-25) suggest that the global restructuring of 
capitalism’s relation to war reflects the reconfiguration of a particular style of violence: Namely, 
cyclical outbursts of violence without a guaranteed endpoint, which generate unlimited social 
routines of violence. This unguarded ritualization of violence has witnessed the reconfiguration 
of the limits of violence’s relation to space and temporality. A “war on terror” for example, is a 
vague, if not entirely abstract concept, which has the built-in potential to never end. This is 
because “we” (“civilized society”) can never really overcome terror. Terroristic violence means 
that killing is invested in futuristic, magical realities, where the space of virtuality connects 
directly to the lethality of materiality (p. 9).  Further, they argue, 
war is not an aggregation of violent acts that finally reaches a given threshold of carnage 
to become war rather than armed conflict, counterinsurgency or peacekeeping, but is the 
invocation and creation of a particular political reality that engages allies and enemies, 
civilians and soldiers, in a particular style of violent interactions. (p. 7) 
 
What is the nature of this political reality, and style of violent interaction? I suggested 
earlier that it absolutely ought to include an analysis of an ethos of military/security 
privatization, which will be better elucidated later. For the time being, following Larry George 
(2002), we can expand this analysis to further claim that war serves to medicate and pacify such 
social ills, as exemplified by President Obama, and his government’s approach to war, which 
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prefers to exclude a national audience in its singular yet repetitive and isolated 
strikes/assassinations as a preventative form of healthcare for the political body.  
As George explains, the protracted Global War on Terror reveals war as paradoxically 
both the disease of and remedy for the social body. These “pharmacotic” mimetic wars use 
sacrificial rituals in a “politically cathartic and unifying function- to ‘cleanse’ and ‘purge’ these 
societies of internal disorder and remove troubling dissenters” (2002, p. 164). This quelling of 
internal disorder, a parallel move alongside foreign wars and occupation, is evident in how 
military technology—not just drones, but guns and other coercive tools that suppress dissent and 
civil disobedience, are used domestically to exploit the boundary between law enforcement and 
war. George further claims that war sanctifies politics by “transubstantiating the blood shed by 
compatriots and enemies, as well as by innocent scapegoats and demonized dissenters, into 
various kinds of fungible political power.” The excess of sacrificial violence- what, in Giradian 
terms would amount to the overwhelming intensification of mimetic violence, resulting in a 
violent contagion and the direction of violence “against all” to “against one-” serves as political 
fuel to authorize renewed violence.  
But George, and to some extent Khan, do not account for how the center of that violence 
is not immediately known, accountable, or even visible and instead take the publicity of 
sovereign power for granted: indeed, in contrast to the monarchical sovereign, which their 
analyses inadvertently and thus ahistorically invoke, the democratic sovereign, which 
characterizes our modern period, is immanent but largely invisible (Singer & Weir, 2006, p. 
445). This sovereign right to execute or ‘let die’ through drone strikes is masked by a regime of 
disciplinary and panoptic power, which operates “through a regime of visibility leaving the 
center of power concealed” (Singer & Weir, 2006, p. 445). If the source of that sacred power is 
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concealed, particularly when nations and their audiences are not explicitly called upon, or folded 
into the sacrificial system, it becomes difficult to imagine what the purpose of pharmacotic war 
is, or what kinds of “fungible political power” are available to be captured, and by whom. The 
neoliberal privatization and fragmentation of social relations, the exclusion of which is a critical 
oversight in George’s argument, has altered the content of sacrifice such that those who 
authorize sacrifice, and what entity is to receive the benefits, are not immediately known.  
Consider the language used by George: “sacrifice,” “ritual,” and “transubstantiation;” 
words that conjure up the notion of the sacred even as his pharmacotic metaphor is strictly 
secular. This hints again at the problem of failing to distinguish between pre-modern and 
democratic sovereignty, where, traditionally, religion (and God’s monopoly on truth) is 
associated with monarchical sovereignty, and secularism with democratic revolutions. If the 
sacred is most immediately allied with an anachronistic form of sovereign power, then we must 
account for how the sacred survives in a secular political setting, where truth is pluralized and 
thus knowledge about the content and meaning of sacrifice is obscured. I will suggest in the final 
section of this chapter that memorialization and memory practices offer a clue in how pre-
modern sovereign conceptions of the sacred manage to continue to circulate politically within 
democratic sovereignty, such that sacrifice continues to be linked to the justification and 
authorization of nation-state violence, despite the theoretical and empirical evidence of a 
weakening connection between agents of nation-state violence—citizen-soldiers—and sacrificial 
cults.    
If war is not to engender national boundaries and demarcations of populations and social 
relations therein, and if it does not call upon a national audience, then what is to be made of the 
sacrificial excess? Indeed, a nation that does not call on its citizens for war is not categorically a 
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nation at all (Taussig-Rubbo, 2011). Further, this style of what I am calling “postmodern 
violence” (cyclical outbursts with no guaranteed endpoint) invokes Sylvester’s (2012, p. 489) 
argument that war does not create new social relations per se, but instead exacerbates social 
tensions that are already present. She writes, “[w]ars are not indicative of a breakdown of inter-
state balances of power, norms or structures of conflict resolution as much as they are an 
intensification [emphasis added] of social relations” (p. 489). The qualities of these social 
relations, characterized by forms of violence that are imminent in society36 and that are 
intensified by the abandonment of the citizen-soldier model of warfare, and drone warfare- 
privatization, fragmentation, and the destabilization of the category of the witness- will be 
explained later in the dissertation. For now, I return to Foucault’s conceptual map to further 
elucidate sacrifice on the continuum between sovereign and biopolitical power. 
Foucault’s work shifts the emphasis away from the intentionality of states to their 
techniques and apparatuses of regulation. He claims that in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century, when the domain of the biological came under the explicit control of the state, 
biopolitical technologies of power were manifested within and against the population. The 
maintenance and administration of the population via the family represents the crux of the 
biopolitical problem. Biopolitics meant to act as a means to enhance the equilibrium in society 
through a disciplining of individual forces in conjunction with regulatory technologies aimed at 
the biological characteristics of the population: in other words, for the first time, the population 
was rendered a political problem, and the family was one entry point into the population. 
Populations’ overall health, longevity, rates of reproduction, fertility, illness, and mortality, 
hygiene, sanitation, and the concern over epidemics, all become targets of power and objects of 
                                                        
36 Much like Foucault “denies us a ‘theory’ of power” (Flynn quoted in Erlenbusch, 2013, p. 52) it is important to 
likewise resist a totalizing theory of sacrifice.  
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calculability under the rubric of the state’s newfound knowledge: statistical analysis (Foucault, 
1978).  
This biopolitical mandate informed the making of war such that the preservation of life 
was its impetus. In an oft quoted passage, Foucault remarks, “wars are no longer waged in the 
name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of 
everyone; entire populations are mobilized [emphasis added] for the purpose of wholesale 
slaughter in the name of life necessity [emphasis added]: massacres have become vital” 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 137). For Foucault, once the former right of the individual sovereign has been 
replaced by the right of the social body to maximize its health, the question of war similarly 
shifts to become, “How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political 
system centered upon biopower?” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). Foreign wars were inspired and 
legitimized by both imperialism and racism. Foucault (2007) argues that race became a 
biopolitical paradigm in the seventeenth century when war emerged as the permanent basis for 
all institutions of power. Since war also became a state privilege at this time, it also became the 
prerogative of an institutionalized army- or military apparatus. War became both a model and a 
principle of intelligibility of politics and thus a grid for analyzing politics. National narratives of 
war and articulations of national consciousness entailed a related understanding about “foreign” 
enemies; a narrative that extended the legitimacy of the nation and naturalized violence against 
perceived others, while affirming its territorial borders and need to protect the nation from 
“dangerous” internally produced and externally threatening peoples. Indeed, the image of the 
foreigner is a productive artifact of national thinking about racial otherness, and is central to the 
configurations of citizenship. As Achille Mbembé (2003, p. 16) claims, power (state and non-
state alike) continuously makes use of the state of exception discourse, emergency, and a 
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fictitious enemy, and labours repeatedly to reproduce these ideas. For Mbembé and Foucault, in 
the economy of biopower, the function of racism is to regulate the distribution of death and to 
make possible the murderous functions of the state (Mbembé, 2003, p. 17). Recalling Foucault’s 
earlier question about how death can function in a system centered upon life, it appears that 
racism offers a clue.   
Racism perpetuates the notion that certain people are inherently inferior, unequal, or 
backwards, ungovernable, or unable to sufficiently self-govern within a liberal economy. This 
belief system is fundamental in regards the question of how death can quietly function in a 
political system centered on life (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). Historically the most abhorrent case of 
racism can be seen in how the National Socialist Party systematically exterminated millions of 
Jewish and other marginalized peoples during the Holocaust (although extreme right-wing, neo-
Nazi and “immigration reform” based parties are quickly re-emerging in many parts of Europe). 
National belonging implies a dialectical relation with its opposite: exclusion and violence against 
perceived others. Nationalism at its extreme demands a violent relationship with the other where 
ethnicity is used to conceptually organize insiders from outsiders. Within affirmative 
performances of national belonging, there is also a symbiotic way that differences, exemplified 
by the social and political marginalization or outright exclusion of gendered and racialized others 
are simultaneously invented and put into sharp relief in relation to that very act of the 
performance of national belonging. 
Nations, as a cultural conceptualization,37 are imagined as ethnically pure entities. But the 
notion of the stranger, outsider, or the modernized category of the immigrant, together reveals 
                                                        
37 It is important here to unpack the use of the word “nation,” and conceptualize some distinctions between 
contractual and cultural nations: as ideal types, there is much complicity between the two. As Singer (1996) argues, 
the cultural nation is thought to be timeless and pre-modern. It uses memory, kinship, language and geography to 
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the politicization involved in symbolically turning, through inclusive and exclusive forms of 
racism, a racially heterogeneous nation into a homogenous one in the eyes of its beholders.38 
Nationalist imagery reinforces a nexus between territory and identity, which hinges on the 
sacred. Indeed, according to Balibar (2004), states cannot become nation-states if they fail to 
consolidate this relation. Nation states must  
appropriate the sacred, not only at the level of representations of a more or less 
secularized “sovereignty,” but also at the day-to-day level of legitimation, implying the 
control of births and deaths, marriages...states thus tend to withdraw control of these 
functions from clans, families, and, above all, churches or religious sects.  (2004, p. 20) 
  
Balibar, although not writing in much detail about sacrifice per se, is suggesting that 
sacrifice (as an appropriation of the sacred) is affirmed at two levels: at the top down level of 
sovereignty, but also at the day-to-day or bottom up level of legitimation. Sacrifice, then, is 
multilayer struggle, as the state attempts to appropriate its essence and control its meaning. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
establish common relations, as such it can be understood through the terms, "particular," "organic" and "collective." 
In contrast, the contractual nation is directly linked to democracy. It is a political community, defined through the 
terms “artificial,” “universalist,” and “individualist.”  
38 Within affirmative performances of national belonging, there is also a symbiotic way that differences, 
exemplified by the social and political marginalization or outright exclusion of gendered and racialized others are 
simultaneously invented and put into sharp relief in relation to that very act of the performance of national 
belonging. In Canada’s case, multiculturalism, a source of national pride, turns on the notion of heterogeneity rather 
than homogeneity of peoples. Multiculturalism has been an official state policy of Canada since 1971. While 
appearing at first glance to tolerate and celebrate difference, multiculturalism is an ideology, or a governing 
discourse (Bannerji, 2000, p. 9) that actively produces these differences. It reinforces economic and political 
inequality through cultural language, resulting in the “culturalization of antiracist and oppositional politics” which 
simply maintains the appearance of democracy (Bannerji, 2000, p. 8). This further supports a common-sense racism 
and a hierarchy of “others” appearing in contrast to the English and the French who are portrayed as “real” 
Canadians—the rightful, founding fathers of Canada. Multiculturalism discourse further eclipses the past and current 
violence—exemplified by the threefold system of appropriation, dispossession, and exploitation (Thobani, 2007) 
against First Nations Peoples that occurred to uphold capitalist endeavors and simultaneously justify these 
unequal relationships. 
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demarcation and then re-appropriation of sacrifice contains noteworthy intersections between 
disciplinary and biopolitical modes of power.  
As Achillé Mbembé (2003:23) explains, the “synthesis between massacre and 
bureaucracy, the incarnation of Western rationality” witnessed the simultaneous demarcation of 
the colonies as a space of exception where the rules about sovereignty and confined warfare 
among equal states did not apply. While Mbembé argues that the state undertook ways to civilize 
and rationalize the sovereign act of killing, it did so under the guise that “the centrality of the 
state in the calculus of war derives from the fact that the state is the model of political unity, a 
principle of rational organization, the embodiment of the idea of the universal, and moral sign” 
(p. 24). While Mbembé is sympathetic to Foucault’s use of biopolitics, it is in this context that 
Mbembé questions whether Foucault’s analysis is conducive to a practical analysis that uncovers 
these colonial and post-colonial relations of enmity (p. 12).    
As such, the racial denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the native 
(ibid) was used to justify colonial war and occupation—a matter of “seizing, delimiting, and 
asserting control over a physical geographical area...the writing of new spatial relations 
(territorialization) was, ultimately, tantamount to the production of boundaries and hierarchies, 
zones and enclaves; the subversion of existing property arrangements, the classification of 
people” (p. 26). Processes of the exteriorization, rationalization and spatialization of war 
included the identification of colonies and their racialized subjects as zones of exception and as 
such the impetus to kill was realized outside, or as “exception” inside the rules contained within 
Western legal and moral achievements.      
Sovereign power, which Foucault defined as embodied by the King, is a repressive, 
spectacular, and prohibitive form of power. In contrast, biopolitical power is a productive power 
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as far as it is a subtler, fragmented, and a potentially invisible form of power that aims to 
enhance life by fixing on the management and administration of life via the health of the physical 
and political population. It compels people to act in particular ways- as a consumer, a patriot, or 
a sexual citizen, as examples—to self-govern. Hence it is a tool that allows for “governing at a 
distance,” since the origin of that power is not traceable back to a single source (mythically 
called “the state”). Foucault’s model of power does not give concrete answers in terms of 
isolating power’s precise location and origin, but instead offers an approach to thinking about 
the materiality of sacrificing bodies,39 and the function and meaning of the power of war and 
militarization (the impetus toward death) within a society that claims to be founded on the 
democratic principles of life. 
Furthermore, the tension wrought by militarization, put in Foucault's terms (2003, p. 
241), in liberal democratic society today goes to the heart of the paradox of liberal modernity 
insofar as how it views life: liberal government is concerned with how to satisfy the conditions 
for two competing types of power to coexist. The first being sovereign power: “to let die,” while 
the second is biopolitical power, which fosters life-enhancing techniques and programs: to 
“make live.” The former sovereign right was to “take life or let live” (Foucault, 2003, p. 241) 
however, as previously stated, beginning around the nineteenth century, the state became 
                                                        
39 Foucault writes that the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body. 
This power projected onto the body is part of a wider ‘political technology of the body,’ a technology which 
operates through strategy, which is never a unilateral articulation of power, but always diffuse. A strategy is an 
operation or manifestation of power, yet subjects never fully possess power. Foucault imagines the body as a site of 
relational processes, theorizing materiality as both physical bodies, as well as places, such as the prison. Butler 
(2004) extends this to say, “it is not just that the movements of the nineteenth century are about the body and 
material things, as if these two are unrelated objects for such movements. It is rather that the very materiality of the 
prison is activated on the body of the prisoner, and through the technology of the soul” (p. 186). Of note is the 
disjuncture between the institution and the body, and the passage between them. This leads Butler to argue that it is 
not only the subject by the body itself that is being redefined so that the body is not a substance or a set of drives, 
but the site of transfer of power itself. When Foucault describes the body as material, he means that to be material is 
not only to resist what works upon it, but also to be the vector and instrument of a continued working.  
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increasingly concerned with regulating and optimizing the health of populations, which co-
emerged alongside the development of social scientific disciplines generating new knowledge 
about populations through statistics, psychiatry, and medicine. These disciplines proffered proper 
conduct, for example, for children, including how to respond to and control their sexuality, and 
related expert knowledge around key figures of moral regulation: the sexual deviant, the 
hysterical woman, the criminal, and madman. These subjective figures all coalesced within a 
framework of biopolitical governing. Thus, biopower came to focus on the body in terms of the 
individual- what Foucault termed “anatamo-politics”40 or the maximization of the individual 
body and the collective, the biopolitics of the population as a whole. The body served as a target 
of power organized around the promotion and enhancement of life, while at the same time, the 
destruction of the body is evidenced by sovereignty’s concern with the spectacle of suffering and 
violence (Foucault, 1978). 
Theses contradictions of militarization—how a liberal society can claim the belief that 
life ought to be protected, but have entire industries and political-economic policies devoted to 
killing—further unfold in the management of the space between life and death, or the 
demarcation of politically important life, as opposed to non-political, or what Agamben (1998) 
calls “bare” life. Agamben criticizes Foucault by extending the biopolitical moment, when 
politics seized hold of life, significantly further back in history, to the ancient Greek polis, 
claiming the production of a biopolitical body is the original, albeit concealed, activity of 
                                                        
40 According to Foucault, since the seventeenth century power has been situated and exercised at the level of life—
the life of the social body. This power over life is expressed in Foucault’s axis where he posits two poles on a 
spectrum which were linked together by a variety of relations: “one pole of biopower focuses on an anatomo-politics 
of the human body, seeking to maximize its forces and integrate it into efficient systems” (p. 139). Moreover, “the 
second pole is one of regulatory controls, a biopolitics of the population, focusing on the species body, the body 
imbued with the mechanisms of life: birth, morbidity, morality, longevity” (p. 139). Foucault argues that at the 
beginning of the 19th Century, the two poles were conjoined within a series of “great technologies of power,” such as 
sexuality. 
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sovereign power. He argues that modernity is predicated upon processes of demarcation, 
regulation, and discipline, which render some expressions of life politically meaningful: life that 
is regarded as transcendent and proficient is marked by its political capacity. This political life 
contrasts with mere animal existence (bare life) that is marked by a lack. According to Agamben, 
biopolitics is intensified today insofar as the death camp is the most absolute biopolitical space to 
have ever been realized. Biopolitics entails the classification of morally and politically qualified 
life (bios), and bare life (zoe), taken from Aristotelian classifications, which delineated the public 
sphere as political, and the private sphere as biological. Other scholars expand this to show how 
biopolitics is also increasingly militarized, unfolding in the form of, as I discussed earlier, the 
expanding influence of biometric technology.41 
I take a critical perspective on Agamben, since his approach- through the notion of Homo 
Sacer- problematically confuses the distinctions made by Foucault’s theory and terminology. 
Agamben’s project further complicates a straightforward reading of Foucault as far as he 
unpacks the relationship between the Sovereign and the Homo Sacer, a term taken from the 
Roman Empire that denoted a person who was politically banned; a man who could be killed 
with impunity yet not sacrificed. Working under the theory of the exception proving the rule 
Agamben demonstrates a deeply entwined simultaneous historical progression of both terms. It is 
how the Sovereign power and Homo Sacer act as almost equal but inverted images of the other 
that draws Agamben’s theoretical attention. In this shift to modern sovereignty, which 
                                                        
41 Following Cynthia Enloe’s (2000) idea of how militarization creeps into ordinary daily routines, Rygiel asserts 
that “biopolitics become militarized, then, when the politics of ensuring the life and health of society occur by 
targeting enemies and relying on technologies of surveillance and control and practices of detention and arrests” 
(Rygiel, 2006, p. 163). This idea similarly reflects Sassen’s (1999) analysis of early twentieth century 
preoccupations with populations, their mobility, ethno-markers and rooting sovereignty within well-defined 
territories. Through an analysis of biometric technology that has emerged in the post-9/11 era, Rygiel claims, 
“disguising itself as bureaucratic and technocratic, biometric technology camouflages a militarized form of 
biopolitics of regulating populations through risk profiling and exercising control over the body” (p. 163). 
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incorporates life via inclusive exclusion, we witness the transition from a monarch towards 
whom we are born subjects, into a body simultaneously constituted by the birth of its subjects. 
The gaze of politics shifts to the health of the body-sovereign, the People. The management of 
this population involves a politicization of bare life, which is channeled through the confluence 
of fact/right in which sovereignty operates by its exclusionary principle. For Agamben the 
concentration camp is the apotheosis of this pure and absolute biopolitical space, where bare life 
meets pure Sovereign power. However, I suggest that Agamben ultimately misreads Foucault. 
Biopower has not displaced or surpassed sovereign power but rather these forms of power have 
been redistributed in field of governmentality.  
For Agamben, Homo Sacer is no longer situated in a single (non) sacrificial body, but 
rather the quality of Homo Sacer is spread throughout the nation’s body.42  Thus the management 
of the line of (in)distinction/knowledge between what Agamben calls biopolitics and 
thanatopolitics, the power to decide the threshold between life and lebensunwerten Leben, 
becomes the primary political issue, which from the beginning is the ground upon which 
sovereign power stands. As such qualified life is the object of the state and all life is capable of 
being rendered bare. The camp as apogee of biopolitical space is a ‘dislocating localization,’ 
increasingly present as the corresponding space of exception to the state of exception, it “is the 
hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living, and it is this structure of the camp that 
we must learn to recognize in all its metamorphoses…” (p. 175). Critically, for Agamben, there 
is “no return from the camps to classical politics” (p. 188). All life has the potential of being 
rendered bare life, or the non-citizen subject of politics. Of the camp, Agamben states, 
                                                        
42 Agamben problematically tends to “describe the state as the nation-state” (Connolly, 2004, p. 30) as if the 
category of the nation state is unproblematic, always-already sovereign, and fixed in time/space dimensions. For 
Connolly, “once you acknowledge that an ethos is internal as well as external to sovereignty you appreciate that 
territorial sovereignty has always operated within a global as well as an internal context” (p. 34).  
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If this is true, if the essence of the camp consists in the materialization of the state of 
exception and in the subsequent creation of a space in which bare life and the juridical 
rule enter into a threshold of indistinction, then we must admit that we find ourselves 
virtually in the presence of a camp every time such a structure is created, independent of 
the kinds of crime that are committed there and whatever its denomination and specific 
topography [emphasis added]. (Agamben, 1998: 174) 
 
The final pronouncement points to problematic generalizations made by Agamben, his 
reluctance to include historical, cultural, and political specificity results in ahistorical and 
apolitical claims about “the state,” which, taking his view reads rather simplistically as an 
“institutional manifestation of sovereign power,” that “remains tangled in a juridico-institutional 
thinking and reductive in its way of understanding disciplinary and biopolitical forms of power” 
wherein “sovereignty was biopolitical all along” (Erlenbusch, 2013, pp. 63-64). Isin and Rygiel 
(2007) extend this critique further. They claim that, representing the nomos of the modern, the 
camp is a zone of indistinction where juridico-political logic is suspended and replaced by an 
alternative logic, or what Agamben deems the state of exception. Within the camp, it is 
impossible to distinguish between fact and the rule of law and this is reflected in the camp’s 
property of immanence whereby the camp as a state of exception becomes the rule but, as 
exception, remains nonetheless outside the normal order (Isin & Rygiel, 2007, p. 183). Isin and 
Rygiel, to be sure, build upon Agamben’s analysis of the camp as a demarcated space invoking 
unique juridical procedures and deployments of power over bare, politically incapable, or 
unqualified life. Arguing that Agamben’s conception of the camp is paramount to theorizing the 
relations between qualified and unqualified life, they claim that it is nevertheless both essentialist 
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and ahistorical. They suggest, rather, the images of “frontiers” and “zones” as spaces where 
subjects are “processed” as inexistent beings—non-citizens in waiting:  
If the camp was a space of abjection where people were reduced to bare life, the zones, 
frontiers, and camps of our times are abject spaces, spaces in which the intention is to 
treat people neither as subjects (of discipline) or objects (of elimination) but as those 
without presence, without existence, as inexistent beings, not because they don’t exist, 
but because their existence is rendered invisible. (Isin & Rygiel, 2007, p. 183).  
 
Isin and Rygiel complicate Agamben’s notion of the camp to include questions of 
geopolitics and space, and by broadening the scope and scale of the logic of the camp to include 
the possibility that those exposed to its rationale might in fact be non-existent/invisible and 
therefore do not even qualify as subjects/objects to be made bare. Indeed, to include these kinds 
of contextual specificities that these critiques call for would require Agamben to abandon his 
obvious desire for theoretical closure.  
Instead, Foucault’s rejection of theoretical closure marks a significant departure from 
Agamben and is ultimately more palatable for a critical political-sociology of sacrifice. Yet, the 
question remains as to what relation biopower entails to the sacred. In this vein, it can be said 
that since sacrifice resides in the domain of killing and dying (sovereignty) biopower’s relation 
to sacrifice can only be indirect. The bio-politicization of war (“wars are waged on behalf of 
everyone, in the name of life necessity”) has witnessed biopower and bio-politics taking many 
forms in contemporary war making. Consider it in the form of so-called humanitarian wars, or in 
the process of military privatization, and/or the integration of drone technology into the 
battlefield: All, in different ways, and with different rationalizations, see the protection of life as 
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their primary concern. Biopower then acts as a kind of counterforce to sovereignty and on the 
application of sacrificial politics that shores up sacrificial politics’ incongruity with postmodern 
violence.  
Indeed, Foucault provides the tools to explore, later in the dissertation, how the empirical 
practices of security-as-exception today offer the potential to (albeit problematically) reconcile 
the tensions wrought by sovereign and biopolitical power’s competing approaches to applying 
violence. In extending these Foucauldian sensibilities, a further claim is that institutions and 
bodies43 become mutually reinforcing sites of power. For our purposes, citizen-soldier bodies are 
both subjects and objects of security practices and discourses, and their unmaking within a 
privatized and technologized neoliberal economic order implies, as will become clear, an 
uncoupling of citizenship and sacrifice thereby providing the impetus for drone warfare.  
Agamben’s analysis shows how the logic of the camp sought to reduce humans to homo 
sacer, so that they could then potentially be made bare: identified, processed, tortured, and 
exterminated. As will be made clear by the end of the dissertation, unmanned systems, and drone 
strikes skip these steps outright. Isin and Rygiel’s account, while providing a necessary 
contribution to Agamben's theory through their argument about “frontiers” or “zones” as sites 
where people are processed, also are not compelling in this context, since cultivating the space to 
contain bodies—to identify, detain, torture and process bodies, whether in the camp or some 
point beforehand—appears to be no longer the primary concern of fatigued American military 
planners as it perhaps once was in the immediate post-9/11 era. The egregious political failure 
                                                        
43 Foucault has rightly endured numerous criticisms regarding his at times unexplainable exclusion of feminism, 
women, and gender in his theorization of the body. See: Butler, J. (2004). Bodies and power revisited. In D. Taylor 
& K. Vintges (Eds.), Feminism and the Final Foucault (pp. 183-197). Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press; and 
Heckman, S. (Ed.). (1996). Feminist interpretations of Michel Foucault. University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press. 
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that is Guantanamo Bay prison, and the related torture scandals of Abu Ghraib prison, serve as a 
haunting reminder of the contradictions that unfold in the maintenance of both biopolitical power 
and sovereign power in the exercise of post-9/11 security-as-exception. 
In arguing that sovereign power cannot simplistically be equated with law, Singer and 
Weir (2006, p. 451) claim that sovereign power always bears an excess relative to law, evidenced 
by the contemporary ‘state of exception’ moment wherein the constitution is 'temporarily' 
suspended under ‘emergency’ conditions. North Waziristan, Pakistan, is one exceptional site of 
governance among several where violence (understood here as a broad continuum of acts from 
permanent surveillance to killing) is externalized onto the bodies of racialized others. Here, the 
rules of conventional warfare as written into international law do not apply. The subjects of 
drone surveillance and strikes make up a community of perpetually terrorized victims in the 
negotiations between the US and its allies or enemies in the Global War on Terror. Drone 
technology is hailed as the grand solution, which will save us from (or at least sanitize) our 
violent, collective sins. Drones are the Obama administration's and others' solution to the spatial, 
political, and economic limitations and long-term political unworkability of the physicality of 
camps—detention centers like Guantanamo—or, the logic of Guantanamo applied to airborne 
technology such as drones. Extermination through targeted killing, as America’s 
counterterrorism policy’s most controversial tactic, enables this policy without the political 
risk—circumventing normal channels of politics altogether, permanently evading the humanity 
of the other. 
Finally, Agamben misreads Foucault: biopower has not displaced or surpassed sovereign 
power but rather these forms of power have been redistributed in a field of governmentality. 
Sovereignty, itself a burdened expression, is variously described as an “animated anachronism” 
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(Butler, 2004) and in terms of a “migration,”44 is thought to have produced petty sovereigns 
outside the nation-state,45 thereby revealing how globalization and corporate interests exacerbate 
a “crisis of sovereignty.”46 This means not that national sovereign power is disappearing, but that 
it is being reconfigured47 insofar as the state’s relation to providing citizenship entitlements thus 
also in ways that leave the citizen-soldier’s relation to sacrifice hollow. Importantly, the 
devitalization of sovereignty does not always coincide with the emergence of governmentality 
(Butler, 2004, p. 53).  
As previously mentioned, governmentality or "the art of governing" requires not that the 
governor "have a sting- that is to say, a weapon of killing, a sword- to exercise his power; he 
must have patience rather than wrath" (Foucault quoted in Burchell et al., 1991, p. 96). To 
govern citizens within a nation state, then, does not compel explicit patriotic displays of love for 
a nation, but instead encourages the development of restrained yet ominous ways to compel the 
expression of loyalty, complicity and/or consent to global violence amongst its populations. As I 
discuss next, governmentality was predicated on the shift between pre-modern sovereignty and 
democratic sovereignty and the shift in symbolic regimes therein (Singer and Weir 2006/2008). 
 
The Democratic Sovereign  
 
                                                        
44 Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt’s concept of Empire refers to a worldwide assemblage wherein some states 
have significantly more priority than others, but one marked above all by the migration of sovereignty toward global 
structures that exceed the power and control of one single state (2000, p. 36).  
45 Butler (2006, p. 54) states, “petty sovereigns abound, reigning in the midst of bureaucratic army institutions 
mobilized by aims and tactics of power they do not inaugurate or fully control. And yet such figures are delegated 
with the power to render unilateral decisions, accountable to no law and without any legitimate authority. The 
resurrected sovereignty is thus not the sovereignty of unified power under the conditions of legitimacy, the form of 
power that guarantees the representative status of political institutions.” 
46 Rosenberg (2001, p. 131) claims that sovereignty is “highly ambiguous as an actual measure of power.”     
47 For Sassen, “denationalization” marks the thinning or withdrawal of the state’s involvement in citizenship 
entitlements, as global and supra-national governing bodies challenge the efficiency of national economic and 
political institutions. 
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Forming a “famous glittering triangle,” Singer and Weir (2006/2008) caution 
Foucauldian scholars of the danger in treating sovereignty as a contrast concept in relation to 
discipline and governance (where the terms are posed antithetically) rather than as an 
analytically distinct concept, and therefore productive in and of itself. Singer and Weir, whose 
research, and conclusions here are worth summarizing at length, argue that historians of the 
present inherit this tendency from Foucault in that they do not adequately treat sovereignty as a 
concept worth investigating but instead use it as a straw man to bring into focus different notions 
of power.  
After a review of their arguments, a discussion of sacrifice in relation to the democratic 
sovereign and the tomb of the Unknown Soldier—the perfect embodiment of the sacrifice of the 
abstract citizen—will follow. My argument in this section is that the shift between monarchic to 
democratic sovereignty, as made compelling by Singer and Weir, is critical to understanding 
how sacrifice is lodged in the archetype of the citizen-soldier, supported by the tradition of 
democratic republicanism. Following Singer and Weir, historical parameters are necessary to 
better understand the dangers inherent to the conceptual fusion of sovereignty and governance. 
Moreover, a historical focus reveals how changes in the logic of sacrifice are tied to the 
underlying change in symbolic regimes.  
Yet I claim below that despite its locus in the climate of democratic sovereignty, 
remnants of pre-modern sovereignty circulate at the site that is the Tomb of the Unknowns. The 
presence of anachronistic iterations, I argue, exists to reaffirm the importance of sacrifice in 
preserving the transcendental qualities of nation-state violence. As I argued in the previous 
chapter, for the ritual of military sacrifice to remain credible, especially considering the 
contemporary style of warfare, which attempts to eschew embodied violence, and therefore 
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sacrifice, it must occasionally draw on anachronistic notions of sovereign power. The Tomb of 
the Unknowns then represents intersections between pre-modern and democratic sovereignty; the 
“secular” and the “religious.”   
According to Singer and Weir (2006, pp. 451-452), Foucauldian scholars insufficiently 
theorize sovereignty in four ways: first, on the issues of historical specificity—they claim that 
sovereignty came into wide use during the Renaissance, not the medieval period; second, on the 
false equations of sovereign power and law— sovereign power and law ought not be equated as 
they have different temporalities. Laws are meant to last, while sovereign power always bears an 
excess relative to the law, as exemplified by the state of exception (the ‘temporary’ suspension of 
constitutional law under ‘emergency’ conditions); third, sovereign power’s false equivalence 
with the state; and four, sovereign power’s false equation with a delimited territory: it was only 
when sovereignty became ‘horizontal’ that it was properly territorialized. Singer and Weir argue 
that, by giving governance an exterior, sovereignty, by extension, would rightly reclaim its 
conceptual and historical parameters.   
However, because of this conceptual incoherence, sovereignty, in Foucauldian literature, 
becomes a residual category because, as previously mentioned, it is used only superficially to 
draw a comparison to discipline, or governance. Additionally, this dearth of conceptual rigor 
encroaches into governmentality theorizing, whereby governance is often conflated with politics 
and the state—governance ends up acting as a catchall for all forms of power. Although the early 
Foucault was largely disinterested in sovereignty—the archeological writings did not foreground 
sovereignty thematically—he still nevertheless, according to Singer and Weir, established some 
defining features of sovereignty.  
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We know from Foucault that sovereignty concerns itself with the juridical subject, 
discontinuous extraction of taxes and labour, and the enactment of law. Sovereignty revels in 
spectacular displays of the monarchical sword. Its object is the land; its power is exercised over a 
territory. Further, Foucault claims that sovereignty is a central form of power prior to the modern 
era, which it is associated with the state, articulated in terms of law. Its preeminent form of 
expression is the execution of wrongdoers. However, much of this theorization of sovereignty is 
communicated not through a direct study of the concept itself but in relation to its antithetical 
form of power—discipline. Discipline, conversely is aimed not at juridical subject. It enacts 
continuous surveillance of individuals; acts through standardizations set through technically 
established norms; operates through a regime of visibility leaving the center of power concealed, 
and its object is the body (2006, p. 445). 
Foucault maintained that the premier instrument of sovereign power has been law. The 
monarch symbolized the living body of sovereignty, while power possessed a single center. The 
law was the expression of that center’s will. Where the theory of right tried to limit monarchy to 
match it with legitimacy, juridical systems later democratized sovereignty by linking it with 
public right, resulting in popular sovereignty. Yet, Foucault argued, whether monarchical or 
popular, sovereignty was still reducible to law and as such he advocated eschewing an 
examination of the genesis of sovereignty in favour of an examination of domination via the 
manufacturing of subjects. Hence the impulse in Foucault, and Foucauldian scholars, is to study 
power apparatuses and power effects rather than documenting who has power and what their 
intentions might be. 
For Singer and Weir, perhaps the most egregious failure of Foucault and his 
descendants—including Butler, whose view that sovereignty has resurged in the field of 
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governmentality problematically builds on and extends Foucault's absence of a genealogy of 
sovereignty, and Agamben, whose historically deterministic ontology of sovereignty treats bare 
life as “part of the inevitable tragedy of Western political thought from its inception, rendering 
the state of exception almost inevitable” (2008, p. 65)—is the ahistorical presentation of 
sovereignty as seen in the lack of distinction between monarchical and democratic sovereignty. 
This in-distinction, or conflation, is further exacerbated by Foucault and Foucauldians’ 
abandonment of the symbolic after the period of French Revolution. It is in this disregard of the 
symbolic that limits the understanding of democratic sovereign, as well as how the “symbolic 
regime,” to use their interpretation of Claude Lefort’s language, shifted to accommodate 
governance.  
What Foucault terms governance is dependent upon this shift in the symbolic regime—
the division between power, knowledge, and law. Drawing on Lefort, the authors argue that 
changes in sovereignty rely on changes in the symbolic regime:  
For the claim here is that the presentation of an orderly, meaningful world in common 
that extends beyond restricted localities is very much dependent on how power, 
knowledge, law and their interactions are themselves presented and represented. The very 
sense of the most basic distinctions through which a common world is expressed—those 
separating the real from the unreal, the natural from the artificial, the orderly from the 
disorderly, the just from the unjust, etc.—is conditioned by the articulation of knowledge, 
law and power within a given symbolic regime. (2006, pp. 452-453)   
 
Governance supposes a certain secularization that renders both power and knowledge 
immanent to this world. It supposes a separation of knowledge, power, and law, and its attempt 
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to articulate the two terms is conditioned by that separation (2006, p. 457). To better comprehend 
the meaning of the symbolic and sovereignty, the authors contrast the symbolic regime within 
the ancien régime and that characteristic of the democratic revolution.  
In the ancien régime, knowledge, power, and law is acquired through, and converged 
through, God. The figure of the King made the divine will present by representing it, as he is the 
ultimate embodiment of all law. “He presents the ‘scene’ in which power, as the source of order 
and justice, can be seen and be seen to be present” (2006, p. 453) thus “representation does not 
represent what is already present but gives presence to what is not present because otherwise 
invisible” (Foucault, 2006, p. 453) and as such, in the case of the monarch, “symbolic power is 
the direct effect of the claim to be the visible intermediary of an invisible, transcendental realm. 
Thus, the importance of his presence, words and acts: his is not a mere presence as it exists on a 
higher plane of reality; his words are not mere words, as they mold the world of things; and his 
acts are most often ritual acts because they serve to communicate between worlds” (Foucault, 
2006, p. 453).       
In contrast to the monarchical sovereign, the democratic sovereign is immanent but 
largely invisible, because “the people” is a fleeting, unstable, and uncertain category. The 
democratic sovereign includes a symbolic regime wherein knowledge, power, and law are 
divided. After the democratic revolution, culminating in the eighteenth century, sovereignty no 
longer relayed a transcendent order, but was imminent to the newly emerging concept of 
‘society,’ thereby severing power’s link to the supernatural and natural worlds (p. 454). The 
heterogeneity of power—truth regimes are now pluralized—witnessed proliferating “knowledge-
holders:” intellectuals, publicists, experts—shattered the Chain of Being as far as the laws of 
nature were no longer regarded as having any bearing on juridical laws. Thus, “the sovereign 
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people may now be immanent to society, but this sovereign does not exist positively, except in 
privileged moments—revolutions and elections (p. 455).” The sovereign is less a positive reality 
than a barely visible referent; because it is never entirely clear what the people want, or even 
who they are (Foucault, 2006, p. 455). Unlike the monarchical sovereign, who provided a sense 
of certainty, the democratic sovereign cannot provide certainty because the visible power-
holders, who are on the same register of reality as individual citizens, are always subjected to 
antagonisms in the form of questioning, contestation, and legal overthrow, weakening their 
relation to truth. This leaves the seat, or place of power, as the authors claim through drawing 
again on Lefort, effectively “empty.” 
What can be said about sacrifice, the citizen-soldier, and the democratic sovereign, in 
light of this? A discussion of the Tomb of the Unknowns, or as it is more colloquially known, the 
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, clarifies how the shift in sacrifice’s tie to the citizen-soldier is 
underpinned by the shift from monarchical to democratic sovereign and thus the related shift in 
symbolic regime described above. However, the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, albeit as I will 
argue is a product of the historical parameters of democratic sovereignty is nonetheless a space 
where iterations of pre-modern sovereignty are preserved and memorialized—therefore, I argue 
that notions of pre-modern and modern sovereignty are not opposed but instead intersect in the 
creation and preservation of such a space.  
This intersection occurs because for sacrifice to maintain its hold in imaginings of 
national violence, to justify the possibility of military violence, it must maintain some elements 
of a historical past, namely that history (whether it is fictitious or not) wherein the ordinary and 
profane realms can be momentarily synthesized, transcendental ideals can be positively 
embodied, known, and communicated, and rendered in certain terms: death for the survival of 
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the new, secular religion—the nation48—must be meaningful. If sacrifice were to lose this 
connection to the symbolism of pre-modern sovereignty it would fail to connect the nation state’s 
violence to the future health of society. Its citizens, the people, as an abstract concept, would not 
be immanent, but would instead risk fading away into an antipolitical landscape characteristic of 
the ancien régime.  
Recall Singer and Weir’s claim that, in democratic sovereignty, “the sovereign people 
may now be immanent to society, but this sovereign does not exist positively, except in 
privileged moments—revolutions and elections (2006 p. 455).” I would add that sites like the 
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and the careful, calculated memorialization49 practices that 
happen there, also confirm the positive existence of a former and indeed, historically 
anachronistic sovereign power, but that that circulation of symbols pertaining to pre-modern 
sovereignty does not contradict or negate the presence of democratic sovereignty; it does not 
suggest the requirement of clear distinctions between the “secular” and the “religious,” but 
instead confirms the constructive interrelation between the two historical contingent 
manifestations of sovereignty in the production of shared meaning, and of the social memory that 
utilizes war as a site of collective identity.   
                                                        
48 Benedict Anderson, as discussed by historian Michael J. Allen, argues that nationalism is a secular religion. “For 
Anderson, nationalism, like religion, was rooted in the grave. Like all sacred beliefs, nationalism promised eternal 
life; immortality through survival of the state. One grave in particular stood out as especially meaningful in this 
regard across a variety of national cultures—the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. ‘No more arresting emblems of the 
modern culture of nationalism exist than the cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers,’ he wrote. ‘Saturated with 
ghostly national imaginings,’ such shrines were so important to narratives of national immutability that Anderson 
dared readers to ‘imagine the general reaction to the busybody who ‘discovered’ the Unknown Soldier’s name,’ 
calling this seeming impossibility ‘sacrilege of a strange and contemporary kind!’” (Allen, 2011, p. 92).    
49 Memorialization practices at the tomb have been highly calculated in the past to the point of fabrication. As 
Michael J. Allen claims, allegations were made against the Reagan administration in 1998 that, with respect to the 
Vietnam Unknown, fourteen years prior, officials had “known the identity of the remains buried there but concealed 
that information to enact a ritual of national reunion in an election year” (Allen, 2011, p. 91). The validity of the 
claims was confirmed in 1998 by CBS Evening News, who claimed, “documents dug out by CBS clearly indicate 
that Reagan officials and the US military knew the remains...when they were buried...and may have covered that up” 
(Allen, 2011, p. 91).   
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Located at Arlington National Cemetery in Washington, D.C., the tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier is a popular monument dedicated to American service members who died unidentified. 
The first Unknown was a WWI soldier, while crypts of the Unknowns from WWII and Korea 
(added in 1958), and Vietnam (added in 1984) are featured west of the WWI Unknown. That the 
soldiers are unidentifiable perfectly expressed Lefort’s claim that the seat of power in democratic 
sovereignty be empty: these tombs may as well be empty, since their contents are vacant of 
identity. Thus “the people” fill the tomb as ersatz soldiers, symbolically sharing in the sacrifice 
of those who died in war. Sculpted into the east panel, which faces Washington, D.C., are three 
Greek figures representing peace, victory, and valor. Inscribed on the back of the tomb are the 
words, “Here rests in honored glory an American soldier known but to God.” 
“Known but to God-” phrasing eerily typical for a pre-modern articulation of sovereignty. 
Recall that in the ancien régime, knowledge, power, and law consolidated in the body of the 
sovereign authority who made visible, made present by representing, what would otherwise be 
invisible: divine, transcendental truth. Thus, viewers at the Tomb are told that there is some 
element of these sacrificial deaths that can only be interpreted by one (heavenly) body. This 
depoliticizes sacrifice in that by mystifying sacrifice it works to encourage people to submit, 
without much questioning, to a higher order, to cosmological truths as can be told only by God 
or his human representative. “He [the sovereign] presents the ‘scene’ in which power, as the 
source of order and justice, can be seen and be seen to be present” (2006, p. 453) thus 
“representation does not represent what is already present but gives presence to what is not 
present because otherwise invisible” (ibid). For these sacrifices to be made visible, they must be 
represented. The notion that only God can do this representing dramatically de-politicizes 
wartime deaths and suffering, making sacrifice a normal part of nation-state violence.   
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Consider also Ronald Reagan’s speech at the tomb of the Unknowns, on November 11th, 
1988, which is worth quoting at length. It too illuminates a stunning mix of ideas pertaining to 
both monarchical and democratic sovereignty, but also gestures to what the sociologist of 
religion Robert N. Bellah famously called “civil religion in America.”50 The role of the ultimate 
sacrifice of the abstract citizen plays into the way knowledge, power, and law are distinct in 
democratic sovereignty while the invocation of God and the certainty of sacrifice as a product of 
God’s divine will harken to pre-modern sovereignty: 
We could not forget them. Even if they were not our own, we could not forget them. For 
all time, they are what we can only aspire to be: giving, unselfish, the epitome of human 
love—to lay down one’s life so that others might live. We think on their lives. We think 
on their final moments. In our mind's eye, we see young Americans in a European forest 
or on an Asian island or at sea or in aerial combat. And as life expired, we know that 
those who could have had last thoughts of us and of their love for us. As they thought of 
                                                        
50 In his landmark essay, Bellah (1967) considers how a profound heritage of moral and religious experiences in 
America can be redistributed and re-presented publicly in a formally secular era. Of this secular era, Angrosino 
writes, “social scientists, heir to the positivist traditions of Comte and Marx, accepted as given the trend of modern 
societies toward ‘secularization,’ and hence have grown increasingly impatient with the notion that religion- even a 
‘civil’ one- has any place in a modern polity” (2002, p.  240). Further, as Hammond, quoted in Angrosino, writes, in 
this context, “the public square does not rule out religious rules and motives; it simply does not accord them 
authority until they are translated [into terms readily understandable even by the non-religious]” (2002, p. 242). 
Bellah defined civil religion as “a collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred things and 
institutionalized in a collectivity. This religion- there seems to be no other word for it- while not antithetical to and 
indeed sharing much in common with Christianity, was neither sectarian nor in any specific sense Christian…it 
reflected their [society’s] private as well as public views. Nor was the civil religion simply ‘religion in general…’ 
the religion was specific enough when it came to the topic of America” (p. 8). Angrosino adds that “American civil 
religion is an institutionalized set of beliefs about the nation, including a faith in a transcendent deity who will 
protect and guide the United States as long as its people and government abide by its laws” (p. 241). Bellah asks 
how we are supposed to determine the references to God in political speeches, when we find “references to God are 
almost invariably to be found in the pronouncements of American presidents on solemn occasions, though usually 
not in the working messages that the President sends to Congress on various concrete issues” (p. 2). In countering 
the idea that God has only a “ceremonial significance” and/or the cynical viewpoint that reference to God is used 
purely for political gain, Bellah demonstrates how the separation of church and state has not denied the public 
sphere a religious dimension (this public dimension is the very notion of American civil religion).  
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us then, so, too, we think of them now, with love, with devotion, and with faith: the 
certainty that what they died for was worthy of their sacrifice—faith, too, in God and in 
the Nation that has pledged itself to His work and to the dream of human freedom, and a 
nation, too, that today and always pledges itself to their eternal memory. Thank you. God 
bless you. (Reagan, 1988)  
 
It is worth pausing here, before analyzing the content of the speech itself, to recall the 
argument from the previous chapter. There, I offered excerpts from recent political speeches of a 
similar variety, as far as they invoked explicitly the thematic content of sacrifice while 
simultaneously de-politicizing the materiality of sacrifice. Therein I claimed that liberal 
democratic nations have a built-in right to call on citizens to sacrifice—and, to ensure the 
democratic health and survival of the nation they are obliged to answer the call. Recall that 
despite then Prime Minister Harper’s own admittance that the meaning of sacrifice is ultimately 
contested (it is “difficult to measure”) he still nevertheless invoked it in concrete terms, as that 
which is integral to democratic sovereignty—drawing on both pre-modern and modern notions 
of sovereignty—of the image of sacrifice to make universal claims about the essential link 
between nationalism and militarization, as well as promote a distinct imagining of Canada’s 
historical legacy and Canadian identity as something inherently vulnerable and that is being re-
made in relation to the historically unbearable weight of wartime sacrifices. I cited Harper’s 
remarks that sacrifice could never be truly known or measured—in our secular world, who can 
legitimately stand in for the divine to represent sacrifice—? Curiously, he nevertheless asserted 
that Canadians still feel the pervasively haunting yet unknowable presence of sacrifice.  
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Both Reagan and Harper shore up the symbolic capital of sacrifice to establish collective 
identity through war, but this is accomplished somewhat arbitrarily, since democratic 
sovereignty offers no body to represent the invisible/transcendental qualities of sacrifice, hence 
the continued references (some more explicit than others) to the divine world as being the only 
source of the truth of sacrifice. Moreover, Reagan’s speech opens and closes regarding the 
perseverance and indeed necessity of memory— “We could not forget them. Even if they were 
not our own, we could not forget them” and “the certainty that what they died for was worthy of 
their sacrifice—faith, too, in God and in the Nation that has pledged itself to His work and to the 
dream of human freedom, and a nation, too, that today and always pledges itself to their eternal 
memory.” The implication here in the hierarchy of death (privileging those who committed the 
ultimate sacrifice) is that, to continue to be free, more death, and more sacrifices, may be 
warranted, for if future-potential wartime sacrifice fails, in both discourse and practice, then 
these deaths will be forgotten, and we will no longer be empowered to be free. Recall from the 
first section of this chapter (the “Governing of Sacrifice”) that the governing of sacrifice implies 
both a contradiction between security and freedom, and an interpolation of an empowered, 
sacrificing subject, who, in his/her sacrifice, makes us free. The legacy of sacrifice, the memory 
of sacrifice past, attempts to sanction the continued liberal democratic call for continued sacrifice 
whilst producing and enabling citizens to answer that call. 
Although Western nations are oftentimes assumed to be liberal and democratic, we 
nevertheless see acts that are typically characteristic of undemocratic societies, where “the 
interests of the mass of the population will often be sacrificed to those of the privileged, intent on 
holding on to their wealth and power” (Pearce, 2010, p. 47) as well as illiberal policies, with 
illiberal effects, despite official claim to adhere to liberal ideals. Furthermore, the history of 
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liberalism, as an art of government, “shows how a range of illiberal techniques can be applied to 
those individuals who are deemed capable of improvement and of attaining self-government” 
(Dean, 1999, p. 51). Illiberal techniques of rule are exposed and realized when liberalism is 
analyzed in relation to both biopolitics and sovereignty. Indeed, according to Julian Reid (2006), 
with the War on Terror climate and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, “liberal societies find themselves 
entering a new stage of development requiring their permanent mobilization against an enemy 
said to move in unforeseeable ways, which strikes at unforeseeable times, festering in the hidden 
recesses of their own defence infrastructures” (Reid, 2006, p. 3). According to Agamben, this 
preoccupation with security as the central task of the state and its source of legitimacy runs the 
risk of turning itself terroristic (cited in Masters, 2005). 
To accomplish the making of an act as sacrificial or not, by rendering violence either 
‘public’ or ‘private,’ will depend on the goals and ideas tied to the application of violence. As 
Patricia Owens states, “there is no such thing as public or private violence. There is only 
violence that is made ‘public’ and violence that is made ‘private’” (quoted in Eichler, 2015, p. 4). 
The same might be said for sacrifice—there is no such thing as purely sacrificial violence or 
purely non-sacrificial violence. What counts is how that violence draws on a certain symbolic 
regime of power; how it is regarded and represented as either sacrificial or non-sacrificial, and 
the varied sociopolitical effects that are wrought from each categorization.  
Sacrificial violence is deeply interconnected with the social and political realms despite 
the prevailing ambiguity and religious connotations of the concept. While the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier is a product of democratic sovereignty, I have attempted to suggest we ought 
to be curious about the deviations. The Tomb nevertheless signifies remnants of pre-modern 
sovereignty’s consolidation of knowledge, power, and law. I argue that this occurs through 
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memorialization and memory practices, and results in the shoring up of sacrifice’s place in a 
distinctly national politics of violence. It is worth here to again turn to, for further illustrative 
purposes, the notion of civil religion. 
Civil religion “at its best is the genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent 
religious reality as seen in or, one could almost say, as the experience of the American people” 
(p. 12) exemplified in how, Memorial Day, for example, “is a major event for the whole 
community involving a rededication to the martyred dead, to the spirit of sacrifice, and to the 
American vision” (p. 11). Further, Bellah writes, “the American civil religion was never 
anticlerical or militantly secular. On the contrary, it borrowed selectively from the religious 
tradition in such a way that the average American saw no conflict between the two. In this way, 
the civil religion was able to build up without any bitter struggle with the church powerful 
symbols of national solidarity and to mobilize deep levels of personal motivation for the 
attainment of national goals” (p. 13). The concept of sacrifice, the “sacrifice theme,” is one that 
survives and indeed thrives in civil religion. 
Bellah writes that, in times of war, people must contend with mass deaths of soldiers 
(consider the Civil War, when the theme of sacrifice “was indelibly written into civil religion” 
and the great number of war dead required the establishment of several national cemeteries.)  As 
such, I suggest, expanding on Bellah’s analysis, that sacrifice acts as a narrative bridge between 
private religion and politics, culminating in what Bellah describes as civil religion. This has two 
consequences: First, as Bellah notes, the theme of sacrifice serves to mobilize support for 
national goals (i.e., for our purposes, continued war making, and the opportunity for moral 
growth, the unification of the collective, and redemption therein) but also, second, in the 
mobilization of support for national goals, the contradiction of sacrifice- its dual nature- is 
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temporarily overcome; its ambiguity is reconciled in the realization of national goals. As Brighi 
and Cerella (2015, p.12) show, the target of sacrifice- the scapegoat, in the case of foreign wars, 
the “uncivilized”- is an object of contempt (as cause of disorder) as well as veneration (for the 
reestablishment of order), hence its dual nature. This is of course a contradiction that, as Asad 
writes, is often worked through, but never resolved. The contradiction of sacrifice, how its dual 
nature is overcome, has much to do with modern liberalism’s culture of war.  As Asad (2007) 
further states, “I want to suggest that the cult of sacrifice, blood, and death that secular liberals 
find so repellent in pre-liberal Christianity is a part of the genealogy of modern liberalism itself, 
in which violence and tenderness go together. This is encountered in many places in our modern 
culture, not least in what is generally taken to be ‘just’ war” (p. 88). Furthermore, 
Today, this contradiction is a part of a modern liberalism that has inherited and rephrased 
some of its basic values from medieval Christian tradition: on the one hand, there is the 
imperative to use any means necessary (including homicide and suicide) to defend the 
nation-state that constitutes one’s worldly identity and defends one’s health and security 
and, on the other, the obligation to revere all human life, to offer life in place of death to 
universal humanity; the first presupposes a capacity for ruthlessness, the second for 
kindness. The contradiction itself constitutes a particular kind of human subject whose 
functioning depends on the fact that the contradiction has to be continually worked 
through without ever being resolved [emphasis added]. (Asad, 2007, p. 88)  
Asad’s writing here invokes the notion of “dying to give life,” which is reminiscent of 
Reagan’s speech, and of course, Lincoln’s address at Gettysburg, where he famously states that 
soldiers give their lives so that the nation might live. The Civil War was one of the bloodiest 
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wars of the nineteenth century; indeed, the loss of life was far greater than any previously 
suffered by Americans. It is no surprise, then, how sacrifice came to be a centerpiece of 
American civil religion. However, it did so during an era of total warfare. It was dead bodies, to 
be crude, that made sacrifice a vehicle for civil religion, whose vocabulary can be translated and 
made palatable for even the non-religious, so easily finding a home in a public expression of 
secular religion- American civil religion. Consider a final definition of civil religion. “American 
civil religion is clearly an offshoot of the Judeo-Christian tradition, but it is not confined to 
conventional denominational categories. And while the concept of divine providence implicitly 
stands behind American civil religion, its character is, by definition, secular- it functions through 
such institutions as the branches of government, patriotic organizations…and outlets of popular 
culture” (Angrosino, 2002, p. 241). American civil religion is therefore both religious and 
secular; somehow sacrifice, a deeply religious concept, must find a way to survive within 
“political” and ostensibly “non-religious” discourse. As the American Civil War showed, as well 
as the establishment of national cemeteries, and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, sacrifice 
“makes sense” in relation to wartime loss and suffering. If, however, that great loss of life no 
longer occurs, such that death in war becomes something to be calculated as that which is to be 
avoided at all costs, then the role of sacrifice in civil religion risks losing its most compelling 
quality; without bodies to attach itself to, the visual spectacle of sacrificial violence is not so 
readily translated to audiences, both religious and non-religious alike.  
Summary 
Undoubtedly there is tremendous disagreement about the meaning of sovereignty, the 
specifics of which invokes too rich a history and cannot be adequately treated in this dissertation. 
   168 
 
 
This chapter has shown that, together, Foucault and Agamben regard life as the target of modern 
power. Foucault’s model of power allows us to capture intersections and contradictions 
necessary to uphold a political-sociological methodological approach to sacrifice, but since he 
uses sovereignty as a straw man, it is difficult to export a purely Foucauldian theory into the 
theoretical sketching of sacrifice. Agamben’s metaphors of bare life and the camp as having a 
logic that might be mobilized in the U.S.’s drone program has some validity for our purposes, 
but his ontology of sovereignty problematically ultimately de-historicizes sacrificial violence.  
The idea of the sacred, of military sacrifice- killing and dying- belongs to the sovereign 
mode of power, which is in no doubt in transformation in line with the marketization 
symptomatic of neoliberalism (although sacrifice’s link to sovereignty undoubtedly survives 
within biopolitical governmentality). What then can be said about the sacred now considering the 
neoliberal reconfiguration of sovereignty? It has been our imperative in this chapter to 
understand this question through a discussion of sovereignty’s relation to biopower in an era of 
governmentality. Postmodern violence is a contemporary style of violence that builds on 1) 
governing-at-a-distance; and 2) the intensification of (privatized) violence as an unending social 
routine. Therein, sacrifice is governed to temporarily reconcile the tensions between sovereign 
and biopolitical modes of power. As such, military violence today is heavily privatized and 
technologized, and therefore to some extent, always-already disembodied.  
Disembodiment also means that there is no obvious ruler, no monarchical sovereign to 
make the sacred immediately apparent—I have argued that the increasing invisibility of the 
citizen-soldier implies that transcendental quality of sacrifice, as made significant through 
sovereign power, has quite literally no body to bear it and render it present. Still, the governing 
of sacrificial politics- how killing and dying is justified politically- transpires on and across the 
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citizen-soldier body, as it is both a subject and object of sacrificial violence. Moreover, that we 
accept the authority of democratic sovereignty does not imply that fragments of pre-modern 
sovereignty do not still circulate to give sacrifice weight in popular imaginings of nation-state 
violence. My analysis of the Tomb of the Unknown soldier argued this point. Further, we can 
gesture to a “decline of the sacred” as is tied to the body of the citizen-soldier while still 
acknowledging potential avenues for “re-sacralization” (see Chapter Six).  
U.S.-inspired sovereign violence is understood quite basically as that violence which is 
regarded as right because it is exceptional and/or legitimate. Consider the following interview 
excerpt from a lawyer working directly on issues pertaining to national security and targeted 
killing: 
The alleged legality [of drone warfare] is under the President's war powers. As Executive 
and commander in chief of the U.S. military, and specifically under the Authorization for 
the use of military force that was issued after 9/11. The Authorization for the use of 
military force is a four-line law; it essentially authorizes lethal action against anyone who 
is supporting or was supporting an arm of al Qaeda in connection with the 9/11 attacks, 
which is primarily where we attack them, because now, you know, however many years 
later the connection between who they're killing now and what happened on September 
11th are pretty shaky.” (SSB, interview) 
 
Finally, militarized violence is becoming less invested in, and anchored to, the twin 
themes of the nation state and its deployment of citizen-soldiers therein. Subsequently, so too the 
sacrificial system is unhinged in response to this thinning of the citizen-soldier archetype such 
that the concealment of violence, and the concealment of the sacred—not its revelation—
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becomes the modus operandi of the democratic sovereign. Further, by treating, as I do below, the 
qualities of sacrifice as that which can be ‘made up,’ it follows that sacrifice can be unmade, 
reconfigured or destabilized in relation to a changing style of violence. It is here, through three 
interrelated axes, where I next argue sacrifice is displaced through the combined efforts of 
military privatization and drone warfare through the following mechanisms, and their twin, or 
mirrored movements: publicity/privatization, surplus/rejection of surplus, and 
embodiment/disembodiment. While I treat these sites below in distinct sections, due to their 
natural overlap, particularly in relation to the continuous disciplining of citizen-soldier, in the 
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Chapter Five: Displacing Sacrifice 
“Violence flows out of the body or enters into it in order to create political value” 
(Feldman, 1991, p. 144). 
 
Publicity/Privatization  
Given that sacrifice is partly about the power to name and legitimize certain deaths as 
having public and/or national significance—it is the power to recognize certain deaths or injuries 
as meaningful in their absence—the privatization of warfare, combined with the proliferation of 
drone technology, invites the question of what is at stake in the negation of the sacrificial violent 
encounter, and the rejection the surplus that arises from this violent encounter: I define a 
productive surplus as that which can be harnessed by the nation state for the purpose of utilizing 
war as a site of collective identity, as will become clearer in the following section.  
For now, recall that military sacrifice is not reducible to a single material act but rather is 
indicative of a series of acts within a particular style of violence; in this section I argue that 
specifically militarized violence obtains its social meaning through the recognition of the act of 
killing and/or being killed as sacrificial or not, and this is accomplished through the demarcation 
of that military violence (and related trauma/suffering) as bearing either public or private 
significance. While this does not imply the reduction of all forms of violence to a sacrificial 
logic, it does mean that for distinctly militarized violence, which undoubtedly draws upon, and is 
heavily invested in, the archetype of the citizen-soldier and its implied sacrificial heritage, and 
homage to sovereign power, that any material attempt to overcome or reject the archetype in the 
imagining and articulation of nation-state violence implies a likewise troubling of, or 
reconfiguration of, its sacrificial content. Therefore, the “decline of the sacred” can be linked to 
the decline of the mass army model of warfare, but this does not imply the complete end of 
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sacrifice. It does mean, however, as this and future chapters will argue, that we can no longer 
readily turn to sacrifice as that which links nation-state violence with citizen-soldiers, since war 
is becoming less viable as a vehicle to ground a claim of national, collective identity. We can 
also locate certain points of “re-sacralization,” which I discuss in Chapter Six.        
The outsourcing of violence implies that governments can disavow the burden of 
humanness in war, while allowing them plausible deniability when things go awry. PMCs let 
states conduct war without drawing in a national population. Thus, states protect their own 
citizens, while easing the burden of killing non-citizens. Alas, this is the cornerstone of both 
privatization and the desacralisation of citizenship (Brubaker, 1992). The ritualization of the 
sacrifices of state-soldiers produces foundational narratives and thus has a communitarian effect, 
and, unlike private contractors, citizen-soldier’s actions are consecrated within the boundaries of 
the nation and memorialized in a way that allows for both the production of shared collective 
memory and a projected future-oriented discourse of unification through shared national or 
ethnic destiny. As an archetype of citizenship, the citizen-soldier normalizes a belief that 
soldiers’ actions in wartime reflected the highest echelon of sacrifice.  
In the period of nation building, social relations are engaged within the boundaries of the 
nation-state. However, globalized wars combined with denationalization (Sassen, 2002, p. 280) 
and military privatization, threaten the citizen-soldier’s status as a stable subject of sacrifice. 
Despite this, liberal governments still aim to control the communicative potentiality of sacrificial 
rhetoric. Part of the state’s strategy for managing sacrifice is to privatize it and move the effects 
of the deaths of soldiers into the domain of the private family, thereby neutralizing them by 
placing it within a gendered framework of mourning (Butler, 2004; Taussig-Rubbo 2009, p. 86). 
The relationship between citizenship and sacrifice has weakened with flexible citizenship, and 
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the private contracting of soldiery captures a shift relative to the sacrificial logic that is bound up 
with the archetype of the citizen-soldier. Recall that, “the problem of government at a distance in 
the 19th century led to an intense problematization of the ethical comportment of those who 
would govern, and the attempt to inculcate these ethical technologies through systems of 
training” (Rose, p. 148) resulting in the bureaucratization and incorporation of experts into the 
machinery of political government (Rose, p. 149). In securitizing the right to be free, private 
military corporations shore up expert knowledge and flexible citizenship.  
The desire for flexible citizens and flexible production within the global economy 
penetrates thinking about military technology and soldiering, areas that are not excluded from 
market rationality and management expertise. As part of the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) and its impetus to downsize, modernize, and professionalize the U.S military, Dalby 
(2008) states that the RMA enables soldiers to maintain the critical edge, to remain competitive 
and effective. The RMA  
is used loosely to refer both to technological innovations in weapon systems and in 
particular the most important changes wrought by computer technologies and 
communication systems...Remote sensors and computer tracking of numerous targets 
supposedly allow sophisticated combat operations to out maneuver foes and destroy 
opposition targets relatively easily with few casualties. This requires a reorganization of 
armed forces with large tank and infantry divisions broken into smaller units to be more 
flexible and capable of moving much faster over long distances. (Dalby, 2008) 
 
Note Dalby’s emphasis on the importance of technology and casualty aversion- two practices 
that are theoretically drawn together with the implication being that the adoption and 
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implementation of sophisticated technology greatly reduces casualties, which is a highly 
desirable outcome in war if not the outright measure of its success. Technology enables the 
covering of more ground without physical boots on the ground. Further, as Blanchard claims 
(2011, p. 153) drawing on John Arquilla, the perceived need activated the RMA to “stabilize 
defense spending” in an era of financial austerity and "to demonstrate the continuing usefulness 
of various military tools in an environment seemingly devoid of serious threat." PMSCs satisfy 
both perceived needs.            
Saskia Sassen’s (2002) central theoretical contribution, “denationalization,” adds a 
historical explanation to Dalby's important theme of troop minimization as a pillar of the RMA. 
Denationalization is not entirely separate from theories of post-nationalism, but is distinct in that 
it suggests that the conditions within the institution of citizenship, and its link to nationality, are 
ripe for change. The presupposed allegiance of one subject to its sovereign authority, which 
developed over a two hundred year period in the epoch of nation building and the emergence of a 
kind of war etiquette, has withered away in the context of the shifting legal content of 
citizenship, as witnessed by the proliferation of dual nationality, on the one hand, for example, 
and novel styles of warfare, where “masses of troops today can be replaced by technologically 
intensive methods of warfare” (Sassen, 2002, p. 280), on the other hand. Denationalization marks 
the thinning, or complete withdrawal, of the state’s involvement in citizenship entitlements. 
Here, global, and supra-national governing bodies challenge the efficiency, legitimacy, and 
meaning of nationalized economic and political institutions.  
This turns on what Appadurai (1996, p.160) calls “unstable sentiments.” Writing on 
patriotism, he claims that patriotism only survives at the level of the nation-state. “Below that 
level it is easily supplanted by more intimate loyalties; above that level it gives way to empty 
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slogans rarely backed by the will to sacrifice or kill.” Patriotism and sacrifice are thus mutually 
reinforcing narratives that are intimately tied to the "health" or vitality of the nation-state. The 
privatization and outsourcing of war suggests a reconfiguration of the social within the nation 
and thus within it a decay of the nation’s ability to cultivate patriotic and self-sacrificing citizens.  
While private warfare has existed for centuries (Singer, 2005), once a tool of monarchs 
who fought with private armies (Kinsey, 2006), as previously mentioned, the use of mercenaries 
diminished after the French Revolution. Private armies for hire have existed for centuries and 
make up the bulk of human history in terms of how armies confronted one another on the 
battlefield: “our general assumption of warfare is that it is engaged by public militaries, fighting 
for the common cause. This is an idealization. Throughout history the participants in war were 
often for-profit private entities loyal to no one government” (Singer, 2005, p. 19). Indeed, the 
historical ebb and flow of the commercialization and bureaucratization of violence can be traced 
back to the emergence of the European state. Having once been a significant tool of monarchs 
attempting to seize and secure territory, the use of privateers diminished after the French 
Revolution when “wars became wars between nations, fought by citizens of those nations, as 
opposed to between monarchs with private armies” (Kinsey, 2006, p. 43). Suddenly, the story of 
the state placed the populace at its center. “The people,” as individual embodiments of sovereign 
power, were now ideologically suited and prepared to initiate and administer warfare themselves, 
on behalf of one another and against threatening outsiders.  
Just as the “the people” came to be constructed as the legitimate source of state violence, 
they can be unmade too. The decline of the mass military model showed that the military was not 
exempt from the broader institutional transformations that marked industrial societies at this time 
of neoliberal reform: like other institutions, it too shifted from a labor-intensive to a capital-
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intensive organization, promoting casualty avoidance, real-time battlefield data and agile 
weapons systems (Manigart, 2006). The decline of the mass army model complemented a 
restructuring that emphasized privatization, professionalization, and “family friendly” military 
policy (Joachim & Schneiker 2012; Stachowitsch, 2012). Managers and technicians increasingly 
theorize and conduct war, as opposed to combat leaders (Moskos, 2000, p. 15). The 
professionalization of the military was essential for the realization of the technological goals of 
the RMA: “a policy agenda emphasizing the exploitation of technological advances to preserve 
and even improve the United States’ long-term strategic position” (Shimko, 2010, p. 2). Without 
this professionalization, the incorporation of precision-guided weapons would have remained in 
the realm of the abstract (Adamsky, 2010:59-61). But this downsizing of the military is also 
rooted in a contentious military history. As the following interview data explains, the decline of 
the mass military model was partly an effect of how disciplinary issues intersected with budget 
cuts, redefining of missions, and a growing distrust of the military on the part of civilians and 
soldiers alike in the post-Vietnam era: 
It’s really about the transformation of military logistics, over the last few decades, 
particularly post-Vietnam, the US government has been trying to figure out how to, for 
reasons of cost, but also for reasons of morale, to shrink the size of the US army. Kids 
don't want to go to war. They don’t understand the need for it, so when you send people 
to war using a draft you're gonna get some very reluctant people who are maybe unruly; a 
lot of people deserted, a lot of people messed up with drugs, a lot of people even shot 
their officers, so you had a real problem in trying to get people to the war. (PC, 
interview). 
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Furthermore, veteran A.S. adds, regarding Vietnam: 
 
It wasn’t for God and country- ‘let’s do our time, stay alive and get out of here.’ A 
number of guys I served with did that kind of thing and what I picked up over the years 
from them was a general feeling that Vietnam was, you know, a mistake but that 
basically the military was used for political purposes and by people that had really no 
interest in the men and women serving in the military, that they were just a tool, and of 
course with the loss of life and the element of defeat, there was just a sense that we're not 
gonna let this happen again. (AS, Interview) 
 
Following the decline of the mass army model American military practices reflect, since 
the 1960s, "dominance without hegemony" given its increasing dependency on foreign capital to 
fund its war making capacity, and because of its role as a global racketeer (Arrighi, 2007). Since 
the entrenchment of economic liberalization policies, which became hegemonic in the 
Washington Consensus period, citizenship has been reoriented away from public ideals towards 
private consumer-based notions of subjectivity, knowledge, and management expertise. This has 
occurred alongside the development of the securitization of citizenship as a chief concern for the 
state. By securitizing citizenship, “technologies of governing are employed that displace the 
governing of populations from authorities and sites traditionally located in the state to other sites 
and actors such as private companies, international organizations, and even individuals and their 
own self-government” (Rygiel, 2008). Hence, “citizenship as government is not just 
internationalized but also privatized and individualized” (Rygiel, 2008, p. 211). Private 
contractor’s bodies represent and absorb the synthesis of the RMA with the ideology of 
securitization; they are actors whose sacrifice may be denied, celebrated, and/or privatized for 
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political gain. In other words, the meaning of their deaths is not determined a priori but rather 
socially constructed by competing discourses in the aftermath of a transgression against them. 
Thus, after 9/11, PMCs were hailed as necessary actors in the successful implementation of the 
goals of the RMA but how states would acknowledge their presence in the battlefield was less 
clear. Still, “simply put, one could not tell the story of the Iraq war without any [a] discussion of 
PMCs” (Singer 2004, p. 6).  
PMCs are the effect of the widening of the meaning of security such that the boundaries 
of the nation state were no longer capable of effectively administrating security as dwindling 
Euro-American state militaries were thought to be ineffective in new wars (Duffield, 2001). 
Thus, there was an unprecedented intervention of PMCs into Iraq following the American-led 
2003 invasion, which was justified through the false assertion that Iraq was harboring weapons 
of mass destruction, among other claims that falsely linked Iraq with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
Simultaneously, the American government outsourced many of their operations to PMCs, 
rendering the war effort unprecedentedly reliant on non-state, corporate actors (Singer, 2004). In 
2007, there were more private contractors than U.S. soldiers on the ground in that country 
(Hartung and Pemberton, 2008). At the height of the war, private contractors outnumbered US 
troops and some have estimated that there were as many as 50,000 armed security personnel 
(Singer, 2004, 2005). Consider the following interview data regarding military privatization. 
“V.H” served during the Cold War until 1984. He joined the National Guard after 9/11 and did a 
tour in Iraq from 2004-2005. In 2011, he deployed to Afghanistan as a private contractor: 
VH: I met a couple guys [contractors] early on in Iraq, and they were crazy. And one guy 
talked, told horrible stories, about what he had done. Were they true? I have no idea, but 
it was really disturbing stuff. And the other guy, I don't know what he looked like- he 
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looked like a cartoon character commander type guy. Weapons all over him, bald 
head...Who knows. One theory that I've heard, the Black Water guys work for the state 
department for the most part, not the military, and they were used to do things that the 
American military couldn't get away with. 
 
BB: Such as? 
 
VH: Assassinate people, and do stuff like that- to do stuff to keep the military’s hands 
clean. It's like the CIA. Is that true? Who knows, but it makes a certain amount of sense. 
Those guys were above the law compared to the army units...The military hates the 
contractors, and they all want to be one when they get out. Because the contractors make 
a lot of money, a lot more money than the soldier does. And so they totally resent it. And 
this started happening in the 80s. What I used to do in the Army, contractors do now. I 
guess part of it is that the military isn't big enough. We would have to have the draft to 
have that many people...I went to Afghanistan as a contractor for financial reasons. I got 
an offer I couldn't refuse. I was unemployed; my house was about to get foreclosed on. 
They said, ‘can you be in Fayetteville in two weeks for training?’ ‘How much? OK I'll be 
there!’ And then of course, contractors don’t carry weapons, but I saw more combat in 
Afghanistan as a contractor than I did in Iraq. I saw a lot of indirect combat, but anyway. 
I struggle with this all the time. I write poetry about it. (VH, interview) 
 
PMCs offer services in information technology, coordination and support, military 
training, combat and security (Alexandra et al., 2008), supplementing weakening state armies, 
and they also satisfy neoliberal socio-political and economic desires for techno-rational, 
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geopolitical, and scientific mastery of space and time. As such, they are now conceptualized as 
integral to how states imagine and manage security threats. PMCs thus reflect, respond to, and 
further blur the distinctions between civilian and combatant, war, and peace (Kinsey, 2006). 
Critically, wars are no longer fought on battlefields between opposing armies wearing uniforms. 
Instead, the battlefield has been uplifted and is essentially everywhere: cities, towns, and 
countryside (Kinsey, 2006, p. 52). Battlefields are virtually constructed and simulated (Der 
Derian, 2001) while security threats are conceptualized as having transnational origins and 
effects. After the East-West conflict officially dissolved, new threats, enemies, and transnational 
security issues emerged, such as the drug trade, environmental degradation, poverty and 
immigration (Moskos, 2000). PMCs are ostensibly a permanent fixture in the security industry 
because of their ability to fill the gap that asymmetrical, ethnic-based, humanitarian, and 
otherwise new wars create.  Privatized warfare is a site where economic and military objectives 
intersect, and this alignment cannot be separated from the dynamic social meaning attributed to 
war, combat and sacrificial violence. The significant incorporation of private military contractors 
into the application of military violence shows how the discursive and material qualities of 
sacrifice are contested in relation to these politics. PMCs are integral to the state’s use of 
violence in the mediation of social relations. Further, PMCs benefit from neoliberal 
governmentality’s reliance upon expert knowledge to develop truths about security threats. In 
this way, they can manage their online self-presentation to industry insiders as far as their 
unchallenged ability to self-cultivate images of legitimacy, superior expertise, and as adaptable 
to changing security contexts (Joachim & Schneiker, 2012). Meanwhile, however, in addition to 
the authority granted to PMCs and their affiliated personnel insofar as their ability to generate 
and curate security threats, confirming their self-ascribed credibility, “neoliberal governmentality 
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tends to ‘de-politicize’ security as public debate narrowly focuses on the technicalities and costs 
of military solutions, while alternative political options…become marginalized (Leander & van 
Munster, 2007).” This two-pronged process confirms the dominance of realist theory within 
international relations' debates, which problematically applies militaristic and problem solving 
approaches to complex social issues (Eichler, 2012) but also reveals PMCs' embrace of self-
governance. Duffield (2001) similarly points out that war and corporatism (which capitalizes on 
the idea that security threats are prolific and unending) are unseemly bedfellows. I argue that the 
privatization of security and military operations has a threefold effect: 1) the aesthetic 
sanitization of war; 2) a disruption of the sacrificial system characteristic of liberal democratic 
nation-states; and 3) privatization lays the socio-political groundwork for the entrenchment of its 
technological counterpart: the cultivation and application of drone warfare.   
First, since PMCs are deployed secretly and contain no internal requirements to publicize 
their operations, an ideological impetus to control and sanitize the publicization and/or 
privatization of death, violence, and suffering, for largely American and Western audiences, is 
provided as both just and rational. As a criticism, feminist geopolitics, for example, shows how 
Iraqi civilian deaths, for example, are marginalized and subordinated in relation to American 
deaths—deaths that are regarded as politically qualified (Masters, 2005). Hyndman (2008, p. 
199) similarly claims that, geopolitically, the question of what kind of suffering is privileged in 
wartime is related to the question of “who counts” and “who cares.” “The ‘fatality metrics’ of 
body counts is deeply lopsided in this context: victimhood is commodified and patriotism 
publicized for soldiers making ‘the ultimate sacrifice,’ while Iraqi deaths are framed as ‘the price 
that must be paid’ for introducing ‘freedom and justice’” (Hyndman, 2008, p. 199). Butler 
further explains this dehumanization process as it relates to racial discourses and the production 
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of Agamben’s (1998) concept of bare life, which he describes as receiving a kind of (non) 
violence: “violence against those who are already not quite living, that is, living in a state of 
suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark” (2004, p. 36). The 
corporatization of warfare is an effect of a political need to dictate and control the terms and 
perceptions of American suffering, rendering the abstract “American-ness” as that which ought 
to be protected. This flexibility of control, signified by the trend to plainly make the violence of 
war a private matter, is solidified through the incorporation of PMCs personnel— subjects who 
cannot technically be sacrificed, and are therefore expendable through their very subjection to 
the flexibility of control offered through privatized models of warfare. 
Consider the case of Texan Jamie Leigh Jones as an example. Jones claims she was 
drugged and gang-raped in her mixed sleeping quarters while working in Iraq in technical 
support for KBR. Jones endured fifteen months of arbitration51 before she could file a civil suit. 
This is because she unknowingly signed a contract stating that any “workplace dispute” would be 
settled in private arbitration rather than a public court. Even if employees do read the fine print, 
they often do not realize they are waiving their right to a jury trial (Summers, 2003). Arbitration 
meant that KBR had the right to unilaterally hire the mediator, all proceedings were secret, and 
Jones had no right to an appeal. Arbitration requires no public record or transcript of testimonies 
or proceedings. There is no formal mechanism for courts to penetrate the reasons for the 
arbitrator’s decision; arbitrators, unlike judges, do not have to write opinions stating their 
findings and thus are not held accountable to their peers (p. 708). Arbitration is supposedly better 
                                                        
51 After 15 months of arbitration the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Jones' federal lawsuit against KBR and 
several affiliates could be tried in open court. Jones was finally able to sue KBR in court thereby effectively moving 
her claims of suffering from the private sphere of the boardroom into the public domain of the trial. She filed a civil 
suit against KBR and requested $114 million dollars in damages. On July 8, 2011, the federal jury ruled in favour of 
KBR. They found that the sex with the accused, firefighter Charles Bortz, was consensual and thus no rape occurred. 
The jury also concluded that KBR did not defraud Jones. 
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for workers and more economically efficient; KBR claims that this process helps protect the 
identity of victims. Indeed, arbitration is better for KBR because, as employer and employee 
lawyers agree, juries are more favorable to employees than are arbitrators and award larger 
compensatory and punitive damages (p. 693).  
Moreover, I agree that the protection of identity is important to KBR, but for different 
reasons than they would offer. This is because the “protection” that KBR is supposedly 
committed to is also a part of a desire to privatize and individualize experiences of what amounts 
to, in instances of gendered violence and harassment at the very least, collective acts of violence. 
This is not to negate the individual responsibility of perpetrators of violence. Rather, the fact that 
arbitration prevents class action lawsuits suggests that corporate employers benefit financially 
and in terms of protecting their reputation when they can isolate victims and eliminate the 
opportunity for publicity of any kind thereby preventing the formation and solidification of a 
collective sentimentality that could be harnessed against the employer. KBR has won 80 per cent 
of its arbitration hearings, perhaps because arbitration allows the employer to delay, increase the 
costs and further wear down an employee from attempting to secure his or her statutory rights (p. 
714).  
The denial of a date in a United States court, and the binding arbitration Jones 
inadvertently agreed to, privatized her suffering, rendering it inaudible and non-political. Forced 
arbitration is part of the way in which the law normalizes militarized violence and reinforces 
PMCs’ right to promote a lack of transparency and accountability. PMCs have been accused of 
participating in forced prostitution and sex trafficking of women and children, as well as 
inflicting sexual violence against Iraqis in detention centers (Lasky et al., 2006). Yet, according 
to Singer (2004, p. 13), more than 20,000 military contractors are present in Iraq and yet not one 
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has been prosecuted or punished for a single crime, sexual or otherwise. Thus, “we can only 
conclude that with PMCs in Iraq we have somehow stumbled upon the perfect village, in the 
midst of a war zone, where human nature has somehow been overcome, unlike in the most 
bucolic villages. Or, we have a clear combination of an absence of law and political will.” 
Senator Al Franken harnessed her case to advance his first major piece of legislation, an 
amendment to the Defense Appropriation Bill, which prevents the military from contracting with 
companies who force private arbitration on sexual assault or harassment claimants (Mencimer, 
2011). Jones testified at a judiciary committee meeting in 2009 emphasizing her constitutional 
rights to have her day in court.  
This trend towards arbitration (although it is now illegal for the government to contract 
with companies that force arbitration in instances of sexual violence) fits neatly within a broader 
political-economic mandate of PMCs, and by extension labor relations more generally, in an era 
characterized by neoliberal global economic imperatives. When PMCs are implicated in 
discourses and practices of sexual violence, be it against civilians, racialized “others,” or 
American co-workers, the mechanisms that allow the corporate bodies to privatize knowledge of 
sexual violence effectively privatizes the harm and severs the democratic impulse, which has 
come to represent the relationship between citizens and states. Wartime sexual violence is a 
global problem that goes beyond the terrain of the nation-state, and it still does not register as an 
issue deserving sufficient treatment by political elites. PMCs conceal the problem of (sexual)52 
violence, rendering its effects invisible (Baggiarini, 2013).  
                                                        
52 Consider the war in Bosnia. Therein, DynCorp employees, who made up the core of the police force, were 
reported to have paid for prostitutes and participated in sex-trafficking schemes including buying and selling women 
for their own personal enjoyment, in addition to purchasing illegal weapons, forged passports and committing other 
immoral acts (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 111). DynCorp is a company never far from controversy and has plenty of 
experience in the “rent-a-cop” field (p. 111). Founded in 1946 by a small group of World War II pilots seeking to 
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Second, PMC personnel cannot sacrifice for the nation. Since they are a diverse group of 
people, and constitute a variety of national origins, and given as individuals within corporate 
entities they do not pursue ideological goals, but rather economic ones (Wong, 2006) they cannot 
technically sacrifice. The issue remains: which single national audience would the sacrifice of a 
military contractor benefit? The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) gives further credibility to 
PMCs in such a way that allows them to render their practices non-political (and thus non-
sacrificial) through its claims to be practicing healthy neoliberal economics (ostensibly not a 
political subject matter). The RMA made technological advancement a key component of 
casualty avoidance and contains a complex set of practices that emerged, in part, within the 
dictates of global capitalism. Flexible citizenship was an integral model that freed both military 
and global economic objectives to facilitate the compression of time and space in mobile and 
transnational sites of capitalist production, to reduce human casualties during war, and to allow 
for efficient strategies of global military, political and economic dominance. It includes 
“technological mastery, omnipotent surveillance, real-time ‘situational awareness,’ and speed-of-
light digital interactions” (Graham, 2008, p. 37). These developments reflect a profound desire to 
overcome the limits of the body of the citizen-soldier. This strategy, “a completely automated 
weapons system devoid of human involvement” (Graham, 2008, p. 51) is packaged in the 
language of economic efficiency and the protection of life, since it seeks to substitute bodies with 
technology. The increasing reliance on technical reason is not a coincidence. It is inextricable 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
utilize their military contacts to make a living in the air cargo business, DynCorp’s employees have a history of 
“behaving like cowboys” (Janice Schakowsky, quoted in Chatterjee, 2004, p. 111). One DynCorp site supervisor in 
the Balkans even videotaped himself raping two women. Former Dyncorp employee, Ben Johnston, provided 
testimony in which “his boss, the Dyncorp contract manager ‘appeared to rape a female.’ Johnston testified: ‘there is 
my supervisor, the biggest guy there [in Bosnia] with DynCorp, videotaping having sex with these girls, girls saying 
no, but that guy now, to my knowledge, he is in America doing fine. There was no repercussion for raping that girl’” 
(Sperling, 2015, p. 173 quoting Mendelson, 2005, p. 36).    
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from the privatization and outsourcing of sacrifice, and with widespread practices that unfold in 
relation to the securitization of citizenship.  
Indeed, the RMA borrows ideological language by referencing “trade liberalization,” 
“economic reform,” and “free markets-” classic hallmark euphemisms of neoliberal-style 
capitalist accumulation (Parenti, 2007). PMCs are thus a product of the neoliberal restructuring 
of capitalism. They reflect a new phase of militarization in the post-Cold War era as well as the 
synthesis of the interaction between the sovereign power to kill and the RMA's biopolitical 
rationale of enhancing life (Baggiarini, 2013). Their inclusion, therefore, aids in the state’s 
ability to disavow sacrifice, thus expanding and legitimizing the mandate of extra-sacrificial 
wars, wherein bodies are both being killed and killing but without the earlier guarantee, promised 
by sacrificial cults, that these actions would be made meaningful.  
Third, PMCs, at the micro level of the individual contractor, and as transnational 
corporate entities, provide the socio-political impetus for drone warfare: a technological 
extension of the philosophy of the social contained within the neoliberal politics that initially 
generated, and ultimately made prolific, today’s military and security privatization practices in 
addition to the explosive use of unmanned military technology. Laura Dickinson (2015) explores 
the risks in outsourcing aspects of the U.S. drone program to contractors. Commenting on a 
report by the Bureau of Investigation about private contractors' involvement in military drone 
operations, which have an especially significant presence in drone imagery analysis, she asserts 
that, state-sanctioned violence—killing, or what she terms “so-called inherently governmental 
functions” it is not always entirely clear cut who is doing what. Despite American military laws 
preventing contractors from engaging directly in combat, interrogations, and decision-making 
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regarding who is to be selected for targeting, she writes that the lines between defence and 
offence, or what is targeting and what is not, are difficult to draw. 
Indeed, as the interview with “V.H.” pointed to, military officials comment on how 
private military personnel confuse authority structures rigorously implemented and present 
within military organization (Wong, 2003). The legal and moral responsibility for contractors on 
the part of military officials is unknown. Additionally, there is no formal arrangement for 
intelligence sharing; this exacerbates danger and contributes to preventable accidents such as 
“friendly fire” where people on the same team kill each other by mistake, often due to lack of 
communication. Contractors serve to challenge unit cohesion as well. Whereas military soldiers 
report that they fight primarily for each other, under the flag of their country, and ideological 
interests such as spreading freedom, liberty, and democracy in Iraq (Wong, 2003), private 
contractors are not motivated by the same ideals, and lack the immediate social justification. 
Indeed, private security companies and their employees, although typically having more 
experience than uniformed personnel in Iraq have little to do with civilian security and more to 
do with professional and economic gain; they are often former military people who, given their 
already established credibility, engage in private contracting to earn additional income, gain 
skills, and remain relevant. The approach inherent to military privatization provides armed 
protection to individuals and places, rather than a civilian constabulary where respect for law and 
public safety is the primary aim (Duffield, 2001) further destabilizing the traditional military 
hierarchy and overall structure of state violence. 
The military industrial complex, as famously criticized by President Eisenhower in his 
1961 farewell speech, illustrates the now vast and permanent network of contracts, flows of 
money, and lobbying between people, corporations, institutions, defense/military contractors, the 
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Pentagon, the executive branch, and congress. This is evidenced by a revolving door between 
military and political spheres. It is reasonable to expect that when a service member retires from 
the military that he/she will go into the private sector where the demand for that kind of expert 
knowledge is widespread, and the pay is significantly higher as compared to the services. The 
military industrial complex also symbolizes a new relationship between public and private 
realms: by the late 19th century, modern warfare became so complex that it required large 
components of industry to be devoted to research and development to produce, sustain, and 
improve rapidly developing military technologies.  
This need for specialized knowledge meant that private companies would be included as 
designers of expert knowledge and as key players in the production of empire through the 
expansion of bases and support of proxy wars. Indeed, during the Cold War, the ideology of 
nuclearism focused on technology platforms such as jet fighters and submarines. Smaller armies 
were preferred since air delivered weapons could theoretically replace ground forces and 
therefore the overall number of soldiers declined. Scientific and engineering labour became 
significantly more important than manufacturing labour and new forms of secrecy emerged to 
protect this rapidly developing technical knowledge. Yet, the military industrial complex hides 
the interconnections between structural and physical violence; violence is not an exceptional 
practice but is a product of the widening gap between global rich and poor, coupled with old/new 
racisms. The notion that “we” (the “civilized” West) engage in war only when provoked, or in 
defense, is a myth that continues to circulate in favor of consolidating or resuscitating sovereign 
power. The Post-Cold War period extended military restructuring (as many institutions did in the 
1990s) in line with common sense business practices: this included downsizing through 
outsourcing, (training militaries of other countries to do proxy work for U.S. interests—this has 
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the added convenience of being able maintain plausible deniability when human rights abuses 
occur—although there are many reasons for issuing proxy work) and of course, privatization and 
outsourcing, practices that benefited from so-called humanitarian wars, or wars of choice: new 
war making doctrines expanded to other areas that were once governed by civilians such as 
famine relief, disaster relief, evacuation operations, often encouraged by the ongoing escalation 
of civilian wars and the slow and often insignificant responses from the United Nations.  
Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, where these types of proxy wars are the norm, these 
political and economic nuances of violence as perpetuated by the ideals of the American empire 
have a way of being subsumed by the twin banners of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom.’  “War” 
conjures up a now outdated rationale that it is ethical, legal, and bound by internationally agreed 
upon conventions as far as accountability and transparency are championed by states, which 
wage war with other states. Indeed, asymmetrical warfare, appears to be the default way of 
strategizing violence—how to contain it, and prevent it from spreading elsewhere. Even the U.S., 
which has been involved in several counterinsurgency squabbles since 9/11, acknowledges these 
difficulties when in 2009 it declared, in the Government Counterinsurgency (COIN) Guide, that 
“insurgency is not always conducted by a single group with a centralized, military-style 
command structure, but may involve a complex matrix of different actors with various aims 
loosely connected in dynamic and non-hierarchical networks” (p. 7). Yet, the “enemy” is often 
imagined to be singular in its source/origin and homogenous in ideological, regional, or national 
orientation.  
Further, the idea of transparency within network style warfare nonetheless brings forth its 
own conundrum that is unique to the intersection of COIN operations, terrorism, and drone wars: 
how to make things, namely bodies, and their actions, knowable, through a regime of visibility. 
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Considering that those very bodies are also prone to resistance, and unpredictability, and thus are 
evasive; rendering visible also implies a need to render invisible, for example, in terms of how to 
conceal or suppress particular qualities of those same bodies—their presence as witnesses or 
victims, or perhaps their demand for rights, protection, and recognition within liberal 
democracies.   
 
Surplus/Rejection of Surplus53 
Sacrifice is first destabilized in relation to the idea of a surplus—a productive surplus is 
that which can be harnessed by the nation-state for utilizing war as a site of collective identity. 
Considering the body as a site of transaction, let us take up Elshtain’s (1993) analysis, which 
provides some, albeit ultimately unsatisfactory insight. She links sovereignty, masculine 
violence, and war together, by claiming “the state’s proclamation of its own sovereignty is not 
enough: that sovereignty must be recognized. War is the means to attain recognition, to pass, in a 
sense, the definitive test of political manhood” (p. 162). As such, sovereignty, much like national 
borders, does not exist a priori but instead sovereignty is brought into being because of, and in 
relation to, sacrificial violence, as they materialize together in the theater of war, wherein men 
act as privileged embodied combatants and therefore as sacrificing bodies. Surely, sovereignty to 
be truly realized must be tested and recognized.  
                                                        
53 I use the term “surplus” throughout the dissertation to refer to the productive political value (the excess symbolic 
capital) that remains in the death(s) of citizen-soldiers. I argue that, traditionally, this surplus has been productively 
harnessed by the state in its post-War re-making and re-imagining of itself and its history and future potential, but 
that, in our contemporary moment, the inclusion of private military contractors reflects a rejection of this surplus 
political value. Geroges Bataille (as well as Marx) also famously used the term. Bataille uses the term to outline his 
notion of a “general economy.” Writing against classical political economy, Bataille challenges the notion of 
scarcity as being the guiding economic principle and instead posits “surplus” (growth, the accumulation of wealth) 
as the economy’s defining feature. For Bataille, this wealth must be deliberately wasted. Grand displays of human 
power (in the form of wars and human sacrifices, for example) reflect this destruction of surplus energy. My use 
should not be confused with Bataille’s, as I am not here using it to rethink political economy, but instead to 
showcase changing meanings of violence as ascribed to citizen-soldiers.    
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However, Elshtain’s analysis, like many scholars who theorize wartime violence as an 
effect of a standard theory of sovereignty, as well as before the prominence of drones, assumes 
the presence of embodied combatants and that those combatants fight in the name of the 
sovereign. In the avoidance of the violent encounter (which I argue is drone warfare’s modus 
operandi) characterized by the absence of a relation between embodied combatants, sacrifice is 
destabilized through disembodiment (as will be discussed later) as an effect of an invisible, 
‘unrecognizable’ sovereign power, which migrates away from the stronghold of the nation and 
the status of citizen-soldiers as witnesses, in the erasure of the violent encounter. 
In post-war periods, when nations collectively reflect on the meaning of violence, its 
value, fallen soldiers remain the property of the state, and the nation reclaims this loss as a 
positive surplus in the remaking of the state. As the epigraph by Feldman illuminates, violence 
has a political value (what I term surplus) as it flows in and out of bodies, but as violence no 
longer flows in between, as an exchange, but instead unilaterally identifies, stalks, fixates, and 
targets, that surplus is not recovered by the nation state, whose audience is not directly engaged 
in the highly-calculated act of killing. Sacrifice historically has allowed nation-states to organize 
collective violence by using the symbolic excess that resides from a sacrifice to assert its 
authority (Edkins, 2003, p. 95). For example, when sacrifice is invoked alongside citizenship, 
belonging, and wartime remembering, it provides the grounds to effectively re-cast national 
collective consciousness in violent terms thereby renationalizing state power.  
When a member of the U.S. military dies in battle, for example, this is considered the 
grandest of sacrificial acts for the nation (Pearce, 2010) and the nation consumes this death and 
recirculates the spiritual residue of the fallen into the bloodstream of the body politic. Sacrifice 
traditionally implies the power to name and legitimize certain deaths as having public 
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significance, to recognize certain deaths as legitimately lost, and to rank those deaths according 
to a schematic of who is worthy of recognition, wherein citizen-soldiers pay “the ultimate price” 
and are therefore, alongside their families, ranked highly in the national schematic of suffering 
and loss. 
Let us circle back momentarily to the previous discussion of military/security 
privatization to both summarize the main points whilst further elaborating upon the meaning of 
surplus, and what I claim is the current rejection of this surplus. If as I described a positive 
surplus as that symbolic capital that can be effectively harnessed subsequent to wartime death, 
injury or suffering for the purpose of utilizing war as a collective site of identity then 
military/security privatization is an unambiguous rejection of that surplus: the sacrificial excess 
has no one to capitalize on it, and it has nowhere—no clear national audience and corresponding 
sovereign figure—to be absorbed, interpreted, and re-circulated anew within the body politic. In 
the dialects of visibility and invisibility, privatization has a dual role: its expert knowledge 
contributes to the rendering of the optics of the battlefield into the scope of the knowable and 
visible. Meanwhile, the bodies deployed under the mandate of privatization are made invisible, 
insofar as private military companies do not report to Congress; the U.S. government does not 
publicize their inclusion in the conflict zone, outright deflects attention away from the topic, and, 
as will be discussed below, has no reliable method of counting or quantifying contractor deaths 
and injuries.      
As I discussed already, military/security privatization exploded with America's 2003 
invasion of Iraq. Foreign policy at this time, as summarized by both Isabelle V. Barker and the 
2002 National Security Strategy, claimed "the U.S. this moment of opportunity to extend the 
benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, 
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development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the world" (U.S. White House 
quoted in Barker, 2015, p. 84). Christine Delphy (2003) has termed this the imperialist “White 
Man’s Burden,” a missionary’s ethos which was later picked up by American political elites in 
the latter half of the twentieth century, specifically expressed within the discourses deployed 
prior to the most recent invasion of Iraq. For example, the Bush administration famously claimed 
that American troops would be greeted as liberators upon their arrival in Iraq. Furthermore, the 
Bush administration, through its neo-imperial framework and their use of embedded feminism,54 
essentially re-invoked past colonial constructs that have traditionally classified non-Western 
cultures as backward, as lacking agency, and in need of Western intervention. As Delphy (2003) 
argues: the words have changed, but it is not difficult to recognize behind this new phrase, “the 
right to intervene,” the same old white man’s burden, still as lethal, for it incorporates the 
missionary’s paradox: “We will save their souls [their freedom] even if we have to kill them to 
do it” (344). During the Skyes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which divided Arab territories amongst 
the British and the French, General Maude, upon his entry into Baghdad, had unequivocally 
declared that the British had arrived as liberators, not conquerors (Abdullah, 2003). The 
missionary’s paradox still circulates within American foreign policy, under the guise of 
protection myths, anti-terrorism discourses and neoliberal economics; governing through 
distance, patience, and calculation—but not through explicit control—this reflects the 
imperatives of governmentality that I previously described as integral to the logic of 
military/security privatization.   
                                                        
54 The Bush administration never publicly articulated itself as feminist in orientation prior to 9/11, but it co-opted 
wholesome sounding liberal feminist rhetoric to justify its imperialist agenda via “embedded feminism” (Hunt, 
2006). Feminists remain interested in why, in the historical juncture of the post-9/11 period, women's rights 
discourses were popularized by a neoconservative administration that had otherwise sought to aggressively 
dismantle the gains that feminists made in the past thirty years. 
 
   194 
 
 
To govern in this manner means that, “over half a million U.S. troops, spies, contractors, 
dependents, and others are now stationed on some 737 military bases located in more than 130 
countries, according to official Pentagon inventories” (Johnson, 2008, p. 21). These contractors 
operating within PMCs come from all over the world to participate in some of the most lucrative 
work available in their profession. They reflect various socioeconomic backgrounds, personal 
and professional histories, roles, and intentions. Yet, Barker claims, there is a strategic paradox 
at the heart of today's Pax Americana: “The only way the United States can support an empire of 
military bases [to accomplish the aforementioned National Security Strategy] with a trimmed-
down force comprised of all volunteers is through outsourcing services” (p. 85). Military/security 
privatization reflects neoliberal ideals because it treats security like a commodity which operates 
within the confines of business ethics; something to be packaged and sold in the marketplace and 
consumed as a service to enhance efficiency, reduce costs and satisfy the diverse needs of 
clients. 
However, this claim to economic efficiency did not translate into savings, or efficiency, 
in Iraq. Upon seizure of Iraq in April 2004, occupation authorities fired all 400,000 soldiers in 
Saddam Hussein’s army with the hopes of training 40,000 new soldiers across 27 battalions 
(Chatterjee, 2004, p. 125). This goal was missed by a large margin, yet this is where American-
based corporations profit regardless of whether the intended target is met or not. For example, 
the Iraqi army was trained by U.S.-based Company Vinnell, which was awarded $48 million for 
the job while they paid soldiers a mere $70 per month. One major source of tension was the 
“forced integration of ethnic Arabs and Kurds, traditional enemies...American planners thought 
they could create a model for the country’s diversity...from the first day this was a nonstarter, 
because military training had to be translated from English to Arabic and then to Kurdish” 
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(Chatterjee, 2004, p. 126). Within the first few weeks, 100 Kurds quit—they also complained 
that their weapons malfunctioned. The U.S. military eventually fired Vinnell for contributing to 
ethnic tensions among soldiers (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 126). Despite Vinnell’s failed contract, the 
Virginia-based company has a long history of providing services to the American military, from 
Guam in the 1950s to the Korean War (p. 126). Privatization has occurred in other areas besides 
those concerned with policing or combat. For example, Halliburton managed to secure $3.9 
billion in contracts related to transportation and the maintenance of equipment from the military 
in 2003, although it is estimated that contracts for Halliburton were ultimately worth as much as 
$13 billion. Halliburton has been repeatedly accused of significant overbilling, attempts to beat 
the competitive bidding clause, and deliberate, widespread inefficiency (Chatterjee, 2004). 
Moreover, Bechtel, one of the world’s largest engineering-construction firms, was awarded a 
$2.8 billion contract to refurbish Iraq’s sewage, water, and school systems. However, the 
company has a long history of botched reconstruction jobs and of creating economic hardships 
for local people once they vacate the county in question. According to one source, “Bechtel and 
privatization go hand in hand. When Bechtel comes to your town, you can expect costs to soar 
and accountability and local control to evaporate” (Beck, quoted in Chatterjee, 2004, p. 65). 
Bechtel recently brought a $25 million lawsuit against Bolivia for cancelling a contract to 
manage the Cochabamba water system. Under Bechtel, the water rates for locals skyrocketed (p. 
65). Within days of the fall of Baghdad, thousands of local and expatriate contractors, working 
for multinational corporations, were hired to reconstruct the country, and install democracy at a 
profit that most assumed would be paid for from Iraq’s vast oil wealth (p. 13). 
Moving beyond the immediate post-9/11 era, what can be said about military/security 
privatization in and beyond Iraq, as it transpired between the Bush and Obama administrations? 
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Where Bush’s mandate included a costly “nation-building” principle (however misguided) 
Obama's reflected a similar pattern—indeed an extension of the philosophy of privatization—
albeit with a so-called “light footprint approach,’ which has relied upon thousands of Americans 
paid to fight and die in the shadows” (Zenko, 2016). “Under Obama, more private military 
contractors have died in Iraq and Afghanistan than all the U.S. troops deployed to those 
countries” (Zenko, 2016, p. TK?) Despite this, the Department of Defense (DOD) still does not 
have a reliable system to track contractor personnel killed or wounded, nor does it have a reliable 
way of knowing the citizenship of the deceased. Drawing on data published by the U.S. DOD, 
and the U.S. Department of Labor, Micah Zenko, a senior fellow with the Center for 
Preventative Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, cites one estimate that between 2001-
2010, 32 percent were citizens, while 68 percent were non-Americans hired by U.S. or non-U.S. 
firms that had won a military contract. He also reveals that private contractors outnumber 
American troops, constituting two of the most contract-dependent wars in U.S. history: There are 
roughly 28,626 contractors in Afghanistan, compared to 9,800 U.S. troops. In Iraq, 7,773 
contractors support 4,087 U.S. troops (these figures do not include those who support the CIA or 
other intelligence communities) (Zenko, 2016). Further, the presence of contractors encourages 
mission creep, since contractors do not count as "boots on the ground" and therefore do not count 
against troop-level caps; “as a result, the government can put more people on the ground than it 
reports to the American people, encouraging mission creep and rendering contractors virtually 
invisible”55 (McFate, 2016).  
                                                        
55 An exception to this invisibility was the widely-publicized incident at Nisour Square, Baghdad, when a group of 
Blackwater employees killed seventeen Iraqi civilians and injured twenty-four. Four guards were convicted in a U.S. 
court. Blackwater changed its name to XE services in 2009 and then again to Academi in 2011 (curiously just one 
letter short of "academic—" signaling its own self-proclaimed expert knowledge.    
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This invisibility—the invisibility of contractor's deaths and injuries, the invisibility and 
refusal to make public the precise numbers and nationhood of those deployed, the invisibility of 
the "light footprint’s” paradoxically expansive and heavy underbelly—marks the rejection of the 
surplus traditionally inherent to the meaning of death and dying on the battlefield. In the 
acceptance of the surplus, therein lied the opportunity, and reasoning, to turn potentially 
meaningless violence away from a vocabulary of murder towards that of the ultimate sacrifice 
for the nation-state. The presence of contractors puts into stark relief that which is absent: the 
embodied, sacrificial will of the citizen-soldier, and the democratic notion of the people to which 
it is beholden.   
 
Embodiment/Dis-embodiment      
I have suggested that the content and meaning of sacrifice, especially in relation to 
globalized wars, is deeply political and cannot be theorized universally but rather only in 
historically specific contexts of war making. Our current moment, evidenced by postmodern, 
techno-fetishistic war, implies not the reality of bloodless war, or end of death or dying for one’s 
nation, but a clear trajectory showing the increasing unevenness and invisibility of violence as a 
byproduct of sovereign power’s departure from the body of the citizen-soldier. War is made 
invisible to national audiences and therefore takes on an anti-political quality thereby becoming 
reliant on widening the gap between citizens and the control/application of violence. The 
imagery of military sacrifice—as being tied to the vitality of the nation state and the embodiment 
of sovereign presence, bloodletting, transcendence, and moral achievement through the 
destruction of the finite body and ultimately injury or death—now gains content only in 
superficial moments, being mobilized when nations attempt to periodically militarize citizenship. 
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Nation-states develop with an interest precisely in securing territory, acquiring resources 
to secure war-making technologies, regulating populations, and categorizing individuals based 
on ethnic markers and citizenship. State policies like citizenship and border security not only 
secure the nation-state from outside interference, but they also solidify an ideological allegiance 
or loyalty to the state as seen in supposedly patriotic acts, such as defending, dying, or killing for 
one’s homeland. The privatization of war, in contrast, demonstrates how the cultivation of this 
kind of loyalty is no longer an explicit priority of the state. This is because military outsourcing 
reshapes the very need for sacrifice in a period marked by de-nationalization: states can now 
surpass borders and harness the appropriate forms of technology to justifiably incorporate non-
humans and non-citizens into the practice of warfare vis-à-vis the interrelated logic of free-
market capitalism, the decline of the mass army model, and flexible citizenship, promoting 
various forms of governing at a distance.  
As a tactic of governing at a distance, drone surveillance and drone strikes reveal that 
there is a clear avoidance of a sacrificial scene- the familiar optics and players integral to 
battlefields of the twentieth century. In drone warfare, there is no formal embodied performance 
of a violent exchange in the name of the sovereign and/or nation, but only precision bombing, 
underpinned by detached, mundane algorithmic calculations. Photographs of coffins draped in 
flags containing dead soldiers no longer circulate for public consumption or oversight as they 
once did during the Vietnam War. 
Consider this anecdote from a military veteran I interviewed:  
 
My unit had originally been tasked with convoy duty, which was by late 2004, the 
insurgency was getting to be really effective at blowing up trucks and so all the convoys 
and civilian vehicles carrying supplies all over the country were guarded by military and 
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we were tasked to do that but then at the last minute it changed; I don't know for sure but 
I think that some of it had to do with the fact that we had women in the company. About 
late 2004 there were a number of stories in the news about female soldiers that had been 
killed in action and I think they might have changed us to a base side duty because of 
that. You know, this war was so well managed by the Pentagon, by the administration. I 
wasn’t in Vietnam but I grew up with Vietnam, and it was every day on the six o’clock 
news- film from Vietnam, and it was often pretty horrific. [In this current war] the 
Pentagon didn’t allow reporters free access. Everything was managed, [as a] matter of 
fact the commanding officer of my unit, [who] I got along with really well, he was a 
really good guy, [and] one of the few competent people that I served with…he mentioned 
there had been some reporters coming to the base. I stuck my hand up and said, 'I’ll talk 
to them.’ And of course, he knew my politics, and he said, “absolutely not.” (AS, 
Interview)  
AS believes that he had the parameters and scope of his mission altered to avoid risk of 
bodily harm to women soldiers, and subsequent negative media attention. His position is 
confirmed by Butler, who remarks that in the immediate post-9/11 era, “graphic photos of US 
soldiers dead and decapitated in Iraq...were refused by mainstream media, supplanted with 
footage that always took the aerial view, an aerial view whose perspective is established and 
maintained by state power” (Butler, 2004, p. 149).  
Governments now shy away from politicizing or calling attention to the deaths of 
soldiers, and the deaths or injuries of private military contractors, who now outnumber 
uniformed personnel, are not even publicized, let alone considered grand sacrifices worth folding 
into a narrative of national identity. In the spirit of Foucault, we may suggest that power no 
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longer recognizes death. This privatization, and/or denial of publicity, and the rejection of 
surplus that results, reflects two mutually reinforcing sites whereby sacrifice is destabilized. The 
third site, that of embodiment, is taken up next.  
The idea of the body reflects a critical aspect of how sacrificial violence is applied, 
experienced, and how these constructions in turn informs the political. In Feldman’s landmark 
study of the Irish social landscape during 1969-1986, the body represents the central terrain by 
which historical and political memory, and action, are expressed and resisted. Through his 
analysis, the body's relation to sacrificial violence and the possibility of resistance to or 
reclaiming of sovereign power therein is revealed. Through the territorialisation and 
classification of bodies alongside liberal spatialization techniques and apparatuses of regulation, 
Feldman argues that bodies are encoded and decoded within both public and private domains. 
Both state and non-state actors emit individualized and collectivized narratives of violence, 
informing the dialogically constructed identity of, for his purposes, the “Irish Self.”  
The neoliberal project of methodological individualism, and thus the juridical subject, is 
simultaneously reinforced and disrupted within the larger agenda of Cold-War state-building 
practices concerned with information warfare. This is reflected in practices of interrogation, 
detention, arrest, and house-raids. Here, the state reduces itself to merely another paramilitary 
presence (p. 89) where the point is to collect information on individuals and communities rather 
than to ascertain truth, to charge and prosecute (p. 110). He shows how these categories are 
mediated by temporal and spatial properties: “crumbling boundaries between the inside and the 
outside, the private and the public” (p. 93). According to Feldman, “being done” is a right of 
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political passage and indeed a sign of political maturity. As Feldman relates, male Republican56 
biographies are inscribed in light of this journey from an apolitical (feminized) subject to a 
masculine political subject: the body, arrest and interrogation experiences are the fabric of this 
passage (p. 98). Individual bodies became, in a sense, weaponized; indicative of historical 
collective memory and action. As a result, the “collectivized weapon endures; it is a hardening 
(reification) of the body. Thus, if embodiment is sublated by the weapon, if weapons become 
bodies, then bodies can be reciprocally metaphorized as weapons. Both ‘hardmen’ and ‘stiffs’ 
are bodies transformed into weapons (p. 103).” Prisoners literally begin to articulate their bodies 
as weapons and sites of political resistance and protest. Here, the weapon and the body become 
central and interchangeable political artefacts of paramilitary culture” (p. 179). 
For Feldman, and as my previous discussion on liberal and republican forms of 
citizenship attests to, part of becoming a political subject (citizen) requires these public 
experiences of practicing, or at least implicitly condoning, violence among men. Borrowing from 
Foucault, Feldman asserts that all prison revolts occur at the level of the body exemplified by 
“the H-Blocks [which had] their myths, local histories, performance spaces, and carnivals of 
violence, symbolic kinship, death rituals and animal totems” (p. 166). The Dirty Protest 
encapsulated techniques and discourses of the body concerned with the interior domains and 
excrements of the body used to counter their “colon-ization” and resist their sense of impending 
death (p. 181). In this respect, “the Blanketmen converted the interior of the body into a zone of 
trickery and a medium of communication with the world outside the prison” (p. 199). Here, the 
                                                        
56 The use of “republican” here has a distinct meaning (when compared to how the term is deployed inside the U.S.) 
as it specifically applies to the history of the Irish “Troubles.” At the heart of the thirty-year conflict (1968-1988) lay 
the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. While the unionists (Protestant majority) sought to remain part of the 
United Kingdom, the nationalist, republican, almost exclusively Catholic minority was to become part of the 
Republic of Ireland. 
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political capacities of the body are linked up with daily automatic processes of excretion. Unlike 
forced nudity, being forced “spread-eagle,” medicalized mirror/cavity searches, and humiliation 
through infantalization, the Dirty Protest is representative of a politics of resistance: it is the one 
aspect of the prisoner’s biology that the guards could not control, thus facilitating new political 
space to resist the sovereign demand of surveillance, rendering the prisoners outside the optics of 
the state’s visibility. Excrement, bearing dirty historical relations and the trace of the other (p. 
180), in addition to the basic biological make-up of the body, becomes communicative and 
expressive sites for both prisoners and guards. Through biological functions, the prisoners and 
guards are drawn into a relationship with each other. They are intimately connected, even when 
not physically together: “the smell would stick to his uniform and to his body and was hard to get 
off...the prison officers did feel defiled because it extended into their private lives...” (p.193). 
The prisoners and guards participate in the production of ideological imaginaries of the other—
they do so vicariously and voyeuristically. Accordingly, sovereign violence is realized through 
the body, a product of shifting boundaries and political terrains of sacrifice.  
Feldman’s anthropology of Northern Ireland, namely his discussion of the body’s relation 
to violence, is illustrative for our purposes in the form of two analytical points: First, Cold War 
and post-Cold War interrogative tactics and rationalities were based on capture, arrest, torture, 
and the detention of bodies as a means to cultivate information, and ultimately realize 
masculinized citizenship as well as the expression of sovereign power’s expression of violence 
through their unequal albeit deeply intimate encounter(s) with one another. Kahn and Agamben 
similarly describe the violent encounter/exchange as the space wherein sacred violence and state 
power converges on the body. Bodies matter in the performance of sovereignty.   
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Second, these violent embodied encounters had a spatial-logical component that informed 
the realization of the encounter. This style of violence provided the space (prison/detention 
center) and opportunities (through bodily encounters) to resist and/or alter the direction and pace 
of violence in their simultaneous claim of and resistance to sovereign power. Competing 
sovereignties are realized in the enclosure of bodies, for the purposes of acquiring information 
directly from the confessions of the detainees, whose materiality and agency is anchored firmly 
in an institutionalized space.  
However, U.S. military policy, exemplified in drone strikes, bypasses the practices of 
enclosing bodies through arrest, capture, torture, and detention—refusing the confining spatial, 
embodied politics of the camp while redeploying its logic through air power—that are bound to 
arise in the act of encountering the ostensible enemy other. If “each of us is constituted 
politically in part by the virtue of the social vulnerability of our bodies...exposed to others, at risk 
of violence by virtue of that exposure” (Butler 2004, p. 20) then drones undo this risk of 
exposure, troubling the content of sacrifice in the context of a style of violence that normalizes it 
as a series of unending social routines. Here, technicians use drones not to confine and 
interrogate for purposes of acquiring information, but to erase the body; not to engage a violent 
exchange, but to bypass one; not to bring its victims into a relation of subordination, but to 
dehumanize upon contact. As Khan (2008, p. 176) succinctly states: “the United States literally 
does not know what to do with the captured terrorist.” An interview I conducted with a lawyer 
working on drone cases for the non-profit organization, Reprieve, verifies this:  
We [Reprieve U.S] expressly think that the reason drone strikes have increased is because 
Obama has essentially implemented a kill instead of capture policy. We are seeing a lot 
of that with ISIS and their conversations now being had about whether to detain alleged 
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ISIS fighters and where to detain them and how to detain them and the government's been 
pretty clear that they are not interested in detaining them in U.S. custody, they prefer the 
countries on the ground detain them, because they got in so much trouble doing that 
beforehand, and in cases where that's not the case they're just taking people out. (SSB, 
Interview)57 
 
Indeed, sovereign power is then not made apparent through embodied and shared 
violence, but instead is eclipsed in this minimization and ultimate erasure of the violent 
encounter. Girard (1979, p. 28) writes of a scene of violence, wherein "two men come to blows, 
blood is spilt, both men are thus rendered impure." Drones offer a solution for containing the 
impurity of the other in that they offer the potential to eclipse the political constraints of 
confining bodies. When asked about why the U.S. is so hesitant to detain people, the same 
interviewee responded:  
It presents a new opportunity to make the same mistakes that they did before [torture]. 
They would have to set out transparently what status they are giving these people, are 
they calling them enemy combatants, are they capturing them on a battlefield, who do 
they keep, where do they keep them, do they give them an attorney right away, do they 
                                                        
57 Although compelling, this viewpoint nonetheless requires clarification, particularly because it directly conflicts 
with official U.S. policy, which indicates it prefers capture operations to lethal action. In the “Drone Memos,” dated 
May 22, 2013, standard operating procedure states for targeting terrorists outside of the U.S. that “capture operations 
offer the best opportunity for meaningful intelligence gain from counterterrorism (CT) operations and the mitigation 
and disruption of terrorist threats. Consequently, the United States prioritizes, as a matter of policy, the capture of 
terrorist suspects as a preferred option over lethal action and it will therefore require a feasibility requirement of 
capture options as a component of any proposal for lethal action. Lethal action should be taken to prevent terrorist 
attacks against U.S. persons only when capture of an individual is not feasible and no other reasonable alternatives 
exist to effectively address the threat. Lethal action should not be proposed or pursued as a punitive step or as a 
substitute for prosecuting a terrorist suspect in a civilian court or a military commission. Capture is preferred even in 
circumstances where neither prosecution or third-country custody are available disposition options at the time.” In 
some instances, while capture might be preferred, the suspect ends up being killed. Such was the case in March 2016 
when Special Forces killed ISIL’s “oil minister” Abu Sayyaf. They had intended to take the leader alive, but he was 
killed when he attempted to fight back (Ensor, January 9, 2017).  
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have habeas corpus rights, do they have any constitutional rights, are any of the U.S. 
citizens, who are entitled to more rights than non-U.S. citizens...there's so much scrutiny, 
and they're under so much criticism internationally for Guantanamo, so now they're just 
killing everyone. It's much harder to tell who they're killing, and how many people 
they're killing because there aren't people on the ground, besides those who are actually 
being killed, to count the damage. 
 
Summary  
In Chapter Three, I argued that the relation to military sacrifice ought to be imagined as a 
political, paradoxical effect of the contradictions inherent to the neoliberal restructuring of 
capitalism’s link to war. In supplementing the theological/philosophical literature, which I 
claimed runs the risk of de-politicizing, and essentializing sacrifice, I argued for an addition to 
the dominant (often theological) theories in the form of a critical political-sociological approach. 
This approach is concerned with the positioning of bodies in the organization of violence, 
discourse, and the meaning of the citizen-soldier archetype, thus it regards sacrifice as 
profoundly publicity-driven, embodied, and social. The chapter took up a comparative method to 
focus on how sacrifice is constructed in a distinctly militarized imagining, and subsequently 
represented as integral to the politics of the nation-state. It examined how sacrifice becomes 
depoliticized, and under what conditions it includes or rejects issues of the body or technology. I 
argued that political discourse on sacrifice reveals this precariousness of the citizen-soldier’s 
relation to sacrifice, and that, because of this precariousness,  the contradictions of the neoliberal 
restructuring of capitalism’s link to war are brought into sharp relief. In Canada, the examples 
given point to how sacrifice is deployed in both a celebratory manner, where identity becomes 
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re-nationalized and re-militarized, and the democratic pulse of the sovereign nation is explicitly 
linked to the memory of honorable past sacrifices. In the U.S. case, sacrifice is deployed in a 
hesitant and cursory manner. It is un-problematically regarded as essential to victorious warfare, 
but ideally no longer required in the fantastical imagining of bloodless, downsized, and high 
technology war, where bodies are treated as fallible liabilities rather than necessary assets. In 
upholding a Foucauldian-inspired inquiry, and through a conscious rejection of theoretical 
closure, I claimed that we are better positioned to investigate these contradictions as unfolding as 
a productive paradox. 
In Chapter Four, I claimed that governing this paradox is a priority for Western liberal 
governments, who, being explicitly casualty-averse, aim to reconcile sovereign and biopolitical 
modes of power by subjecting sacrifice to governing. Here, Foucault's language of “letting die” 
and “making live” captures how this paradox is governed in relation to multidirectional forms of 
violence, which intensified in tandem with global militarization following the end of the Cold 
War. Marked by the formal downsizing of militaries alongside the expansion of militarization, 
the question of how the U.S. ought to manage the geo- and social politics of the paradox of 
military sacrifice, otherwise coded in terms of how to deploy bodies, citizens, or others in war, 
reveals the contradictory effects of a liberal state that is both casualty averse and engaged in 
prolonged high technology warfare. The paradox, once again, is about how to maintain the 
ideological, sociopolitical, and militarized conditions to simultaneously demand and deny 
sacrifice. In the first instance, there is a call to citizens to sacrifice, and the cultivation of a brand 
of citizenship wherein those subjects answer the call and/or tacitly support creeping domestic 
and global surveillance and militarization. In the second, there is denial of sacrifice effected by 
the circumnavigating of bodily politics. The effects of the thinning of the archetype of the 
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citizen-soldier and what it has historically represented for the nation are becoming abundantly 
clear, paving the way for a form of violence that benefits from postmodern capitalism’s reliance 
upon high technology’s fusion with the intensification of military and security privatization 
schemes. Finally, I claimed that to comprehend the applicability of sacrifice, we must position it 
within a historically defined concept of sovereignty. In highlighting some of the conceptual 
differences between pre-modern and democratic sovereignty I claimed that sacrifice is rendered 
conceptually incoherent within the political landscape of the democratic sovereign. As a result, 
to gain credibility, sacrificial discourse must invoke aspects of pre-modern sovereignty to 
maintain the nation-state’s grip on legitimate violence.   
In Chapter Five, I argued that sacrifice has been displaced along three interrelated axes: 
publicity, surplus, and embodiment. While rhetoric links citizenship to sacrifice (Kahn 2011, p. 
80) “for many today, the link of citizenship to identity and identity to sacrifice seems a 
memory—a remnant—of a less cosmopolitan, and more violent past” (Kahn 2011, p. 99). 
Indeed, I gestured to the idea that political rhetoric upholds a relation between citizenship and 
sacrifice in the context of a rapidly changing style of violence where the intensification of social 
relations, rather than their redistribution is evident: Here, the speed at which violence is designed 
and applied is held back by the ideological, citizenship-based commitments to the body of the 
citizen-soldier and, by extension, “the people.” Yet, recalling Foucault's famous remark that 
“wars are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the 
purpose of wholesale slaughter,” it appears that this imagining of war as an all-encompassing 
activity, or the idea of total war as was best reflected by WWII, is undermined by the neoliberal 
economic framing of war (Foucault, DATETK, PTK). Rather than war, in its traditional practice, 
we have targeted, fragmented, and isolated acts of violence where sovereign power is no longer 
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maintained by or reflected in the body of the citizen-soldier. Considering this rejection of a 
national audience—the demobilization of (nationalized) populations—I argued that sacrifice is 
disrupted along three interrelated themes or axes, which all hinge on the sovereign and symbolic 
power associated with the archetype of the citizen-soldier: publicity/privatization, 
surplus/rejection of surplus, and embodiment/disembodiment.  
In Chapter Six, I aim to flesh out these disruptions with greater precision in the context of 
drone warfare, showing how the abandonment of the citizen-soldier model of warfare has further 
enabled this destabilization of sacrifice. If we accept that the most valorized expression of 
sacrifice is contained within the image of the citizen-soldier, we must account for how the 
combination of the outsourcing and technologizing of war making destabilizes and reconfigures 
this powerful process, amounting to non-sacrificial style of warfare. What work is the citizen-
soldier no longer doing for the nation state?  
As I have argued, in the imagining of the nation state, the citizen-soldier represents the 
supreme expression of sacrifice, and therefore citizenship, which other citizens are compelled to 
aspire to. The figure of the citizen-soldier, making up the first group of people to receive regular 
benefits, signified ideally proper conduct for all civilians, as people who are seen as sacrificing 
for a particular body or association are regarded as “true” citizens (Burchell, 2002). However, 
the end of conscription, coupled with neoliberal flexible citizenship, troubled the content of 
military sacrifice and its ability to act as a check on violence. Rather than liberal democracy’s 
promise of a decline in violence (we have fewer casualties) however, drone warfare—as the 
technological expression of the sociopolitical philosophy of privatization—is contributing to the 
expansion of more, increasingly invisible, and therefore meaningless violence. Drone violence 
gains credibility through a dialectic of visibility (the battlefield) and invisibility (the violence): 
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by rendering that which was previously unseen visible—casting excess light upon the battlefield 
to break up the fog of war—it claims to save and protect those lives that matter most: American 
and allied soldiers. However, the political and social landscape in which drone warfare operates 
and gains credibility, is dependent upon the invisibilization of interrelated processes: the politics 
of emotional trauma, the scene of sacred violence, and the identification of the witness.  
To repeat a variation on the question motivating this dissertation: What are the contested 
meanings of sacrifice—which I argue is defined by suffering, injury, and bloodshed creating 
surplus for the nation—in both the ideology and practical application of military privatization 
and combat unmanning? The paradox of sacrifice is clear in relation to the (potentially ever 
expanding or unending) temporal dimensions of the War on Terror and its subsequent series of 
related undeclared wars. Former calls for sacrifice, particularly those pertinent to the twentieth 
century, occurred in wars that provided more discernable, concrete, beginning, middle, and end 
points, characterized by official declarations of war, and the signing of treaties, which signaled 
their end. Current wars, or a series of acts of “routine” military violence, are nevertheless 
mobilized by a desire to protect life but lack the impetus to apply strict parameters around 
sacrificial acts. This is a political shift, which is concealed by neoliberal political discourse, 
corporate rationality, and techno-fetishistic smokescreens. Although I do not address the use of 
martyrs by non-state groups in my dissertation (aside from a brief discussion in Chapter One) it 
is worth noting that the more sacrifice becomes unevenly shared or distributed, the more 
entrenched the discourse of sacrifice appears, particularly in moments when the injustice of state 
violence—its non-sacrificial character—is made apparent.  
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Chapter Six: Sacrifice Lost 
 
"I believe I lost some of my humanity while I was in the drone program" (L.L., Interview). 
 
N.M.: "Humans are made in a certain way that when they start killing one another, it really destroys 
something in them that they can’t restore. I think it’s inevitable that that will happen. When we were in Ohio we 
were talking with a couple of guys in the Air Force, one of them had been doing this study of the drone pilots and 
there was some discussion in the Air Force about whether these pilots should be sequestered in some kind of base 
where the pilots wouldn’t go home everyday after work because essentially you’ve got people who are being asked 
to be executioners, everyday they go to work and are asked to blow up somebody, and then they go home and play 
with their kids, "daddy what did you do today," "how was it," and this kind of stuff, I think that would make you 
crazy. And so I think the stress of this thing too has to do with flying these things at long distance, there’s a few 
seconds delay in lead time, they can follow someone days on end and in way get to know that person, and then the 
order comes: 'OK, kill them.' That’s different than if you’re in a tree line and you blast…you don’t really know that 
person, right? I think this is a whole other level of…it’s kind of a worming into your own personality and eating it 
out from the inside if you’re actually killing somebody you get to know... 
 
B.B.: I guess only time will tell how the state will interpret these traumas…they can just say "forget you." 
 
N.M: I think that’s generally what they want to do with all veterans" (NM, interview). 
 
 
Intimacy-in-Distance, and the Impossibility of the Witness 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) industry insiders speak endlessly about the limitless, 
favorable optics provided by drones—optics that are harnessed to protect soldiers. What was 
previously unseen must be brought into view, and it is through drone vision that this is 
accomplished. The inherent subtext to this legitimizing discourse is a perplexing politics of 
visibility (intimacy) and invisibility (distance). In this section, I argue that drone warfare, 
because of its radical rupture of temporal and spatial logic relative to violence, renders the 
category of the witness, as a political archetype integral to interpreting and mobilizing 
knowledge and criticism of war's violence, increasingly troubled.  
Consider the Association for Unmanned Air Vehicles Systems International's annual 
convention in 2014. There, a distinguished military official, Kevin W. Mangum, indirectly 
commented on the issue of drones and the visibility/invisibility nexus when he quipped, much to 
the uninhibited excitement and cheers from his audience, “nothing ruins a good war story like an 
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eye witness.” Here, the General was claiming, in so many words, that enhanced sight and 
interpretation of data wrought by drones is conceptualized as distinct from the politicized act of 
witnessing. According to this theorization, there is plain/objective, uncontested and uninhibited 
“seeing” and then there is a more problematic kind of seeing that is deeply political and so goes 
against the military ethos of keeping political opinions at bay in relation to military planning, and 
achieving mission objectives. Advocates of drones claim, again not explicitly, but in so many 
words, that the technology can only really be apolitical; a machine is just a machine after all 
(until it is employed in practice, as part of a social system, but what happens then is not their 
concern). To be sure, humans are not eliminated, advocates will argue (although to some extent 
they will agree they are obscured). What they- the drones- “see” is ostensibly undisputable: it is 
pure and objective truth that is captured by the camera; there is only one single way to interpret 
the imagery or data, a person, who he is, who his associates are, and what he is doing at that 
given moment. This is in stark contrast, accordingly, to what witnesses, or humans with political 
inclinations, emotional vulnerability, and relational impulses and sensibilities see. They see a 
complex array of social imagery, exchanges, and sometimes, contradictory actions. Sometimes 
they see, but instantly forget, or they unconsciously create false, fragmented memories. Drone 
vision’s inclusion and exclusion of visual data generate intimacy-in-distance: who is rendered 
capable of seeing, what is worth seeing, and what or whom is to be made invisible. 
Notably, Agamben (2002) defines the witness, on the one hand, by the subjective 
potential for testimony and thus the production of truth as recognized by law, and on the other 
hand, as a survivor: “a person who has lived through something, who has experienced an event 
from beginning to end [emphasis added] and can therefore bear witness to it” (p. 17). (We may 
supplement Agamben's analysis here with a sacrificial twist: if survivors/victims or scapegoats 
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code their experience with sacrificial language- speaking to a sacrificial truth- then sovereign 
power will be called out from the shadows to verify this subjective testimony). What constitutes 
the beginning and end of violence, as wrought by drones, is unclear, since their presence can be 
found in undeclared war zones, as a permanent feature of the sky whose dull humming can be 
heard by the people who dwell below; the timing of the potential strike is deliberately opaque but 
nevertheless is made to feel imminent. To witness an act of violence requires that that violence 
have a beginning, middle and endpoint. On the other side, for drone operators, the collapsing of 
their public and professional lives- the blurring of the home front and the war front- produces a 
shift in the spatial and temporal logics that we have come to rely upon to understand the 
traumatic experiences of soldiers, which in turn allow the possibility for memorialization. 
Victims of drones, targeted communities too cannot refer to normal wartime spatial and temporal 
logics because of the drone vision’s panoptic potential and unending presence. “LL” is an 
outspoken critic of the U.S. drone program, having worked on the distributed ground system: 
What people don’t understand about drones, if you look at WWII: you had an airplane, 
the airplane flew, it came in, it dropped bombs and then it left. When it left, all these 
people could come out of the bomb shelters, and you know, the alarms went off, well in a 
developing country, you can make an effective bomb shelter out of sandbags, and so what 
would happen, is people would have the opportunity to run into these shelters, the 
civilians mostly, pretty much, and save themselves, and then the plane would leave and 
they could get on with their daily lives. (LL, Interview)58 
 
                                                        
58 The invention and application of the A-4/V-2 rocket during WWII, the first long-range ballistic missile to be used 
in combat, provides a counter-narrative of the one offered by this informant.  
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In the above excerpt, large drones act as techniques of government at a distance by 
loitering for unprecedented periods of time. Drones prohibit the “getting on with daily life” for 
those under its gaze; as previously mentioned, there is no clear beginning or end to the violence. 
Meanwhile, for soldiers, drones enable battlefield success by giving the tactical edge to the 
soldier by minimizing that soldier’s footprint, which in modern warfare tends to be significantly 
large. As General Mangum further added at the AUVSI conference, the question for military 
planners in their acquisition of drone technology is, how can we give the soldier a massive 
amount of data, and the ability to control numerous systems on one display. As he said, “when a 
soldier is closing in on the enemy, they need unmanned aerial systems (UAS) now, not in a few 
minutes.” Micro drones, combined with other unmanned systems, give the individual soldier a 
tactical edge.  
Unmanned systems help accomplish this by establishing the four key grounds for 
maintaining control over one's environment: Awareness, understanding, ownership, and 
dominance. Drone technology also successfully brings “populations into the terrain of state 
legibility and security so that they might become governable subjects [emphasis added]” (Adey, 
Whitehead & Williams, 2013, p. 3). In contrast to the threat of direct, physical violence, 
governing “presuppose[s] the freedom of the governed” (Rose, 1999: 4). Because of drone 
technology's permanent gaze, people exposed to ongoing surveillance and violence do not 
qualify as witnesses, or proper political subjects capable of testimony, but instead are made 
governable subjects. They are thought to be free, in the most basic legal sense, but it is precisely 
because of this freedom and potential for violence they must be governed and controlled to 
ensure U.S., and by proxy, global security interests.      
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Governing at a distance undermines the transformative potential of witnesses- both 
perpetrators and victims alike- whose experiences of drone wars have no clear temporal 
boundaries, and therefore cannot be. Again, recall Magnum’s quote: “nothing ruins a good war 
story like an eye witness.” We can imagine that “good” post 9/11 war stories should replicate the 
narrative that America is the original victim of violence and is thus warranted in its continued 
violence against terrorist threats. They should include themes of American exceptionalism, 
heroic, masculine sacrifice, and triumph over evil.  
Targeted killing at a distance forecloses the embodied encounter between executioner and 
victim. As far as the technology offers more ease in effectively closing in on a battle space 
(shortening the kill chain) it is nonetheless a space where the enemy is potentially intimately 
known, generating an intimacy-in-distance that nevertheless is constitutive of a mode of “seeing 
without being seen;” an asymmetrical power relation that offers not only empowers violence but 
provides opportunities for pleasure in the viewer (Grayson, 2012). The military technology, the 
weaponry itself, is that which is paradoxically cultivating these intimate deaths: a kind of 
violence that is (mostly) not accidental and in fact it is theorized and deliberately calculated and 
executed like never before, yet since “you (the drone operator) can see what’s been done” its 
aftermath produces new kinds of trauma and suffering for those operators, unlike previous 
soldiers who “really weren't tied to it;” (TW, Interview) they simply dropped bombs and turned 
away from the damage. This is not to say that traditional Air Force personnel did not suffer 
because of their roles in killing, but rather their ability for intimate vision, and therefore to 
experience themselves or self-identify as agents of violence, was bracketed such that its impact 
might never be perceived, unless deliberately recalled, in psychoanalysis, for example. Their 
suffering was partly limited in that, with no photographic data, video, or other kinds of visual 
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imagery to be imported into their post-war memories, these former pilots, coupled with a distinct 
view of air war, were afforded the chance to compartmentalize emotions and/or actions to 
whatever extent possible or desirable- they are afforded this in part because of the technology at 
their disposal- piloting a helicopter, for example, over hostile enemy territory logistically does 
not permit an extended encounter.59 At the same time, however, fighter pilots can be shot at. 
Their spatial and temporal experience of war is purely embodied and visceral. Moreover, in this 
comparative vein, “LL” adds: 
They’re different (drone combat versus traditional combat) but there’s one major 
difference. The major difference is if you go to war and you go to combat, and I’ve gone 
to a combat zone, I’ve deployed overseas, so I’ve experienced both, when you go 
overseas, people have an understanding, so you know if you fly off the handle a little, 
people understand, ‘oh you know she just got back.’ So you know, ‘give her some slack.’ 
But when you’re talking about people who do this every single day, and they live right 
next door to you, and the same sorts of situations happen, even former General Hayden, 
on Fareed Zakaria, said that PTSD and the people that work on drones, that he’s seen it 
with his own eyes, that it’s real. The public doesn't understand it. And even more so, the 
people in the military don’t get it either. So you can work with people that are in the same 
uniform that are in the building right next door to you, and they don’t get it either, so 
especially the guys, I don't think so much the women, but the guys, you know they’re 
                                                        
59 “Due to limited fuel capacity, jets normally can’t observe a target for too long before a strike. However, drones 
can stay over a target for a long time. This means that the drone can be used to observe a target and wait for a clear 
shot in situations where civilian losses are being minimalized.  Drones can also be used in signature strikes, meaning 
that instead of targeting a specific person, a drone will fly over an area and look for signs of militant activity. If a 
certain amount of militant signatures are observed, the drone can fire even if the operator doesn’t know the exact 
identity of the target(s)” (AJ, Interview). 
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called...they get flack from fellow Airmen, well you didn't really go to war, you're just 
playing video games. 
 
BB.: So the airman’s mission, it’s all about physicality, and heroism, and sacrifice, so it 





While drone operators experience no immediate threat to their security, they must 
nonetheless to some extent confront and negotiate their roles in ongoing surveillance, and as 
perpetrators of possible lethal violence, even though the distance that UAV technology affords 
not only minimizes their risk but reconfigures their spatial awareness and the meaning of their 
supposed presence in the (to some extent- imagined) battlefield. As Paul Rolfe, a former U.K. 
drone operator writes, drone pilots endure high operational stress: “you're absolutely there, 
you’re in the fight...you’re hearing the guys on the ground and you're hearing their stress, so 
when you finish your stress it’s very odd to then step outside...it's the middle of the day and 
you’re in Las Vegas.” Rolfe describes a profound disconnect between his mind (which is with 
his colleagues on the ground) and body (which is protected, and most certainly not on the 
ground). Indeed, drone pilots operate within different temporal boundaries; an unusual timeline 
of battle altogether, marked by their communications across different time (and war) zones, and 
an unsettling cognition of identity as pertains to space, which signals the emergence of a new 
normal for those who operate and engage in air power. Indeed, as a visual practice, a form of 
“control without occupation,” (Grayson, 2012, p. 124) targeted killing is made possible through a 
dramatic fragmentation of time, space, and the citizen-soldier’s identity.    
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Consider the following remarks by Colonel Cluff in a New York Times article, where the 
authors posit that drone pilots are, or at least feel they are, in effect “perpetually deployed” since 
their labour, while allowing them to engage the battlefield from the U.S., means that they are 
constantly shifting from work to family activities. In contrast to the epic journey of Odysseus, 
who takes ten years to return home from war, Cluff claims, “having our folks make that mental 
shift every day, driving into the gate and thinking, ‘All right, I’ve got my war face on, and I’m 
going to the fight,’ and then driving out of the gate and stopping at Walmart to pick up a carton 
of milk or going to the soccer game on the way home- and the fact that you can’t talk about most 
of what you do at home- all those stressors together are what is putting pressure on the family, 
putting pressure on the airman” (Drew & Philipps, 2015). Drone warfare, and the collapsing of 
the social space with the military work, indeed the collapsing of social identity that results- from 
soldier/warrior to/from father/husband- presents a problem as far as it troubles the conditions of 
possibility for how one ought to primarily identify amidst competing identities. The neoliberal 
demand for flexible forms of citizen-soldiering not only erodes the line between the beginning 
and end of a workday, as it does for many types of labour specific to neoliberal capitalism, but 
during and after work it would appear one would feel out of place, disjointed, and altogether not 
quite right. Military violence is supposed to be exceptional- not just temporally but spatially too- 
but for drone operators that violence, and violent mentality, cannot be neatly packed away at the 
end of a shift in time to return home. Further, as one of my interviewees remarked, of the 
potential stresses that he could imagine being applicable to piloting a UAV. TW, a retired USAF 
Colonel and current experimental test pilot remarks, 
It’s a different kind of stress, because flying a fighter is a lot of physical stress, and 
mental stress, I think the guys that are doing it from the ground, are probably even more 
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psychologically stressed. I could see where guys flying on the ground, they have long 
work days and fairly high stress environments, they don't want to kill somebody that isn't 
supposed to be killed, how that could really be stressful, and especially a lot of the 
weapons today, you can see what's been done. (TW, Interview) 
 
A study conducted by the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center found that drone 
pilots tend to suffer from mental health disorders at the same rate as those in combat, confirming 
the sentiment behind the discussion. “Remotely piloted aircraft pilots may stare at the same piece 
of ground for days,” said Jean Lin Otto, an epidemiologist who was a co-author of the study. 
“They witness the carnage. Manned aircraft pilots don’t do that. They get out of there as soon as 
possible” (Dao, 2013). Furthermore, drone operators are not afforded the ability (whether 
desirable or not) of mental compartmentalization. “VH” has experience as both an American 
soldier, and a private military contractor. He claims, 
The biggest thing after 9/11, depending on who you were and what job you had, you 
could call home every day. Or if you wanted to, depending on what you were doing, what 
your job was, but you could call home, or have email. You had email available, even if it 
was 20 minutes a day. Vietnam, you waited for weeks for a letter, or WWII, even desert 
storm was pretty primitive in that regard...I think the rise of the drones is pretty horrible; 
it freaks me out. What just makes me sick is I don’t know how people can, somebody 
sitting in Arizona flying a mission to blow somebody up in Yemen, and then going home 
at night. There’s Air Force pilots that fly out of South Dakota, they fly, then come home. 
 
BB.: Why does that freak you out? 




I think that being in the environment—I was in Iraq and Afghanistan—when you’re over 
there, it’s total immersion.60 You don't have a choice, and it’s everybody around you is 
all involved in the same thing, more or less. There are no distractions. I think it’s a lot 
harder for the families at home than those of us over there. For us it’s cut and dry, you 
don’t have to worry about taking the kids to the baseball game. To mix the two just really 
freaks me out. It’s bad enough as it is, if you’re sitting in Afghanistan. There are people 
back here, at Fort Huachuca, that have PTSD, and they’re here in the Sates. Sitting in the 
States. So, from a military cause of PTSD, you really shouldn’t get that if you’re not in a 
war zone.” (VH, Interview) 
I have argued that the viewing of real-time violence on a live video feed has a way of 
generating an intimate, although simultaneously unbounded, bond between the perpetrators and 
victims, creating an intimacy-in-distance that is nevertheless fraught with a deeply unequal 
power relation. Since drone warfare is legally upheld by the continued reauthorization of the 
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, which allows the U.S. to deploy armed forces 
against those who are thought to have contributed to 9/11 or, so-called “associated forces,” the 
War on Terror is an unending war that ruptures the logic of time and space that characterized 
previous modes of violence. To witness violence, to be regarded as a subject with the potential 
for truth-telling, is to experience its closure. But the drone War on Terror, as a visual practice 
(Grayson, 2012) only offers limitless and expanding forms of surveillance, and targeted killings, 
                                                        
60 “From the time you go into the military you’re always trained, and it's really driven into that, you go where you 
told, you don’t get to choose, you’re there to serve and that’s just the way it is: ‘mission focus’ is a phrase that 
permeates” (A.S. Interview). 
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leaving perpetrators and victims a form of depoliticized power, which, having no mechanism to 
make it otherwise, can only retreat inward.     
 
Make Live/Make Visible 
In this section, I argue that the primary justification for drones, and its most oft-touted 
and publicized benefit according to those who advocate or lobby for drones, is that drones 
protect the warfighter and ultimately save soldiers’ lives. Furthermore, the saving of lives is only 
possible insofar as drones are able to make visible what was previously unseen, by dislocating 
and extending the scope of the military gaze, making the politics of life and visibility the most 
palatable, and indeed marketable aspect of drone warfare. To make live is to make visible. 
However, as I will ultimately conclude, it is the processes of invisibilization and the anonymity 
of state terror that deserve equal, if not greater attention. Enhanced sight and interpretation of 
data wrought by drones are distinct from the politicized act of witnessing and making sense: an 
act of critique through the authoring of a counter-narrative of a violent event. However, military 
practices are now deeply privatized and rendered invisible, sovereign violence is no longer the 
legacy of the citizen-soldier or nation-state, such that, in a way we might imagine how state 
terror emerges as a “non-event.” State terrorism benefits from the privatization and 
depoliticization of the witnessing of the event through a minimization of those who have access 
to it, but further, through the language of technology and security; drones help re-classify the 
witnessing of the event. State terrorism operates on this singularity. The non-event of state terror 
produces terror without witness, and without premonition, invoking the omnipresent power of 
god- blending divine retribution with profane catastrophe.  
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The acquisition of uninhibited vision in the form of a legal and social erection of a swift 
and potentially permanent surveillance architecture is thought to be the final stone in the 
construction of a completed edifice; the eventual complete protection of the American soldier. 
“The drone as a concept and as a system, as an actual system, is really a surveillance system, 
that's ninety-nine per cent of what it does, it’s used for watching and targeting” (PC interview). 
Drones, as enabling architecture of panoptic surveillance, give the impression that "you can lift 
the fog of war, you can change this century old idea that the opponent might surprise61 you. He 
cannot surprise you when you have him under constant surveillance" (NS interview). In this era 
of so-called humanitarian warfare, life is the primary concern. Drone vision protects life by 
making visible and restraining the element of surprise: 
I was in Iraq in 2004 and they had them [drones] around the base all the time. They were 
using them for surveillance around the base. And of course I saw them where they 
launched them from and that kind of thing, all the ones I have personally seen are all 
small. They had the little ones with cameras and I’m sure they flew them outside the base 
as well. From a technology perspective, they’re great. Nobody’s at risk, you can get more 
information than you can when you have people out there driving around, or walking 
around, even in an aircraft...the system that I worked on came into play directly as a 
result of an attack on a base in Afghanistan, where they just got...nobody saw them 
coming. It was a small little base, and a lot of people got killed. And they decided they 
needed something to give early warning, so there were camera operators that are 24/7, 
                                                        
61 This desire to avoid being surprised (by doing the surprising) is confirmed in a separate interview data by a 
DARPA employee: “DARPA’s role is to look beyond immediate national security needs and enable future 
technological surprise by investing in breakthrough technologies.” (The views and opinions expressed are those of 
Stefanie Tompkins and should not be interpreted as expressing the official views or policies, either expressed or 
implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the Department of Defense).  
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looking, operating these camera systems, but that’s different. Those things were used for 
targeting also; I mean occasionally, I saw it a few times. They found somebody putting in 
an IED in the middle of the night and then called in, you know, an Apache helicopter or 
something to go blow them up.” (VH, interview) 
 
Accordingly, the IED represents the tool of the terrorist- the element of surprise that must 
be controlled, and drone vision is acquired through rather simplistic, unassuming technology. 
The historical context for this aspiration for an unending military gaze is a post-Vietnam62 
identity crisis around how to avoid casualties, defeat, and subsequent unwanted publicity when 
                                                        
62 The history of warfare can be understood as a continuing practice of how best to inflict lethal harm while 
protecting one’s own troops. To this end, some may argue that casualty aversion has always been a consideration for 
military strategy, pointing to a series of technological improvements- from spears, boomerangs, bows and arrows, to 
gunpowder, hand cannons and other small arms, to rockets, shells, machine guns, and then tanks and nuclear bombs, 
to name some key developments- as a sign of casualty aversion’s broader historical relevance, and its realization 
through technological means (consider the notion of “distanciation,” the importance of putting distance greater and 
greater between one’s troops and one’s enemy, or Paul Virilio’s concept of “dromodology,” an argument that echoes 
that of distanciation, but with a focus on how acceleration and speed, made possible through technology now trumps 
geopolitics); all of which precedes the Vietnam moment. However, this 1) runs the risk of being techno-fetishistic, 
and deterministic, ignoring human intentions, and 2) misses how the Vietnam and post-Vietnam era produced 
critical effects around the policing of wartime suffering and memorialization; it did not just inspire casualty aversion 
as a political universal ideal (uniting both liberals and republicans in this common interest) but it troubled the 
sacrificial idioms associated with citizen-soldier bodies and their relation to war making. The “Vietnam moment” 
then is about more than how it formalized an ideology of casualty aversion. It signals sociopolitical ruptures and 
congruent effects around- hyper-individualization, neoliberal flexibility, and the decline of the nation-state, that are 
relevant for thinking about military sacrifice specifically. Regarding the first point, the danger is in attributing 
technology with its own internal essence; treating technology as if it bears its own rationality, distinct from the 
humans who employ it. I take issue with the assumed linear historical progression that becomes tethered to the 
understanding of technological improvement. For example, writing on human-machine interface, DeLanda claims 
“the events on a computer screen may also become elements in a strategy to set humans out of the loop, to shorten 
the chain of command. This seems to be the direction where machine vision and machine translation are going” 
(1991, p. 193). Aside from the obvious criticism that “machine vision” and “machine translation” simply cannot be 
without a human interlocutor, the question of how intelligent machines displace humans- by what social or political 
mechanisms- remains undertheorized. My research shows that drones in fact rely on hundreds of bodies in their 
operationalization but that it is the political significance of their bodily presence, their labor, that signals the most 
profound form of displacement. Indeed, a consideration of “the social” in the organization of warfare would prove 
fruitful. On the second point, if the nation-state bears some residue of sacredness, and if there are citizen-soldiers to 
embody this, then sacrifice will continue to be evoked as both an important theme, and in practice. However, the 
U.S. state, since Vietnam, has clearly moved toward “privatizing” many aspects of warfare (consider how the Bush 
administration sought to minimize the circulation of images of flag-draped coffins) such that wartime experiences of 
loss and suffering become disassociated with the nation-state’s right to violence (consider that no new memorials 
have been erected stateside to celebrate those who died serving in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars).       
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things go awry. This crisis provided the technological incentives to prevent further loss of life in 
future missions, making the protection of life the centerpiece of military strategy and its 
protection of life then the measure of a mission's success. Indeed, as “PC,” a popular author and 
investigative journalist remarks, “these drones are operating in places where there are no 
soldiers” (PC, interview). Moreover, “there are no troops [in Yemen]. We are not at war with 
Yemen” (VH, interview). Fragmented, decentered, and disembodied military power, not its 
reduction or minimization in terms of scope, is the central component of postmodern violence. 
This goal is accomplished, I argue, through drone vision: establishing the potential for enhanced 
and unending sight.    
As a feature of postmodern war, high-technology enables the erasure and avoidance of 
the embodied encounter, (“these drones are operating in places where there are no soldiers”) 
transporting the ideology of casualty-aversion from the realm of science fiction, or the 
unimaginable, into the realm of the very possible, ostensibly mandatory measure of a mission’s 
success. Drones and unmanned systems turn on this incapacity for the expression and experience 
of sovereign power by becoming a kind of receptacle- the very sites and embodiments of 
sovereignty. As I will show by the end of this chapter, drones are now imagined as fetishistic 
artifacts loaded with the symbolic potential for sovereign power. They are novel, militarized 
cultural vessels for a confused and misplaced theory of sovereignty and sacrifice.  
Foucault’s axiom, to “make live” tells of an increasingly important function of the 
modern state: to enable rather than nullify life through a distinctly biopolitical mandate. The 
modern state, while no doubt consisting of multiple iterations, too numerous to capture here, is a 
technological state, whose violence is thought to be more or less “humane” insofar as it is 
regarded as not only high-tech and therefore clean, but loyal also to the biopolitical liberal 
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project of not obliterating or erasing life, but of enhancing and protecting life. To make live, 
from a military standpoint, the link between technological innovation and casualty avoidance is a 
critical development. The synthesis between technology and protecting life was made especially 
compelling in light of the 1991 Gulf War, which was widely hailed as a highly efficient success 
in part because the American casualty rate was unprecedentedly low. This was attributed to a 
historically unparalleled application of military technology (Shimko, 2010). Consider this 
interview statement from a veteran who served in the Cold War, Iraq and Afghanistan: “Kosovo 
is I think the best example of a technology war. People sat at home and lobbed missiles at 
Sarajevo.63 And people didn't get their hands dirty as much. The Gulf War, earlier, was I think 
the only reason it was different, was because it was so easy in the end” (VH interview). In this 
instance, high technology first developed and applied in the Gulf War allowed for people during 
the Kosovo War to “sit at home” and still achieve victory while keeping their hands clean (of the 
impurity of the other, and ostensibly other tragedies or scandals of war). “Sitting” implies an 
image so profoundly contrary to traditional imaginings of citizen soldiering- that minimal 
physical fitness, effort, or endurance is required- while the reference to “home” would suggest 
again that a certain risk-free and familiar comfort is afforded to the war fighter. This new model 
of fighting, namely where soldiers do not have to enter a battlefield per se, has a history that is 
intimately tied to America's defeat in the Vietnam War.64 As previously stated, the idea of 
casualty aversion is, in part, a by-product of the profound identity crisis, and related 
                                                        
63 This interlocutor’s confused use of geography is not lost on the author. I believe the main point stands.    
64 It is not simply the Vietnam War that characterizes the link between casualty avoidance and high technology. It is 
the loss of life during wartime in general, specifically as read through air power. As T.W. explains: “If you go to 
Edwards air force base all the roads are named after guys who got killed in flight tests; there haven't been too many 
added since the 60s, there have been a few, that's in proportion or percentage wise that were killed in flight tests in 
the 80s and 90s but not anywhere close to the number of folks that were killed in the early days of supersonic 
testing, and the same thing in the fighter world, airplanes have gotten a lot more sophisticated, weapons have gotten 
a lot more sophisticated, and the night capability has increased significantly and weapons' precision is just 
phenomenal” (TW interview). 
   225 
 
 
emasculation, that was suffered by the American body politic after a performance that was 
regarded as rife with disciplinary problems, general dysfunction, and was, in summary, thought 
to be an entirely abysmal demonstration of military ineptitude (see Masters, 2008).  
During this time, while dealing with the political and symbolic consequences of defeat, 
American military strategists also had to address the disciplinary problems associated with the 
transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF) a system that does not always attract the most skilled 
or technologically perceptive personnel.65 As one drone whistleblower explained, drones are now 
the preferred military tools because 
it’s politically expedient- I also think that some of it [is to act as] counter measures from 
all the protesting that was done during the Vietnam conflict. People would be up in arms, 
and complain, if they knew. We still glorify the indiscriminate killing of others; it's 
almost traditional, sadly” (LL, Interview). 
 
As I argued earlier in the dissertation, from the end of the Cold War into the current 
counter-terrorism wars following 9/11, the outsourcing of military labour has been a key strategy 
to correct this deficit of expertise, experience, and technological knowledge. Additionally, 
beyond a rethinking of strategy, at this time technology too altered tactics- how troops would be 
used in battle- thus creating downsized troops (to be supplemented by special operations forces 
and/or outsourcing where necessary) but also generated greater distance between troops and the 
enemy. Consider this following exchange, where it appears the drone technology itself, 
                                                        
65 “It’s really about the transformation of military logistics, over the last few decades, particularly post-Vietnam, the 
US government has been trying to figure out how to, for reasons of cost, but also for reasons of morale, to shrink the 
size of the US army. Kids don't want to go to war. They don't understand the need for it, so when you send people to 
war using a draft you're gonna get some very reluctant people who are maybe unruly; a lot of people deserted, a lot 
of people messed up with drugs, a lot of people even shot their officers, so you had a real problem in trying to get 
people to the war” (PC, Interview). 
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combined with the ideology of casualty aversion, is accredited tremendous power, such that it 
may shift the nature of military missions- how they are conceptualized, and prioritized- in a 
dramatic way: 
T.W. “I think all the press that's been out there has given a negative connotation to the 
use of unmanned aircraft through weaponized stuff; I think the one thing that people miss 
is that these systems are a lot more precise now than manned aircraft used to be and in 
fact in some instances manned aircraft are right now, as the weapons get better and even 
more precise, you’re going to end up with a lot less collateral damage than we've had in 
the past.”  
 
B.B. “...It does seem to change the nature of what kinds of mission are considered 
acceptable and appropriate...?” 
 
T.W. “You’re perfectly right, you would say you need either a very good way to 
legitimize causalities and that would raise the bar, or you would go for missions that 
guarantee very low casualties, air strikes rather than boots on the ground, so you have 
impacts on the selection of missions, on the strategies of the mission, impacts on tactical 
level, so this casualty issue is very important on a whole range of issues for political as 
well as military people who have to fulfill the missions” (TW, Interview).  
 
S.G., a drone lobbyist, and member of the organization, Association for Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems International, further confirms this (contentious) shift in how to define the 
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enemy and therefore the mission parameters- note the primacy of economic language (“cost-
benefit analysis”) used to rationalize his perspective: 
From what I’ve heard recently is that there are more new pilots being trained for RPAs 
than for the real ones. And the question is a cost-benefit analysis. How does it help to 
fulfill the mission? The mission is changing. Today we’re undergoing major changes 
what that mission is. Who is the enemy? What is their rule of engagement and how do we 
defeat it?” (SG, Interview) 
 
Technological innovation provides the rationale to make some missions more worthwhile 
than others, those thought to be “too risky” because they may put troops in harm’s way versus 
those that pose little to no risk. This profoundly limits what kinds of military solutions might be 
afforded to state and non-state actors looking to negotiate and problem-solved in conflict zones, 
reshaping the very possibility, and meaning of humanitarian intervention. Technology also 
provides the solution to foster this distance between “us” and “them,” thereby protecting (our) 
lives, and theoretically minimizing risks to the unknown others.  
In the first excerpt below, the desire to protect soldier’s lives is directly linked to the 
haunting of the defeat in Vietnam- a “history of lost wars.” In the second excerpt, from a 
different interviewee, a retired USAF Colonel and experimental test pilot, the saving of lives, 
including Americans, but also in terms of preventing collateral damage of unknown others, is 
attributed to the ostensible precision of drone technology. Finally, in the third excerpt, a Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) employee,66 (“ST”) when asked to define a 
drone and suggest their benefits, tells me plainly that drones are unmanned vehicles that allow 
                                                        
66 The views and opinions expressed are those of Stefanie Tompkins and should not be interpreted as expressing the 
official views or policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the 
Department of Defense.  
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for greater protection of soldiers while extending their reach via enhanced visibility. “NS,” an 
academic, explains: 
The basic problem is that Israel and the US have this history of lost wars, more recently 
where they had casualties, and the casualty factor had been way more important in the US 
and Israel than in Europe, because we [Europeans] did not have comparable scenarios 
like Vietnam etc. The marketing in the US is based on: drones will save soldiers’ lives. 
And that’s the major argument, it’s the most important argument in Western democracies, 
especially when you have this history of lost wars where you had high casualty rates, so 
this way of marketing, I saw it very early in the US early in 2004 in Washington where 
you had billboards that said, 'those UAVs will save soldiers’ lives.’” (NS, Interview) 
 
More than half of the pilots there are unmanned pilots; the Air Force has really embraced 
that particular technology. Look at how many predators and global hawks are out there 
and what they’re doing, and even on the small side, all the services are embracing the 
smaller UASs because they're so capable of saving American lives, I know the army, it’s 
become a part of their whole, concept of warfare... If you compare it to other wars, the 
collateral damage or collateral casualties has just been less significant. And if you look at 
where we are today, throughout the whole spectrum, that is probably the biggest concern 
of everybody, collateral damage, so that is why everyone is working really hard to make 
weapons more and more precise, so that you don’t have collateral damage, but I think 
history, if you look back in history, I think you’ll find that in today’s world collateral 
damage is significantly less than it was even ten years ago, five years ago, I believe that’s 
a concerted effort on the part of the military and everybody else to make that happen, 
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because no one wants to think that they dropped a bomb and killed, you know, other 
people that they shouldn’t have, but that's sort of the price of war, if you get into the 
nitty-gritty philosophy of war.” (TW, Interview)  
 
A drone is a popular term for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and its primary 
advantage is in keeping our soldiers out of harm’s way and extending a soldier’s reach. 
For instance, UAVs equipped with cameras can provide information about an area before 
a soldier must enter it. (ST, Interview) 
 
In today’s globalized wars, American military planners measure success as a function of 
their ability to minimize the introduction of ground troops, as an effect of outright casualty 
avoidance (Mandel, 2004, p. 1) thereby establishing a positive correlation between what defines 
the parameters of a mission, and what counts as political victory as seen in the protection 
(wrought by technology and mastery of it) of Western and/or North American life. As one 
interviewee asserts above, “[collateral casualties] is the biggest concern for everybody.” Taking 
this as true, drones then provide a way to kill using kind, gentle, and even friendly weapons 
systems.  
Nevertheless, the question remains: what precisely is a drone? The answer is not entirely 
obvious, as made clear through interviews from both critics and advocates of drones 
(advocates/lobbyists will typically reject the term ‘drone’). However, what is clear is that a drone 
is simply one piece of a deepening and widening architecture of panoptic violence, which is 
anchored in practices of surveillance and a philosophy of targeted killing, where decisions are 
made based on “signatures” of military activity and/or mundane algorithmic calculations: 
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Now as I look at it, what’s a drone? Drone is an unmanned aircraft. Now that drone is out 
there to do either surveillance, or it could be armed with bombs and missiles and so forth. 
Now the near fact that they removed the human being from that air vehicle, creates a 
different set of psychological issues, and one of the things the Western world is always 
respected is human life, so if a drone is shot down, there is no human life sacrificed; 
killed or captured (prisoner of war). So that’s one thing that people who are being 
[watched] that thing has been taken away. The second thing is long duration; you can 
have a drone hovering for 24 hours a day, which is not practical. But my view is that if 
you look at the warfare over even before the First World War and go beyond thousands 
of years prior to that, human beings have always found a way to have a technological 
edge over the enemy. Drones are just a step towards that evolution” (SG, Interview).” 
 
I think a lot of people in the military don’t actually know what a drone is. They know 
their specific role, they imagine a camera maybe flying a plane, but the entirety of the 
system, the surveillance system, for the military, in reality a lot of people in the military 
especially the young kids who were hired as imagery analysts don't actually know, it’s 
not in their job description. (PC, Interview). 
 
“IG,” a robotic aviation expert, explains:  
“Robots that fly; Two dimensions, it's a flying robot. It knows how to fly, you give it 
high-level commands to go fly where you want it to fly. No one pays you for that, 
apparently. So it’s all about the data. Now you’ve got access to a third dimension, what 
do you want to know: now you can go collect in the air, so what do you want to know? 
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The military usually wants to know, is looking for bad people doing bad things, or pattern 
of life, those all tend to be things in real time, look over here, look over their kind of 
stuff. What you want is a robot that flies, that is safe, and that collects data for you. (IG, 
Interview) 
 
What I focus on is military drones, actually are often called, an unmanned aerial system 
by industry because they like to sell the idea of these robots, and what the military calls 
remotely piloted aircraft, and I actually like the military’s title the best because in fact the 
military drone is not in fact a robot at all, it is a combination of a couple hundred people 
who are networked together from around the world, who use a vehicle that happens to be 
unpiloted, they use it for surveillance, for tracking people, and occasionally for killing 
them...the drone itself is just an aircraft, within it there's a lot of sensors: FMV (full 
motion video sensors) there are electro optical sensors, there are synthetic aperture radar 
sensors, aerial precision geo location sensors, there's transmission equipment, and each of 
them requires a manager, so you have multiple imagery analysts, multiple full motion 
video analysts, and of course the pilot and the sensor operator, you have radio 
technicians, so once you add all these up, each of these pods that have three to four 
aircraft require hundreds of people to keep them operating, and that to me is the drone- is 
those people- and what they're involved in is not killing but surveillance, that’s their 
primary task. (PC, interview) 
 
If you really understand the system, like a predator, it's a pretty simple aerodynamic 
airplane, it’s not real complex.” (TW, Interview) 




It’s nothing more than a model helicopter, or airplane that have been around for ages. So 
many people have had experience flying model airplanes when they were kids. That’s 
what it is right now; It’s nothing different. (BD, Interview) 
 
Here’s the thing, like everybody talks about it like it’s just a plane. It’s just this 
unmanned vehicle that flies somewhere, but what they don’t see, is that some of the 
decision-making processes are algorithms, is that the future of where we’re going? Are 
we going to look at trusting an algorithmic definition of what an enemy combatant is? A 
bunch of data is put in, a calculation is done, and I’m sure it is overseen by human beings 
somewhere in the links and the chains, but not overseen, overseen is not the right word, 
I’m sure that it's perhaps viewed by human beings before the strike takes place, but really 
we’re basing it on an algorithm. (L.L., interview) 
 
These divergent and contradictory definitions differentially understand the simplicity or 
complexity of the technology itself and the place of bodies67 in operating it, signaling a 
disagreement about not only the role of humans, but about how simple or complex, autonomous, 
and/or animated, the technology is and ought to be. It is perhaps not surprising that the 
                                                        
67 “Your average combat air patrol, which involves three to four drones, has 186 people involved in it. Now that is 
the predator or reaper, if it’s a global hawk, it’s a lot more people. And those range, from the launch and recovery 
element, which is the people that actually put it up in the air, and they use what’s called line of sight technology to 
get it going and bring it back, and then once it’s in the air you have a pilot who is typically elsewhere, not 
necessarily at the launch site. If I can narrow this let’s say to a predator in use over Pakistan let’s say, that is 
typically managed not by the launch and recovery pilot who is in let’s say Afghanistan, but it's managed by 
somebody, let’s say, in Nevada, now, they obviously cannot launch it, that is done by somebody at the physical base, 
but they manage it once it goes beyond line of sight, essentially managed through what's called BLS (beyond line of 
sight). So then you have a pilot, and you have a camera operator. So in theory there are two people that physically 
operate it: the person who manages the cameras and the person who manages the plane; however in fact there’s a lot 
more people involved” (PC Interview). 
   233 
 
 
interviewees who advocate for drones (IG, TW, and BD) effectively depoliticize and simplify 
scientific matters in their definitions, referencing the technology as if it exists in a social vacuum, 
while the ones who criticizes their operational aspects (PC and LL) decidedly invoke more 
complex themes of embodiment, politics, and drone warfare-in-practice.  
Still, in terms of pure definitions, the Air Force, for example, prefers “remotely piloted 
aircraft” (RPA) maintaining the importance of the pilot (whereas the less favorable ‘unmanned 
aerial vehicle,’ or UAV, suggests an unsavory vacant/soulless machine as represented by the 
displacement of the humanized pilot). Despite an industry-wide discomfort if not outright 
rejection of the term ‘drone,’ for the purposes of this dissertation, the word itself can and will be 
used as shorthand to describe a fundamentally basic (although constantly improving) 
technological concept: marine, land-based or airborne machines with various payload capacities, 
that are sometimes armed, and which feature cameras and, depending on the sophistication of the 
drone in question, some potential for autonomous decision-making. Drones, at least in their 
initial inclusion in war, are deployed to extend the optical range or scope of the militarized 
human gaze to include previously unseen, whether due to political/legal restrictions or 
environmental obstacles, unfriendly social geographies, and territorial landscapes. Whether in 
the sky, marine or ground spaces, the technological system that is a drone, in its successful 
implementation (as a weapon) effectively joins together two distinct processes in one machine: 
“accurate” weapons systems, and speedy data transmission. As IG put it above, “it’s all about the 
data.” 
In this respect, Michael Toscano, President and CEO of the Association for Unmanned 
Systems International (AUSVI) claimed in the opening remarks at the 2013 Drones and Aerial 
Robotics conference, held in New York City, that drones constitute a “revolutionary technology 
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on an evolutionary pace.” He expressed resentment at the fact that the word ‘drone’ now exudes 
a near-universal negative connotation: that of large, looming, militarized, hostile, weaponized, 
and autonomous system. He implied this imagining is tied to the fact that society has an aversion 
to a machine killing a human being, something for him that further adds to this negative 
association of drones. Many speakers at this particular event reflected similar sentiments. Some 
objected outright to the term ‘drone,’ preferring it be totally abandoned in favor of the more 
sanitized ‘autonomous UAV,’ or ‘remotely piloted aircraft,’ which, as previously mentioned, is 
the preferred term of the Air Force. In terms of commercial applications, Mr. Toscano argued 
that precision agriculture would be a key commercial application, since "corn doesn't mind if you 
watch." The unspoken subtext from this awkward witticism, which garnered nervous, but still 
plentiful laughter from his audience, is of course, that people do have an inherent aversion to 
being watched. They, unlike inanimate objects, mind being watched, and as a basic right would 
prefer to have knowledge of whether they are being watched. For example, many urban areas 
contain signs indicating that closed circuit television monitoring (CCTV) is in effect- knowledge 
of which seems to placate people in this regard- while also simultaneously conveniently 
facilitating the normalization of surveillance technology in urban spaces.  
Nevertheless, UAS have the potential to enact panoptic mechanisms of surveillance. It is 
not purely a matter of consolidating power in the cultivation of the gaze, but of redistributing that 
power insofar as drone vision generates a corresponding moral regulatory effect upon those 
targeted; targeted populations must exist in a state whereby they always remain unsure of the 
presence of the drone but nevertheless act as though its violence is imminent. Regardless of 
whether or not they are permanently surveying targets below, as I will discuss in more detail 
later, populations regularly exposed to the presence of drones report feeling a constant fear of 
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death, making the violence of the drone terroristic in the imminence of its potential presence. 
Thus, individuals in their communities report altering their behavior assuming the presence of 
drone vision.  
A drone, irrespective of its size or purpose, is made up of fundamentally basic 
technological elements, although the technology is dynamic, and as such in some sense, alive: 
One of the things that I really like about drones, is that each part evolves: Let me unpack 
that a bit, so when I talk about what we do, we provide an ‘airborne data acquisition 
architecture.’ We’re that airborne acquisition piece of the industrial internet. Anyone can 
go to Best Buy today and pick up a drone, whatever you pay, different capabilities: 
what’s significant is part of the safety thing is telling each other where we are and there’s 
transponder technology that is coming that’s now coming into both manned and 
unmanned systems- that airspace access piece is the next thing- globally because we have 
all these devices that anyone can put in the air so it now behooves us to put transponders 
on them so that we can avoid them. The big thing is knowing that they’re there.” (IG, 
interview) 
Drones synthesize 1) aspects of advancements in flying and navigation, such as ‘sense 
and avoid’ or ‘beyond line of sight’ (BLS) technology; 2) autonomy (to what extent the human is 
imagined to be involved in its deployment is increasingly ambivalent; future drones will 
communicate with each other but not necessarily confer with humans); and 3) surveillance 
technology, such as cameras. “UAVs’ can be configured with various types and sites: optical, 
retro optical, thermal, so you can see different spectral ranges” (GB, Interview). Therefore, the 
fundamental power of the drone can be reduced to its capacity for enhanced, prolonged, and 
uninhibited vision; it is effectively, an eye in the sky thought to “lift the fog of war.” The RQ-4 
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Global Hawk, a long-endurance high-altitude surveillance and reconnaissance drone, is an 
example made popular by mainstream media. Drones, as a mechanism for a unified and 
uncontested representations of truth, that have, according to their proponents, the built-in 
potential to ultimately overcome human error- the human's inability to see clearly (objectively) 
without being blinded by politics, or blatant incompetence: President Obama- whose people “sit 
here in judgment [but] don't engage” (PC, Interview) echoed the importance of permanent vision 
and the need to maintain tools necessary to ensure this visibility in an address to the nation on 
December 14th, 2015, which was directed to ISIS leaders: He said, “you cannot hide.”  
Indeed, this builds on Magnet’s (2011) discussion of an “aesthetic of transparency,” a 
phrase coined by Rachel Hall, and also the defining features of privatization. Biometric 
technology, her example, is employed to expose things in current space and time, so that they 
may not hide: bodies, identities, even the inner workings of thoughts, but also extends its reach 
to the domain of the “future-potential,” as risk theory advocates us to contend with. Yet when 
biometrics is entrenched within an ethos of private corporations, there is a simultaneous move 
toward invisibilizing these processes (discussed later), to prohibit and seize information, rather 
than compel its release, rendering the programs and effects of the technology private, secret, and 
opaque. Drones engender similar optical politics insofar as they are activated to enhance vision, 
but their deployment within a political-economic context of military and security privatization, 
non-sacrificial warfare, and flexible citizenship, obfuscates the socially dangerous effects of that 
heightened awareness.  
Since 9/11, drones and UAV technology have been used in ninety-five percent of the 
US’s targeted killings, thus normalizing the technology and the surveillance practices that unfold 
from it, since a targeted killing in theory requires a history of drone footage and corresponding 
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signals intelligence before it can occur. Much of the data captured by the drone results in 
mundane images. Yet, drones do not just simply capture things in real time, they also create a 
backlog of events, flooding historical data into the present, to be interpreted. This surplus of 
(mostly) banal imagery, however, is the basis of intelligence that may authorize a strike. That the 
everyday life of the drone’s gaze can instantly produce both dull and disastrous results shows 
how state and non-state terror operate around different logics of legitimacy, to be sure, but also 
around notions of visibility, witnessing, and legibility.  
While rarely deployed under President Bush, former President Barak Obama dramatically 
increased the use of drones. The Air Force, despite severe problems with burnout and retention 
difficulties,68 now trains more drone pilots than fighter and bomber pilots. UAVs are seen as the 
logical culmination of weapons development, what is often termed a “natural progression” in 
aviation that has revolutionized the conduct of war. Indeed, a cursory glance at international 
politics shows the expanding presence of drones globally. By 2022, the global drone sector is 
expected to reach a market value of 82 billion dollars, despite no consensus on how to govern the 
expansion of the industry and curtail what critics identify as the innumerable problems 
associated with the military applications of drones.  
Yet, the services have embraced drone technology due to a desire to protect life through 
making visible what was previously unseen:  
                                                        
68 “Not a lot of people want to join this [drone operations] and there’s a variety of reasons, because it’s a catch 22, 
they have so few, and the military they're 65 combat air patrols (CPS) and they want to increase it to 90. It takes 12-
18 months to get somebody ready to do these tasks they can only train so many, so they are shorthanded, these 
people are working 12 hours a day, seven days a week. So most people when they can get out they get out simply 
because they are exhausted, so the reason why this is very difficult is because they’re so short staffed, so they’re 
pulling other people in from other services, air frames, etc. so there's been a huge amount of attrition purely because 
they don't have enough so let’s suppose in a perfect world they have the perfect number of pilots that problem would 
go away, what they’ve been doing is trying to increase pilots, privatize it to a certain extent, bring back people who 
have retired, provide counseling to people who have had problems with the distance between their two lives etc., and 
that is essentially solvable, it’s somewhat ironic because there are these whistleblowers, perhaps if they had a cushy 
life and didn’t have to work that much they wouldn’t complain at all” (PC Interview). 
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[Drones have] an impact for the better; the last thing [our company] did was Afghanistan; 
that was a type of warfare. Now we’re deploying troops to Latvia, to stand at the border. 
And I’ve done that job! I did that as a young guy in Germany. It’s the same thing. So 
that’s a different warfare: peace. The Minister of National Defense is preparing to send 
troops into Africa for peace support to the UN, that’s a different problem. But they have 
one thing in common: that is, the better they understand the environment, the more 
effective the operation is, and the safer the operation is. There’s now this ubiquitous, cost 
effective capability that you can deploy in any of your operations, it does change decision 
making, and because it’s ubiquitous, it’s not just Waterloo, right? General on the Hill, 
right? It's not just the General looking down, things are more distributed, people can get 
information at a lower level, as the mobile internet has changed our world, the mobile 
internet with a third-dimension view, changes the operation view. So, you’re a patrol, just 
getting food aid, and there are bridges and, you know, crappy roads and the occasional 
bandits, and other stuff but now you have this view that changes the world. I think there’s 
a positive aspect to this that you can't understate. (IG, interview)    
  
Drones are ubiquitous, a seemingly unstoppable and universal solution to various kinds 
of complex but ill-defined social problems (war and peace are not opposed but instead overlap as 
similar “problems”). As such drones are the perfect tools regardless of the social specificities. “A 
view that changes the world” is possible only with a near perfect intelligence, and therefore 
(ideally cost-effective) ownership of one's environment. Regardless of the “problem,” whether it 
is peace, or war, a view that is radical enough to transform the shape and outcome of violence, to 
indeed “change the world” of the individual war fighter, and perhaps the outcome for soldiers 
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and citizens more broadly, must offer more than a single, homogenous and therefore isolated 
vantage point; it must be one that not only looks down from the hill but also above, around, 
beneath, and ostensibly through it. To complicate matters further, this view’s heterogeneity must 
somehow be synchronized within the non-hierarchical network. Moreover, one must be able to 
acquire that vision without risk, or “sticking their neck out.” A UAV consultant explains: 
I did work on a bid for a manned portable one [drone], folds up and goes on your back, if 
you need it you throw it up, it has a small TV screen, and fly it over the hill and you look 
at what's there, the company commander can go and look at it and go ‘ah ok, cool,’ and it 
flies back and falls on the ground. It’s made out of carbon fiber so you roll the wings up 
and put it back in its tube, where it's recharged by a little solar shell. So, it gives you a 
chance to look over the hill without sticking your head out. You can drive it around and 
look at whatever you want. And its manned portable, and at a very low level, so it’s 
deployed down to the soldier level- what I call the soldier level- the tactical level- and it 
gives them that chance, we’re coming up the town, what the hell's in there, send this over, 
it’s quiet, it’s black, it’s designed to look like a bird, it’s much more organic looking. 
(GB, Interview) 
 Gone are the solitary, lonely Generals, and their singular, inefficient visions. Visibility 
and invisibility, exposure, and erasure, are mutually enforcing ideas explained in part by the 
desire for enhanced optical ranges, and thus the presumed life-saving potential wrought by 
drones. The theme of acquiring uninhibited vision for purposes of lifting the fog of war and 
avoid being surprised by the enemy is marked by a further problem for military planners to 
overcome. Namely, of how to enhance and accelerate the speed of data transmission such that 
the clarity of communication, and focus of imagery, can be effectively utilized to enable the 
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dominance and precision of the disparate yet ultimately unified American military gaze(s). 
Superior vision for the purpose of situational dominance is opposed to singularized, or simple 
top-down viewing from the hill. It is temporally bounded insofar as it is constant- occurring in 
“real time;” it is deliberately fragmented to enable many simultaneous gazes, and perpetuates a 
multi-dimensional theory of superior vision. It is explicitly and positively correlated in popular 
and security experts’ discourse with saving lives. Life itself is understood through this new kind 
of vision as that which is the drone's true and most deserving beneficiary.  
Specifically, advocates of drones and unmanned systems industry insiders attest to how 
the now ubiquitous presence of drones is underpinned by the perceived potential to permanently 
alter the war theater such that the concern over human casualties (primarily but not exclusively 
on “our” side) might be negated. Within the drone industry itself however there is agreement that 
whatever the drawbacks might be- of which industry insiders interviewed for this research will 
admit few if any- drones alone are argued to be integral to the outright saving of life, if not at a 
minimum the enhancing and protecting of life. Wherever drones are operational, in risky or non-
risky environments alike, drones at a minimum allow humans at least the opportunity to avoid 
some of the “dangerous, dirty, and dull”69 tasks, and because of this, they are argued to be a force 
for good.  
It is a compelling, and admittedly difficult-to-refute argument: that regarding life’s 
fundamental deserving of protection where possible. It gains further credibility in this era of 
humanitarian inspired conflicts, characterized by a deeply felt aversion to casualties. To be brief, 
                                                        
69 “I know the army, it’s become a part of their whole, concept of warfare, is the use of small UAS' as well as the 
medium UAS' like Shadow or whatever, all the services, now that they really, the technology has gotten to a point 
where unmanned systems are viable, and in a lot of cases better than manned systems, especially in what we call 
'dull, dangerous, and dirty' stuff” (TW, Interview). 
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the theory is that all life deserves equal treatment under international law thereby requiring 
unquestionable protection. Since this argument has been used particularly to justify the 
development and deployment of drones in war zones after 9/11, drones have since become a 
pillar of U.S. counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, which, as previously discussed, 
includes everything from border protection to protecting the troops to community protection. The 
ability to enhance, protect and save American lives is directly linked to the drone's ability to aid 
in the expansion of the visual terrain of the war fighter. Consider this testimony of a Chief 
Executive Officer of a Canadian robotic aviation company, whose company is described as a 
“leader in delivering airborne sensing solutions.” He describes drones as playing a critical role in 
what he explains is a “significant emotional event” during the rollout of drone technology in 
Afghanistan.   
A significant emotional event was in 2008, I was standing by the side of the road at four 
o'clock in the morning. Standing outside the tent in Afghanistan, we were going up to the 
site to become operationalized, and we were doing a convoy escort. And the convoy 
escort, just at that moment while I was waiting for the other guys, it drove by, and I 
looked up at the convoy commander, and it was a significant emotional event because, at 
that point we were losing an incredible amount of folks to IEDs, and now, all day, this 
guy had this unseen angel flying above him, looking ahead, and somebody else had a 
view into what he was doing, and so we were able to focus the energy of the organization 
into making that successful and safe.” (GI, Interview)   
In this conceptualization, drones are perversely anthropomorphized. It is a perversion 
because these inanimate artifacts are conceptualized not as human-like per se but as having an 
essentially supra-human or supernatural quality. Drones, in this person’s construction, act as 
   242 
 
 
inherently innocent, cherub-like and fundamentally caring guardian angels, symbolically perched 
on the shoulders of soldiers. This idea is similarly reflected in a coloring book, entitled What's 
Flying There? Distributed by Amsterdam's Next Nature Network, it features cartoon drones, 
wherein we are presented with images of drones as child-like, innocent, and even charming. 
Drones work for the greater good so that these soldiers might ultimately live. Unlike the fallen 
heroes that came before them, who ultimately perished because of poor vision, and an inability to 
control the element of surprise (which presents in the form of improvised explosive devices) 
soldiers of today are guided into battle not by an all-knowing, singular being (God) but by a fleet 
of all-knowing and all-seeing, clairvoyant techno-demigods. In this way, we might identify drone 
technology as constituting the ground for the “re-sacralization” of warfare. For this informant, 
drone technology is ascribed sovereign power, sovereign presence, in that it guides the civilized 
into battle and through its life-saving ability confirms that God is indeed on “our side.”  
Advocates further argue that drones also save the lives of civilians in targeted countries 
where military operations occur. Weaponized and/or reconnaissance drones, insiders argue, are 
in fact a morally superior technology since they are so technically advanced that they can be 
deployed to destroy a single building whilst leaving those buildings flanked on either side 
relatively unscathed. Because of their supposed accuracy offered by precision-guided munitions, 
or at least their built-in potential for precision, drones are regarded as the most benevolent and 
humane tool for targeted killing in today’s aesthetically sanitized warscape.  
In comparison to previous bombing campaigns, most notably America’s in Vietnam, it is 
difficult to argue against the use of drones, which, when deployed as part of planned airstrikes 
against known targets (notably without the presence of ground troops) do produce fewer 
casualties when compared to other air-based campaigns. Marked by a haunting memory of a war 
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that left American war planners pondering defeat, in addition to the future of the draft given the 
disciplinary problems the military faced as the end of the Cold War drew near, the Vietnam War 
is remembered (although not universally) most readily as a senseless war: in this view, the deaths 
of American soldiers and innocents alike had no greater meaning, no sacrificial surplus to be 
effectively folded into the myth of the enduring nation, in part, because of the sentiment amongst 
anti-war activists and veterans alike that the reasons used to justify the war were fabricated, and 
therefore unrighteous. This sense of unrighteousness, the crushing ‘negativity’ of the Vietnam 
War as far as how it informed future constructions of both the military and the citizen-soldier, 
was brought into sharp relief in relation to the style of military violence, and the technological 
limitations therein, that characterized war making at this time. For example, consider its primary 
technique of air power: the indiscriminate application of carpet-bombing, now regarded as a 
notoriously inhumane tactic of deploying unguided bombs in succession, along with other 
indelicate weapons such as mines, shells, and mortars. This style of air power lacked the 
precision, and therefore the humanitarian potential that is typically ascribed by its advocates to 
today’s high-tech weapons systems. As one interviewee asked me (which illustrates this point 
about ‘humane versus inhumane’ weapons systems):  
Do you remember during the Vietnam War, we had carpet-bombing? We just bombed a 
certain village, let’s say a quarter of mile, we thought the whole country was the enemy. 
That is just not possible for U.S. forces today. (GS, Interview)  
 
From this excerpt, we can speculate that as the technological precision of killing is 
intensified, its moral credibility is emboldened too. Entire countries cannot possibly be imagined 
as enemies; instead enemies are ejected from a national narrative and are conceptualized as 
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hyper-individualized forces operating through transnational organization. As I have already 
argued, the synchronistic efforts of the US government, the Pentagon, arms manufacturers, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC) and the private contractors, suggest a future of militarized 
violence as always-already attempting to transcend the numerous perceived vulnerabilities- 
political and physical- of the citizen-soldier, which does define what is possible in terms of 
mission parameters. Regarded by some as “too fat to fight,”70 ordinary bodies appear ill prepared 
to combat the (savage yet shrewd) enemy. In the asymmetrical yet perpetual Global War on 
Terror, whose architects are also explicitly casualty averse (Mandel, 2004; Shimko, 2010) the 
privatization of militaries, as I have argued, serves as an initial, necessary but insufficient, social 
pre-requisite in the quest for ‘clean’ bloodless war. UAS, in their varied applications, consolidate 
and extend this socioeconomic philosophy of privatization, delivering, their supporters argue, 
enhanced battlefield capabilities to the war fighter by promoting constant situational awareness, 
real-time understanding of an asymmetrical battlefield, ownership of data and dominance 
through various iterations and expressions of combat unmanning.  
This is evidenced in the varying ways in which interview subjects invoked the theme of 
sight. According to the first interview subject, drones effectively minimize the confusion 
wrought by differing interpretations of an event that are bound to occur when imperfect humans 
are left alone to their own devices. As one interviewee, a veteran of the Canadian Forces and a 
                                                        
70 A 2010 report by “Mission: Readiness,” an organization of retired, senior military experts, warned that childhood 
and adult obesity might soon pose a threat to national security. It claims that 75 per cent of young Americans are 
unable to join the military, because of weight, educational inadequacies, asthma, criminal records, and drug abuse 
(Mission: Readiness, Too Fat to Fight (Washington, DC).   
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current UAV consultant described, UAVs provide an uncontested visualized form of objective 
truth, without the messy burden of interpretation. In this view, drones 
can do some reconnaissance that we would normally send people out to do, it’s very 
efficient at that, UAVs’ can be configured with various types and sites: optical, retro 
optical, thermal, so you can see different spectral ranges, they’re very hard to detect, they 
are very small, they don’t make a lot of noise, and they're not reflective in any way, 
they're very hard to see, they provide real time...and you can record it, which is a key 
part, because instead of someone coming back and saying ‘I saw x, y, and z’ you can say, 
well let’s look at the date. The commander can say ‘show me that hill we’re supposed to 
attack, I want to see the UAV footage’ and he can look at it himself. From the point of 
view, it doesn’t endanger anybody; it provides better intelligence that can be 
independently reviewed by other people, versus one person says, ‘I went and saw it, this 
what I saw.’ Ok, it depends on their description skills, and what they did see, other people 
may have described it differently, two different guys might say two different attitudes, 
two different responses, whereas the UAV can review the film. It can see just as well at 
night as it does during the day, which people can’t do, and it's in spectrums that people 
can’t see. (GB, Interview) 
For this interviewee, the assumption is that while more people will be able to see the 
footage in question, there will be implicit agreement (as opposed to a potentially contentious 
social struggle) to determine what the content of the footage means- the qualities of the desert 
landscape, or urban setting being filmed, the intentions, actions, or future-potential actions of any 
people that inhabit its surface, their thoughts and interactions with others, should now be self-
evident because the drone will make it so- the UAV can review the film. While the drones- here 
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attributed with a kind of personhood, capable in and of itself of reviewing film- are more 
efficient than people at “seeing,” the people nevertheless see through the drone as far as they are 
meant to analyze the footage after it has been captured. The drone’s eye is an extension of the 
human’s eye, which is weak and fallible. This gaze is nonetheless made stronger when inserted 
to the drone’s technological apparatus. Through the pausing, zooming in or out, and/or slowing 
down of time, the eye surpasses all other sensory body parts as that which can determine the 
outcome of a mission.  
A more critical interviewee contradicts this position, challenging the superiority of the 
technology, and suggests that honest interpretation of footage is indeed quite fraught at best, and 
impossible at worst: 
If you're just watching let’s say a temple or a mosque or a church, or some such thing, 
and you can just put it above fairly easily just like you would a security camera, pretty 
easy. When you’re trying to track people on the ground that’s when it becomes much 
more complicated, more problematic, not so much because of the drone, but because of 
the technologies it uses to locate those people. It doesn’t actually work. If you set up a 
camera, and point it at something, especially a low-resolution camera, which is actually 
what they use because they can’t transmit it at high speeds, it’s actually easy for me to 
fool that camera if I know what I’m doing. On the other hand, to fool a human being 
who’s watching, is actually much harder. And true you can record the whole thing and 
play it back and back again, imagery can be very subjective. I mean there are things it 
does better because it doesn’t fall asleep. But given the low quality of the resolution, it’s 
not objective, actually it's not so much that it's not objective, it’s not very accurate, and 
you have to do a lot of interpretation. (PC, Interview) 
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Moreover, when asked about misrepresentations of UAV technology, an UAV industry 
insider confirms that the technology itself is flawed in that it does not, and cannot, live up to its 
perceived potential as claimed by marketing campaigns. He, in line with the interview excerpt 
above, believes that perception carries tremendous weight. (Although, it is worth noting that this 
response was initially a reaction to the belief held by some critics that drones could be used for 
spying on neighbors and/or invading personal privacy in general. His claim- that the technology 
that is commonly in circulation amongst citizens is not good enough to accomplish this kind of 
activity- is deliberately taken out of context by the author to, in some sense challenge the content 
of the interview to show how the argument could similarly be applied to claim that the 
technology is not very good full stop). 
I think there is a lot of exaggerated [claims] laid out by the manufactures, and the 
capabilities of their particular aircraft, I’ve seen some things that I flat know that they are 
saying they can do, and they can’t...why do you think every camera that you see, the 
movie guys, they all have a tripod? The aircraft is bouncing around so much, when you 
zoom in you can demonstrate with your IPad or whatever camera you want- just sit down 
there and try and hold it steady on a zoomed in... For instance, you’re trying to read a bar 
code with your hand-held camera, see how hard that is to do. The only way you can 
really do it is take a snap shot, there's no video. That’s the same thing when you, Aeryon 
has a new, with a new thirty or thirty-two-to-one zoom lens on it, and it’s difficult, 
because especially if there’s any wind at all, if you have a rotor, with one of the 
propellers slightly out of balance, it’s gonna set up a vibration, so perception, I’ve fought 
this for 30 years, this perception, what they can see. Yeah, I can see you, a distance away, 
but I can’t look in your eyes, see your emotions, you’re moving, the camera’s moving. 
   248 
 
 
The other thing that always gets me is that everything has to be rendered in a video, 
you’re looking at so much, it’s gotta be processed, it’s perception...you can show 
someone what the capabilities really are, and it's not what they’re imagining. (B.D. 
Interview) 
The misunderstanding about the nature of drone vision (who or what is capable of seeing) 
is revealed again in a third respondent, a former signals intelligence analyst. He claims: 
My task was to find high value targets and support the mission by doing so through a 
series of signals intelligence, I would work directly with drone technology, the more 
official terminology is used for it is RPA or UAV, uh so, um, the basic idea was that I 
would help find targets and the drone would go looking for them. 
 
Who, or what, precisely is going and/or doing the looking, and wherein agency lies is 
unclear. The original point of this gaze- if it is to be located at all- is not immediately self-
evident. Again, the dynamic between the operator and the drone, as confirmed above, is an 
understanding of vision as being a supplementation of sorts; the drone, here attributed with its 
own agency, aids the person in seeing what s/he cannot see on his/her own. Finally, a third 
interviewee, a retired USAF Colonel, drone lobbyist, and experimental test pilot, attributes the 
precision of today’s weapons systems due to better synchronization between weapons and data 
transmission, alongside enhanced GPS, and vision capabilities: 
Weapons have gotten a lot more sophisticated, and the night capability has increased 
significantly and weapons’ precision is just phenomenal in today's world, guys, both for 
manned and unmanned aircraft, the precision bombing is just phenomenal, when I was 
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flying F4s and dropping bombs in hard sight I was lucky to hit the earth; in today's world, 
you can drop bombs from pretty high altitude and still get right on the mark. 
 
Further, the same interviewee claimed: 
 
A lot of the weapons today, you can see what's been done, you know whereas in past 
wars you haven’t had the information, and the internet, and digital cameras and all that 
kind of stuff that you got today, the guys really weren’t tied to it, they were either seeing 
it first hand or people weren’t seeing it, and now, everybody sees it. Same thing, it’s the 
same bad stuff- but the proliferation of information, that’s I think part of why people are, 
now they’re seeing the horrors of war, before they just sort of read about it. 
 
There were like 20,000 plus ravens, used by the army, there were over 20,000 of those 
built, and they were used by a lot of people in Iraq an Afghanistan, those people, soldiers, 
and marines, and air force guys, come back, and a lot of them get into the public safety 
applications, and they go ‘why can't I have something like this’ as a law enforcement 
entity, where I can look behind a building, whereas in Iraq and Afghanistan they’re 
looking behind a building to see if there’s bad guys there with guns, or if there’s not bad 
guys there with guns, or, ‘why can't I have that here so I can see if there’s a bad guy 
behind that building with a gun?’” (TW, Interview)    
 
In the last line (“why can’t I have that here”) drone vision is thought to be an entitlement: 
if the possibility exists to see “if there is a bad guy behind a building with a gun,” it is a moral 
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failing on the part of the state to not provide that soldier (or police officer) with whatever tools 
needed to enable that, since it is life that is at stake. However, as this interviewee gestures at 
earlier on in the excerpt, there are drawbacks to this vision. Whereas “in the past” pilots could 
not be tied to the act of bombing in any kind of intimate way. There could be no post-bombing 
analysis, no post-bombing interpolation or re-inscription into the event, and no plethora of media 
and information technology to catalog events into a narrative of “what happened” thrusting the 
past into the present in a click of a button. In drone operations, pilots still are not tied to the act 
of bombing, in that they simply navigate the plane and ensure it is operating safely and on target. 
But, their counterparts, imagery analysts, are in fact charged with very intimate acts of 
witnessing and are indeed embedded in the visual footage of targets. This proximity of the 
imagery analyst to the target is thought to result in more efficient killing practices. “DH,” a 
known drone program whistleblower, explains: 
There are people who exist in that world who do imagery analysis only, their primary 
responsibility is to observe what's going on and fulfill the view of the camera, and to 
basically reiterate in constant, an ongoing ticker, of explaining, of writing out everything 
that is happening, every person that shows up, every person that leaves, the amount of 
children, the amount of women, the amount of men, every color, door, window, so on. 
(DH, Interview) 
 
Imagery analysts are typically straight out of high school, they’re 18, it’s their job to look 
and see if this person’s a terrorist or not, and it’s their job when they say, ‘yes this person 
is a terrorist,’ that that person then...you are actually watching people, and you are not 
sure, this is actually very traumatic for the person who realizes that they are deciding 
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between life and death. And it’s particularly hard for the imagery analyst and the sensor 
operator; pilot it doesn’t matter, even if the pilot fires the missile, the pilot doesn’t see an 
image. They’re given a set of coordinates and they press a button. Just like a jet pilot has 
no contact with the person; they generally don’t have any remorse, they’re just fulfilling 
an order, and if they really believe in the system or the war then, if you’re an imagery 
analyst then you’re actually watching people and you know what their lives are like, and 
doubt creeps into your mind. And it should, because most of the time these people are 
innocent...In none of these cases, when these people are killed, they’re never actually in 
the middle of an act, never. They’re always at home, or sleeping, etc. The pilot has a 
difficult task, keeping the plane steady and moving the plane etc., they’re not really 
watching anything, and they’re looking at a computer screen. The sensor operator is 
managing a camera; it's more of a tactile involvement in the act of killing, if they push 
the button. (PC, Interview) 
The imagery analyst,71 as described here, is a young kid “straight out of high school” who 
is nonetheless tasked with a monumental job: to document and effectively analyze “everything” 
that appears on screen with a degree of certainty and objectivity such as to “decide between life 
and death.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism's report on how the private sector is profiting 
from the Pentagon's “insatiable demand”72 for drone war intelligence, includes an excerpt from 
                                                        
71 “Imagery analysts who review video footage are among the lowest ranked among the personnel who work in the 
drone war hierarchy. Typically these are entry level 'airmen' who only need a high school diploma and eleven 
months of military training. The drone pilots are officers with undergraduate degrees and more years of training” 
(Chatterjee, CorpWatch, August 5, 2015). 
72 “A spokeswoman for the Air Force said intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) was ‘vital to the 
national security of the United States and its allies,’ and there was an 'insatiable demand' for it from combatant 
commanders. She said this demand was the reason for increasing use of contractors, which she said was a 'normal 
process within military operations’” (Privatized War). 
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an imagery analyst that further elaborates on the nature of the labor pertinent to imagery analysis. 
The authors summarize that  
if he [the imagery analyst] thought the images showed someone doing anything 
suspicious, or holding a weapon, he had to type it into a chat channel seen by the pilots 
controlling the drone’s missiles. Once an observation has been fed in to the chat, he later 
explained, it’s hard to revise it- it influences the whole mindset of the people with their 
hands on the triggers. ‘As a screener anything you say is going to be interpreted in the 
most hostile way,’ he said, speaking with the careful deliberation of someone used to 
their words carrying consequences.   
 
Later in the report, appropriately entitled Privatized War, which explores the intersection 
of global surveillance systems and private corporations, it is revealed that this imagery analyst 
does not wear a uniform, and he does not work for any branch of the U.S. government. Instead, 
he works for one of a cluster of companies that have made money supplying imagery analysts to 
the U.S military’s war on terror. They claim, “the defense industry’s supply of equipment to 
drone operations is well known, but the private sector’s role in providing a workforce has been 
harder to pin down.” Nonetheless the Bureau was able to trace the contracting histories of eight 
companies that have provided the Pentagon with imagery analysts in the past five years. It is 
worth citing this portion of the report at length, to reveal the complexity and multilayered nature 
of contracting: 
In 2007, defense behemoth SAIC—later rebranded Leidos—was contracted to provide 
services, including imagery analysis to the Air Force Special Operations Command 
(Afsoc). A contracting document described SAIC’s involvement as ‘intelligence support 
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to direct combat operations.’ Its 202 contractors embedded in Afsoc were providing 
‘direct support to targeting’ among other functions (in military-speak, targeting can refer 
to surveillance of people and objects as well as lethal strikes). In a bidding war to renew 
the deal in 2011, SAIC lost out to a smaller defense firm, MacAulay-Brown...[who were] 
tasked to ‘support targeting, information operations, deliberate and crisis action planning, 
and 24/7/365 operations.’ The company asked for $60 million to perform these functions 
over three years. Although Zel Technologies is now the prime contractor, MacAulay-
Brown is providing some of the intelligence specialists the contract demands. Indeed, it is 
not unusual for analysts to simply move from company to company as contracts for the 
same set of services change hands. They market themselves on recruitment sites with a 
surreal blend of corporate and military jargon. One boasts of having supported the 
“kill/capture” of “High Value Targets.” Others go in to detail about their expertise in 
things like establishing a pattern of life and following vehicles.” 
Moreover, 
The Air Force is not the only agency that employs contractor imagery analysts. Intrepid 
Solutions, a small business based in Reston, Virginia, received an intelligence support 
contract with the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command in 2012, scheduled to run 
until 2017. In 2012 TransVoyant LLC, a leading player in real-time intelligence and 
analysis of big data based in Alexandria, Virginia, was awarded a contract with a 
maximum value set at $49 million to provide full motion video analysts for a US Marine 
Corps ‘exploitation cell’ deployed in Afghanistan. Transvoyant had taken over this role 
from the huge Virginia-based defense company General Dynamics. In 2010, the Army 
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gave a million-dollar contract to a translation company, Worldwide Language 
Resources, to provide US forces in Afghanistan with “intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance collection management and imagery analysis support.” In the same year, 
the Special Operations Command awarded an imagery analyst services contract to 
the firm L-3 Communications, which was to net the company $155 million over five 
years. Defense industry giants BAE Systems and NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden’s 
former employer Booz Allen Hamilton are also involved in the US’s ISR effort. BAE 
Systems describes itself as “the leading provider of full-motion video analytic services to 
the intelligence community with more than 370 personnel working 24 hours a day.” The 
Bureau has traced some of the activities it carried out through social media profiles of 
company employees. People identifying themselves as video and imagery analysts for 
BAE state that they have used real-time and geo-spatial data to support tracking and 
targeting. A job advert posted on June 10 by BAE gave further insight into the services 
provided. The posting sought a “Full Motion Video (FMV) Analyst providing direct 
intelligence support to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)” to be “part of a high 
ops tempo team, embedded in a multi-intelligence fusion watch floor environment.” Booz 
Allen Hamilton has also aided the intelligence exploitation effort for special operations 
command at Hurlburt Field. Its role included “ongoing and expanding full motion video 
PED operational intelligence mission,” according to transaction records. A recent job ad 
shows the company is looking for video analysts to join its team “providing direct 
intelligence support to the Global War on Terror.” 
Finally, this section of the report concludes: 
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The hundreds of millions of dollars paid to these companies for imagery analysis 
represent just a fraction of the private sector’s stake in America’s global surveillance 
effort. The Bureau has found billions of dollars of contracts for a range of ISR services. 
These include the provision of smaller drones, the supply and maintenance of data 
collection systems, and the communications infrastructure to fly the drones and connect 
their sensors with analysts across the other side of the world. These contracts have gone 
to companies including General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Ball Aerospace, Boeing, 
Textron and ITT Corporation. 
In the Air Force, contractors are still a minority of the workforce—the anonymous 
contractor (‘John’) interviewed in this report estimates that contractors represent around an 
eighth of the analysts working in support of Special Operations—contractors still “fill the gap to 
give enough manpower to provide flexibility for the military to do things like take leave” since, 
“in the military no-one's obligated to respect your time,” explained John. “John argues that 
taking on even a small number of contractors helps ease the strain on the uniformed force 
without incurring the expense of pensioned, trained, health-insured employees.” Further, John 
and other informants agreed that contractors are highly professional, providing a concentration of 
expertise:  
By the time an airman has built up enough experience to be competent at the job it’s 
usually time to change their duty location. Age also has a lot to do with the 
professionalism of contractors. Most contractors are at the youngest mid to late 20s, 
whereas Airmen are fresh out of high school, said one analyst. “As a full motion video 
(FMV) analyst, you cannot identify something unless you’ve seen it before.” 
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Private contractors are exposed to normal conditions that characterize ordinary business 
practices: “you can get fired,” notes John, claiming that knowledge as a motivational factor for 
contractors, as companies bid and performance are heavily scrutinized; a contract may include a 
built-in incentive fee. There is a clear free-market logic operating here: in theory, the best staff 
and the most meticulously managed company ought to successfully acquire contracts, while the 
details and implications of those contracts remain obscure.73 
As I discussed in Chapter Five, the deaths of PMC personnel are not made public in the 
ways that the deaths of American soldiers are, and they are dying at similar if not greater rates 
than uniformed personnel. Hence, “the turn to the military contractor represents an attempt by 
officials to designate, by law and policy, a class of persons whose deaths will be banal and 
insignificant to a national audience. Their existence and relation to the body politic is one of 
contract, not sacrifice” (Taussig-Rubbo, 2009, p. 85). The RMA, coupled with, as detailed in the 
Bureau's report, the “insatiable” demand for ISR intermediaries gives credibility to PMCs in 
such a way that allows them to render their practices non-political through its claims to be 
practicing healthy economics, not politics (Baggiarini, 2013). Although contractors working in 
intelligence analysis are certainly unlikely to be killed or injured on the job their inclusion within 
a Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS)74 reflects how the neoliberal demand for both 
                                                        
73 For example, the task of simply knowing how many people are involved in private contracts remains impossible. 
A report entitled “Contractors’ Support of Operations in Iraq,” produced by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 
found that, “increased use of performance-based contracting—a procurement model that emphasizes outcomes 
rather than specification of work processes—has further reduced the government’s ability to know how many people 
are working on a given contract.” 
74 “The Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) is the Air Force's primary intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and 
dissemination (PCPAD) weapon system. The weapon system employs a global communications architecture that 
connects multiple intelligence platforms and sensors. Airmen assigned to AF DCGS produce actionable intelligence 
from data collected by a variety of sensors on the U-2, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper and other 
ISR platforms” (U.S. Air Force).  
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flexible citizenship and free-market capitalism—synthesized in the act of privatization—has 
deeply penetrated the military sphere, where contractors solve the problem of personnel 
shortages, a deficiency in expertise, and perhaps most importantly, are not subject to the usual 
benefits that are afforded to military personnel as set out by the Department of Veteran's Affairs. 
As said, in the aforementioned case of imagery analysts, and indeed all workers within 
the drone labour hierarchy, it is not their deaths that will be rendered banal, since they are not 
exposed to such risk. Rather, their mental traumas and emotional suffering may potentially be 
excluded from a rights-based, collective and/or nationalized narrative, and instead would be 
managed by reducing work hours and hiring more people to share the burden of increasing 
combat air patrols (CAPS) through even more privatization and even more technological 
solutions.75 In early 2015, “the Air Force operated 65 combat air patrols, or up to 260 drones 
patrolling war zones around the world, but was under pressure from the Pentagon to expand the 
number of drones in the air to 360. But pilots, overwhelmed by the complexity of their work and 
the grueling schedule, began to vote with their feet and quit” (Thompson, 2015). This created a 
critical shortage of pilots (which, as the Air Force Times reports (Losey, 2016), has seen the Air 
Force respond by offering incentive packages and retention bonuses of upwards of $175,000 if 
they agree to a five-year active-duty service commitment) and thus invited privatization to fill 
                                                        
75 Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force is currently tackling the problematic link between stressful working conditions 
and its impacts on job efficiency and specifically, mechanical memory. Historically they have used Ritalin to treat a 
variety of mental health disorders in the services, but have found it to be as addictive as cocaine and have since 
attempted to develop alternatives. As a result, it is currently experimenting with "transcranial direct current 
stimulation." Neuroscientists and military researchers have developed a brain stimulation kit consisting of five 
electrodes that send weak electric currents into specific parts of the cerebral cortex. “The US military has found over 
the past few decades that during highly stressful military operations whereby people need to multitask and process a 
huge amount of information at once, there comes a point whereby human operators of specialised equipment can no 
longer take on any new information and process it effectively to make good decisions quickly” (Russon, 2016). 
From their experiments, they concluded that the group that was continuously zapped had improved working 
memory. 
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the gap. Meanwhile, the Air Force plans to add 65 new Reapers to its fleet, doubling the number 
of pilots, as well as facilitating the development of new drone operations centers at Air Force 
bases around the US (ibid). Two companies have been awarded contracts from the Air Force to 
provide drone support services: the first, Aviation Unmanned, is a small, veteran-owned, and 
operated business. The second is General Atomics, a large, California-based military contractor 
that manufactures both the Predator and Reaper drones (although companies such as Booz Allen 
Hamilton, General Dynamics and SAIC have previously held contracts to analyze surveillance 
data acquired by drones operating over war zones (ibid). Notably, Major Keric Clanahan, legal 
advisor to the U.S. Special Forces, warns that “it is imperative that contractors not get too close 
to the tip of the spear” (Clanahan, quoted in Thompson, 2015) suggesting the sacredness of 
killing—that, despite the normalization and expectation of military privatization, killing is the 
realm not of ordinary civilians, but of citizen-soldiers, who act in the name of the sovereign 
authority.   
The privatization of war, after all, is not simply an economic maneuver, but a social and 
deeply political one. It is worth quoting below an excerpt from Heather Linebaugh, a former 
imagery analyst featured in the film National Bird. In an article for the U.K.’s Guardian 
newspaper (December 29, 2013) she pointedly asks politicians who defend the U.S. Predator and 
Reaper drone programs, “how many soldiers have you seen die on the side of the road in 
Afghanistan because our ever-so-accurate UAVs were unable to detect an IED that awaited their 
convoy?” Her understanding of her experience in the U.S. drone program is worth quoting: 
What the public needs to understand is that the video provided by the drone is not usually 
clear enough to detect someone carrying a weapon, even on a crystal-clear day with 
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limited cloud and perfect light.76 This makes it incredibly difficult for the best analysts to 
identify if someone has weapons for sure.  
 
It is worth interrupting the text here to pause and insert an example to verify Linebaugh’s 
point about the difficulty in identifying a weapon. Despite the techno-fetishistic assertion of the 
perfection of the drone-acquired imagery, the technology is in fact far from perfect, in terms of 
rendering clear images. “In Kosovo, the intelligence we would get was typically a photo, 
normally black and white, often from a plane that would take it the day before,” claims Lt. 
Colonel David Haworth, director of combat operations at the U.S.'s combined air operations 
center in Qatar (quoted in Fielding-Smith & Black, 2015). He adds, of current intelligence, "it's 
like being able to talk on a can and a string before, and now I have a smartphone” (Fielding-
Smith & Black tk page). However, “the video can prompt commanders to make decisions before 
they fully understand what they are seeing” (Cloud & Zucchino, 2011). As a counterpoint to the 
argument about the infallibility of drone technology, consider that in an official U.S. military 
transcript of radio transmissions and cockpit conversations of a drone attack, carried out in 
Afghanistan on February 21, 2010. Through the below transcript of events, we learn about the 
lethal effects of serious miscommunication over making a PID (positive identification): 
identifying with certainty objects and people on the ground is in fact an arduous process.  
Among those involved, there were: The Predator drone crew at Creech base in Nevada, as 
well as the Predator’s mission intelligence coordinator and a safety observer (notably one of the 
                                                        
76 Weather modification, or geoengineering, is a potential method to correct, or attempt to correct, some of these 
identified technological deficiencies in drone operations. The CIA is reportedly invested in the theoretical military 
applications of the mass manipulation of the weather, either degrading the enemy with excessive weather patterns, 
or using this technology to perfect the conditions in which its own military operates. Although cloud seeding was 
used during the Vietnam War (Operation Popeye) to create excess rainfall, geoengineering up until now remained 
more of a conspiracy theory. Under the guise of a concern for climate change, CIA director John Brennan recently 
spoke publicly about the topic (Broze, July 7, 2016).    
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Air Force's more experienced teams was piloting the drone. According to the LA Times, the Air 
Force declined to name the crew or make them available for interviews. Although the Predator 
crew was disciplined following this event, the nature of that discipline is unknown, and no one 
was court-martialed), video screeners in Florida (enlisted personnel trained in video analysis, 
monitored live feeds from drones flying over Afghanistan) an AC-130 plane in the sky, and a 
special operations team (known as the ‘A-Team’) nearby on the ground.  
Beginning at 5am, together these remote bodies were tracking a convoy, with the 
screeners sending instant messages to the drone crew, observations that were then radioed to the 
A-Team, trying to decide whether it was friend or foe. At 5:08am, the convoy halted. Six 
minutes later, the AC-130 crew radioed to the Predator crew that they were flashing their lights 
in the darkness; at that point, they became immediate targets of suspicion (Cloud, LA Times), 
when, a mere six minutes after the lights flashed, the A-Team reported “roger, ground force 
commander’s intent is to destroy the vehicles and the personnel.” Following this, the transcript 
indicates that every attempt was made over the next four and a half hours to cultivate the 
required evidence after the fact—to confirm the presence of a hostile threat after the convoy was 
already determined to be a hostile threat, and despite there being mixed reports about the 
presence of weapons and children; warnings that children were present were disregarded by the 
drone operator and Army captain, who authorized the air strike. “We all had it in our head, ‘Hey, 
why are there 20 military age males at 5am collecting each other,’” an Army officer involved in 
the incident said. There could only be one reason, and that’s because we’ve put [U.S. troops] in 
the area” (Zucchino & Cloud, 2011). The following transcript, quoted at length, is a short excerpt 
from the over 100 pages of communications on the incident, sought and obtained through the 
   261 
 
 
Freedom of Information Act by David S. Cloud, and published in  the LA Times  on April 10, 
2011 (all emphasis is my own). 
“What do these dudes got?” the camera operator said. “Yeah, I think that dude had a 
rifle.” 
“I do too,” the pilot replied. 
But the ground forces unit said the commander needed more information from the drone 
crew and screeners to establish a “positive identification.” 
“Sounds like they need more than a possible,”77 the camera operator told the pilot. Seeing 
the Afghan men jammed into the flat bed of the pickup, he added, ‘That truck would 
make a beautiful target.’” 
At 5:37 a.m., the pilot reported that one of the screeners in Florida had spotted one or 
more children in the group. 
“Bull--. Where!?” the camera operator said. “I don't think they have kids out at this 
hour.” He demanded that the screeners freeze the video image of the purported child and 
email it to him. 
 
“Why didn't he say ‘possible’ child?” the pilot said. “Why are they so quick to call kids 
but not to call a rifle.” 
The camera operator was dubious too. “I really doubt that children call. Man, I really ... 
hate that,” he said. “Well, maybe a teenager. But I haven’t seen anything that looked that 
short.” 
A few minutes later, the pilot appeared to downplay the screener’s observation, alerting 
the special operations unit to “a possible rifle and two possible children near the SUV.” 
.... 
The screeners continued to look for evidence that the convoy was a hostile force. Even 
with the advanced cameras on the Predator, the images were fuzzy and small objects 
were difficult to identify. Sometimes the video feed was interrupted briefly. 
The Predator crew and video analysts remained uncertain how many children were in the 
group and how old they were. 
                                                        
77 The phrasing “more than a possible” here is referring to the legal requirement that subjects be targeted with “near 
certainty—“near certainty that the individual being targeted is in fact the lawful target and located at the place where 
the action will occur. Also absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action will only be taken only if there is near 
certainty that the action can be taken without injuring or killing non-combatants” (The Drone Memos, 2013, p.  
227). 
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“Our screeners are currently calling 21 MAMs [military age males], no females, and two 
possible children. How copy?” the Predator pilot radioed the A-Team at 7:38 a.m. 
“Roger,” replied the A-Team, which was unable to see the convoy. “And when we say 
children, are we talking teenagers or toddlers?” 
 
The camera operator responded: “Not toddlers. Something more towards adolescents or 
teens.” 
“Yeah, adolescents,” the pilot added. “We’re thinking early teens.” 
At 7:40 a.m., the A-Team radioed that its captain had concluded that he had established 
“positive identification” based on “the weapons we’ve identified and the demographics of 
the individuals plus the ICOM.” 
Although no weapons had been clearly identified, the pilot replied: “We are with you.” 
The pilot added that one screener had amended his report and was now saying he’d seen 
only one teenager. “Our screener updated only one adolescent, so that's one double-digit 
age range.” 
“We’ll pass that along to the ground force commander,” the A-Team radio operator said. 
“Twelve or 13 years old with a weapon is just as dangerous.” 
... 
At 9:15 a.m., the Predator crew noticed three survivors in brightly colored clothing 
waving at the helicopters. They were trying to surrender. 
“What are those?” asked the camera operator. 
“Women and children,” the Predator's mission intelligence coordinator answered. 
“That lady is carrying a kid, huh? Maybe,” the pilot said. 
“The baby, I think, on the right. Yeah,” the intelligence coordinator said. 
The Predator’s safety coordinator, cursing in frustration, urged the pilot to alert the 
helicopters and the A-Team that there were children present. “Let them know, dude,” he 
said. 
“Younger than an adolescent to me,” the camera operator said. 
As they surveyed the carnage, seeing other children, the Predator crew tried to reassure 
themselves that they could not have known. 
“No way to tell, man,” the safety observer said. 
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“No way to tell from here,” the camera operator added. 
At 9:30 a.m., the pilot came back on the radio. 
“Since the engagement,” he said, “we have not been able to PID [positively identify] any 
weapons.” 
In its investigation, the U.S. figured that fifteen or sixteen men were killed and twelve 
were injured, including a woman and three children. However, interviews with elders from the 
Afghan’s home villages (conducted by Cloud and his investigative team) instead suggest that 
twenty-three people were killed, including two boys, Daoud, aged 3, and Murtaza, aged 4 
(Cloud, 2011). Before returning to Heather Linebaugh's testimony, some summative points 
should be made: the enthusiastic, dehumanizing language used, and apparent eagerness to engage 
the air strike, despite no evidence of wrongdoing is indeed, remarkable. It shows, perhaps 
contrary to certain elements of my argument here, that not all people involved in electronic 
warfare are hesitant, self-reflexive, and full of self-doubt. An interview with “JA” attests to this. 
He joined the Army as a senior in high school in 2003 and served on active duty as a Fire finder 
radar repairer and operator from 2003-2009. He was stationed in Fort Campbell, KY with the 
2nd Field Artillery Detachment, 101st Airborne Division and was deployed to Iraq from 2005-
2006. He did a year in South Korea with the 2nd Infantry Division from 2006-2007 and then was 
stationed with 3-16 Field Artillery, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in Fort Carson, CO. He was 
honorably discharged in early 2009. He claims that, 
The drone operator is doing all of this observing, meaning that they could be watching a 
target for hours or for several days in a row before blowing that person up. The operator 
may see the target going about day to day activities or around his family, so all that time 
watching can lead to empathy with the person being observed. Once it is time to launch a 
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missile at the individual, drone operators may feel guilt or regret about what they have 
done. 
 
In contrast to the above, I think that in some respects remote/electronic warfare could 
make it easier for soldiers to pull the trigger. Some drones used oversees are operated by 
pilots within the continental US, meaning that the pilot is removed from the conflict and 
can go about his/her normal day in between killing people remotely. That disconnect 
probably makes it easier to pull the trigger. 
 
  
The dual nature presented here of drone warfare—as both generating/rejecting 
empathy—as it manifests in the subjectivity of the operator is perhaps too dichotomous in its 
rendering. This contrast therefore cannot capture the undetectable qualities, nuances, and 
contradictions inherent to personality. Nonetheless, what matters less, for our purposes here, is 
whether or not this ‘either/or’ rendering can be upheld logically, but how a style of violence 
underpinned by the feature of intimacy-in-distance splits the agent of violence at the level of the 
body: the act of killing, with no exposure, no vulnerability, no fight-or-flight response inside the 
killer(s). Even for those on the ground (such as the ‘A-Team’ in the previous example) they are 
often miles away from the perceived enemy such that the risk of physical entanglement is 
minimal. Yet, given the nature of the work itself, there is plenty of time to entertain, as 
Linebaugh attests to below, “haunting memories,” and the guilt of always being “a little unsure.” 
The speed of killing—from the determination that a kill is imminent to the strike itself—is 
matched only by the sluggishness of affectivity; the emotional making-sense-of the event:      
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One example comes to mind: ‘The feed is so pixilated, what if it’s a shovel, and not a 
weapon?’ I felt this confusion constantly, as did my fellow UAV analysts. We always 
wonder if we killed the right people, if we endangered the wrong people, if we destroyed 
an innocent civilian’s life all because of a bad image or angle. 
 
It’s also important for the public to grasp that there are human beings operating and 
analyzing intelligence from these UAVs. I know because I was one of them, and nothing 
can prepare you for an almost daily routine of flying combat aerial surveillance missions 
over a war zone. UAV proponents claim that troops who do this kind of work are not 
affected by observing this combat because they are never directly in danger physically. 
 
But here’s the thing: I may not have been on the ground in Afghanistan, but I watched 
parts of the conflict in great detail on a screen for days on end. I know the feeling you 
experience when you see someone die. Horrifying barely covers it. And when you are 
exposed to it over and over again it becomes like a small video, embedded in your head, 
forever on repeat, causing psychological pain and suffering that many people will 
hopefully never experience. UAV troops are victim to not only the haunting memories of 
this work that they will carry with them, but also the guilt of always being a little unsure 
of how accurate their confirmations of weapons or identification of hostile individuals 
were. 
Although following the tragedy in Afghanistan cited above, the phrase “military aged 
male” was banned by General McChrystal, the U.S. still counts all military-aged males as 
militants, a claim that can only be verified posthumously (Living Under Drones). Signature 
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strikes target people who are not identified but merely display a certain “pattern of life,” racial 
profiling gone global. CIA members, for example, do not personally identify these targets, but 
rather “they exist as digital profiles across a network of technologies, algorithmic calculations, 
and spreadsheets” (Shaw, 2013). Indeed, what Shaw (2013) names a topological spatial power 
means a drone’s victim never hears the missile that kills him (Rhode, quoted in Benjamin 2013, 
p. 149).  
Targeted communities are often referred to in dehumanizing and homophobic terms, as 
the transcript above highlighted, while the discourses of technology are saturated with sexual 
innuendo. For example, as Benjamin (2013, p. 44) states, people attempting to flee the attacks, 
commonly known as “double taps,” are referred to as “squirters”; the technological prowess of 
Hellfire missiles is described in phallic and sexually violent language, as being able to “lock into 
targets before or after a launch [and] engage targets to the side and behind them without 
maneuvering into position.” According to one drone pilot, the code name for casualties is 
“bugsplat.” Suspected militants are termed “poor bastards,” “prairie dogs,” “barbarians,” 
“savages,” “rats slithering through the slums,” and are imagined as mice being snagged by hawks 
circling above (Martin, 2010).  
Nevertheless, in the face of mounting pressure around the legality of drone strikes as per 
international humanitarian law, former President Barak Obama, having barely admitted to a 
drone program, said in May 2013, “dozens of highly skilled al-Qaida commanders, trainers, 
bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been 
disrupted...Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.” The notion that preemptive strikes save 
lives is a statement that assumes an imagined schematic of risk, that of course cannot be 
guaranteed, but instead requires the audience to buy into, and consent to, the biopolitical 
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dichotomous paradigm of civilized Western life (which ought to be protected and made to live) 
versus life that is to be left to die: irrational, barbaric, and bare forms of life.   
As should be clear now in the dissertation, the idea that drone strikes are ultimately 
effective since they save lives is abundant in my interview data. Notably, those lives are thought 
to be American lives, at least this is the subtext since the topic of non-American deaths is 
eclipsed by the sacrificial politics of suffering and loss at home. It is not always clearly 
distinguished, between American and non-American life, but when it is not explicitly stated, it is 
at least implied, because, it is assumed that in war there are only dichotomies—clear sides and no 
contradictory positions that might hover in the in-between spaces. Most interview data from 
industry insiders supports this, although from more critical participants, it becomes clear that 
these dichotomies and ways of classifying the meaning of war's violence are fictitious or 
antiquated. For example, “in a non-war zone, how can you have an enemy combatant? You 
can’t. None of it makes sense...Is there really a declared war zone? I’ve never seen a declared 
war after WWII. I mean the possibility exists that somebody declared it somewhere, but I have 
never seen a declaration of war since WWII” (L.L. Interview). Despite the ambiguity of the 
enemy body, and what constitutes war, the idea that drones save lives persists. 
Below, in the first two passages, drone technology is credited with saving lives, while in 
the second two passages it is credited with saving lives but also reducing collateral damage. It is 
notable how “life” and “collateral damage” emerge not as synonyms but as antonyms, positing 
the proper subject of life, that which deserves protection, as the Western, North American 
citizen-soldier. The implication of this distinction is that the incorporation and adoption of 
sophisticated technology is essential to the reduction in loss of Western and/or North American 
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life, which also positively correlates with the minimization of collateral damage- this being a 
desirable byproduct of drones but nevertheless not the primary priority. 
Put it this way, you blow a drone out of the sky, they shoot it down, so what? In less than 
in a week we’ll have a new one in Afghanistan, flying again. We’ll rush one on a plane; 
very quickly they can have another drone there. It’s a major issue if someone gets killed 
while on a reconnaissance mission. So, the cost is one thing, but if you blow ten drones 
out of the sky no one will be upset except the finance guys, and if you kill ten guys that 
will be on the front page of the Globe and Mail. So cost avoidance, yes, but I think 
lifesaving, there's a strong argument that drones save lives, I would suggest. (G.B. 
Interview) 
 
More than half of the pilots there are unmanned pilots; the air force has really embraced 
that particular technology. Look at how many predators and global hawks are out there 
and what they’re doing, and even on the small side, all the services are embracing the 
smaller UASs because they’re so capable of saving American lives. (T.W. Interview) 
 
Well, the question becomes the missions of the past are being redefined for missions of 
the future, so missions of the future will not need soldiers-“boots on the ground”- in 
foreign wars, as compared to Korean War, or Second World War, or Vietnam for that 
matter, or even the first Iraq War. Those kinds of troop movements are going to be less 
frequent, at least based on the trends that I see. Something will be lost. Human 
intelligence will be far more critical. There are all kinds of futuristic ways people imagine 
what war will be about. Our accuracy of killing has become much better, our collateral 
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damage has become much less. The electronic sophistication, you can blow up a house, 
and the houses on either side of that are going to be untouched. It’s all part of electronics, 
whether manned or unmanned, and so conducting war from a distance…and again that 
has been going on, it’s just that what we’re seeing now is greater sophistication because 
of technology, but the trend in terms of what is actually being accomplished is not much 
different it’s just that the execution is quite different because of the novelty of 
technology, and the expense of feeding soldiers. (GS, Interview) 
 
Indeed, troop movements do appear to be less publicized and less frequent. When troops 
do move, it is a few select, highly trained individuals (usually special operations forces- JSOC 
personnel). Private contractors are key partners in the CIA's counterterrorism and drone 
assassination program. The company formerly known as Blackwater is active in the assembling 
and loading of Hellfire missiles onto Predator aircraft, work formerly done by CIA personnel. 
Benjamin quotes Scahill claiming, “it is Blackwater that runs the program for both the CIA and 
JSOC” because “contractors and especially JSOC personnel working under a classified mandate 
are not [overseen by Congress], so they just don’t care. If there’s one person they’re going after 
and there’s thirty-four people in the building, thirty-five people are going to die. That’s the 
mentality” (Benjamin, 2013, pp. 63-64). They operate in the shadows of nighttime, so as to 
minimize detection and remain largely invisible. Another interviewee, a former signals 
intelligence officer and drone whistleblower, verifies the appeal of utilizing special operations 
teams. He also, like the previous interviewee, confirms the value of leaner forces integral to the 
War on Terror, and human intelligence in today’s electronic wars: 
   270 
 
 
I was then indoctrinated into the joint special operations command (JSOC) basically they 
are of their own...if you think in military terms, basically if you can imagine them as a 
separate branch of the military, but collectively all of the best of the services, but they're 
relatively small, there’s no fat on them, they don't carry any dead weight, but at times 
when missions ramp up, especially now with the threat of terrorism popping up in several 
different countries all over the place, they need additional support- when they need it, 
they tend to get it, and they get priority over most people and the positions have to be 
filled, that was basically what I was filling, was the need for them to have support in 
intelligence to come and be a part of their world for a little while and then I'd go back to 
doing my own thing. . . . 
 
When dealing with JSOC they considered themselves to work more effectively, to cut 
through red tape faster, to get around issues that prevent most conventional forces from 
basically being as effective as the could be. So basically JSOC is very streamlined 
process, organization, for doing special operations and they worked at what they say, it’s 
like hitting the treadmill at 100 miles an hour, they don't have time for people who lag 
behind, or people who don't understand, or people who can't give a straight answer 
immediately, so they have a certain level of professionalism that is somewhat in a way 
admirable and refreshing compared to the politics and bureaucracy and sluggishness and 
insufficiency of the military in general, I mean when I came into the world of JSOC, 
there was this kind of I guess, call it appreciation, for what they were doing.  
 
Further, 




It was my responsibility to train any new person that arrived in the country, because even 
though you get trained before you get there, it’s still not real world experience, you need 
to have some sort of training to make sure you aren’t going to be making any major 
mistakes because it’s a very important thing that you’re doing, people lives are on the 
line not just our own, but because your intelligence leads to what could be sending a 
strike team out but also the lives of potentially innocent Afghans being caught in the 
crossfire. I took the position very seriously, but the position itself did not require an 
immense amount of effort, just simply required endurance and attention, you had to be 
paying attention, and you had to be ready to respond any time you were called upon. 
Sometimes you would go the whole twelve hours and absolutely nothing would happen, 
and sometimes you would be working three missions at time for that entire twelve hours. 
There were people who worked night shifts, and there were people who just worked day 
shifts. Typically, people who worked day shifts were in the process of just doing general 
monitoring to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence on high value targets and 
people who work at night were usually doing support for night time missions, nighttime 
raids. Basically, you know it was very common to send out a strike team, you know, a few 
strike teams go out every night and they try to capture the individuals that they’ve been 
monitoring for however long, um, if enough intelligence has been gathered to lead to 
them believing that they can actually capture the person. (DH, Interview) 
 
The use of special operations forces, here described as possessing such talent and grace 
that they cannot operate under normal protocol—characterized by “sluggishness and 
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inefficiency” but instead, having a direct line to the President, follow their own rules of 
engagement. Recall the last line in the final excerpt. D.H. explains that it is common to send 
strike teams at night to capture people that have been under surveillance “if enough intelligence 
has been gathered to lead to them believing that they can actually capture the person.” Given 
interview data cited previously from legal experts who work directly on national security 
matters, specifically aimed at curtailing the drone program, regarding the shift from a capture to 
kill mentality, this point should cause pause, especially in light of the fact that the U.S. has 
killed—deliberately through targeted assassination, and sometimes as supposed accidents- its 
own citizens in drone attacks. If they could not muster the intelligence (and aspiration) to capture 
their own citizens, and bring them to trial back in the U.S. for a hearty dose of justice, it remains 
doubtful that they would generate the necessary intelligence to capture non-U.S. citizens; the 
cost-benefit analysis remains unconvincing to do so.  
The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) revolution within American 
warfare has meant that, according to a retired three-star General, “we’re drowning in data” 
(Deptula, quoted in Fielding-Smith & Black, 2015) and that “we’re seeing just an insatiable 
demand signal. You cannot get enough ISR capability to meet all the warfighter’s needs” (Cluff 
quoted in Smith & Black, 2015). Drones have their own highly regarded intelligence capabilities 
such that the possibility of avoiding a raid to capture—an act that will always present risks of 
bodily injury to troops—can be avoided. Since we “cannot get enough” data (even though we are 
simultaneously “drowning” in it) the intelligence provided by drones, as captured in the form of 
film footage is, because it cannot be sufficiently quantified, simultaneously desirable and 
undesirable.   
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Let Die/Terror of Invisibility 
In the post-9/11 era, security discourse is rationalized through reference to known and 
unknown forms of violence. It is saturated with the language of terror, and its response—
counter-terror. Therein lies a built-in assumption that there is an original victim of terror and that 
any violence that flows directly from that single event is a future-oriented self-defense and 
therefore is not terror but legitimate violence as self-defense, even in pre-emptive forms. 
Moreover, the assumption further suggests that we all know what ‘counts’ as terrorism, and 
whose violence is credible or not. Non-state terror is conspicuous, making its cause visible in 
rendering the identity of the terrorists knowable, and through its embrace of collateral damage. In 
effect the terrorist act calls into existence the terrorist itself, the act predates the subject, the event 
rewrites its own causal history. Not simply as terrorist but as politically visible and indeed 
recognized subjects, the act imbues a certain power in the actor, however terrible.  
State terror, conversely, through claims of precision, technological apparati and scientific 
calculability, attempts an erasure of all traces of its existence. The trace that remains is the 
accident. However ironically though, the accident does not rebuke the action but in fact 
reinforces its potential infallibility. Consider the transcript I cited previously of the drone 
bombing gone wrong. Although all parties involved admitted officially to wrongdoing, not one 
person was court-martialed, the discipline that the crews endured was not revealed, and the 
anonymity of those crews involved was maintained—they were protected still by a military 
tradition that resists self—and therefore group—persecution. Their mistakes then were not 
intelligible within any moral or political framework, rendering their actions ultimately 
innocuous. There are moments when violence is celebrated, such as in the capture and killing of 
Osama bin Laden. But that event was, although long awaited, exceptional; a onetime only 
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spectacle, the demise of America's truest villain. Drone strikes are now ordinary occurrences, the 
increasing banality of which resists a distinctly political expose.     
Further consider how the Bush Doctrine, or counterterrorism as a national strategy 
positions the Western state (noble and responsible) as the original victim of the violence of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. The American body politic is a perpetual target of violence, whose 
injury resonates at the site of sovereignty in the form of terrorism—illegitimate violence— rather 
than viewing itself as a practitioner or agent of violence. Drones enable a violence that in many 
ways is transparent in its own knowledge creation, yet it leaves no trace, one that wipes its hands 
clean of any stain of source, of original power. 
To make a metaphorical point in this regard, consider that in 2015, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the agency tasked with spearheading pioneering 
technologies for America's military, released a plan to develop a so-called “vampire drone.” 
Much like how the sun is a vampire’s weakness in popular cultural representations of vampires, 
the vampire drone would completely disintegrate into thin air upon contact with daylight, so that 
there would be literally no historical or material evidence of presence, no physical trace of its 
existence, once the drone's mission was complete (to be sure, this development is partly in 
response to an embarrassing 2011 incident where the Americans lost a drone over Iranian 
airspace).  
The technology pertinent to the vampire drone, as written in DARPA’s original 
solicitation for research proposals, is based on the integration of “engineered vanishing materials 
into advanced aerodynamic designs to produce an autonomously vanishing, field-testable 
program by the end of the two-year program.” Further, DARPA sought proposals for the “design 
and prototyping of vanishing air delivery vehicles capable of precise, gentle drops of small 
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payloads. These precision vehicles must be guaranteed to rapidly physically disappear following 
safe payload delivery.” Certainly, the vampire drone does not represent unmanned technology 
trends as a whole; by all indications, the payload capabilities do not suggest that vanishing 
drones will be equipped with missiles.  
Indeed, depending on the mission parameters and goals, various iterations (vanishing or 
not) of unmanned technology will be utilized, likely alongside manned technology.78 But, the 
vampire drone is a productive allegory, if not symptomatic, I argue, of a “speakable invisibility” 
that coincides with disembodied combat. It is a style of violence that appears to be mindful and 
self-reflexive in its rationality yet leaves no discernable trace of itself or its target—fault and 
accountability, for example, is often evaded during drone bombing accidents, since mistakes can 
be attributed to simple communication problems amongst allied forces—the “fog of war.” 
Drones are now a “speakable” topic as far as the U.S.'s (military-run) drone program is public 
knowledge, a plethora of numbers, statistics, near-perfect algorithmic calculations, and facts 
have emerged, directly from military and government officials, in the public domain for all to 
embrace.  
Indeed, Obama, in a rare unambiguously self-congratulatory remark, boasted that his 
administration “is the most transparent in history” and that the American public will “know the 
parameters” of the drone program and should be assured that “there’s never been a drone used on 
an American citizen on American soil. We respect and have a whole bunch of safeguards into 
                                                        
78 The combination of manned and unmanned tools, rather than purely unmanned strategy in the future is likely: “In 
the mid-80s that was a big topic- manned v. unmanned, and I basically said you'll never have a totally unmanned 
fleet and you'll never go back to a total manned fleet, you'll use the appropriate airplane for the appropriate scenario, 
so if you're going into a real high threat area maybe an unmanned system would be best; or a lead manned airplane 
with a bunch of unmanned aircraft sort of following, following direction from the manned aircraft, I mean there's all 
these new scenarios that are coming out, and capabilities coming out, it's really hard to predict which way things are 
going to go, I think one good prediction is, you'll never go full one way or the other- there will always be a mix” 
(T.W., interview). 
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how we conduct counter-terrorism outside the United States...the rules are different inside the 
United States” (Easley, 2013). That transparency is a cornerstone of liberal democratic politics in 
invoked to placate and soften the materiality of drone warfare’s terroristic violence: putting aside 
reasonable suspicion about the accuracy of statistics, expert knowledge about the existence of 
drones supersedes and simultaneously undermines the political effects of drones.  
Indeed, this recent flooding of data into the public domain should not be confused with a 
shared, uncontested truth, or likewise an aspiration towards the truth of the material destruction 
of the drone's terroristic violence. For example, bombing “gone wrong” is theorized in terms of 
“failures” and “accidents,” rather than in terms of political, racialized violence, and as such the 
quest to perfect the technology continues unabated. This is a visibility of data that is, according 
to advocates of drones, and perpetual peace theorists, positively correlated with safety and the 
preservation of (white) life itself. Yet, I claim that the “success” of drone warfare, emerges in 
contrast to 9/11 as a visual spectacle. 9/11 was so visually spectacular and therefore it was so 
quickly absorbed by a traumatic narrative so as to produce stable identities and clear antagonisms 
between those who were “with us” and those who were “against us.” This “unspeakable 
visibility” effortlessly legitimized a clear course of action: heightened security measures, and the 
war on terror. Yet, as Maja Zehfuss reminds us, this did not occur without a particular, 
politicized deployment of memory. Zehfuss claims that 9/11 was about visibility as it was 
“meant to be right before our eyes.” Even if we attempted to forget, a specific mobilization of 
memory halted it: “Despite his [Bush's] confidence that you will never forget, he will not stop 
reminding you. He needs you to remember.” Drone warfare is defined by a violent event that 
leaves no trace. As such, if the event is without a trace, then the invisible is only speakable; one 
can never have a specular relationship to the event.  
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However, drone warfare is more thoroughly theorized in terms of how it is grounded in a 
politics of invisibility, and what is decidedly unseen- reflected in the erasure, rather than 
exposure- of violence, the outright denial of the embodied encounter. As one interviewee 
confirmed, “I think one of the things that are very appealing is that they’re tools of assassination 
that sneak through the cracks of international law where you can send these things in and kill 
specifically so that you could even deny that you’ve done it” (N.M. Interview). The appeal of the 
drone is in this repression of violence as seen in the potential for the preservation of anonymity.  
Despite their potential to remain invisible, and bracket their effects in the domain of the 
invisible, the novelty of drones79 is nevertheless evident in how they terrorize, insofar as they 
only make their material power present in the moment of the violent enactment: the moment of 
the strike, while the symbolic power/presence is felt constantly. While they can be heard 
“buzzing,” no one knows if they are armed, or whether a strike is imminent. The Bush Doctrine 
altered the temporal dimensions of war, and the space of terror: Given this doctrine, when does 
war’s terror begin, and how do we know, what is the evidence? When does it end, and how do 
we know it is over? Formal declarations of war, with clear beginnings and end, as least from the 
perspective of law, appear to be anachronistic epistemological remnants of nineteenth and 
twentieth century warfare. Drone warfare operates on this expanded, unbounded and 
unprecedented pre-emptive temporal horizon wrought by the Bush Doctrine- its invisibility, yet 
panoptic potential to be made present, portends its omnipresence. Its visible absence is the 
                                                        
79 As Steve Coll (2014) writes in The New Yorker, “being attacked by a drone is not the same as being bombed by a 
jet. With drones, there is typically a much longer prelude to violence. Above North Waziristan, drones circled for 
hours, or even days, before striking. People below looked up to watch the machines, hovering at about twenty 
thousand feet, capable of unleashing fire at any moment, like dragon’s breath. ‘Drones may kill relatively few, but 
they terrify many more,’ Malik Jalal, a tribal leader in North Waziristan, told me. ‘They turned the people into 
psychiatric patients. The F-16s might be less accurate, but they come and go.’” 
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confirmation of it is always possible presence in such an invasive way as to be an excessive force 
of non (presence). As part of a targeted community, and in line with Foucault’s analysis of 
panoptic power, drones are constitutive of an omnipresent power, insofar as they could 
theoretically strike at any time. Consider the various testimonies and data contained in the in-
depth NYU and Stanford report Living Under Drones (2012, pp. 80-81), which is worth quoting 
at length: 
 
The drones were terrifying. From the ground, it is impossible to determine who or what 
they are tracking as they circle overhead. The buzz of a distant propeller is a constant 
reminder of imminent death...the constant presence of US drones overhead leads to 
substantial levels of fear and stress in the civilian communities below. One man described 
the reaction to the sound of drones as a “wave of terror” coming over the community. 
“Children, grown-up people, women, they are terrified…They scream in terror.” 
Interviewees described the experience of living under constant surveillance as 
harrowing…God knows whether they will strike us again or not. But they’re always 
surveying us, they’re always over us, and you never know when they’re going to strike 
and attack.” Another interviewee who lost both his legs in a drone attack said, “everyone 
is scared all the time. When we're sitting together to have a meeting, we’re scared there 
might be a strike. When you can hear the drone circling in the sky, you think it might 
strike you. We’re always scared. We always have this fear in our head. 
 
Terror and ongoing trauma are explicitly linked to the drone and its presence/absence in 
targeted communities, revealing the drone’s potential for panoptic power. The panopticon, which 
informed the development of the classic prison model, came into effect in nineteenth century 
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England. In this model, the prison guards cannot be seen, so regardless of whether a guard was 
present, inmates learned to self-correct and self-monitor- to act as though they are always being 
watched and under constant surveillance. The prison then reconfigured not only the prisoners' 
bodies, but also their minds, turning them into self-disciplining subjects. Unlike the underground 
dungeon, which encloses people in space, and keeps them in the dark, the model of panoptic 
power necessitates that people come into the light, enabling greater visibility. It was through this 
visibility that better, more efficient control could be affected.   
This model of power, emerging alongside a still nascent capitalist system, was concerned 
with disciplining citizenship. It attempted to make lawful, right-minded, and conformist 
individuals, so that education systems, the emerging economic system- capitalism- as well as the 
army, making up good citizen-soldiers. However, unlike Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq, which 
signaled some, albeit botched attempts at state-building (indeed these attempts were poorly 
theorized and implemented, and without claiming here that state-building as Bush regarded it is 
desirable or ethical) Obama’s drone program attempts little if any forms of material intervention. 
It is not a military intervention coupled with bettering the lives of those on the ground through 
additional resources or monetary support. Instead it reflects pure, unmediated violence with the 
explicit intent to terrorize targeted populations into submission as governable bodies. 
The violence of drones is of course, not just material. It is also carries tremendous 
symbolic and future-oriented potential since the threat of immanent violence is maintained 
twenty-four hours a day. It is a style of violence that always-already configures death as existing 
as a future potential. Death is, as an abstract idea, imminent for all humans, in many ways simply 
through being, but drones, as a reality or in imagination, create a constant state of fear for 
targeted communities. “In contrast to objective crime, wherein the effect of criminal behavior is 
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immediate and visible, surveillance-type victimization falls under the subjective crime category 
that is associated with psychological and emotional stress” (Zureik & Hindle, 2004:118-119). 
Indeed, people report curtailing their activities for fear of being associated with the wrong 
person, landmark, or situation. As the Living Under Drones Report attests to, many people are 
traumatized, and report fearing the presence of drones. They fear death daily. As one interviewee 
in the report said: “if, for instance, there is a drone strike and four or five of your villagers die, 
and you feel sad for them and you feel like throwing everything away, because you feel death is 
near— [death is] so close...” This terrorization has produced widespread distrust of the US 
military. Moreover, first responders, neighbors, and humanitarian workers, who attempt to rescue 
the injured and to recover bodies, risk becoming victims themselves because of “double tap” 
policy, in which an area is targeted multiple times in quick succession. People are less likely to 
come to the aid of victims for fear of being killed themselves.  
The deaths of Pakistani tribal members, who are a priori considered bare life, do not 
count in the registry of death and suffering. This shows a deeply racialized politics underpinning 
the international, and soon to be domestic use of drones. As Shaw and Akhter (2012) explain, the 
FATA region has long existed as a colonized space of exception, as an ungovernable buffer state: 
“The Pashtuns [tribes] were theoretically to retain a measure of autonomy over their own affairs, 
but control was exercised through subsidies provided to selected tribal leaders from the British. 
The British state thus extended its control, but not its rule [emphasis added]” (p. 1498). Here 
Shaw and Akhter, by differentiating between control and rule, confirm the FATA region is 
subject to governing practices, much like the aforementioned quote suggests: drones operate by 
bringing “populations into the terrain of state legibility and security so that they might become 
governable subjects [emphasis added]” (Adey, Whitehead & Williams, 2013, p. 3). Through the 
   281 
 
 
application of militarized drones, states extend their control over a population without the official 
motive, as in previous state-centric wars, of securing territory and thereby amalgamating and 
amassing their colonial empires. The battlefield is not about discrete places, but about flows- 
cyberspace collaborating with air space and ground forces being directed from the data produced 
by this network.         
Violence at a distance, as a moral-epistemological conundrum (Coeckelbergh, 2013) 
exists at a micro and macro level: between the fighter and the enemy (embodied distance) and in 
its quest to surpass the enemy through full-spectrum dominance (spatial and temporal distance). 
As previously stated, this technology attempts to generate governable, docile subjects. In doing 
so, drones provide distance from the normative framework offered by the social contract, 
privatizing and depoliticizing the experiences of those who are implicated in war practices, 
whether as perpetrators or as victims (Baggiarini, 2013).  
To be sure, this domestic distance from the normative framework of the social contract, 
because it is marked by the desire to overcome the politics of the body, produces violent 
racialized and gendered effects internationally. Ibrahim Mothana, a Yemini writer and activist, 
writes, “in Yemen, we fear that the signature strike approach allows the Obama administration to 
falsely claim that civilian causalities are non-existent. In the eye of the signature strike, it could 
be that someone innocent like me is seen as a militant until proven otherwise. How can a dead 
person prove his innocence? For the many labeled as militants when they are killed, it’s difficult 
to verify if they really were active members...let alone whether they deserved to die.” When 
violence is virtualized it is also depoliticized and de-historicized (Leander and van Munster, 
2007). “Virtual war dehumanizes the victims, desensitizes the perpetrators of violence, and 
lowers the moral and psychological barriers to killing” (Sluka, 2013, p. 187). Drones, which 
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supposedly offer ‘clean’ warfare, result in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians; often 
unacknowledged, and therefore perpetually dehumanized, their deaths (and even their lives) do 
not register as legitimate in the eyes of American political elites.    
 
Summary 
Drones are a part of a war strategy to “let die,” and can be expanded to include the 
infliction of ongoing emotional harm—to ‘let die’ is a practice that is embedded in increasing 
cases of post-traumatic stress disorder and, undeniably related, an epidemic of suicide amongst 
veterans. Targeted killings promote a sanitized war aesthetic both “at home” and “abroad,” 
characteristic of a postmodern virtual warscape. Despite ongoing and brutal civilian deaths, in 
which bodies are incinerated and destroyed in very unclean ways, the bombs are still regarded as 
smart. Survivors often cannot recover the bodies of loved ones and thus cannot properly mourn; 
another example of how drone violence is boundless in both time and space, haunting both the 
people who deploy the technology as well as those who are victimized by it.  
Killing has been made effortless because of technological shrewdness such that it appears 
as an invisible, mechanized practice, even while it is justified, and rationalized, through explicit 
reference to the law.80 As corporatization and militarization are increasingly inter-reliant and 
indistinguishable, technologies of war will continue to simultaneously mystify and rationalize 
violence (Beier, 2012). By controlling the politics of witnessing through military/security 
                                                        
80 In contrast to the “state of exception” theory, where a practice of violence operates through the power of the 
exception, “that is, by defining areas where the law no longer has the force of law because the law is said no longer 
to apply” drone warfare is a form of lawfare, where targeted killing is in fact sustained through direct reference to 
law, through legal interpretations. The justifications for drone warfare, rather than attempting to escape the law, in 
fact resides in the language of law, but it does so specifically through its ability to “harness the inherent ambiguities 
regarding principles like imminence, proportionality, combat status, named targeting and last resort in the 
contemporary security environment” (Grayson, 2102, p. 122).  
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privatization (rendering non-state actors- flexible, corporate works unworthy of sacrificial logic- 
agents of state violence), and by limiting boots on the ground (since soldiers’ post-war 
testimonies have historically been difficult to assimilate in one coherent national narrative) the 
state remains hidden in the act of terror, preferring the repression of its own violence in the form 
of anonymity, to the visible declaration of violence in the form of employing boots on the 
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Chapter Seven: Non-Sacrificial War 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that drone warfare as state terror seeks to 1) limit the 
exposure of the state to the act of witnessing and remembrance, and 2) through the ethos of 
privatization, legalistically attempt to control the narrative of violence. The resulting effect is a 
distancing of the state from the event of violence (save the singular event of the strike). Through 
the strike the state asserts itself as present, despite it invisibility. By doing so it underlies an 
inversion of visibility of the state-terror versus non-state-terror duality. Drones allow for the 
disavowal of sacrifice and the transcendence of the physical, moral, and economic limits of the 
human body. Yet, the body—it’s vulnerability to bloodshed and violence from the other—is an 
essential component in the imagining of sacrifice. Without the political recognition of bodies, 
and without the material presence of humans, including perpetrators, bearing witness to, and 
being accountable for violence, the myth of sacrifice appears as a cultural glitch: people are 
sacrificed (victims/drone imagery analysts), and perhaps engage in practices they would identify 
as sacrificial (those remaining ground troops) but who is ordering the sacrifice, and for what 
social purpose (who or what entity is receiving the sacrifice?) is vague. I claim this reflects a 
paradox of knowledge in the speakable invisibility of drone warfare, as far as it remains possible 
to know about drone warfare through facts and figures, and simultaneously not know about 
drone warfare, through those very same facts and figures. The positive knowledge of drone 
warfare gives shallow credence to the aims of liberal democracy, while the deficiency of 
knowledge remains in the political, ethical/moral, effective, and affective realms, marked by the 
untethering of sacrifice to the archetype of the citizen-soldier body and the general disconnect 
between a national society and its war making ability. As L.L. claims, 
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I believe I lost some of my humanity while I was in the drone program. All of the words 
that they used were clean, sanitary...what was really going on was that people were 
getting killed and dismembered in areas where we may or may not have been at war. And 
although I wasn't involved directly with any of the strikes, working on a distributed 
system, I think everybody should carry some of the responsibility. I mean I think the 
people that live here should carry some of the responsibility of a war that is being carried 
out in their name. And that's not happening. (LL, Interview) 
  
Extra-sacrificial (or non-sacrificial) war is a style of violence that is carried out in the 
name of the people, but it does so without their citizens operating necessarily as sacrificing 
bodies. Non-sacrificial war is the effect of liberal states attempting to reconcile the paradox of 
military action (which has become more difficult to reconcile as the War on Terror spreads 
without end): the supposed promise of a guarantee of security, without the political scandal of 
sacrifice. Embodied violence has been integral to the practice of warfare for thousands of years, 
culminating in the modern period when “the people” claimed the sovereign presence of, and 
capacity for violence, for themselves. The global scope of militarized violence has meant that 
states have had to look beyond their national borders for not only labour, but justifications for 
continued violence; the War on Terror troubles the temporal and spatial limits to warfare, 
disrupting all the legal categorizations and precedents for war and violence therein. The 
implication for this style of warfare has profound effects as far as how it transforms social 
relations: 
I remember when I was a kid my parents would go down to the post office and we would 
get ration cards. Everybody had to paint the top half of their headlights black so when the 
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Germans flew over so they couldn’t see the cars. It was a way to make everybody feel 
like we’re in this together. You’re not going to get to buy every single thing that you 
want because some of this stuff goes into making tires for airplanes or whatever it was, so 
people realized that we’re in it together. This is not the situation now. (NM, Interview) 
 
Drone warfare exacerbates an inherent tension between “the people” and the state, 
revealing its need to be made and remade over time. This interviewee situates his learning about 
national community—social relations—through an experiential lens of warfare, and the small 
sacrifices made therein (“you’re not going to get to buy every single thing that you want”). 
Although it is problematic for various reasons to cultivate national identity through violent 
imaginaries, that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. This testimony still nevertheless 
suggests that the value of sacrificial violence is in its communalizing potential (“we’re in this 
together”).  
In a similar way, “JA” draws upon sacrifice in his description of how he was unwillingly 
subject to the military’s practice of “stop-loss,” which is used to involuntarily extend a service 
member’s contract at the end of their enlistment terms:    
I was also opposed to stop loss because I saw it as a back-door draft and a way to 
continue using our overextended military to fight multiple wars without asking the 
American people to sacrifice much. Instead of risking a political backlash by instituting a 
draft, the government was involuntarily forcing those of us who volunteered for service 
to stay for even more time. Instead of asking the American people to share in the 
sacrifice, those in the military (who often come from poorer and minority backgrounds) 
were deployed over and over again. (JA, Interview) 
   287 
 
 
Few other events other than war have a way of so forcefully bringing into view sovereign 
power’s bearing on sacrifice, its potential lethal materiality, into the lived present of the citizen 
and/or national body. Accepting, however, that “this is not the situation now” and that “instead 
of asking American people to share in the sacrifice” the argument that we have entered a non-
sacrificial model of war remains compelling. The military’s use of stop loss is an egregious 
example of how those who had already sacrificed were compelled (against their will) to sacrifice 
more “over and over again” since the “overextended military” of the post-9/11 era could not 
possibly make the political case for a draft or the requesting of additional troops. Drone violence, 
extending from the sociopolitical response to casualty aversion—military/security 
privatization— unsurprisingly has become the way of future militarized violence; there is no 
immediate evidence that it will be curtailed.  The quality of this violence, its “achievements” as 
far as how it is applied is evinced by how it so easily glides from the politics of visibility to 
invisibility that its nefarious character evades the national audience from which the violence 
emerges. While I certainly am not advocating here for needless killing or increased violence, the 
issue of what faceless, soulless, or heartless killing means comes to bear on the health of the 
nation that, even discreetly, authorizes the violence. It is, indeed, as Paul Khan cautions, a 
violence that looks increasingly like murder, not sacrifice.  
I have argued in this dissertation that there is a foundational paradox within discourses 
and practices of military sacrifice, which is revealed and exacerbated by the neoliberal 
restructuring of capitalism’s link to war. Therein, this paradox is acutely captured by shifting 
ideas of how citizen-bodies ought to sacrifice in relation to militarized violence, and what 
meaning can be gleaned from the content of the relative presence and recognition of bodies (be it 
through publicized and/or nationalized through memorialization practices) or relative absence of 
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bodies (be it through flexible, privatized and/or corporatized logic). This was the subject matter 
of Chapter Three. In Chapter Three I argued that the relation to military sacrifice ought to be 
imagined as a political, paradoxical effect of the contradictions inherent to the neoliberal 
restructuring of capitalism's link to war. In contrast to the dominant theological/philosophical 
literature, which I claimed runs the risk of essentializing, de-historicizing, and de-politicizing 
sacrifice, I developed a critical political-sociological approach, which is concerned with the 
positioning of bodies in the organization of violence, discourse, and the changing meaning of the 
citizen-soldier archetype; it embraces an antagonistic view of politics. The chapter briefly 
invoked a comparative method as a means to focus on how sacrifice is constructed in a distinctly 
militarized imagining, and subsequently represented as integral to the politics of the nation-state. 
It examined how sacrifice becomes depoliticized, and under what conditions it includes or rejects 
the body and/or technology. I argued that political discourse on sacrifice reveals this 
precariousness of the citizen-soldier's relation to sacrifice, and because of this precariousness, 
attempts to manage the contradictions of the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism's link to war 
are brought into sharp relief. In the Canadian context, the examples I cited show how sacrifice 
can be deployed in both a celebratory manner (re-nationalizing and re-militarizing identity) and 
the democratic pulse of the sovereign nation is explicitly linked to the memory of honorable past 
sacrifices. In the U.S. case, I argued that sacrifice is deployed in a hesitant and cursory manner. It 
is un-problematically regarded as essential to victorious warfare, but nevertheless presented as 
ideally no longer required in the fantastical imagining of bloodless, downsized, and high 
technology war, where bodies are treated as fallible liabilities, rather than necessary assets. In 
advancing a Foucault-inspired inquiry, and through a conscious rejection of theoretical closure, I 
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claimed that we are better positioned to investigate these contradictions of sacrifice as unfolding 
as a productive paradox. 
Themes of justice and justification (casus belli) permeate the idea of military sacrifice 
today. I have argued here that sacrifice is not being eclipsed, indeed, it is both demanded and 
disavowed. But, sacrifice must not only be held in reserve; it is a reserve that must be visible to 
the people. Sacrifice is increasingly contentious; the value of the sacrificial subject now is so 
great that only in extremis it is an act that must be made. Although I argued that Canada and the 
U.S. are currently operating with opposing (although not mutually exclusive) ideas of sacrifice, I 
did so to show sacrifice’s internal contradictions; to display its deeply politicized nature. What 
unites both the Canadian and American cases, is that military sacrifice must appear alongside a 
schematic of justice. If the people regard a war as just, if citizen soldiers exist to bear at least a 
residue of the nation-state’s sacredness, then a sacrificial impetus is, in theory, more effortlessly 
applied by the state and its military apparatus. Considering how this sacrificial subject is being 
placed at the edge of modern politics- so fraught in today’s liberal societies, whose ever-elusive 
promise of peace remains the context for the conduct of international politics- the question of 
how to apply violence remains, particularly when its expression, and its tools, are so fraught with 
the problem of the extremis becoming, as I argue, increasingly extreme. The solution appears, 
aside from withholding violence altogether, to conduct it in the margins, its visibility and 
invisibility being guided precisely by a politics of violence that views sacrifice as that which 
must be readily demanded, but also disavowed. However, the presentation of a “just war” is not 
in and of itself sufficient to motivate cohorts willing to sacrifice. Not simply influenced by the 
“Vietnam moment” but also growing individualization, the decline of the nation-state, and 
flexible citizenship, together these processes have suggested the existence of political forms that 
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complicate the simple link between the re-presentation of a just war and its implied sacrificial 
logic. Even the language of “just war” appears, following the arguments of this dissertation, 
somewhat empty. I have claimed that, rather than the official “war,” we have witnessed a series 
of violent events and violent (non) encounters, revealing not violence’s renewed formalization 
but rather its hackneyed routinization, its potential for temporal limitlessness.  
Furthermore, I argued that while military/security privatization is the sociopolitical 
expression of this reconfiguring of citizen-soldiers’ link to sacrificial military violence, drones 
are the congruent technological expression. While both military privatization and drones can be 
said to have harmonizing effects on the problematic of sacrifice, I argue that their relation runs 
much deeper than this fact alone, for both drones and PMCs are symptomatic of the same 
philosophy of violence, i.e. how war’s violence ought to function: both processes aid in putting 
greater distance—political, physical, affective, cognitive—between the nation-state’s violence 
and its citizens. PMCs perpetuate this distancing by turning violence into an economic or 
development problem instead of a sociopolitical problem. While there is a marked moral and 
physical distancing in remote fighting, which is exacerbated by military technology such as 
drones and unmanned systems, there is also a political distancing that misidentifies the subject 
and the object of violence. When contractors suffer death or injury, states are not responsible for 
confronting the consequences, or for providing care or benefits, since the relationship between 
the two is a corporate rather than a social contract. Hence private contractors are unsacrificeable 
subjects, since no single national public can validate their actions as such (Taussig-Rubbo 2011). 
Instead of being worthy of sacrifice, their presence in the war theater protects American life and 
saves American audiences from confronting a national past that, following defeat in Vietnam, 
includes collective mourning, body-bag syndrome, and emasculation of the body politic (Masters 
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2008). Private war is, quite literally, private (Baggiarini, 2015). Drones are the technological 
expression of this, insofar as they are machines with sensory and lethal capabilities that have 
come to be as a result of military privatization; privatization not simply understood as an 
economic maneuver, but a sociopolitical one, too.    
Indeed, the liberal democratic style of warfare, as seen in the application of military 
drones in post-9/11 war theaters, demonstrates the preference for a military strategy that 
minimizes risk posed to certain bodies as exemplified in the ideology of casualty aversion. To 
minimize risk is to avoid the scene of sacrifice whilst eclipsing violent embodied encounters. 
Since this style of violence avoids the scene of sacrifice through the rejection of embodied 
encounters, drone warfare can be theorized as symptomatic of a desire for extra-sacrificial war, 
or as a non-sacrificial style of violence. Yet, of critical importance is that that drone warfare 
facilitates a non-sacrificial style of violence does not mean that some categories from sacrificial 
systems past do not remain in cultural circulation, dislodged, however, from a totalizing 
sacrificial system. To be sure, we have free-floating sacrificial fragments, absent the whole. 
Sacrificial practices, rhetoric, and ideals are indeed still resuscitated through nationalistic, 
inclusive/exclusive discourse periodically for political purposes, or to placate or congratulate 
citizens at annual events with the explicit mandate of remembering, but these sentiments ring 
uncritical and hollow, occurring in disharmonious tension with the contemporary reality of 
wartime violence. Of course, there is nothing immediately problematic about remembering the 
past—it becomes troubling when this oversimplifies politics and/or mystifies military policy.  
As I argued in Chapter Four, this smooth, uncontested interpellation of sacrificial citizen-
soldiers though draws on a historical past that does not compute with present conditions, but 
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which still nonetheless re-authorizes, normalizes, and legitimizes military violence. I claimed 
that governing this paradox is a priority for Western liberal governments, who, being explicitly 
casualty-averse, aim to reconcile sovereign and biopolitical violence by subjecting sacrifice to 
governing. Here, Foucault’s language of ‘letting die’ and ‘making live’ captures how this 
paradox is governed in relation to disembodied forms of violence, which intensified in tandem 
with global militarization following the end of the Cold War. Marked by the formal downsizing 
of militaries alongside the expansion of militarization, the question of how the U.S. ought to 
manage the geo and social politics of the paradox of military sacrifice, otherwise coded in terms 
of how to deploy bodies, citizens, or others, in war, reveals the contradictory effects of a liberal 
state that is both casualty averse and engaged in prolonged high technology warfare—the Global 
War on Terror. The paradox, once again, is about how to maintain the ideological, sociopolitical, 
and militarized conditions to simultaneously demand—to call on citizens to sacrifice, and to 
likewise cultivate a brand of citizenship wherein those subjects answer the call and/or tacitly 
support creeping domestic and global surveillance and militarization—and deny sacrifice by 
circumnavigating bodily politics. The effects of the thinning of the archetype of the citizen-
soldier, and what it has historically represented for the nation, are increasingly clear, paving the 
way for a form of violence that benefits from postmodern capitalism's reliance upon high 
technology's fusion with the intensification of military and security privatization schemes. 
Finally, I argued that to better understand the applicability of sacrifice today, it should be 
positioned within a historically defined concept of sovereignty. In highlighting some of the 
differences between pre-modern and democratic sovereignty I claimed that sacrifice is 
conceptually incoherent within the political landscape of the democratic sovereign. As a result, 
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to gain credibility, sacrificial discourse must invoke symbolic aspects associated with pre-
modern sovereignty to maintain the nation-state’s grip on legitimate violence.   
As for the sacrificial fragments: I claim here that drone operators, specifically imagery 
analysts, are scapegoated despite documentation that they suffer tremendously, while targeted 
communities make up the category of pure victims. The deaths of soldiers who perish in 
combat81 on “our side” (who no longer return home in body bags, begging a public display) are 
considered in hyper-individuated, accidental frameworks, rather than as a productive surplus that 
can be harnessed by the nation state for utilizing war as a site of collective identity. Since drone 
warfare is underpinned by a theory that regards aspects of one’s environment as inherently 
calculable to a degree where loss of life is disregarded as failures or accidents in a system that is 
approaching, or can approach perfection. Any imperfection in the system is thus viewed in terms 
of progress in the perfectibility of the system itself.  
Although certainly marked by different experiences, forms of accountability, and agency, 
(as perpetrators or agents of violence on the one hand, and targets/victims of symbolic and 
material violence on the other hand) these distinct categories of people are nevertheless drawn 
into a similar symbolic positioning as far as they cannot bear witness. As the initial epigraph by 
Khan (in the introduction of this dissertation) states, “every act of identifying an enemy is 
fraught with risk, for if the populace fails to see that person or group as the enemy, it will see 
only murder, not sacrifice” (Kahn, 2011, p. 156). Many of those killed or injured during drone 
strikes edge dangerously close to a murderous plot as opposed to a sacrificial one, while the body 
                                                        
81 As an important aside: a 2016 report released by the Office of Suicide Prevention, of the U.S. Department of 
Veteran's Affairs, found that, in 2014, twenty veterans died per day by suicide.    
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of the perpetrator—the author of sovereign violence—remains largely invisible; the trace of the 
drone, it's visibility, is apparent only in the moment of the strike. 
In this dynamic act of erasure, what is being concealed or dislocated is the origin of 
sovereign power, understood as that power that is directly tied to the author(s) of state violence. 
Whereas sovereign power in war zones was traditionally expressed through the embodied and 
violent encounter characterized by twentieth century notions of a spatially contained and 
publicized battlefield, featuring the prominence of the national flag, the uniform, and relatedly 
foregrounding violence as that which occurs in the name of the people and their nation, today’s 
drone wars circumnavigate the “problem” of sovereign power’s relation to biopolitics (put 
differently: the problem of how to reconcile liberal democracy's promise of peace with 
expanding forms of violence) in the outright denial of the encounter, combined with the 
explosion of spatial and temporal limits to said violence.  
I took up the theme of erasure in Chapter Five, where I argued that sacrifice has been 
displaced along three interrelated axes: publicity, surplus, and embodiment. I gestured to the idea 
that political rhetoric upholds a relation between citizenship and sacrifice in the context of a 
rapidly changing style of violence where the intensification of privatized/disembodied social 
relations, rather than their redistribution is evident: Here, the speed at which violence is designed 
and applied is held back by the ideological, citizenship-based commitments to the body of the 
citizen-soldier and, by extension, ‘the people.’ Yet, given that “wars are waged on behalf of the 
existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter 
(Foucault)” it appears that this imagining of total war is undermined by the neoliberal 
economics. Rather than war, in its traditional practice, we have targeted, fragmented, and 
isolated yet prolonged acts of violence, where sovereign power is no longer maintained by or 
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reflected in the body of the citizen-soldier. In light of this rejection of a national audience I 
argued that sacrifice is disrupted along three interrelated themes or axes, which all hinge on the 
sovereign and symbolic power associated with the archetype of the citizen-soldier: 
publicity/privatization, surplus/rejection of surplus, and embodiment/disembodiment.  
About what is at stake in these politics of invisibility through the act of “letting die,” and 
the terroristic application and effects of drones, I argued that drone warfare amounts to a form of 
state terror that manifests a “speakable invisibility” presenting itself as a “non-event” since the 
author of violence can claim the power of anonymity and the trace of the drone is often 
suppressed. Here, there is a restructuring of wartime experience as a direct extension of 
traditional means of the nation-state’s cooptation of traumatic narratives. Drone violence is 
privatized, depoliticized, and swiftly cleansed of its visible aspects—the spatial logic of the 
battlefield that informed twentieth century warfare is eclipsed—and as such, history has its 
traumatic wound erased. This implies the end of a specific temporal logic, whereby the writing 
of contemporary history now occurs minus the traditional forms of sacrifice and embodied 
violence. Structures of meaning, pertaining to citizenship and the nation state, are removed from 
the theater of war.  
In Chapter Six, I synthesized interview data, participant observation, drone advertising 
imagery, and secondary data, to argue that drone warfare attempts to transcend the socio-political 
and moral limits of bodies (which are always threatened by simply being) thereby eclipsing the 
injury of citizen-soldiers on “our” side. This problematically destabilizes traditional means of 
commemorating wartime suffering—and therefore dramatically limits how wartime state 
violence can be acknowledged or recognized in a distinctly sacrificial language. The aim was to 
show how drone warfare has further enabled the destabilization of citizen-soldiering’s link to 
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sacrifice. The combination of military privatization—the outsourcing and technologizing of war 
making— destabilizes sacrificial idioms, producing a trend towards a non-sacrificial style of 
warfare. The citizen-soldier is no longer capable of binding the nation state to a credible use of 
violence. Yet, drone violence gains credibility through a dialect of visibility (the battlefield) and 
invisibility (the violence) by rendering that which was previously unseen visible—casting excess 
light upon the battlefield to break up the fog of war. As such it claims to save and protect those 
lives that matter most: American and allied soldiers. However, the political and social landscape 
in which drone warfare operates and gains credibility, through visibility to make live, is 
dependent upon its mirror: the invisibilization of the politics of emotional trauma, the scene of 
violence, and the identification of the witness.  
This dissertation illuminates how the acquisition of the discursive apparatus of sacrifice, 
its proliferation in language and popular culture, simultaneously makes claims about the 
biopolitics at stake in the question of citizenship. The strengthening of the relationship between 
citizenship and sacrifice during nationalization projects becomes weakened in light of processes 
of denationalization and privatization. Flexible citizenship and the private contracting of soldiery 
capture a shift relative to the sacrificial logic that is bound up with the archetype of the soldier-
citizen. If private contractors cannot make any claims of legitimate sacrifice, then this begs the 
question of why the state might deem the “end of sacrifice” (as that which is fundamentally tied 
to the citizen-soldier) beneficial. If state-soldiers continue to become an increasing burden on the 
state, because of the political toll of unpopular wars or the financial costs of lifetime support of 
veterans, the inclusion of private contractors provides respite for the state. When war making is 
outsourced it is subsequently rendered invisible, thus challenging the belief that the legitimacy of 
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war depends on a national public validating it. The end of sacrifice will make the death of 
soldiers profane.  
I have attempted to map the terrain of the biopolitics of sacrifice as it pertains to 
citizenship. I adopted an approach that regards citizenship as a mechanism of global government. 
The globalization of citizenship has produced privatized and individualized effects that trouble 
the state-as-container thesis. I explored how the soldier-citizen came to represent the most 
glorified expression of sacrifice in a period of nation-state building, in a time that saw the 
rationalization and exteriorization of war and the codifications necessary to maintain proper 
conduct between powerful states and colonial spaces. As a chief archetype of citizenship in the 
post-War era, I argued that the soldier-citizen was cultivated by the state within the boundaries of 
a social-national contract. It implemented strategies of gendered and moral regulation to suggest 
the ideal model of citizenship for that particular historical moment, and to act as a referent point 
for civilians and “others” as to what constituted “good” citizenship.   
This type of citizen was self-sacrificing and ideologically opposed to dangerous outsiders 
as portrayed by official grand narratives of the nation-state. Indeed, notions of foreignness 
allowed in some ways the political elite to circumvent the real paradoxes contained within liberal 
democracy. Liberal democracy champions a brand of subjectivity that saturates itself in 
fragmented identity politics while subjectivity is simultaneously exposed to centralized and 
privatized forms of power.  
Post-WWII citizenship in North America relied on a thriving welfare state. Rights, 
understood as unfolding in social, political, and economic domains, and obligations, such as a 
willing submission to the rule of law and a collective agreement to protect the private property of 
individuals, were apparent and well regarded. However, the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism 
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witnessed the reconfiguration of the state’s willingness to maintain its end of the social contract. 
Privatization and other modes of power characteristic of the postmodern era not only restructured 
war-making practices to mimic business models by championing the uninhibited market, but 
they also produced new kinds of flexible citizens and flexible soldier-citizens.    
This flexibility contained by both the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism and within the 
mandate of the RMA has been the prototypical feature in the making-up of the private military 
contractor: his/her body is the site where these ideologies meet. I use the concept of sacrifice to 
make a claim about how the biopolitics of citizenship draws on the sacrifice of state-soldiers and 
private contractors differentially depending on what is at stake in the discursive constellation of 
citizenship. If we accept that citizenship is about a subject’s “becoming” in light of a public 
audience then the privatization or negation of a contractor’s sacrifice limits that subject’s claim 
on the state, thus disrupting how we conceive of citizenship and nationhood in postmodern times.  
Together, military privatization and combat unmanning reveal the tenuousness of the 
citizen-soldier's link to militarized sacrificial idioms and cults. This decay of the citizen-soldier's 
place in the modern concept of “the people,” and its related erosion within the nation-state’s 
articulation of legitimate violence, challenges two significant prevailing assumptions of our time 
as pertains to the ontological status of warfare: that militarized violence is 1) always-already 
sacrificial and 2) that military violence links trauma to a certain kind of aesthetics of bodily 
suffering and a grammar of transcendence for the nation.  
I conclude that if violence becomes increasingly removed from the sacrifice of the 
citizen-soldier body, and if violence, as real or imagined, is increasingly omnipresent in its 
technical, panoptic form, then so too the event of the violent encounter is effectively dislodged 
from a politics of memory, physical/emotional trauma, and therefore an affective schematic of 
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sacrifice. Trauma, and/or sacrifice, becomes isolated in it hyper-individualization, and so a 
national narrative cannot lock into it, and in fact, has no compelling reason to. This creates even 
greater distance between the public and the increasingly private modes of warfare. War, as 
expressed through various forms of combat unmanning and drone technology, is then no longer a 
sufficient rallying point for the collectivizing of citizenship. It cannot present a framework for 
national identity, nor can it serve as a reference point in the quest to understand the pain of 
others, even as the abstract terroristic violence of drone war in the name of the nation continues.  
In the traditional imagining of the nation state, the citizen-soldier has come to represent 
the supreme expression of sacrifice, and therefore citizenship, which other citizens are compelled 
to aspire to. The figure of the citizen-soldier, making up the first group of people to receive 
regular benefits, signified ideally proper conduct for all civilians, as people who are seen as 
sacrificing for a particular body or association are regarded as “true” citizens (Burchell, 2002). 
However, the paradox of military sacrifice has come to endure a seemingly unbearable pressure. 
We might trace this back to the end of conscription, coupled with the advent of neoliberal 
flexible citizenship, or the globalization of military technology, but its most compelling 
explanatory framework has been the Global War on Terror—the legal and social innovations 
upon which it is enabled. Rather than liberal democracy's promise of a decline in violence (we 
have fewer casualties) we have instead violence with contested meaning. Drone warfare—as I 
argued is the technological expression of the sociopolitical philosophy of privatization—is 
contributing to the expansion of more, increasingly invisible, and therefore meaningless 
violence. Therefore, I proposed the concept of non-sacrificial war as a means to capture these 
trends in state violence, where privatization and drones work together to destabilize the 
archetype of the citizen-soldier, even as sacrificial discourse still circulates. Recall the 
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introductory pages of this dissertation, namely that of Ryan Owen’s death in a recent botched 
counterterrorism raid. Of Ryan’s death, U.S. President Trump, turning on White House 
comments regarding the sacrificial nature of his death, remarked that his legacy will be “etched 
into eternity.” Indeed, the power of sacrifice, despite its untethering to the citizen-soldier, 
revealing its unambiguously paradoxical nature, remains deeply entrenched in the narrativization 
and orientation of liberal politics. Sacrifice is the cornerstone of nation-state violence; it must 
find a way to consolidate in the public imagination—to bring the citizen into contact, if only 
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